

Olha Tkachenko

DISCOURSE OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

in the Polish Opinion-Forming Press
during the Orange Revolution
and the Euromaidan.
Media Linguistic Analysis



Discourse of Ukrainian Identity
in the Polish Opinion-Forming
Press during the Orange
Revolution and the Euromaidan

For Roman

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INTRODUCTION

The question of identity has been a key issue for Ukrainians since their country gained independence after the fall of the Soviet Union. The common history and Polish-Ukrainian relations have had a significant impact on its formation. After the collapse of the USSR, the Polish democratic government based its policy toward Ukraine on the principles of the “ULB doctrine” developed by Jerzy Giedroyc, which envisaged cooperation with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus.¹ Ukraine’s foreign orientation and its relations with its closest neighbours, including Poland, influenced its image and the perception of its identity in the latter country. The awareness of how a state’s identity is perceived beyond its borders plays an important role in international political communication and the overall strategy of international relations. In the case of the perception of Ukraine in Poland, there were two vectors of influence – European or Western (embodied in the European Union) and Eastern or post-Soviet (embodied in Russia). Political scientist

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¹ Iwona Hofman, *Szkice o paryskiej “Kulturze”*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004, 147.

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Beata Surmacz adopted this pattern in her analysis of contemporary Polish-Ukrainian relations.²

In Ukraine, the beginning of the 21st century was marked by several important social and political changes that also contributed to the construction of Ukrainian identity and its perception in the outside world. The year 2004 ended with Ukrainians protesting against fraudulent presidential elections; these protests became known as the Orange Revolution. They also marked the end of the “multivector” foreign orientation of the previous government led by Leonid Kuchma. The newly-elected president, Viktor Yushchenko, promised a pro-Western orientation and declared a strong stance on Ukrainian national identity. However, the lack of political will and the inability to confront the entire post-Soviet legacy soon brought disappointment and uncertainty to the Ukrainian society. Moreover, the economic crisis of 2008 deepened the depression that had followed the euphoria of the Orange Revolution. As a result, Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in 2010. During his time in power, the traditions of the post-Soviet style of state governance were upheld, which resulted in nepotism, feudalism in the bureaucratic system, oligarchy, corruption and political persecution. There were no signs of systemic transformation. In contrast, in foreign policy, Yanukovich declared a European

² She suggested studying Polish-Ukrainian relations through the correspondence between the Poland-Ukraine-Russia and Poland-EU-Ukraine triads. See Beata Surmacz, *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie. Polilogiczna analiza traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2002, 137–140; eadem, “Scenariusze stosunków polsko-ukraińskich. Próba weryfikacji,” in *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1991–2014. Próba bilansu*, edited by Marek Pietraś, Markijan Malskyj and Beata Surmacz, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2016, 110.

orientation and was apparently willing to sign an association agreement with the European Union.

In November 2013, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov announced his refusal to pursue an EU-oriented foreign policy. And as political scientist Olga Onuch commented, “it happened again!”³ Mass public protests erupted once more as a result of “hijacked expectations.”⁴ This time, the movement was called the Euromaidan because of its main postulates: achieving an institutional rapprochement with Europe and proclaiming identity changes. Later, the Euromaidan was also called the Revolution of Dignity. These two names are metaphors connected with the two main parts of Ukrainian identity – national and supranational. The prefix “Euro-” combined with the Ukrainian word for an open urban space – *maidan* (square) – signifies the introduction of a European identity discourse into Ukraine’s internal situation. The second name – the Revolution of Dignity – refers exclusively to internal issues. The term “revolution” is an indicator of violent changes of the system. “Dignity” is a specific feature of human character that self-conscious, strong individuals possess.

Despite the fundamental differences between the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, both were influential in building the national identity of independent Ukraine. The former gave impetus to the emergence of civic society in Ukraine.

³ Olga Onuch, “Maidans Past and Present. Comparing the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan,” in *Ukraine’s Euromaidan. Analyses of a Civil Revolution in Ukraine*, edited by David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills, Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2015, 27.

⁴ Jurij Macijewskyj, “Dwa kryzysy i rewolucja. Wydarzenia z 2004 i 2014 r. na Ukrainie w perspektywie porównawczej,” *Politeja* 12 (2) (34/1) (2015), 66.

INTRODUCTION

Indeed, despite its failure, it resulted in many civic institutions and initiatives being created that contributed to the construction of civic identity. On the other hand, the Euromaidan was not a colour revolution since people were united by the common values of the European idea.⁵

Naturally, the events of the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan were covered to a greater or lesser extent by foreign media. For the analysis of the perception of Ukrainian identity abroad, I chose contemporary Polish opinion-forming press because Poland is Ukraine's closest neighbour in Europe, and both countries are linked historically and culturally. The former has a measurable influence on the shaping of Ukrainian identity, which makes its insight into Ukrainian identity changes significant. However, as acknowledged by Polish sociologist Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin, Poles are unfamiliar with contemporary Ukraine, basing their idea of it on history and collective memory that is rooted in conflicts from the time of the Second World War. Thus, the perception of Ukraine and its identity in Poland is very often constructed on historical references, going back even to the times of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.⁶ However, the outbreak of the Orange Revolution led Poles to rediscover their eastern neighbours and realise that Ukrainians strive for freedom and democracy.⁷

According to a 2013 study by the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych), 74% of Poles declared that they

⁵ Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Ignorance Is Power," *Ab Imperio* 3 (2014), 225.

⁶ Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin, "Kontakty polsko-ukraińskie a zmiany wzajemnego postrzegania Polaków i Ukraińców," *Państwo i Społeczeństwo* 16 (1) (2016), 85–86.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 87.

got their knowledge about Ukraine from the media.⁸ Therefore, I decided to see how Ukraine was being presented to the Polish society by journalists and experts writing for the opinion-forming press. The gap or, as Marek Pietraś put it, the “rift” in the development of civic society, respect for human rights or on the social, economic and political level between the post-Soviet states of East-Central Europe and the states of East-Central Europe that are already EU members is widening.⁹ Despite this fact, studying the perception of Ukrainian events in the Polish press allows us to identify what kind of mediatised discourses exist between two East-Central European countries that are now institutionally located in different geopolitical spaces.

As mentioned above, the two social movements – the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan – dealt with the issues of identity and possible or desired identity changes in Ukraine. It should be noted that the question of identity is not just an internal issue of a group. For effective political and international communication, it is extremely important to know how it is perceived by others.¹⁰ This explains the relevance of studying the perception of Ukrainian identity in Polish media discourse

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⁸ Joanna Fomina et al., *Polska–Ukraina. Polacy – Ukraińcy – spojrzenie przez granicę*, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2013, 26.

⁹ Marek Pietraś, “Partnerstwo strategiczne Polski i Ukrainy w ‘pękniętej’ Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej,” in *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1991–2014. Próba bilansu*, edited by Marek Pietraś, Markijan Malskyj and Beata Surmacz, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2016, 59.

¹⁰ Agnieszka Hess and Agnieszka Szymańska have shown that the public is showing increasing interest in events taking place outside its home country. Hence, the mass media are not just a means of conveying information but one of the most important actors in foreign policy, especially in diplomacy. Agnieszka Hess and Agnieszka Szymańska, *Pomost medialny? Międzynarodowa komunikacja polityczna na przykładzie relacji polsko-niemieckich*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2009, 28–30.

as it allows us to better understand the social processes taking place between Ukraine and Poland and the factors that influence the image/perception of Ukrainian identity in Poland.

According to the discourse theory, identity is always a matter of representation and can be accepted, rejected or negotiated through discursive processes.¹¹ Since representation often appears in media discourse, it seems reasonable to examine the latter and the mechanisms of discursive strategies that media use to construct identity. In addition, the analysis of the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press sheds light on how society functions and perceives others. Last but not least, this study introduces the English-speaking audience to the specifics of the Polish media market and Polish media studies and highlights such concepts as opinion journalism (*publicystyka*) and opinion-forming press (*prasa opiniotwórcza*), contributing in this way to the general scope of the theoretical aspect of media studies.

Therefore, this book consists of two parts. The first one deals with the concept of identity, discourse and the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). I provide an overview of the theoretical foundations of identity, covering various theories and approaches, along with a presentation of the main strands of academic research on contemporary Ukrainian identity issues. I also explain the historical connections between Poland and Ukraine to understand the current discourse. The second part of the book focuses on the linguistic analysis of selected articles

¹¹ Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: SAGE, 2002, 43.

from the Polish opinion-forming press and its relevance to the analysis of Ukrainian identity in Polish media discourse.

The scholarly literature on this particular topic is very scarce. Research on Ukrainian identity in the media in general is also virtually non-existent. Recently, the way in which Ukraine is presented in contemporary Polish media was addressed by Jarosław Jura and Kaja Kałużyńska in the context of the image of foreigners in the discourse of Polish traditional and online media.¹² Much attention has also been paid to the image of migrants in the Polish press. A reliable quantitative and qualitative analysis of several titles of daily, weekly and monthly newspapers from the first half of 2009 was conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs.¹³ It must be noted, however, that the study did not focus solely on Ukrainians. Similarly, Ukrainians appear in Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska's study on constructing the image of the "other" in Poland, in which she included the analysis of the press from 1993 to 2003.¹⁴ In his research on migrants in Poland, Maciej Mrozowski also explored the issue of the representation of Ukrainians as one of the social groups in the Polish press.¹⁵

¹² Jarosław Jura and Kaja Kałużyńska, "Obraz obcokrajowców i imigrantów w polskich mediach tradycyjnych i internetowych," in *Imigranci o wysokich kwalifikacjach na polskim rynku pracy. Raport z badań 2014–2015*, edited by Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin, Warszawa: ISEE, Fundacja "Nasz Wybór," 2015, 119–174.

¹³ Ignacy Józwiak, Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin and Michał Tudorowski, *Bez cudzoziemców bylibyśmy ubożsi. Wizerunek cudzoziemców na łamach polskiej prasy*, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2010.

¹⁴ Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska, *Konstruowanie 'innego.' Wizerunki imigrantów w Polsce*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2007.

¹⁵ Maciej Mrozowski, "Obrazy cudzoziemców i imigrantów w Polsce," in *Integracja czy dyskryminacja? Polskie wyzwania i dylematy u progu wielokulturowości*, edited by Krystyna Iglicka, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2003; idem, *Obraz imigranta na łamach prasy*

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Research on the presentation of Ukrainian issues in the Polish press is less frequent and usually concerns the way in which certain events or actors have been portrayed. For example, Barbara Maria Mazurkiewicz analysed the image of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in the *Wprost* weekly,¹⁶ while Renata Rozbicka studied the portrayal of Ukrainian politicians in the Polish press on the examples of two presidents, Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko.¹⁷ Researchers of Polish media have also analysed the presentation of such political events as elections.¹⁸

Nevertheless, academic studies on the perception of independent Ukraine in contemporary Polish press have not been conducted to a sufficient degree. This is evidenced by the fact that only one monograph on this topic has been published. In *Ukrainian Issues in the Polish Press in 1991–1996*,¹⁹ Agnieszka Sawicz presented a wide range of events, mainly political, that took place in Ukraine from its independence to 1996, when the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the constitution. From a methodological point of view, Sawicz's monograph contains a descriptive analysis of the content of selected titles of the Polish press, which presents a wide range of issues

polskiej. Prace migracyjne 1, Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami. Instytut Studiów Społecznych UW, 1997.

¹⁶ Barbara Maria Mazurkiewicz, "Wizerunek Leonida Kuczmy na łamach tygodnika 'Wprost' w latach 1994–2004," *Studia Medioznawcze* 3 (34) (2008), 11–44.

¹⁷ Renata Rozbicka, "Wizerunek ukraińskiego polityka w polskich publikacjach prasowych w latach 1994–2010," in *Sąsiedztwa III RP – Ukraina. Zagadnienia społeczne*, edited by Marcin Dębicki and Julita Makaro, Wrocław: GAJT, 2015, 286–304.

¹⁸ Sylwia Maria Zakrzewska and Maryana Prokop, "Ukraińskie wybory prezydenckie w 2010 r. na łamach wybranych tytułów prasy polskiej, ukraińskiej i rosyjskiej," *Warmińsko-Mazurski Kwartalnik Naukowy. Nauki Społeczne* 2 (2012), 147–163.

¹⁹ Agnieszka Sawicz, *Problematyka ukraińska w prasie polskiej w latach 1991–1996*, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2010.

concerning the relations between the two states during this period, political dialogue, economic cooperation and the problems of Polish national minorities in Ukraine and Ukrainian ones in Poland. However, the author did not analyse the issues related to Ukrainian identity.

The Orange Revolution and its frequent portrayal in the Polish press have increased the scholarly interest in the presentation of Ukraine in the Polish media. A substantial collective work edited by Robert Potocki, Agnieszka Stec and Leszek Kucz analysed the coverage of these events in various Polish daily and weekly newspapers.²⁰ In addition, several articles on this topic appeared in Polish and Ukrainian academic journals. Beata Kapinos presented the image of Ukraine during the Orange Revolution in the Polish press from the perspective of political discourse,²¹ while Henryk and Mikołaj Stroński described the general perception of these protests in the Polish mass media.²²

The most comprehensive collection of scholarly works on this topic was published in 2014. Iwona Hofman and Justyna Maguś, the editors of *The Image of Contemporary Ukraine in the Polish Media*,²³ gathered more than a dozen articles devoted to various aspects of Ukrainian issues presented in the Polish media (not only the press): history and the present, Polish-Ukrainian relations,

²⁰ Robert Potocki, Agnieszka Stec and Leszek Kucz, eds., *Lekcja Majdanu. Polskie czasopiśmiennictwo wobec pomarańczowej rewolucji*, Częstochowa: Instytut Geopolityki, 2008.

²¹ Beata Kapinos, "Wizerunek Ukrainy i Ukraińców w polskim dyskursie publicznym," *Společzeństwo i Polityka* 2 (31) (2012), 15–51.

²² Henryk Stroński and Mikołaj Stroński, "Rewolucja Pomarańczowa na Ukrainie w polskich masmedia w 2004 r.," *Zbirnyk prats TO NTSH* 3. *Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny vchora i sohodni* 3 (2007), 211–225.

²³ Iwona Hofman and Justyna Maguś, eds., *Obraz współczesnej Ukrainy w mediach w Polsce*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2014.

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politics and elections, society and culture. The contributors to the volume described the image of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in selected media, the image of certain politicians and political events, such as the 2012 parliamentary elections, and social movements, including the Orange Revolution and the activity of the feminist organisation “Femen.” Therefore, they provided solid background information on Ukrainian issues discussed by Polish journalists but did not expand our knowledge about how the identity of the independent Ukrainian state is perceived in the Polish mass media.

A part of the academic literature on the subject is devoted to the analysis of stereotypes about Ukraine and Ukrainians in the contemporary Polish press. This topic is particularly popular among researchers because the media, along with culture and family histories, contribute significantly to the creation of stereotypes about other nations.²⁴ Such analyses have appeared in both Polish and Ukrainian academic circles.²⁵ These studies

²⁴ Konieczna-Salamatin, “Kontakty...,” 77.

²⁵ Dariusz Baran, “Wizerunek Ukraińców na łamach wybranej polskiej prasy,” *Państwo i Społeczeństwo* 16 (1) (2016), 97–116; Renata Radzka, “Wizerunek Ukrainia w prasie polskiej na wybranych przykładach. Medialna struktura stereotypu narodowego,” in *Nowe zjawiska w języku, tekście i komunikacji*, edited by Alina Naruszewicz-Duchlińska and Mariusz Rutkowski, Olsztyn: Instytut Filologii Polskiej Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, 2006, 169–177; Mirosława Czuczupaka, “Obraz Ukrainy w regionalnej prasie lubelskiej,” *Naukovi zapysky natsionalnoho universytetu “Ostrozka akademiia”* 16 (2010), 372–375; Bogdan Brydak, “Stereotyp Ukrainia w prasie Polski południowo-wschodniej po 1989 r. na tle polskich doświadczeń historycznych,” in *Polska i Ukraina po II wojnie światowej*, edited by Włodzimierz Bonusiak, Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1998, 273–286; Maryana Prokop, “Stereotyp Ukrainia w polskim tygodniku ‘Polityka’ oraz stereotyp Polaka na łamach ‘Dzierkało Tyżnia. Ukraina,’” *Warmińsko-Mazurski Kwartalnik Naukowy. Nauki Społeczne* 3 (2013), 47–66; Mariia Pavliukh, “Stereotypy i obrazy Ukrainy ta ukrainsia u suchasni polskii zhurnalistytsi,” *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Serii Zhurnalistyka* 30 (2007), 253–261; Liubomyr Khakhula, “Stereotypy polsko-ukrainskykh vidnosyn u polskii presi 90-tykh rr. XX st. – pochatku XXI st.,” *Ukraina: kulturna spadshchyna, natsionalna svidomist, derzhavnist* 17 (2008), 618–622; idem, “Ukraina i ukrainsi v ofitsiinomu

are very relevant to the subject of my book because stereotypes refer to an imagined identity.²⁶

The latest research on stereotypes about Ukrainians in the Polish press was published in 2016 by Dariusz Baran, who analysed how “Ukrainians as an ethnic group are portrayed in the Polish press.”²⁷ He examined newspapers and magazines published from 2012 to 2015, omitting materials devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Volhynia Massacre and the Euromaidan events. Baran concluded that the representation of Ukrainians in the Polish press was still burdened with various gender and national stereotypes that were constructed during the course of the common Polish-Ukrainian history. In addition, his research showed that the media image of Ukrainians in Poland depended heavily on Ukraine’s new historical policy in the context of a new law that recognised the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as fighters for Ukrainian independence. Baran also focused on the portrayal of Ukrainians living in Poland, i.e. students, economic migrants and the Ukrainian minority, and the representation of their social identities.

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i mediinomu dyskursakh suchasnoi Polshchi (persha polovyna 1990-kh rokiv),” *Ukraina-Polshcha: istorychna spadshchyna i suspilna svidomist* 3–4 (2011), 22–233; Olha Ihnatova, “Obraz suchasnoi Ukrainy v polskomu tyzhnevnyku ‘Polityka,’” *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriya Zhurnalistyka* 25 (2004), 499–504.

²⁶ According to Walter Lippmann, people tend to imagine things before experiencing them, basing their ideas on the culture and tradition in which they grew up. Hence, as Lippmann says, the process of perception is governed very strongly by stereotypes (Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922). Stereotypes combine thus two aspects: perception and imagination. These processes are intertwined in the human mind and very often run simultaneously, so that imagination can influence the perception of a thing and vice versa – perception can be based on the already-established ideas about things.

²⁷ Baran, “Wizerunek...,” 99.

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An article by Renata Radzka, which analysed the media structure of stereotypes about Ukrainians in the Polish press, paid much attention to national stereotypes stemming from historical experience. As usual, the activity of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)-UPA proved pivotal in creating stereotypes of Ukrainians as bandits and people hostile towards Poles. Radzka also pointed out the importance of Polish literature in this matter, noting especially that Polish novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz was accused of creating such a negative stereotype of Ukrainians.²⁸ Economic factors turned out to be significant, too, though not as pervasive. Radzka showed that Ukrainians who worked in Poland for economic reasons were mainly portrayed in a negative light as not very good, honest or smart workers.²⁹ Regarding social and political factors, Radzka mentioned that after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians began to be presented in a more positive way as equals, partners and citizens of a “European nation.”³⁰

Hence, most works on Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Polish press conclude that the stereotypes have roots in three main areas: culture, politics and history. Maryana Prokop, who analysed the stereotype of the Ukrainian in the Polish weekly *Polityka* between 1991 and 2005, showed how Polish journalists portrayed Ukraine as a state with an uncertain identity, divided between “the Orthodox East and the Uniate West.”³¹

²⁸ Radzka, “Wizerunek...,” 176.

²⁹ Ibid., 173.

³⁰ Ibid., 177.

³¹ Prokop, “Stereotyp...,” 51.

Surprisingly, she found that the main stereotype about Ukraine was what she called “the stereotype of a divided Ukraine.”³² However, she paid little attention to the issue of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press and considered almost every portrayal of Ukraine in *Polityka* a stereotype, even in general articles and in the context of Polish-Ukrainian relations, politics, culture and history. Like Radzka, Prokop recognised the role of the Orange Revolution as a turning point that had changed the negative “stereotypes” about Ukraine to more positive ones.³³

The portrayal of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the Polish press was analysed in several articles.³⁴ Renata Rozbicka, for example, presented this issue in the context of Europe and the European Union,³⁵ as well as NATO.³⁶ She also discussed the depiction in contemporary media of problems related to the Polish-Ukrainian common history, like the question of the Eaglets Cemetery in Lviv,³⁷

³² Ibid., 54.

³³ Ibid., 57.

³⁴ Renata Rozbicka, “Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w kontekście Unii Europejskiej w oparciu o polskie publikacje prasowe,” *Media – Kultura – Komunikacja Społeczna* 5 (2009), 228–254; eadem, “Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w publikacjach prasowych ‘Gazety Wyborczej’ i ‘Rzeczpospolitej’ w latach 1993–2005. Ukraińska droga do NATO,” *Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski* 5 (2) (2014), 87–108; Renata Radzka, “Ukraina – Polska – Europa w prasie polskiej po 1989 roku,” in *Regionalne, narodowe, uniwersalne. Literatura i media w perspektywie komparatystycznej*, edited by Grażyna Borkowska, Bernadetta Darska and Andrzej Staniszewski, Olsztyn: Instytut Dziennikarstwa i Komunikacji Społecznej, Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski, 2005, 212–223; Maria Ewa Ożóg, “Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w świetle publicystyki polskiej lat dziewięćdziesiątych,” in *Polska i Ukraina po II wojnie światowej*, edited by Włodzimierz Bonusiak, Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1998, 311–325.

³⁵ Rozbicka, “Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w kontekście...,” 228–254; Radzka, “Ukraina...,” 212–223.

³⁶ Rozbicka, “Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w publikacjach...,” 87–108.

³⁷ Renata Radzka, “Polsko-ukraiński spór o otwarcie Cmentarza Orłąt Lwowskich w relacji prasy polskiej po 1989 roku,” *Media, Kultura, Komunikacja Społeczna* 2 (2006), 37–46.

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Operation “Vistula”³⁸ or Józef Piłsudski’s Ukrainian politics.³⁹ In 2010, Rozbicka defended her doctoral dissertation entitled *Ukrainian Issues in Polish Opinion-Forming Press after 1995. History, Politics, Literature, Religion* where she presented a wide spectrum of the ways in which Ukrainian issues were portrayed in Polish printed media.⁴⁰ However, it has not yet been published. In 2016, Przemysław Basak defended a PhD thesis on a similar topic (*Polish-Ukrainian Relations in 1989–2005 in the Light of Polish Opinion-Forming Press*).⁴¹

In Ukraine, Andrzej Kreslo wrote a monograph devoted to Polish-Ukrainian relations and the image of Ukraine in the Polish press between 1991 and 2003.⁴² Olha Konsevych, a scholar from the Kyiv Institute of Journalism, published in 2015 a study of the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the Polish press.⁴³ She conducted a content analysis of 49 issues of the weekly *Newsweek Polska* on the topics of the Euromaidan, the occupation of Crimea and subsequent events in Eastern Ukraine. Konsevych also wrote an article about the image of Ukraine after the Euromaidan in the weekly

³⁸ Renata Rozbicka, “Akacja ‘Wisła’ w prasie polskiej w latach 1989–2007,” in *Ukraina, Polska, Unia Europejska. Ze studiów nad przekształceniami ustrojowymi na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, edited by Henryk Stroński et al., Lviv–Olsztyn–Ostrołęka: Ostrołęckie Towarzystwo Naukowe imienia Adama Chętnika, 2014, 515–524.

³⁹ Renata Rozbicka, “Polityka ukraińska Józefa Piłsudskiego w polskiej publicystyce lat 1995–2005,” *Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski* 2 (2011), 163–178.

⁴⁰ Renata Rozbicka, *Problematyka ukraińska w publicystyce polskiej po 1995 roku. Historia, polityka, literatura, religia* (PhD thesis), University of Warmia and Mazury, 2010.

⁴¹ Przemysław Basak, *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w latach 1989–2005 w świetle polskiej publicystyki* (PhD thesis), University of Rzeszów, 2016.

⁴² Andrzej Kreslo, *Polsko-ukraiński stosunki i obraz Ukrainy u polskiej prasy (1991–2003)*, Lviv: LNU im. I. Franka, 2005.

⁴³ Olha Konsevych, “Ukrainsko-rosiiskyi konflikt na storinkakh tyzhnevnyka ‘Newsweek Polska,’” *Sotsiokomunikatyvne seredovyshe: teoriia ta istoriia* 3 (18) (2015), 37–45.

*Polityka*⁴⁴ and a general analysis of the portrayal of Ukraine in socio-political weeklies *Polityka* and *Wprost*.⁴⁵

After the Euromaidan, several articles were devoted to the coverage of this movement and the annexation of Crimea in the Polish press.⁴⁶ Of the most recent, the report of the Laboratory of Media Studies of the University of Warsaw is worth mentioning. It presents the results of an analysis of the Polish press discourse on the conflict in Ukraine in 2014–2015.⁴⁷ However, none of these studies contained an insight analysis of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press.

The purpose of my study is a media linguistic analysis of the main discourses of Ukrainian identity predominating in the Polish opinion-forming press during the period of major social and political events in Ukraine in the 21st century. Special attention is paid to the theoretical and methodological part of the research in order to introduce new methods of textual

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⁴⁴ Olha Konsevykh, "Obraz Ukrainy u polskomu tyzhnevnyku 'Polityka' pislia Revolutsii Hidnosti," *Zhurnalistyka* 15 (40) (2016), 117–136.

⁴⁵ Olha Konsevykh, "Tematyka materialiv pro Ukrainu v polskykh hromadsko-politychnykh tyzhnevnykakh," *Styl i tekst* 15 (2014), 174–182.

⁴⁶ Roman Horbyk, "From 'UkrainEUkraine' to 'F**k the EU.' Europe in the Public Spheres of Ukraine, Russia, and Poland during the Euromaidan," *Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal* 1 (1) (2014), 62–79; Alexandra Martines, "Ukrainskiy krizis v polskih piechanykh SMI (noiabr 2013 goda – fevral 2014 goda)," *Wschód Europy. Studia humanistyczno-społeczne* 1 (2015), 123–143; Michał Lubicz-Miszewski, "Obraz rewolucji na Ukrainie przełomu 2013/2014 roku w polskich mediach (w prasie i Internecie)," in *Spółczesność a wojna. Kryzysy społeczne – retrospekcja i współczesność*, edited by Marek Bodziany, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Oficerskiej Wojsk Lądowych imienia generała Tadeusza Kościuszki, 2015, 93–122; Iwona Massaka, "Ramy interpretacyjne faktu przyłączenia Krymu do Federacji Rosyjskiej w prasie polskiej na przykładzie 'Gazety Wyborczej' i 'Naszego Dziennika' w okresie 15–31 marca 2014," *Studia Medioznawcze* 2 (65) (2016), 67–79.

⁴⁷ Tomasz Gackowski and Karolina Brylska, eds., *Polski dyskurs prasowy o konflikcie na Ukrainie. Perspektywa porównawcza 2014–2015*, Warszawa: Laboratorium Badań Medioznawczych UW, 2017, accessed April 26, 2022, <http://www.lbm.uw.edu.pl/attachments/article/123/Polski%20dyskurs%20prasowy%20o%20konflikcie%20na%20Ukrainie.%20Perspektywa%20por%C3%B3wnawcza%202014-2015.pdf>.

and linguistic analysis of the media. It should be noted at the outset that I will not examine what the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan were as social phenomena and how they influenced Ukraine's further development nor explore Polish-Ukrainian relations and their mutual perception⁴⁸ in historical or political terms. I also do not intend to conduct a comparative analysis of the media content and Polish public opinion on the issue of Ukrainian identity. The latter aspect could be the subject of further studies and inquiries by sociologists, historians or political scientists. This book uses the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis to show how the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan were perceived in the Polish press in terms of identity and what linguistic tools were used by Polish journalists and opinion-makers in the popular press to describe "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians."

In this book, I introduce the concept of perceived identity, discovered during the analysis of the perception of Ukrainian

⁴⁸ I believe that there is no need here to deal in depth with the sociological aspect of the perception of Ukrainians in Poland as it has already been covered by Polish sociologists. For example, Joanna Konieczna-Salamatin regularly conducts reliable sociological analyses of the mutual perception of Ukrainians and Poles, the perception of Ukrainians and Ukraine in Poland and various factors influencing this situation. Just to name some of her publications on this topic: Joanna Konieczna-Salamatin, "Kontakty polsko-ukraińskie a zmiany wzajemnego postrzegania Polaków i Ukraińców," *Państwo i Społeczeństwo* 16 (1) (2016), 75–96; eadem, "Polacy i Ukraińcy – wzajemne postrzeganie w trudnych czasach," in *Polityka bezpieczeństwa. Polska. Ukraina*, edited by Tomasz Horbowski and Piotr Kosiewski, Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 2015, 137–153; eadem, *Coraz dalsi sąsiedzi? Wizerunek Polski i Polaków w Ukrainie*, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2011, accessed April 26, 2022, <http://www.archiwum.isp.org.pl/publikacja/47/1429/coraz-dalsi-sasiedzi-wizerunek-polski-i-polakow-na-ukrainie>; Joanna Konieczna, *Polacy–Ukraińcy, Polska–Ukraina. Paradoksy stosunków sąsiedzkich*, Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 2003, accessed April 26, 2022, http://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/forum/ukraina_ue/polacy_ukraincy_paradoksy_stosunkow.pdf; eadem, *Polska – Ukraina, wzajemny wizerunek. Raport z badań*, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2001, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.isp.org.pl/pl/publikacje/polska-ukraina-wzajemny-wizerunek>.

identity in the contemporary Polish press, which had not been conducted before. Moreover, in the theoretical and methodological part of the study, I propose a new solution in social sciences, i.e. a combination of interdisciplinary research on discourse, identity and media. The analysis of Ukraine's identity in the Polish media discourse offers a wider understanding of the role of mass communication between two states. Ordinary people form their ideas about the world mainly based on mass media, so knowing how Ukraine and its identity are perceived in the Polish public discourse can be useful for future international relations, reconciliation and a better understanding of each other.

I seek to answer the following questions: How can the concept of "identity" be analysed in media discourse? What methodological tools are relevant for the analysis of "identity"? What are the main patterns of Ukrainian identity during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan created/presented in the Polish press? Which actors of Ukrainian identity are described in the Polish press? Is there consistency in the presentation of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan? What factors influence the portrayal of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press? What linguistic expressions were used in the Polish press to indicate Ukrainian identity?

I have formulated the following four hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The representation of Ukrainian issues in the Polish opinion-forming press is a particular way of the discursive construction of the identity of one group (Ukraine) in the environment of another group (Poland). This process entails

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the construction of perceived identity. The methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis is an appropriate tool to analyse the concept of identity in a media text, and it can thus serve to distinguish perceived identity.

Hypothesis 2: The perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press is not uniform. I argue that national Ukrainian identity is simultaneously intertwined with supranational, i.e. European (influenced by the EU), and post-Soviet identity (influenced by Russia).

Hypothesis 3: The burden of a common past and the overall historical context of Central and Eastern Europe play a key role in the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press.

Hypothesis 4: Social and political changes during the period of social movements work in favour of a positive representation of Ukraine as a nation-state with a strong national identity combined with an element of European identity.

The hypotheses take into account the independent variable, which is the social and political situation in Ukraine, and the dependent variable, i.e. changes in the number of publications about Ukraine during the analysed periods.

In this study, I use the term “discourse” because it is the most appropriate methodological tool to analyse the perception of one group’s identity in another group’s environment. According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s theory of discourse,⁴⁹ every social process, including the construction of identity, can be understood through discourse; therefore, discourse is

⁴⁹ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso, 1985.

not limited to linguistic phenomena. Laclau and Mouffe argue that certain concepts or structural elements of reality do not have meaning in themselves but acquire it through discourse.⁵⁰ In other words, a question becomes an “issue” or “problem” in discourse. Therefore, to find out how Ukrainian identity is presented in the Polish press, I combined classical content analysis with Critical Discourse Analysis of the written text. These two approaches allow a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The analysis of text samples is based on text selection and coding. I have selected all printed articles about Ukraine in the Polish weeklies that corresponded to the journalistic genres of the opinion-forming press.⁵¹ Both the coding and the analysis in this study were done manually, although there are ways that use computer software.⁵²

Any sample that proved to include qualitative data was coded so that it could be further analysed with the help of CDA. I used four main analytical tools of CDA to determine how Ukrainian identity was perceived in the Polish opinion-forming press. Firstly, the samples were analysed according to Norman Fairclough’s basic principles of critical analysis of the discourse: description, interpretation and explanation.⁵³ Next, I applied Ruth Wodak’s approach in the analysis of discursive construction of national identity, which includes the analysis of strategies

⁵⁰ Jørgensen and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis...*, 35.

⁵¹ For more about the opinion-forming press and journalistic genres, see Chapter 2.

⁵² One example is my analysis of the representation of the Euromaidan in the Polish opinion-forming press that uses data analysing software QDA Miner. Olha Tkachenko, “The Perception of Ukrainian Identity during Euromaidan in Polish Opinion-Making Press,” *Studia Medioznawcze* 1 (64) (2016), 75–85.

⁵³ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Harlow: Longman, 2001.

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as well as personal, spatial and temporal references.⁵⁴ Thirdly, following Theo van Leeuwen, I analysed the actors of identity⁵⁵ and, finally, the narrative.

The analysis of the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press was conducted based on selected opinion-forming weekly magazines.⁵⁶ They were chosen with the aim of including

⁵⁴ Ruth Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 2nd ed., translated by Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten and J.W. Unger, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

⁵⁵ Theo van Leeuwen, "The Representation of Social Actors," in *Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard, London–New York: Routledge, 1996, 32–70.

⁵⁶ It is worth mentioning that the researchers of the Polish opinion-forming press also pay attention to journals with low circulation, published by NGOs or not very big publishing houses. These periodicals usually have no advertisements, and their average circulation is about 3,000 copies (Tomasz Mielczarek, *Monopol, pluralizm, koncentracja. Środki komunikowania masowego w Polsce w latach 1989–2006*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2007, 160). The articles are written in the opinion-forming style, not only by professional journalists but also intellectuals, scholars and thinkers. Although I do not analyse these magazines here, what follows is a brief overview of the issue.

The oldest periodicals in this group are Catholic journals *Znak* and *Więź*. The monthly *Znak* was founded in 1946 by Catholic intellectuals associated with *Tygodnik Powszechny*: Józef Feldman, Hanna Malewska, Jerzy Hubert Radkowski, Stefania Skwarczyńska, Stanisław Stomma, Stefan Świeżawski and Jerzy Turowicz (Jacek Gałuszka, Grażyna Maroszczuk and Agnieszka Nęcka, eds., *Pisma kulturalne w Polsce po 1989 roku. Leksykon*, Katowice: Śląsk, 2010, 347–348). Its circulation is 3,000 copies. After 1989, its editors-in-chief were Stefan Wilkanowicz, Jarosław Gowin, Hanna Malewska and Michał Bardel. Currently, the editor-in-chief is Dominika Kozłowska. *Znak* is a socio-cultural magazine that aims to be an intellectual platform for discussion on various points of view on the Catholic Church, faith and their relation to contemporary times (Mielczarek, *Monopol...*, 160–161).

Więź holds a similar position. From its founding in 1958 until 2008, it was published monthly; then it became a quarterly. Its first editor-in-chief was the first prime minister of the democratic Polish Republic, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Currently, the editor-in-chief is Zbigniew Nosowski. *Więź* touches on political, religious and cultural issues. It does not identify with any political group or ideology (Mielczarek, *Monopol...*, 161).

Another intellectual periodical with a low circulation is *Res Publica Nowa*, until 1993 titled *Res Publica*. From its founding in 1979 until 1987, it was illegal and published underground. From 1993, it was published by the Stefan Batory Foundation and was bought by the "Polityka" corporation in 2000. Since 2003, it has been a quarterly with a circulation of 3,500 copies. Thematically, the periodical focuses on the margins of many disciplines such as the history of ideas, political science, philosophy, sociology, literature and art (Gałuszka, Maroszczuk and Nęcka, eds., *Pisma...*, 254). Its orientation can be described as conservative-liberal-democratic (Mielczarek, *Monopol...*, 161).

Conservative magazines include the Cracow-based *Arka* and *Arcana*. *Arka* was first published in 1983 with the subtitle "History, literature, politics." In 1994, almost its entire editorial board

a wider spectrum of data in order to obtain better results. Thus, the following weeklies were analysed: *Polityka*, *Wprost*, *Gość Niedzielny*, *Newsweek Polska*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Przegląd*, *Do Rzeczy* and *wSieci*.

The study encompasses two periods of social and political changes: the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan. Therefore, I took into account articles published from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2005 and from November 2013 to March 2014. The chosen time ranges require explanation.

Although the Orange Revolution lasted from November 2004 to January 2005, I also included articles written before it and those that described the “post-Orange” disappointment. Thus, 194 articles from the years 2004 and 2005 were analysed: 73 from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 30 from *Przegląd*, 28 from *Polityka*, 26 from *Newsweek*, 25 from *Wprost* and 12 from *Gość Niedzielny*. Of these, 96 were written during the protests themselves: 41 in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 14 each in *Przegląd*

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founded a new but ideologically identical periodical, *Arcana*, the subtitle of which was “Culture, history, politics” (Mielczarek, *Monopol...*, 162).

Among the left-wing, liberal press, *Krytyka Polityczna* is worthy of note. It was founded in 2002 by Sławomir Sierakowski, who has been its editor-in-chief ever since. The name of the magazine refers to the Polish periodical *Krytyka*, which published texts by intellectuals opposed to the Polish People’s Republic (Gałuszka, Maroszczuk and Nęcka, eds., *Pisma...*, 138). *Krytyka Polityczna* has created a progressive and intellectual environment that addresses current developments in Poland in the context of postmodernism, globalisation and other contemporary challenges. Every year, *Krytyka Polityczna* organizes the Jacek Kuroń Festival, where current and acute global and regional issues are discussed by leading scholars and intellectuals from around the world. The magazines described above are more socio-cultural than socio-political. In addition to essays and analytical articles, they publish prose, poems and critical reviews. They are addressed not to a wide audience but to a narrow circle of interested readers.

Other socio-cultural and political press in Poland with low circulation include *Dziś*, *Debata*, *Magazyn Obywatel*, liberal-conservative *Najwyższy Czas*, conservative and right-wing *Nowe Państwo*, *Opcja na Prawo*, *Frona*, liberal *Nowa Europa Wschodnia* and a liberal quarterly *Przegląd Polityczny* (Tomasz Mielczarek, “Współczesna polska prasa opinii,” *Rocznik Historii Prasy Polskiej* 16 [1] [31] [2013], 100).

and *Newsweek*, 11 in *Wprost*, 10 in *Polityka* and 6 in *Gość Niedzielny*. Therefore, the analysis encompassed also the period before and after the revolutionary events to provide the entire socio-political context of the first major social movement in post-Soviet Ukraine as seen by the foreign press. It also enabled a broader understanding of how Ukrainian identity was perceived before, during and after the Orange Revolution, which gave a rationale for analysing Ukrainian identity during the second social movement, the Euromaidan.

The second time range was limited to the duration of the event in question. The starting point were the first protests in Kyiv in November 2013, and the latest analysed materials were published in March 2014 (reports about the occupation of Crimea were omitted). This was due to the fact that the period immediately after the Euromaidan belongs to a thematic scope beyond the framework and aims of this study. The samples were selected based on the journalistic genre (short news reports were not taken into consideration), the degree of representation and scope (only articles entirely devoted to Ukrainian topics were included). Thus, the analysis encompassed 114 articles published during the Euromaidan events: 29 in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 21 each in *Gość Niedzielny* and *Przegląd*, 18 in *Polityka*, 17 each in *Do Rzeczy*, *Newsweek* and *wSieci* and 12 in *Wprost*.

It should be noted here that the study also has its limitations. Firstly, applying the methodology of CDA results in a certain subjectivity in the interpretation of the data obtained through content analysis. Secondly, I focus only on one particular type of media, i.e. printed weeklies, which narrows the scope of the

presentation of the topic. Thirdly, the analysis encompasses only the period of the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan events, which does not open up a broader temporal perspective.

The book consists of five chapters. The first one covers the main concepts, ideas and approaches used in the research. I explain the very concept of identity and national identity in the social sciences and describe the constructivist approach in identity studies to show why, in my opinion, it is most suitable for the study of the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press. I also present the main academic works and opinions of intellectuals on contemporary Ukrainian identity. Finally, I introduce the concept of discourse and explain the connections between discourse, identity and media. In the second part of Chapter 1, I develop the methodological framework of the study, which combines Critical Discourse Analysis and classical content analysis of the press.

Chapter 2 explains the nature of media and communication and provides a classification of media to show why they are important in identity studies. It also describes the relationship between these two concepts. In the second part of the chapter, I explain what “opinion-forming press” is and present its history, classification and the genres specific to it. I also provide an overview of the main titles of such newspapers and magazines in the Polish media market.

The following three chapters contain the textual analysis of the selected weeklies and the interpretation of observed patterns based on the theoretical material from the previous chapters. Chapter 3 presents the main patterns of Ukrainian identity which

appeared in the Polish press before, during and after the Orange Revolution, i.e. in 2004 and 2005. Particular attention is paid to the representation of social actors and agencies that influenced the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press during these events. The chapter demonstrates the wide range of historical, political, social and cultural narratives used by Polish journalists to create a particular image of Ukraine, which, in turn, shaped the perceived identity of Ukraine in Poland.

Chapter 4 focuses on the perceived identity of Ukraine in Poland during the Euromaidan, presenting the wide scope of discursive strategies that very often unconsciously created a particular image of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press. Here, too, considerable attention is paid to the actors of identity and the agencies in which they operate. I analyse the linguistic elements of the articles and the wording used by the journalists, as well as the personal, temporal and spatial references they make, which allows me to interpret the identity frames that exist in the Polish media discourse about Ukraine.

In Chapter 5, I describe the differences in identity construction during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, analyse the narrative of the journalistic texts, identify particular discursive strategies and references to common Polish-Ukrainian history and explain the links between historical discourse and contemporary perception of Ukraine in the Polish press. In addition, based on the data obtained from the analysis, I distinguish the main patterns and models of Ukrainian identity constructed by the Polish opinion-forming press during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION OF QUOTES

I use the transliteration of the Cyrillic alphabet into the Latin alphabet in accordance with the official decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated January 27, 2010, “Про впорядкування транслітерації українського алфавіту латиницею” (“On the Transliteration of the Ukrainian Alphabet into the Latin Alphabet”).

Г г	H h
Ґ ґ	G g
Є є	Ye ye (at the beginning of the word) Ie ie (in other positions)
Ж ж	Zh zh
И и	Y y
Ї ї	Yi yi (at the beginning of the word) I i (in other positions)
Й й	Y y (at the beginning of the word) I i (in other positions)
Х х	Kh kh
Ц ц	Ts ts
Ю ю	Yu yu (at the beginning of the word) Iu iu (in other positions)
Я я	Ya ya (at the beginning of the word) Ia ia (in other positions)
Зг зг	Zgh zgh
Ь (“м’який знак”)	not transliterated

All the translations of the quotes from the sources, i.e. the analysed journalistic texts, were done by me. Original quotations in Polish are given in the footnotes.

**NATIONAL IDENTITY
AND DISCOURSE.
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY**

1.1. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DISCOURSE

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1.1.1. NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A CONSTRUCT

The concept of identity is present in all spheres of human life, both private and public. We cannot imagine our society without asking the question, “Who are you?” Identity has become not only an ontological issue but an epistemological one as well.

The very concept of identity derives from the philosophical study of self-determination. All traditions of philosophical thought took a deep interest in this phenomenon. Indeed, researchers believe that without referring to philosophy, no comprehensive definition of this notion would be possible.¹

Philosopher Charles Taylor discovered the origins of modern human identity, which cannot exist without an understanding

¹ Paweł Ścigaj, *Tożsamość narodowa. Zarys problematyki*, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2012, 13.

of “self” or “subjectivity,” in the works of Plato. In Plato’s thought, the ideal of self-mastery as self-control is seen as the Intellect that is able to realise the Good. This implies the presence of a vision of the subject and its separateness from its environment.² Taylor presented the development of the perception of the “self” from the philosophical tradition of antiquity to modernity. Later research on self-identity in philosophy was connected with the cognition of “me, myself” and the understanding of the “other” and “stranger,” the search for the nature of the self and the specific understanding of “selfness.” According to Polish philosopher Barbara Skarga, the latter issue was addressed in the works of Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.³ Polish researcher Paweł Ścigaj writes that the source of “selfness” is the interiority of the subject. Selfness reveals itself most visibly when it encounters the “other” or “stranger” because the question then arises, “Who am I?” It is a perpetual search without a defined plan or route. This can be seen in the ideas of Heidegger, Henri Bergson and others.⁴

Nowadays, identity studies are concerned with not only self-identity but also collective identity, changes of identity and identity as perceived by others. It is thus necessary to give an overview of the origins of the concept of identity in the social sciences.

² Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001, 115–116.

³ Barbara Skarga, *Tożsamość i różnica. Eseje metafizyczne*, Kraków: Znak, 2009, 241.

⁴ Ścigaj, *Tożsamość...*, 39.

The typology of identity in the social sciences is based on the dimension of subjectivity, which is created through discourses.⁵ Depending on the form and level of subjectivity, two basic types of identity are distinguished: individual (identity of the entity) and collective.

Following a very convenient classification of identities in the social sciences, Ścigaj divides both individual and collective identities into two groups – the former into personal identity and social identity and the latter into the identity of a real community and identity of social types.⁶ National identity is connected to the question, “What do I belong to?” and is one of the social identities,⁷ although it also refers to the collective type of identity. Moreover, a nation understood as people can be both the subject and object of identity.⁸

The concept of national identity derives from the study of nations and nationalism, i.e. what forms a nation shapes national identity. It is not an innate quality but is constructed by specific characteristics that organise people into communities that make up a nation.⁹ As I have indicated in an earlier article,¹⁰ national identity is viewed in the social sciences as part of an individual's

⁵ Gary Taylor and Steve Spencer, *Social Identities. Multidisciplinary Approaches*, London: Routledge, 2004, 4.

⁶ Ścigaj, *Tożsamość...*, 103–104.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 135.

⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed., London: Verso, 1991; Erik J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Ernest A. Gellner, “Nationalism and Modernization,” in *Nationalism*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 55–63.

¹⁰ Olha Tkachenko, “Reinventing Ukraine. Ukrainian National and Supra-National Identity in Contemporary Polish Opinion-Forming Press,” *Colloquia Humanistica* 5 (2016), 143.

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social identity and as a collective phenomenon that organises people into national groups.¹¹ Therefore, it will be presented at both the collective and individual levels.

Depending on the type of nation, national identity is divided into civic and ethnic; hence, there are ethnic and civic nationalisms.¹² Theoretician of nationalism Anthony Smith identifies five main features of national identity: “1. an historic territory, or homeland; 2. common myths and historical memories; 3. a common, mass public culture; 4. common legal rights and duties for all members; 5. common economy with territorial mobility for members.”¹³ The first three elements define the ethnic type of identity. Common territory, culture and historical memories form the core of the common origin of a given *ethnie* (ethnic community) and its connection with the nation-state. Speaking of *ethnie*, Smith adds three other features: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.¹⁴ Hence, ethnic identities are more exclusive and emphasise the uniqueness of their group.¹⁵ They are considered in various aspects, such as exploration, resolution and affirmation of ethnicity.¹⁶

Jean S. Phinney has proposed a three-stage model of ethnic identity development, based on addressing three questions:

¹¹ Karina V. Korostelina, “Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine,” *Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41 (2) (2013), 293.

¹² Shlomo Sand, *The Invention of the Jewish People*, translated by Yael Lotan, London: Verso, 2019, 53.

¹³ Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991, 14.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁵ Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford–Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986, 47.

¹⁶ Adriana J. Umaña-Taylor, “Ethnic Identity,” in *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, edited by Seth J. Schwartz, Koen Luyckx and Vivian L. Vignoles, New York: Springer, 2011, 792.

1. The meaning of ethnic identity for the person.
2. The place of one's ethnic identity in their sense of self.
3. The level of positivity or negativity in one's attitude to their ethnic identity.

Overall, ethnic identity puts emphasis on primordial values – the special role of national culture, history and traditions¹⁷ – as well as, according to Holley Hansen and Vicki Hesli, on promoting their sub-group to the exclusion of the other groups.¹⁸

Civic identity, on the contrary, is based not on the ethnic attachment but on group affiliation to a place of residence and tolerance of other ethnic groups living in the state.¹⁹ Daniel Hart, Cameron Richardson and Britt Wilkenfeld argue that civic identity is closely related to such concepts as citizenship and civic participation that ensure civic behaviour:

A sense of civic identity leads people to volunteer to help their neighbours and their neighbours' children, vote in local and national elections, join the military and risk their lives to protect national interests, and pay taxes to provide for fellow citizens who are unable to earn enough to pay for housing, food, and medical care. The sense of oneself as a civic actor empowers political discussion, protest of governmental policies judged unfair or illegal, and participation in many facets of political life. Civic identity infuses meaning in, and provides the motivation for civic behaviour.²⁰

¹⁷ Jean S. Phinney and Anthony D. Ong, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Ethnic Identity. Current Status and Future Directions," *Journal of Counselling Psychology* 54 (3) (2007), 271.

¹⁸ Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli, "National Identity. Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised Individuals," *Europe-Asia Studies* 61 (1) (2009), 4.

¹⁹ Stephen Shulman, "The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 56 (1) (2004), 37.

²⁰ Daniel Hart, Cameron Richardson and Britt Wilkenfeld, "Civic Identity," in *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, edited by Seth J. Schwartz, Koen Luyckx and Vivian L. Vignoles, New York: Springer, 2011, 771.

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Civic identity is thus subject to personal choice because, as Liah Greenfeld writes, “membership in the nation in this case ultimately depends on one’s will to be a member, and nationality, similarly to religion, may be both acquired and lost.”²¹

To better understand the dichotomy between ethnic and civic nationalism, Hansen and Hesli suggest turning to social identity theory. It explains the discrepancy between exclusive ethnic identity and inclusive civic identity by the strong in-group favouritism that results in a negative attitude toward out-groups.²²

National identity is tied to many spheres of life, such as political and social life, ethnicity, nation, culture and religion. In order to systematise approaches to identity research, Polish sociologist Zbigniew Bokszański has described different models of understanding national identity:²³

1. The model of objectivity perceives the nation in a cultural and civic way. It uses quantitative empirical methods and analysis of sources and serves mainly historians and historically-oriented sociologists. The main representatives of this approach are Anthony Smith and John Armstrong.

2. The model of discovered identity perceives the nation in a cultural way and considers culture to have a decisive role in the way national identity is conceptualised. Similarly to the first model, it uses quantitative empirical methods and analysis

²¹ Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism. Nationalism and Economic Growth*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, 2.

²² Hansen and Hesli, “National Identity...,” 2–3.

²³ Zbigniew Bokszański, *Tożsamości zbiorowe*, Warszawa: PWN, 2008, 114.

of sources. The main representatives of this approach are Samuel Huntington and Antonina Kłoskowska.

3. The model of constructed identity uses the same methods as the previous two, combining history, sociology and cultural studies with political science. The main representatives of this approach are Ernest Gellner, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Bernhard Giesen, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson.

4. The model of identity as public opinion uses quantitative methods and serves sociologists and social psychologists. The main representatives of this approach are Zbigniew Bokszański and Mikael Hjerm.

Based on Bokszański's division, Ścigaj, having conducted a thorough analysis of various research theories of national identity, distinguished the following main approaches:²⁴

1. National identity from the perspective of the *longue durée* (perennialism, primordialism, ethnosymbolism, modernism and postmodernism in Smith's concept).

2. National identity from the cultural perspective (e.g. Kłoskowska's view on identity in the borderlands).

3. National identity from the constructivist perspective. People are not born with identities but acquire them during socialisation. The process of identity formation is influenced by various factors, such as politics, institutions, culture, environment, events, etc. One of the most important analytical tools of this approach is discourse analysis, focusing on, e.g., press, TV materials, documents, opinion journalism and literature.

²⁴ Ścigaj, *Tożsamość...*, 167.

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4. National identity from the public opinion perspective, which is based on sociological methods of opinion polling on the topic of identity.

The constructivist approach is the most relevant for this study because I analyse how Ukrainian identity is perceived by external actors (in this case, Polish journalists) and how it is reflected in the discourse of the Polish opinion-forming press. Therefore, it is necessary to describe the general objectives of the constructivist approach in identity research.

Counterintuitively, I will start with a critique of the constructivist theory of national identity. In their paper “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper argue that constructivists are wrong in their assumptions about identity being unstable, fluid and fragile. The researchers ask why something that is changeable and fluid should be called “identity.” They also reject ideas about institutional factors impacting the construction of identity, claiming that institutional modes of identity formation “cannot serve as indicators of real ‘groups’ and robust ‘identities.’”²⁵

Nevertheless, the constructivist approach occupies a prominent place in the field of identity research and has been widely explored. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen were among the first to develop theoretical aspects of collective identity as a construct. In the article “The Construction of Collective Identity,” they often refer to Durkheimian structuralism and Weberian notion of *Gemeinschaftsglauben* (community

²⁵ Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” *Theory and Society* 29 (1) (2000), 26.

of faith). They propose a general model for the analysis of collective identity and make strong arguments that collective identity is constructed. These include the following:²⁶

1. "Collective identity is not naturally generated but socially constructed." This process can be both intentional and unintentional.

2. "Collective identity is produced by the social construction of boundaries" that separate "ours" from "others" or "strangers." It also raises the issue of "crossing boundaries" and reconstructing one's identity.

3. Establishing the "symbolic codes of distinction" makes it possible to recognise the differences between in-groups and out-groups. These codes are fundamental in the construction of collective identity.

4. "Primordality is the first ideal code of collective identity." It is also a social construction that requires special rituals and communicative efforts to exist and be maintained.

5. Civic codes of construction of collective identity are very important in the process of socialisation. They construct identity through social practices and institutional arrangements.

6. The cultural code of the construction of collective identity is similar to the primordial and civic ones, but it proposes a supernatural source of identity. Unlike the previous two, the cultural code overcomes the problem of social boundaries and relates the collectivity to a stable and eternal realm of the sacred and the sublime (God, Reason, Progress, Rationality).

²⁶ Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, "The Construction of Collective Identity," *European Journal of Sociology* 36 (1) (1995), 73–84.

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Researchers who use the constructivist approach in studies of identity formation refer to such theorists of nation and nationalism as Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm. For instance, Shlomo Sand, in his book on the construction of the Jewish nation, states that it was Gellner and Anderson who first claimed that the nation was primarily a cultural project.²⁷

When examining the process of identity formation during the postcommunist transformation, scholars emphasise that the period of transition from an authoritarian state to a democracy is deeply related to the construction of the state and the rethinking of fundamental principles of different levels of identity.²⁸ Moreover, every process of change involves situations of conflict, which particularly affect the construction of identity. Herbert Kelman, analysing the role of identity in conflict resolution, argues that national identity is constantly being reconstructed and redefined; therefore, he claims that identities are “potentially changeable and indeed negotiable.”²⁹ This is the basis for conflict resolution because if two identities are to become compatible, they have to be reconstructed. Kelman sees national identity as a social construction that does not arise by itself but is based on certain characteristics inherent in the group of that identity. He agrees with Anderson that national identity

²⁷ Sand, *The Invention...*, 36.

²⁸ Korostelina, “Mapping National Identity...,” 293–315; David Lane, “Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 (6) (2011), 925–934; Ireneusz P. Karolewski, “European Identity Making and Identity Transfer,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 (6) (2011), 935–955.

²⁹ Herbert Kelman, “The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution. Experiences from Israeli-Palestinian Problem-Solving Workshops,” in *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction*, edited by Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussim and David Wilde, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 194.

is more a product of an imagined past – common traditions, language, history, religion, territory, culture:

Typically, the social construction of an identity involves a dual process of discovery (or rediscovery) and creation of such common elements. The social construction of the identity implies a degree of arbitrariness and flexibility in the way the identity is composed (which elements are admitted into it and which omitted from it), and in what its boundaries are (who is included and who is excluded).³⁰

This issue of “inclusiveness” and “exclusiveness” is also deeply intertwined with the search for the Other. Hence the presence of boundaries in the process of identity construction, as described by Eisenstadt and Giesen. Anthropologist Fredrik Barth, who has made the greatest contribution to the study of symbolic boundaries, writes that social boundaries are established by members of a social group to indicate “ours” and “strangers,” which defines “membership and exclusion.”³¹

Defining who is the Our and who is the Other or the Stranger is crucial in the process of identity formation in societies in transition. A vivid example is provided by the intellectual discussion going on in the 1980s in the countries of the Soviet bloc. The fundamental question was whether these countries belonged to Europe. Intellectuals equated the Our with Europe and its opposite, the Other, with the Soviet system. Ola Hnatiuk stresses that European identity was one of the main elements in the reconstruction of national identities at the turn of the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, edited by Fredrik Barth, Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1998, 15.

postcommunist transformation.³² It involved both the redefinition of the concept of Europe in general and the establishment of a European identity in a territory that geographically belonged to Europe but, due to political factors, had been pushed outside the boundaries of European identity.

In this way, the Central European discourse offered a national identity inscribed in the European context and, at the same time, clearly distanced from the Soviet Union. Arguing for a common European identity in Eastern and Central Europe, intellectuals raised the issue of spiritual values and cultural heritage,³³ which remains very visible in the construction of Ukrainian identity in the post-Soviet period. The examples from Central Europe illustrate the construction or reconstruction of identity at the cultural level in intellectual discourse. The use of the framework of identity reconstruction through the operation of spatial and territorial phenomena refers to the popular concept of “inventing” territories, as does Larry Wolff’s concept of inventing Eastern Europe.³⁴ It is also a vivid example of the construction and deconstruction of identities in discourses.

The construction of identity is also closely related to elites. Shlomo Sand argues that every group needs intellectual elites to form a nation and its identity, both ethnic and civic.³⁵ David Lane emphasises that elites construct, reconstruct or deconstruct

³² Ola Hnatiuk, *Proshchannia z imperiieiu. Ukrainski dyskusii pro identychnist*, translated by Marta Boianivska, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005, 68–69.

³³ *Ibid.*, 274.

³⁴ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

³⁵ Sand, *The Invention...*, 31.

identities. There are different ways of identity formation and different types of elites, and their role is especially important in postsocialist countries. In those states, ruling elites create the conditions for reshaping national identities while pursuing their interests by forming political and social identities. Lane points out that national identity is also constructed through the establishment of new institutions or changing the existing ones.³⁶

One more aspect of the constructivist approach to national identity is the relationship between institutional changes and identity, especially in the postcommunist region after the establishment of the new European agenda. Ireneusz P. Karolewski considers the process of institutionalisation to be an identity transfer in the construction of European identity. In his opinion, the European Union has been trying to construct a collective identity of both its own citizens as well as the states belonging to the European Partnership. The methods used for this purpose include promoting a positive self-image (green Europe, social Europe), common symbols (European anthem, currency) and values (the Charter of Fundamental Rights). The EU promotes the European identity in non-member states by supporting human rights, good governance standards and modernisation projects.³⁷

³⁶ Lane, "Identity...", 926.

³⁷ Karolewski, "European Identity Making...", 936.

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1.1.2. MAIN TYPES OF IDENTITY PROBLEMS IN UKRAINE DURING THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, like other post-Soviet republics, began to build its own national identity. The literature on this topic is vast. Although different researchers have identified different types of identity in contemporary Ukraine, they all refer to a lesser or greater degree to the constructivist approach in identity theory described above. In this subchapter, I will provide a brief overview of the most prevalent patterns and models of Ukrainian identity in academic and public intellectual discourse.

Mykola Riabchuk, a Ukrainian scholar and essayist, claimed that Ukraine was the most ambiguous state in terms of identity formation among the postcommunist countries that underwent transformation between 1989 and 1991.³⁸ He also introduced the idea of “two Ukraines” and attempted to explain the Ukrainian ambivalence in his work bearing just such a title.³⁹ Riabchuk argued that Ukraine had not completed the postcommunist transition in matters of identity and was “neither an unequivocal success story like its postcommunist neighbours to the west nor a complete failure like its neighbours to the east,”⁴⁰ but something in between. It is in this “transitional status” that the

³⁸ Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s ‘Muddling Through.’ National Identity and Postcommunist Transition,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45 (2012), 439.

³⁹ Mykola Riabchuk, *Dwie Ukrainy*, translated by Marta Dyhas, Wojciech Stanisławski and Ewa Gołąb-Nowakowska, Wrocław: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej, 2004.

⁴⁰ Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s ‘Muddling Through’...,” 439.

ambivalence of Ukrainian identity and the existence of “two Ukraines” have their source. Riabchuk believed that Ukraine was divided into two parts: eastern and western. These two regions have their own perceptions of the independence of the state they constitute and different visions of the future. This ambivalence helps explain the two main patterns or models of identity in Ukraine – Soviet Ukraine and European Ukraine. To make it clearer, Riabchuk compared the Donetsk and Lviv regions (*oblasts*): “Anybody who visits the extreme eastern and western Ukraine, for example, Donetsk and Lviv, inevitably feels the profound differences between the two regions, as if in reality they belong to two different countries, two different civilisations.”⁴¹

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This approach of dividing Ukraine into two regions with different mentalities has been strongly criticised in Ukrainian academic discourse. For instance, Tatiana Zhurzhenko calls Riabchuk’s concept of “two Ukraines” merely a myth. She argues that it was created because of inconsistent interpretations of Ukrainian history,⁴² although she acknowledges the existence of a divided society in Ukraine.

Zhurzhenko critically writes about the division of the Ukrainian society in political, intellectual and public discourses into two separate parts or even civilisations in the Huntingtonian sense. This is how the “Huntingtonisation” of Ukrainian reality

⁴¹ Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine: One State, Two Countries?,” *Eurozine*, September 16, 2002, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/ukraine-one-state-two-countries/>.

⁴² Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “The Myth of Two Ukraines,” *Eurozine*, September 17, 2002, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/the-myth-of-two-ukraines/>.

occurs.⁴³ According to her, it is also a division into better and worse parts of the country. After the collapse of the USSR, Western Ukraine became the engine of democratic reforms and a pro-Ukrainian and pro-European environment with a strongly developed sense of national identity. Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine, meanwhile, remained within the sphere of Soviet beliefs and viewpoints.

Hence, Zhurzhenko claims, it was the national democrats and critics of the West who created the negative image of Eastern Ukraine as an inferior part of the state. The “Huntingtonisation” of Ukraine was not their intention, but “in their eyes, the promising project of a ‘European Ukraine’ was rejected by the Russified population of the East, and it is therefore the East which is responsible for the split into ‘two Ukraines.’”⁴⁴ In 2002, the researcher expressed the belief that the “two Ukraines” would be reconciled but only after much will and effort from both parts of the country:

Like other myths, it is not just an invention, but rather a re-construction of the political and cultural realities of Ukraine, based on a certain vision of history, on opinion polls and election results, on Western theoretical constructs, cultural stereotypes and ideological prejudices.⁴⁵

In asserting this, Zhurzhenko failed to take into account that all of these factors influenced the public consciousness of the citizens who lived in the state and were part of the identity formation process. Hence, the only way

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

to unite Ukraine is for Western Ukraine to start treating Eastern Ukraine as equal because, as she believes, Eastern Ukrainians are not inferior but represent a “distinctive version of Ukrainian identity.”⁴⁶

In post-Soviet states, national identity is closely linked to the supranational or transnational one.⁴⁷ In the case of Ukraine, national identity has been tied to a supranational one – imperial or postimperial.⁴⁸ This link is clearly illustrated by Stephen Shulman, who distinguishes two “identity complexes”: ethnic Ukrainian national identity and East Slavic national identity.⁴⁹ The former is based on the idea that Ukrainian ethnicity, culture and language should be the dominant integrating forces of the Ukrainian nation-state. Ethnic Ukrainians, as the dominant group and the original indigenous people, should have a special status. Proponents of this type of identity view Ukrainian-Russian historical relations as relations between the colonised and coloniser and the Russian presence in Ukraine as the result of Russian imperial policy. It was Russia and Russification that caused the unnatural division between ethnic Ukrainians since the spread of the Russian language was imposed by the Russian Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union.

This type of identity is similar to other Central and Eastern European identities. Despite the presence of ethnic elements,

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ray Taras, Olga Filippova and Nelly Pobeda, “Ukraine’s Transnationals, Far-Away Locals and Xenophobes. The Prospects for Europeanness,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 56 (6) (2004), 836.

⁴⁸ Inna Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert and Tetiana Kostuchenko, “Balancing National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation. Identity Building and the Role of Political Parties in Post-Orange Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 (6) (2011), 1062.

⁴⁹ Shulman, “The Contours...,” 36.

some researchers describe it as inclusive and civic but with a strong sense of belonging to national culture.⁵⁰ This is also confirmed by Shulman in another article, in which he analyses Ukrainian identity complexes and the ability to support change and reform in social and political life. He has found that ethnic Ukrainians are more likely to participate in civic life and support social change toward democracy.⁵¹

On the contrary, the East Slavic national identity complex assumes that the Ukrainian nation is composed of two basic ethnic groups, languages and cultures – Ukrainian and Russian. They are united due to being embedded in a common historical and cultural space. The East Slavic identity refers to the imperial Russian and Soviet historiography of “brotherly union” or “Slavic unity” between Russians and Ukrainians.⁵² A part of the East Slavic identity is the post-Soviet identity, which derives from the concept of *homo Sovieticus*. It is characterised by a weak sense of culture and ethnicity. Representatives of the post-Soviet identity often lament the collapse of the USSR and speak neither Ukrainian nor Russian but a mixture of the two called *surzhyk*.⁵³

One reason for such ambiguity in the process of identity construction in Ukraine is the political factor of late nation formation. As Andrew Wilson wrote in 2002, “despite winning independence in 1991, Ukraine remains an amorphous society

⁵⁰ Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s ‘Muddling Through’...,” 422.

⁵¹ Stephen Shulman, “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine,” *Slavic Review* 64 (1) (2005), 74–75.

⁵² Shulman, “The Contours...,” 39.

⁵³ Melnykovska, Schweickert and Kostiuhenko, “Balancing National Uncertainty...,” 1060.

with a weak sense of national identity.”⁵⁴ In addition, history and its interpretation have played an important role in creating the Russia-Europe dichotomy in Ukrainian identity. During the Soviet period, Soviet historiography continually imposed the myth of a common Slavic world of three brotherly nations: Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian, certainly under Russian domination. It was present in everyday discourse and exerted a strong influence even after the fall of the Soviet Union. This distorted perception of history was crucial for the formation of the Soviet or East Slavic type of identity with a pro-Russian orientation. Therefore, since regaining independence, Ukrainian society has been polarised between a post-Soviet lifestyle and pro-European and cultural aspirations.

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Identity models currently existing in Ukraine demonstrate that language has become one of the most significant yet ambiguous factors influencing Ukrainian identity. The data from the last census in 2001 show that among the two largest ethnic groups, Ukrainians (77.8%) and Russians (17.3%), Ukrainian is declared as the native language by 67.5% of the population and Russian by 29.6%. Ethnic and linguistic borders in Ukraine do not overlap, which means that those who speak Russian and live in Ukraine do not consider Russia their homeland. Therefore, as Anna Fournier points out, there is a “Russian-speaking” identity that includes both Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Andrew Wilson, “Elements of a Theory of Ukrainian Ethno-National Identities,” *Nations and Nationalism* 8 (1) (2002), 31.

⁵⁵ Anna Fournier, “Mapping Identities. Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 54 (3) (2002), 431.

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The issue of language in Ukrainian society has been of significance both from a political and cultural point of view. Ukrainian scholar Volodymyr Kulyk argues that the Ukrainian language is perceived as important not only ethnically but also civically. It means that its value is not “limited to its actual use, or its communicative function,”⁵⁶ and even those who do not speak it in their daily lives acknowledge its importance. Kulyk concludes that the relationship between language and identity in Ukraine has been embedded in the division of the country into two parts that differ in this respect – Ukrainian nationalist and East Slavic, “which entail[s] Ukraine’s development as a Ukrainian nation-state and a part of Russian-dominated post-Soviet realm.”⁵⁷ It should also be noted that the issue of language has often been misused by politicians to gain support among the Russian-speaking or Ukrainian-speaking part of the society.⁵⁸

In the modern Ukrainian state, intellectuals have argued against both Slavic “brotherhood” and Russia’s historical singularity in order to counter the post-Soviet historiography and such a colonial view of Ukraine. Among the researchers who first brought Ukraine into the discourse of postcolonial studies was the above-mentioned political and cultural scientist Mykola Riabchuk.

In his numerous publications and books, he explains that the process of building the Ukrainian state and nation is currently

⁵⁶ Volodymyr Kulyk, “Language and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Transformation of an Unbroken Bond,” *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies* 5 (2) (2013), 20.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁵⁸ Volha Charnysh, “Analysis of Current Events. Identity Mobilization in Hybrid Regimes. Language in Ukrainian Politics,” *Nationalities Papers* 41 (1) (2013), 2.

belated. Riabchuk sees the main reason for this in Ukraine's postcolonial status, which results in its lack of self-confidence as an independent country, combined with the permanent minority complex of being a periphery in relation to the Russian centre, which has been constructed in the Ukrainian mass consciousness for a long time. For instance, in his book *From Little Russia to Ukraine*,⁵⁹ Riabchuk describes how Ukrainian culture was always portrayed by Russian imperial and then Soviet propaganda as inferior and backward and associated only with folklore but never with high culture. For this reason, he explains, many people, even Ukrainian speakers, chose to speak Russian in the cities and preferred the "more advanced" Russian culture, even if it was usually of low artistic value. To deconstruct this discourse, Riabchuk constantly emphasises the differences between Ukraine and Russia that undermine the claim that their history and culture are similar.

The identity issue that is at the core of many internal and international problems Ukraine copes with, stems from two very different notions of "Ukrainianness." In a sense, Ukraine copes today with the consequences of a pernicious historical myth that, being internalized, heavily influenced Ukrainian identity and, being internationalized, heavily influenced the Western perception of both Ukraine and Russia. In brief, it is a myth of the "thousand-year-old Russian state," which in fact had neither been a "thousand-year-old" nor, actually, "Russian." Hardly any historical myth has ever made such a great international career in a garb of an undisputable historical "truth." No other myth was so broadly and uncritically accepted in academia, multiplied in mass media, and enshrined in mass consciousness and in popular discourse.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Mykola Riabchuk, *Vid Malorosii do Ukrainy. Paradoksy zapizniloho naciivtvorennia*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2000.

⁶⁰ Riabchuk, "Ukraine's 'Muddling Through'...", 440–441.

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Riabchuk also stresses the great importance of yet another historical interpretation of the term “Rus” and its relationship to the Duchy of Moscow. This narrative embraced the overestimated significance of the Orthodox Church and created the anti-Western discourse of East Slavic-Eurasian-Orthodox civilisation that rejected Western values and institutions, including the notion of human rights, civic national identity and a liberal democratic nation-state.⁶¹

The mythologisation of history and its perpetuation during the Soviet period caused an identity split in Ukraine. This resulted in the emergence of two competing identities – the national Ukrainian and the “Little Russian” or “Creole” one. Therefore, Riabchuk states:

... rival identities in Ukraine are no longer “Ukrainian national” and “Russian imperial” (or, even less, “Russian national”) but, rather, two different types of Ukrainian identity. One of them that was roughly defined as “Ukrainian national” is similar to other Central-East European identities, largely but not exclusively ethno-linguistic, i.e., largely inclusive and civic but with a clear ethno-cultural core. It has evolved within the past two centuries through painstaking emancipation from the Russian-Orthodox “ummah,” distancing itself from Russia as the main “Other,” and symbolical self-identification with the imaginary “West.” The other type of Ukrainian identity can be even more roughly defined as “Little Russian” or “Creole.” It is a peculiar product of the semi-destruction of the traditional supranational (East Slavonic, Orthodox Christian, Soviet) identity, a result of partial emancipation from “ummah” and vague, incoherent drift from regional patriotism within the empire towards a Ukrainian national loyalty within the independent state.⁶²

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 442.

The passage quoted above reveals the significant role of supranational identity not only in understanding the contemporary foreign orientation of preferences but also in historical discourse. There are two dimensions of external factors influencing Ukraine in different historical periods – Russian and European. Historian Roman Szporluk agrees that the formation of modern Ukraine should be considered in the international context. In one of his articles, he highlights the role of Poland and Russia in this process, as these states had a strong influence on Ukraine during its history. Szporluk states that the modern Ukrainian identity is possessed by those who have rejected both Polish and Russian identity.⁶³

While Russia has influenced the pro-Soviet type of Ukrainian identity, Poland has facilitated its orientation towards Europe. Describing Ukraine's transformation into a modern nation-state, Szporluk, like Riabchuk, seeks to challenge the popular image of it as a Russian province. Referring to the historical circumstances of the annexation of Ukrainian lands by Russia, he shows that initially, more than three and a half centuries ago, only a small part of Ukraine came under the tsar's rule. These were the then Poltava and Chernihiv regions with the city of Kyiv.⁶⁴ Therefore, after 1667, Warsaw governed more Ukrainian territories than Moscow. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth possessed the lands west of the Dnipro River until the final partition of Poland in 1795. Furthermore, as Szporluk points

⁶³ Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine. From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," *Daedalus* 126 (3) (1997), 86.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 87.

out, the Polish nobility was the dominant group in the area until 1830, if not 1863, and the Poles retained considerable social and cultural influence even after the Russian revolutions of 1917. In the west, the Ukrainian-Polish bond persisted until the Second World War.⁶⁵ Szporluk argues that it is thus a mistake to consider Ukraine purely as a post-Soviet state because it is partly Central European due to the influence of the Polish factor combined with the Austro-Hungarian one.

The affinity between Ukraine and Europe that has been established through European structures is also evidenced by the existence of the so-called European idea in Ukrainian historical and intellectual discourse. The intelligentsia was the first to realise that Poland “knew a shorter road to Europe, in particular to its liberal and democratic ideas and institutions.”⁶⁶ Szporluk points out that the “European” idea became very popular because it was the main feature of Ukraine’s separateness from Russia.⁶⁷ He argues that the European dimension of the formation of Ukrainian identity was strongly influenced by the presence of the Ukrainian factor in the revolution of 1848. A similar view is also expressed by American historian Timothy Snyder, who writes about the impact of historical events on the penetration of the European element into the Ukrainian identity as a sign of distinctiveness from Russia. “Today’s Belarus and Ukraine were in contact, through Vilnius and Warsaw, with

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Roman Szporluk, “The Western Dimension of the Making of Modern Ukraine,” *Eurozine*, July 22, 2005, accessed April 26, 2022, <http://web.archive.org/web/20150918233021/http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2005-07-22-szporluk-en.html>.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

the Renaissance and the Reformation, neither of these trends reached Moscow.”⁶⁸

Stephen Shulman takes a similar approach in his research on the cultural foundations of Ukrainian ethnic identity. He states that two axes influence the evaluation of its characteristics. One is the relationship between Ukrainian culture and the culture of the countries that historically have ruled Ukraine for extended periods – Russia and Poland. The other is the relationship between Ukrainian culture and European culture.⁶⁹

It should be added that it is not only due to its relationship with Poland that Ukrainian intellectuals include Ukraine in Europe; the Austro-Hungarian Empire, under the hegemony of which some Ukrainians lived, also played a great role in shaping Ukrainian identity as European, especially in the cultural aspect. Szporluk states that the Austrian or German factor created a particular type of identity, “homo Austriacus” or “Viennism,” as Tomáš Masaryk called it. Overall, the researcher sees the revolution of 1848 as a kind of a starting point for the “European theme” in Ukrainian discourse.⁷⁰

The fact that Europe had played a significant role in the formation of Ukrainian cultural identity was reflected at various levels of public intellectual discussion in independent Ukraine. It was considered one of the most important factors by both political and cultural elites. Europe as a “symbolic

⁶⁸ Timothy Snyder, “Europe and Ukraine: Past and Future,” *Eurozine*, April 16, 2014, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/europe-and-ukraine-past-and-future/>.

⁶⁹ Stephen Shulman, “The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (6) (1999), 1016.

⁷⁰ Szporluk, “The Western Dimension...”.

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power”⁷¹ also remained relevant in contemporary political discourse. The idea of Europe could integrate the Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking people and help build a single European supranational identity,⁷² as demonstrated during the Euromaidan.

The “European” idea found wider expression among Ukrainian writers and scholars, who emphasised that it could be inscribed into the Ukrainian identity frame through the concept of “Central and Eastern Europe” as conceived by intellectuals from the former Soviet bloc.⁷³ In this case, Europe was mainly perceived in two different dimensions: as an institution and as an idea.⁷⁴

Europe as an idea appeared very often in Ukrainian intellectual discourse because the construction of identity in contemporary Ukraine was closely related to the question of the country’s place in Europe. Initially, the discussion focused on whether Ukraine belonged to Europe or not, and if it did, what kind of Europe was it? This led to the creation of a symbolic mental map of Europe. Geographically located in the centre of the continent, post-1991 Ukraine was considered simultaneously part of Eastern Europe, especially in the political and economic sense, and part of Russia and not a fully independent player. Europe was close at hand but, at the same time, unreal and unattainable. To dispel this belief, or at least diminish it, Ukrainian intellectuals very often emphasised the idea of Europe

⁷¹ Charnysh, “Analysis...,” 2.

⁷² Ibid., 10.

⁷³ Hnatiuk, *Proshchannia...*, 260–275.

⁷⁴ Volodymyr Yermolenko, “Dreams of Europe,” *Eurozine*, February 6, 2014, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/dreams-of-europe/>.

in their scientific or literary works, inventing in this way their own Europe. The greatest attention was devoted to the question of Central and Eastern Europe.

Compared to its western neighbours, the idea of Central and Eastern Europe began to be discussed in independent Ukraine relatively recently. Ola Hnatiuk writes that the topic first appeared in the Lviv magazine *Ji*. In 1995, it published several texts on European identity, in particular, a translation of Milan Kundera's essay "A Kidnapped West or the Tragedy of Central Europe" and some novels by Bruno Schulz and Joseph Roth, Central European writers born in Galicia. *Ji* thus highlighted the topic of Ukraine's belonging to Central Europe, framing it in the context of the Austro-Hungarian heritage.⁷⁵ The magazine (and another one, *Krytyka*) continued to periodically publish essays by contemporary Ukrainian writers and intellectuals reflecting on the question of Europe, its regions and Ukraine's belonging to it.

Among Ukrainian intellectuals, writer Yurii Andrukhovych has drawn particular attention to the European idea and Ukraine's place in it. He does not agree with the political and economic reality, so he rhetorically asks where Europe ends:

On the right bank of the Rhine because the great European Konrad Adenauer said so? Beyond the fence of Austrian chancellor Metternich's garden because another great European, to whom this garden belonged, marked such borders? Far to the east of the imaginary Berlin Wall? On the western borders of the former USSR? On the border between Western and Eastern Christianity? Between the rivers Danube and Don? Between the rivers Dnipro and Dniester? In Mesopotamia? On this side

⁷⁵ Hnatiuk, *Proshchannia...*, 279–280.

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of the Ural Mountains or beyond them? On the shores of the Pacific Ocean? In Vladivostok, where someone is listening to Mozart? Or in San Francisco, where someone is also listening to Mozart's music?⁷⁶

Andrukhovych presents Europe not merely as a geographical territory but as a concept or idea that can be constructed and reconstructed. Nevertheless, he still tries to draw some boundaries, although they have nothing to do with physical borders. His Europe is the product of the civilisational development of the world. In searching for its limits, Andrukhovych refers to the three main concepts that, in his opinion, make up the idea of Europe: a common history, Latin or, as he calls it, Western Christianity and culture.

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In the essay "Europe Is Not Yet Dead," he offers an interesting but, by his own admission, adventurous theory about the essence of Europe. He views European identity as a deeply individual concept:

Europe is wherever the people think they are in Europe. Europe is defined subjectively. Someone in China or Singapore will never consider themselves European, and neither will someone in Saudi Arabia, India, Mongolia or Iran. But quite possibly Azerbaijanis and probably Armenians – would.⁷⁷

Herein Andrukhovych implies probably the cultural aspect of European civilisation and the aspect of religion, namely Christianity, which, for him, is one of the crucial features of Europe.

Looking for a way to bring Ukraine into the scope of European identity, Andrukhovych introduces the concept

⁷⁶ Yurii Andrukhovych, "Shche ne vmerla Yevropa," *Krytyka* 1–2 (2007), 8–9.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

of Central and Eastern Europe. The reason why Ukrainian intellectuals want their country to be not only Eastern but also Central European stems from the 18th–19th centuries when Eastern Europe was associated with poverty and backwardness, corruption and restrictions of people's rights and freedoms.⁷⁸ The Central European discourse also signifies separation from Russia and the possibility of acquiring a European identity.⁷⁹ Ukrainian historian Olena Betlii argues that the concept of Central and Eastern Europe is very popular in Ukraine because it has become “a successful metaphor for a political and spiritual return to Europe.”⁸⁰ It has been used by intellectuals to distance themselves from political discourse associated only with Eastern Europe.

Andrukhovych addresses the issue of European borders also in another essay, “Atlas. Meditation,” written as a polemic against the German World Atlas *Diercke Weltatlas*. The author rejects the image of Central Europe presented in this work, which does not include Belarus, Ukraine and Romania.⁸¹ Due to the fragile and changeable nature of Central and Eastern Europe, Andrukhovych calls it “a belt of frequent changes of state formations, a transitional inter-imperial seismic zone,”⁸² implying the postcolonial character of the region.

Although Andrukhovych attempts to ultimately outline the shape of Central and Eastern Europe, his concept of it is not very

⁷⁸ Benjamin F. Schenk, “Mentalnyye karty. Konstruirovaniye geograficheskogo prostranstva v Yevropie,” *Politicheskaya nauka* 4 (2001), 4–17.

⁷⁹ Olena Betlii, “Perevynaidennia Skhidnoi Yevropy,” *Krytyka* 7–8 (2007), 6.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Yurii Andrukhovych, “Atlas. Medytacii,” *Krytyka* 1–2 (2006), accessed April 26, 2022, <http://maidanua.org/static/mai/1145307656.html>.

⁸² Ibid.

precise. In the essay “Time and Place, or My Last Territory,” he depicts it as a mirage, an unrealistic phantom. “In Europe, the East is paradoxically in the place of the centre. Central Europe, the child of Kundera, Miłosz and Conrad, this strange substance, of mere ideas, feelings, mystifications, is the American device of a few disappointed dissidents.”⁸³

A similar description of Europe appears in the essay by Ukrainian writer Tanya Malarchuk, “Show Me Your Europe and I Will Tell You Who You Are.” She sees Ukraine as an ideological and metaphysical construct in an idealistic Europe without geographical borders.

I have never seen it [Europe – O.T.] in reality, but I know that Europe belongs to one category of philosophy ... For everyone, it is a certain set of imperative human values and traditions but not cities and landscapes. Freedom is what Europe is most proud of now. It depends not only on me but also on many others who will give it to me or not. That is why Europe embodies tolerance for different points of view and different traditions in which freedom appears.⁸⁴

Regardless of how vague the definition of Europe is, Ukrainian intellectuals want to inscribe Ukraine in it. Andrukhovych, for instance, even finds commonalities between European and Ukrainian folk traditions and culture. In his essay “Carpathologia Cosmophilica,” he analyses the significance of the Carpathian Mountains for Ukraine. They form a line along which runs the boundary that separates Latin culture from Byzantine culture,

⁸³ Yurii Andrukhovych, “Chas i mistse abo moia ostannia terytoria,” in Yurii Andrukhovych, *Dezorientatsia na mistsevoosti*, Ivano-Frankivsk: Lilea-NV, 1999.

⁸⁴ Tanya Malarchuk, “Pokazhy meni svoju Yevropu i ja skazhu khto ty,” *Krytyka* 1–2 (2007), 9–10.

which reinforces Ukraine's ambiguous situation and makes Central and Eastern Europe even more illusory. However, Andrukhovych argues that there is still a cultural factor that can connect Ukraine to Europe. It is embedded in the authentic music of the mountains, which "gives meaning to conversations about unity, oneness and is separate from all the chronic conflicts and stereotypes."⁸⁵

The issue of Central and Eastern Europe is also prominent in Riabchuk's essay "Beyond the Fence of Metternich's Garden. A Ukrainian Perspective on Central and Eastern Europe." Riabchuk argues that this concept is used by those who have problems with identity. A vivid example of a country with such problems is post-Soviet Ukraine, where debates about who is more "Central and therefore more European"⁸⁶ are still ongoing. Like Andrukhovych, Riabchuk tries to reconstruct the existing discourse in Europe and inscribe Ukraine into it. He disagrees with the words of the chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer, who said that "Asia ends on the Elbe," and 19th-century Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich, who jokingly stated that Asia began beyond his garden, i.e. beyond the eastern suburbs of Vienna.⁸⁷ Emphasising the Austro-Hungarian heritage, Riabchuk points to Ukraine's place in it in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. This embodiment of the European identity of Ukraine in the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian heritage on a semiotic and symbolic level occurs quite often.

⁸⁵ Juriy Andruchowycz, "Carpathologia cosmophilica," *Więź* 10 (1996), 3.

⁸⁶ Mykola Riabchuk, "Za ohorozheiu Metternikhovoho sadu," *Ji* 13 (1998), 13.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

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European symbolism and semiology have created a particular kind of mythology in Ukrainian discourse. Claude Lévi-Strauss argued that a myth is “bricolage,” the creation of new objects from existing parts to solve old problems.⁸⁸ The image of Europe in Ukrainian intellectual discourse was, in some ways, nothing more than a myth. Especially since essayists used the concept of Central and Eastern Europe to construct Ukrainian European identity by suggesting ways to apply the old material (in this case, “Central and Eastern Europe”) to the Ukrainian intellectual sphere.

However, the myth of Central and Eastern Europe functions in Ukraine in several variants. The most widespread is the myth of the “lost paradise,” which is associated with the Habsburg Empire and refers mainly to Western Ukraine, specifically Galicia. It is significant for the Galician cultural tradition because it shifts the region from peripheral Eastern Europe to desirable Central Europe. And yet, being in “Austrian Central Europe” does not mean being in the centre. This myth is not a panacea for the periphery but its affirmation. Indeed, Austrian writer Joseph Roth once said, “The essence of Austria is not the centre but the periphery.”⁸⁹ Ukrainian intellectuals, however, cannot let go of the concept of Eastern and Central Europe, even though they admit it is weak and unstable, because it seems to be the only way to separate the Ukrainian supranational discourse from the Russian imperial or Soviet one.

⁸⁸ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, translated from the French, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, 25.

⁸⁹ Ihor Andrushchenko, “Na peryferii vseludskosti,” *Krytyka* 10 (2000), 17.

This is particularly evident in the already-mentioned writings of Andrukhovych. He admits that the Austrian factor is clearly visible only in Western Ukraine, where it has been made unreal and mythologised. He confirms that in Galicia, “mythology compensates for history; native legends here are more important and more reliable than textbooks. As a result, history here is nothing more than a variant of mythology.”⁹⁰

In another essay by Andrukhovych, entitled “Erts-Herts-Perts,” the “Austrian myth” is so idealised that the author extrapolates its value in the Ukrainian socio-cultural space. He argues that Austrian influence was undoubtedly a positive phenomenon in Ukrainian culture. In his opinion, people should be grateful to Austria for the Ukrainian “component” that is stored in the “boundless linguistic and national diversity of the world.”⁹¹ These special features create a mythological but “Ukrainian” version of Central and Eastern Europe.

Lviv, located in Western Ukraine, occupies a central place in this approach. Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak distinguishes three types of myths about this city. First, there is the very popular myth of Austrian Lviv, sustained by numerous signs and symbols. For instance, Lviv has often been depicted as the “Vienna of the East” on account of “theatres, cafés and Viennese fashion.”⁹² The second myth is the nostalgia after the loss of Central European Lviv. Hrytsak relates it to the interwar period when Lviv became part of independent Poland.

⁹⁰ Andrukhovych, “Chas...”

⁹¹ Yurii Andrukhovych, “Erts-Herts-Perts,” in Yurii Andrukhovych, *Dezorientatsia na mist-sevosti*, Ivano-Frankivsk: Lilea-NV, 1999.

⁹² Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Strasti po Lvovu,” *Krytyka* 7–8 (2002), 57–58.

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To explain the third myth, he infers that over time, Lviv lost its Central European status. After the Second World War, it became “merely” Eastern European, without any additional adjectives.⁹³

It is worth noting that Ukrainian essayists discussing Ukrainian identity in the European context rarely mention the European Union. Rather, it appears as an antipode to the concept of Europe. For example, Andrukhovych describes the EU as a pragmatic formation “with its fears, reserve and all the other complexes of unlucky imperialists.”⁹⁴ He states that the EU has nothing in common with real Europe, which, in his opinion, is definitely open, geographically undefinable, always changing and free. For him, Europe exists in an ethical, conscious and cultural sense.

To sum up, in Ukrainian academic and broader intellectual discourse, Ukrainian identity depends mainly on relations with Russia and Europe. In an attempt to inscribe “Europeanness” into Ukrainian identity, academic, cultural and other intellectual elites have reconstructed and redefined the meaning of Europe for Ukraine.

Generally speaking, Ukraine has been linked to Europe in two ways. The first was based on the fact that Ukraine was considered to have a distinctly European culture. In this context, Europe was perceived as a source of ideas and values but not as a political or economic entity. The second way involved redefining the borders of the whole Europe or its parts and centred around the debate about the concept of Central and Eastern Europe.

⁹³ Ibid., 58.

⁹⁴ Andrukhovych, “Shehe ne vmerla Yevropa,” 8–9.

Ukrainian intellectuals have placed Ukraine on the border between the East and the West, at the same time emphasising the European character of Ukrainian cultural and political tradition. But as Hrytsak points out,

it is believed that nowhere did the clash between economic and political modernization take such a violent turn as in Eastern Europe; and there is probably no other region of the world in which modern empire building and state-building have been subject to such ambivalence.⁹⁵

This ambivalence, according to Hrytsak, led to the “confusion and contestation of identities,” which meant that people supported “mutually exclusive ... ideas,” for instance, Ukraine having close relations with both Russia and Europe.⁹⁶

The examples of the constructivist approach described above also refer to the construction of identity in discourse. The concept of discourse will be explained in the following section.

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1.1.3. TEXT, DISCOURSE AND CONTEXT

“Discourse is the power which is to be seized.”⁹⁷

In his famous lecture “The Order of Discourse,” Michel Foucault made a very strong hypothesis that “legitimises” the purpose of this chapter and this study in general:

in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role

⁹⁵ Yaroslav Hrytsak, “The Borders of Europe – Seen from the Outside,” *Eurozine*, January 10, 2005, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/the-borders-of-europe-seen-from-the-outside/>.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in *Untying the Text. A Post-Structuralist Reader*, edited by Robert Young, London–Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, 53.

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is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.⁹⁸

The awareness of the discourses of certain societal institutions or structures thus allows us to understand how that particular society functions and what power relations predominate in a given social group, regardless of its size and importance.

Linguists have already agreed that language does not exist in isolation from society and human actions.⁹⁹ The texts I analyse in this study are, therefore, a particular reflection of a particular society. Hence, discourse is a crucial part of my research, which aims to understand identity in the mediatised world.¹⁰⁰ However, scholars acknowledge that the term “discourse” has been over-used and misapplied in academia,¹⁰¹ and different interpretations of it can be found. This section discusses different approaches in discourse studies to clarify what is understood as “discourse” in this study.

Before describing the existing definitions of discourse in more detail, I would like to start with a quote from Jan Blommaert, a prominent scholar in the field of discourse studies:

... an event becomes “a problem” as soon as it is being recognised as such by people, and discursive work is crucial to this; a mountain becomes

⁹⁸ Ibid., 52.

⁹⁹ Fairclough, *Language...*; Gunther Kress, *Linguistic Processes in Sociocultural Practices*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; Teun A. van Dijk, “The Study of Discourse,” in *Discourse as a Structure and Process*, edited by Teun A. van Dijk, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997, 1–34.

¹⁰⁰ Andreas Hepp and Friedrich Krotz, “Mediatized Worlds – Understanding Everyday Mediatization,” in *Mediatized Worlds*, edited by Andreas Hepp and Friedrich Krotz, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 1–15.

¹⁰¹ John E. Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers. An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*, Hampshire–New York: Macmillan–Palgrave, 2007, 21.

a “beautiful” mountain as soon as someone singles it out, identifies it and comments on it to someone else.¹⁰²

These seemingly simple words illustrate the whole nature of discourse: it gives social and cultural meaning to the environment. Thus, discourse consists of two components: linguistic and socio-cultural.

The term “discourse” entered the research and methodological framework of various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences in the 1970s. The study of discourse began when language was recognised as a key factor in structuring power relations.¹⁰³

Several schools of discourse studies have been established over the years. They are homogeneous in their view on the nature of discourse but vary in approach and spectrum of analysis. In her analysis of the history of discourse studies, Ruth Wodak explains that these schools differ from the study of discourse in linguistic terms derived from Foucauldian conceptions of discourse (Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen), cognitive-oriented approaches (Teun van Dijk, Jan Blommaert) as well as sociolinguistics and the study of discourse as a social practice.¹⁰⁴

Initially, the concept of discourse originated in linguistics. Norman Fairclough, studying the phenomenon of discourse, refers primarily to linguistics, specifically to critical language

¹⁰² Jan Blommaert, *Discourse*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 4.

¹⁰³ Ruth Wodak, “What CDA Is About – A Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its Developments,” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001, 5.

¹⁰⁴ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 7.

studies. By “critical,” he means that which is “hidden from people,” i.e. the relationship between language, power and ideology. Critical language studies analyse the social interactions made possible by language but with an emphasis on what lies beyond the linguistic elements. What is “beyond” is very often hidden and can produce certain hidden effects that determine social relations.¹⁰⁵ This means that the direct meaning cannot always be read from the content; it is often “presupposed.”¹⁰⁶

The concept of “hidden from people” and “beyond linguistics” corresponds to Teun van Dijk’s explanation of what discourse is. In the colloquial sense, discourse very often means a form of language, public speeches, i.e. spoken language and the way it is used. Although discourse derives from linguistics, sometimes researchers analysing the discourse of a political or philosophical doctrine omit the linguistic aspect altogether. Van Dijk emphasises, however, that such definitions are very informal. In more in-depth studies of discourse, analysts try to find out what goes “beyond common sense”¹⁰⁷ by assuming that discourse derives from the use of language. The concept of the use of language has been further developed by Blommaert, who argues that discourse is language-in-action or language-in-use. Therefore, in discourse studies, language and action are equal.¹⁰⁸ In a broader sense, discourse deals with **who** uses language, **when**, **how** and **why**.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Fairclough, *Language...*, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers...*, 63.

¹⁰⁷ Van Dijk, “The Study...,” 2.

¹⁰⁸ Blommaert, *Discourse*, 2.

¹⁰⁹ Van Dijk, “The Study...,” 2.

Defining discourse as “language-in-use” makes sense for analysing different types of texts and their interrelationships with social phenomena. The point is that the language people use often varies depending on their social identities, social relations and social settings in which they are involved. This was already demonstrated at the beginning of the 20th century by linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who made a distinction between *langue* and *parole*. Saussure called *parole* a language that was actually spoken or written. In his opinion, it was not socially conditioned but a matter of individual choice.¹¹⁰ However, Fairclough argues that people change the language under the influence of social conditions, so he considers the concept of *parole* to be unsatisfactory; he uses the term “discourse” to indicate that language is socially determined.¹¹¹

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To explain more precisely what discourse is, it is necessary to establish what discourse is not. An example of the difference between such close linguistic phenomena as text and discourse can help clarify the meaning of the latter. The basic distinction is that discourse is not a product but a process, while a text is a product of the process of text production¹¹² by an individual who is a social agent. He or she operates, as Gunther Kress notes, within specific sets of discursive practices that exist within the social institutions in which he or she is situated.

¹¹⁰ Saussure explained this difference in his famous lectures, published posthumously as *Course in General Linguistics* (1916). See Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, translated by Wade Baskin, edited by Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, 9–15.

¹¹¹ Fairclough, *Language...*, 17.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 20.

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These discourses are represented in various forms in the text that the individual produces.¹¹³

Fairclough explains that the process that is discourse includes both the process of producing the text and the process of interpreting it.¹¹⁴ Earlier, it has been noted that discourse refers to the spoken language; however, a text is not limited to speech but encompasses different types of expression. It has its “users” – authors and readers,¹¹⁵ who incorporate the product (text) into a particular process (discourse).

From this point of view, Fairclough proposes the following definition of discourse:

Discourse, then, involves social conditions, which can be specified as social conditions of production, and social conditions of interpretation. These social conditions, moreover, relate to three different “levels” of social organization: the level of the social situation, or the immediate social environment in which the discourse occurs; the level of the social institution which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse; and the level of the society as a whole.¹¹⁶

In other words, using Fairclough’s framework and nomination scheme, it can be said that discourse studies are concerned with the relationship between text, context and interaction.¹¹⁷

As already mentioned, the broadest and most general definition of discourse is “language-in-use.” When people use language in any of its forms – written or spoken – they communicate, and when people communicate, they do something;

¹¹³ Kress, *Linguistic Processes...*, 31.

¹¹⁴ Fairclough, *Language...*, 20.

¹¹⁵ Van Dijk, “The Study...,” 3.

¹¹⁶ Fairclough, *Language...*, 20–21.

¹¹⁷ Van Dijk, “The Study...,” 3.

they interact.¹¹⁸ Van Dijk calls this phenomenon a communicative event.¹¹⁹ Therefore, discourse deals with something that is beyond language. In this context, discourse analysts identify the interrelationship between discourse and social practices.¹²⁰

This approach is based on the Foucauldian idea that discourses should be regarded as “discontinuous practices” that intertwine and interact with each other. Foucault did not use the term “social practice,” but for subsequent scholars of discourse, it has acquired a crucial meaning. Accordingly, Fairclough and Lilie Chouliaraki provide the following definition of social practices:

... habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world. Practices are constituted throughout social life – in the specialised domains of the economy and politics, for instance, but also in the domain of culture, including everyday life.¹²¹

Chouliaraki and Fairclough emphasise that social practices can be viewed in two ways: as particular social actions or habitual ways of acting. This duality means that they have the character of both event and agency.¹²² The media are a vivid example of social practices that are simultaneously actions and agencies.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 2.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁰ Foucault, “The Order...,” 67.

¹²¹ Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity. Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, 21.

¹²² Ibid., 22.

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1.1.4. DISCOURSES OF IDENTITY AND MEDIA

The connection between discourse analysis and the construction of national identity can be found in the work of Austrian researcher Ruth Wodak and her colleagues. They have examined how national identity is constructed by elites in the public, semi-public and private spheres, rejecting the idea of a **single** national identity. The researchers believe that there are different identities, “discursively constructed according to audience, setting, topic and substantive content. National identities are therefore malleable, fragile and, frequently, ambivalent and diffuse.”¹²³ Hence, they refer to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* and treat identity as a “complex of common or similar beliefs or opinions internalised in the course of socialisation” and as “common or similar behavioural dispositions, including inclusive, solidarity-oriented and exclusive, distinguishing dispositions and also in many cases linguistic dispositions.”¹²⁴

Wodak and her colleagues propose four main content-related areas in the discursive construction of national identity that can be applied not only to Austria, on which they focus in their study, but to other countries as well: the concept of nation, *homo nationalis*, the construction of a collective past and the relationship between the concept of “Europe” and a given country.¹²⁵ They also examine the role of the German component in the construction of national identity in Austria, which is relevant to

¹²³ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 4.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 28.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 4.

this study since I analyse the impact of the Polish component on Ukrainian identity.

In media practice, the process of identity making is implicit because there are no direct indicators of identity; there are, however, certain discourses which guide us on how to interpret information about identity. As Fairclough explains, readers can infer the implied meaning from a list of attributes. However, different signs are used to help the recipients to decode the hidden meaning or relations of power in the discourse.¹²⁶ Blommaert thus proposes to understand discourse as a semiotic human activity associated with historical, cultural and social patterns and development of use.¹²⁷ According to him, the phenomenon of discourse includes all the arrangements of signs that make up the entire meaning of the material under analysis. For example, a newspaper article has a title and a subtitle and may be illustrated or divided into sections. Authors may use special linguistic, morphological and syntactic features in the narrative of the text, as well as metaphors and various indirect references. All these elements, taken together, point to a certain meaning of the entire discourse of identity.

The process of constructing or manifesting identity involves semiotic representation: various symbols and narratives.¹²⁸ Blommaert identifies several semiotic layers of identity: real; sociological – groupness; socially-constructed categories – age, sex, occupation, nationality, cultural and ethnolinguistic

¹²⁶ Fairclough, *Language...*, 45.

¹²⁷ Blommaert, *Discourse*, 3.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 203.

identities; certain complexes – old versus young, well-educated versus the less educated, etc.¹²⁹

In turn, discourse can produce certain structural effects, which Fairclough divides into three levels. At the content level, structural effects are associated with knowledge and beliefs; at the relational level – with social relations; and at the subject level – with social identities. This categorisation is crucial for the study of Ukrainian identity in Polish media discourse because the way in which this identity is presented (or what type of identity discourse is presented) determines the structural effects among the audience of these discourses. One such structural effect is the already-mentioned concept of **perceived identity**.

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Blommaert supports the idea of constructed identity in discourse, arguing that identity is not an innate trait but an acquired one: people do not possess an identity, but they perform, enact or produce it. Hence, the main assumption of this study is that identity, in order to be established, must be **recognised** by others.¹³⁰ On the political level, this is clearly expressed when a state is recognised by other states as independent. If it does not meet the requirements, it retains its non-state status.

Blommaert rightly argues that identity is assigned independently of self-identification. People make claims about their identities through various indicators: actions, signs, symbols. All these attributes can be interpreted differently depending on the circumstances. Therefore, under different social conditions, a given sign may imply a different identification. Blommaert

¹²⁹ Ibid., 204.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 205.

emphasises that being included in a certain category of identity is not up to the individual; people are grouped by others in a particular process of social categorisation, which is known as othering.¹³¹ This is the very example of language-in-use: language in social conditions constructs, ascribes, projects identities. Blommaert proposes to see identity in discourse as a particular form of semiotic potential, organised into a repertoire and as an act of performance. In a discursive narrative, people express themselves as different actors, playing different roles. All these features make up the semiosis of identity organised by topic, situation, genre, style, occasion, purpose, actors and roles. I will use this semiotic framework in the analysis of the discourse of Ukrainian identity in the Polish opinion-forming press.

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This is only one of the approaches to identity and discourse. Others are connected with particular times and places that differ in terms of who holds the power. For example, in the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc, there were deliberate practices aimed at simplifying identity. One form of such simplification are stereotypes.¹³² Ron Scollon's analysis of the relationship between national identity and discourse refers to the constructivist approach in socio-cultural space. His main argument is that all human actions are mediated by "cultural tools." One of these cultural tools is language, which

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ron Scollon, "Official and Unofficial Discourses of National Identity. Questions Raised by the Case of Contemporary Hong Kong," in *Challenges in a Changing World. Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Christoph Lunwig, Wien: Passagen-Verlag, 1999, 21–22.

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constitutes the essence of discourse. In turn, certain discourses are limited and, at the same time, defined by socio-historical tradition.¹³³ Scollon's approach is worth applying in this study for methodological reasons because the researcher attempts to establish whether there are any discourses of identity specific to postcolonial relations.

Discourse is very often about face-to-face communication. However, in modern society, it often involves participants who do not know each other and are separated in time and space.¹³⁴ The most visible example of such discourse occurs in the radio, press, television, film and Internet, that is, in the media. Fairclough writes that media discourse is interesting because power relations are not always clear; he calls them hidden relations of power.¹³⁵

According to Fairclough, media discourse is characterised by "one-sidedness," with no direct interaction between participants. There is a sharp divide between producers and interpreters because the former do not exactly know who their audience is. However, the lack of immediate feedback does not mean that media producers do not target anyone. They always "produce with some interpreters in mind," which means that media discourse is created for an ideal subject with whom the actual recipients of the information have to negotiate a relationship.¹³⁶

¹³³ Ibid., 26.

¹³⁴ Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse...*, 10.

¹³⁵ Fairclough, *Language...*, 41.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

Media owners, media producers and media outlets have become new sources of power – the power of communication.¹³⁷ Fairclough describes the power relations in the media as mediated relations between the power holders and the masses. If we assume that the process of identity formation is also a kind of power relationship and replace the word “power” with the word “identity,” we will get what is considered by media discourse as **mediated** relations between identity holders. This approach is supported by Robert Ferguson, who argues that ideology and power relations should be studied by every media researcher since they are mediated through media discourses.¹³⁸ This type of power “is implicit in the practice of media rather than being explicit.”¹³⁹ While the media seek to provide a venue for discussion and gratuitously illustrate social changes, they play the role of a constructor and mediator of meaning.¹⁴⁰

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Media texts can have causal consequences and influence social actions.¹⁴¹ The media – in the case of this study, the press – are the discourse, i.e. the context of the language-in-use. The functioning of the media in society is very specific because they gather many discourses that refer to different levels of social action. One of them is the identity discourse.

As studies of mass communication and culture suggest, the portrayal of identity issues in the media is strongly tied to

¹³⁷ Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

¹³⁸ Robert Ferguson, *The Media in Question*, London: Arnold, 2004, 24.

¹³⁹ Fairclough, *Language...*, 43.

¹⁴⁰ Wodak, “What CDA Is About...,” 1–13.

¹⁴¹ Nick Couldry, “Media Discourse and the Naturalisation of Categories,” in *Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Veronika Koller, Berlin–New York: de Gruyter, 2008, 67.

the concept of interpretation. The ways of representing and interpreting reality in the media have been described by Stuart Hall, who uses the terms “encoding” and “decoding.”¹⁴² He argues that all information in the media is first encoded by special tools used to create the media message and then decoded by readers, who also use a certain cognitive and emotional apparatus. The first stage (encoding) is called media discourse and is concerned with the analysis of the content and output. The second stage involves the study of the audience.

More specifically, the media discourse encompasses two main aspects – what is written or broadcasted and under what social conditions, i.e. how the process of producing a text in the media is determined by the rules and norms of a given community.¹⁴³ For this study, I have adopted a method in which the media discourse is viewed in the context of the community in which it is produced¹⁴⁴ since the media represent reality through the “distorting lenses or selective filters” of the social group they create and represent.¹⁴⁵

As the discourse itself has a linguistic and social dimension, the media discourse analysis can be both linguistic and “non-linguistic.”¹⁴⁶ The linguistic approach focuses on all levels of language analysis, including style and variation, and also refers to the related areas of discourse – register and

¹⁴² Stuart Hall, “Encoding, Decoding,” in *The Cultural Studies Reader*, edited by Simon During, London–New York: Routledge, 1993, 91.

¹⁴³ Colleen Cotter, “Discourse and Media,” in *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, edited by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen and Heidi E. Hamilton, Oxford–Malden: Blackwell, 2001, 410.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 417.

¹⁴⁵ Myra MacDonald, *Exploring Media Discourse*, London: Arnold, 2003, 12.

¹⁴⁶ Cotter, “Discourse...,” 417.

genre.¹⁴⁷ The non-linguistic research touches on such disciplines as political science, communication studies and, in some cases, cultural studies.¹⁴⁸

Colleen Cotter writes that a paradigm for “discourse analysis” enables an analysis of a media text that goes beyond the structure of the word or sentence to include “questions of participant, topic, function, and discourse structure, as well as a range of topics that includes news interviews, quotation and reported speech, register issues, politeness, positioning and framing, and so forth.”¹⁴⁹ The various methods of discourse analysis will be discussed in the next subchapter.

1.2. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS OF TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Researchers attach great importance to the interpretation of media discourse.¹⁵⁰ This opens up the field to the analysis of the perception of media text. The process of interpretation is closely related to the content of the text. There are many types of textual analysis, but a proper understanding of the world depends on choosing the right one. According to Alan McKee, textual analysis is an appropriate method of collecting data for those researchers who “want to understand how members of different

¹⁴⁷ Ruth Wodak, “Introduction: Discourse Studies – Important Concepts and Terms,” in *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, New York–Hampshire: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008, 1–29; Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse. Textual Analysis for Social Research*, London–New York: Routledge, 2003.

¹⁴⁸ Cotter, “Discourse...,” 418.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 417.

¹⁵⁰ Couldry, “Media Discourse...,” 77.

cultures and subcultures make sense of who they are and how they fit into the world in which they live.”¹⁵¹ It is thus very useful in identity studies.

Media analysts agree that textual analysis is derived from the theories of structuralism and poststructuralism,¹⁵² as well as the linguistic studies of Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes and Jacques Lacan. It was significantly influenced by Barthes, who argued in his *Mythologies* that a myth consists of a “tri-dimensional pattern” of sign, signified and signifier.¹⁵³ Later, his concepts were applied to all kinds of culture and so also to media and media texts. Semiotic analysis is, moreover, based on the Saussurian notion of language as a site of meaning.¹⁵⁴

Generally, there are two types of texts: open, which can be interpreted in many ways, and closed, which have a specific meaning. The more complex a text, the more open it is.¹⁵⁵ As Jason Bainbridge argues, in the media, texts are polysemic, i.e. open to multiple interpretations. Very often, they manipulate the relationship between signifier and signified in order to adapt the message to different audiences. Bainbridge emphasises that when analysing a text, it is useful to ask questions not only about what is present but what has been left out – the structuring absences.

¹⁵¹ Alan McKee, *Textual Analysis. A Beginner's Guide*, London: Sage, 2003, 1.

¹⁵² Jason Bainbridge, “Textual Analysis and Media Research,” in *Media and Journalism. New Approaches to Theory and Practice*, edited by Jason Bainbridge, Nicola Goc and Elizabeth Tynan, 2nd ed., Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011, 224.

¹⁵³ Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, translated by Annette Lavers, New York: The Noonday Press, 1991, 113.

¹⁵⁴ Denis McQuail, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, 5th ed., Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007, 346.

¹⁵⁵ Bainbridge, “Textual Analysis...,” 229.

1.2.1. CONTENT ANALYSIS

One of the most popular methods of analysing media texts is content analysis. It will be used in this study together with Critical Discourse Analysis (see below). Content analysis aims to create an objective, measurable and verifiable description of the contents of a media text. As John Fiske writes, it analyses the denotative order of signification. Content analysis is not selective; it analyses the entire message or message system.¹⁵⁶ That is what makes it objective; to quote Agnieszka Hess, “it eliminates bias from the description of media outlets, clarifies the terminological apparatus, referring to both the form and the content of the outlets.”¹⁵⁷

Media scholar Denis McQuail distinguishes two types of media content analysis: message content analysis (“traditional”) and structural content analysis.¹⁵⁸ Traditional content analysis is quantitative, that is, it involves counting the occurrence of selected units in a text. It also includes the study of content functions and expresses the results as an “overall distribution of the complete universe or chosen content sample in terms of the frequency of the occurrence of the sought-for referents.”¹⁵⁹ Structural content analysis, in turn, provides an in-depth examination of the text’s structure and its meaning, complementing

¹⁵⁶ John Fiske, *Introduction to Communication Studies*, 2nd ed., London–New York: Routledge, 1996, 136.

¹⁵⁷ Agnieszka Hess, *Spoleczni uczestnicy medialnego dyskursu politycznego w Polsce. Mediatyzacja i strategie komunikacyjne organizacji pozarządowych*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2013, 146.

¹⁵⁸ McQuail, *McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory*, 364.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 363.

message content analysis to create the whole picture of the analysed sample. It is qualitative, holistic, selective, illustrative, specific, reveals hidden meanings and is more relative to readers.¹⁶⁰

McQuail's division corresponds to the main tools of empirical analysis of textual documents: **quantitative** and **qualitative**.¹⁶¹ Quantitative analysis involves examining the individual parts of a text to obtain quantitative indicators. Qualitative analysis explores how a text contributes to social and cultural ideas and is often called discourse analysis.¹⁶²

Barrie Gunter describes the basic concepts of quantitative research. Firstly, it should have a **concept**: an abstract idea, an interpretation of why a phenomenon occurs.¹⁶³ The second component is a **construct** – a combination of concepts, a complex of characteristics. There must also be a **variable**, which is an empirical representation of concepts and constructs, e.g. gender, age, identity.¹⁶⁴ Variables can be differentiated based on the attributes that characterise them (e.g. gender is divided into two categories – male and female). In addition, they can be independent and dependent. The independent variable (also called the “causal” variable) can be “manipulated” by the researcher. The dependent variable, also known as the “effect” or “criterion” variable, is the measure of the response. The researcher's

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 366.

¹⁶¹ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*, 2nd ed., London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004, 87.

¹⁶² Bainbridge, “Textual Analysis...,” 236.

¹⁶³ Barrie Gunter, “The Quantitative Research Process,” in *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research. Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies*, edited by Klaus Bruhn Jensen, London–New York: Routledge, 2002, 210.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

objective is to demonstrate causal relationships between the dependent and independent variables.¹⁶⁵

An essential part of the quantitative research and data collection process is the coding frame of the research sample. “This is the form on which the occurrences of the different categories relating to the unit of analysis, its features and attributes, can be numerically catalogued.”¹⁶⁶ Hence, referring to Fred Kerlinger’s definition, Gunter states that quantitative content analysis is characterised by three main features:¹⁶⁷

1. It is systematic and requires that samples be selected according to clear rules. A uniform coding and analysis procedure must be followed.

2. It is objective, which means that the researcher should not allow his personal biases to influence the analysis.

3. It is quantifiable and accurately presents data on a body of media messages.

However, quantitative content analysis has its limitations. As McQuail points out, by conducting only quantitative research, analysts run the risk of showing “a meaning system rather than discovering it in the content.”¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, quantitative content analysis, being a purely descriptive account of the characteristics of media texts, does not inform us about the role, influence and social impact of the analysed samples.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 211.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 220.

¹⁶⁷ Barrie Gunter, *Media Research Methods. Measuring Audience, Reaction and Impact*, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000, 56–57.

¹⁶⁸ McQuail, *McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory*, 364.

¹⁶⁹ Gunter, “The Quantitative Research...,” 222.

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One should remember, however, that content analysis is not just about quantitative research. As Gunter emphasises, counts and numbers must be complemented by interpretation. Only this can determine the “weight of the message.”¹⁷⁰ The researcher distinguishes the following types of qualitative content analysis: a) structuralist-semiotic analysis, b) discourse analysis, c) rhetorical analysis, d) narrative analysis, e) interpretative analysis.¹⁷¹ They can all be gathered under the name of Critical Discourse Analysis.

1.2.2. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

As mentioned in the previous section, discourse analysis belongs to the qualitative tools of content analysis. Norman Fairclough has paid special attention to textual analysis in social research and suggested that it should focus on ideology and major political and economic processes connected with capitalism, neo-liberalism, Fordism, etc., that shape the development of a social system. This approach involves the analysis of language and its relationship with other aspects of social life, with a particular focus on the social function of the text.¹⁷²

One of the key methods of discourse analysis is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which was developed from Systemic Functional Linguistics based on the work of Michael Halliday.¹⁷³ This method has been elaborated throughout the academic

¹⁷⁰ Gunter, *Media...*, 57.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹⁷² Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse...*, 5.

¹⁷³ Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse...*

tradition of discourse studies by such distinguished scholars as Norman Fairclough and the British school of discourse studies, Ruth Wodak and the Viennese school, Theo van Leeuwen, Teun van Dijk and the Amsterdam school, Jan Blommaert and others. In this section, I will provide a brief general overview of CDA and its many approaches and then identify the CDA tools I will use.

As John Fiske points out, every “individual has a number of discourses deriving from the various social groupings of which s/he is a member: reading is a negotiation between the numerous discourses of the reader and the discourse in the text.”¹⁷⁴ CDA is thus an interpretative, contextual and constructivist approach to analysing media texts. In other words, it provides “interpretations of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from this.”¹⁷⁵ It also takes into account the contexts and the relationships between the producer and receiver of the text.

First and foremost, CDA is a particular way of discovering and interpreting knowledge. Siegfried Jäger explains its essence in terms of Foucault’s discourse theory, stating that it serves to answer questions about the nature and function of knowledge.¹⁷⁶ He argues that knowledge is all kinds of information that people acquire in everyday life and gain from science.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Fiske, *Introduction...*, 113.

¹⁷⁵ Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers...*, 15.

¹⁷⁶ Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith, New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.

¹⁷⁷ Siegfried Jäger, “Discourse and Knowledge. Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis,” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001, 33.

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Therefore, since knowledge permeates all spheres of human life, discourse is present everywhere, and CDA serves as the “flow of knowledge.”¹⁷⁸

Although, like discourse, CDA is derived from linguistics, it crosses discipline boundaries and goes beyond linguistics. Some researchers are of the opinion that its method is more sociological or socio-psychological.¹⁷⁹ This is because CDA focuses on the relations between discourse and power and considers discourse as a “social practice,”¹⁸⁰ which ensures its interdisciplinarity. Since CDA is closely related to social processes, Michael Meyer states that it should be considered not as a single method but rather as an approach consisting of different levels.¹⁸¹

It is these levels that constitute the essence of the analysis.

The term “critical” needs to be clarified here. Ruth Wodak writes that

a fully “critical” account of discourse would thus require a theorization and description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects, create meanings in their interaction with texts. Consequently, three concepts figure indispensably in all CDA: the concept of power, the concept of history, and the concept of ideology.¹⁸²

In addition, Robert Ferguson considers ideology as the basis for the formation of a belief system, which also occupies

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 35.

¹⁷⁹ Michael Meyer, “Between Theory, Method, and Politics. Positioning of the Approaches to CDA,” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001, 16.

¹⁸⁰ Wodak, “What CDA Is About...,” 2.

¹⁸¹ Meyer, “Between Theory...,” 14.

¹⁸² Wodak, “What CDA Is About...,” 2–3.

an important place in media discourse.¹⁸³ The three concepts emphasised by Wodak can be extended to tradition, culture and society.¹⁸⁴ Tradition can be interpreted as part of history and culture as a component of ideology or political tradition. Notwithstanding, all these concepts form the context of the text that is central to CDA. In general, CDA serves “to ‘demystify’ discourses by ‘deciphering’ ideologies.”¹⁸⁵

1.2.3. NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH’S METHODS OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

It should be noted that CDA is a highly complex form of textual analysis. It has seen many variations and modifications since its introduction into the academic sphere. Its foundations and methodology were developed primarily by Norman Fairclough, who distinguished three stages of CDA: description, interpretation and explanation.

During the first stage, **description**, the content of the text is examined on several levels, depending on the analysed components: vocabulary, grammar, textual structures.¹⁸⁶ This stage uses lexical and grammatical analysis, which constitutes the micro-textual level of the CDA.¹⁸⁷ It prepares the ground for the macro-level analysis that occurs at the later stages of interpretation and explanation, which is when discursive and social practices can be discovered. In fact, CDA involves “moving

¹⁸³ Ferguson, *The Media...*, 10–11.

¹⁸⁴ Meyer, “Between Theory...,” 15.

¹⁸⁵ Wodak, “What CDA Is About...,” 10.

¹⁸⁶ Fairclough, *Language...*, 91–93.

¹⁸⁷ Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers...*, 47.

back and forth, in recursive circles”¹⁸⁸ between micro- and macro-levels of analysis.

The second stage is **interpretation**, when discourse processes are analysed according to background knowledge and assumptions in order to show when the invisible gets visible.¹⁸⁹ Fairclough argues that the relationship between text and social structure is indirect. It is mediated primarily by the discourse of which the text is a part because the values of textual features only become real and socially operative when they are embedded in social interaction, where texts are produced and interpreted against a background of common-sense assumptions that give textual features their value.¹⁹⁰ To understand this “common sense,” the researcher needs interpretative analysis.

The third stage of Fairclough’s framework is **explanation**, which treats discourse as part of social order, process or practice and analyses it in terms of how it is determined by social structures and what effect it can have on them, i.e. whether it sustains or changes them.¹⁹¹ In other words, the analyst examines the relationships that are mediated by the social context of the discourse and determines the relationship of the discourse to social processes. At this stage, all the features of discourse described in the previous subchapter are taken into account.

¹⁸⁸ Gerlinde Mautner, “Analyzing Newspapers, Magazines and Other Print Media,” in *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, New York–Hampshire: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008, 44.

¹⁸⁹ Chouliaraki and Fairclough, *Discourse...*, 67. Although some scholars distinguish interpretative analysis as a distinct form of content analysis (Gunter, *Media...*, 90), I will treat it in this study as part of CDA.

¹⁹⁰ Fairclough, *Language...*, 117.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 135.

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Power relations and social struggles, ideologies and ideals, hidden meanings and implications of discourse producers and others are analysed. In the case of this study, the explanation stage allowed me to discover, as Leo Havemann writes, the different foci of the “multiple ways in which identities are articulated and constructed, contradicted and negotiated, across that blurred boundary between cultural representations and realities.”¹⁹²

1.2.4. RUTH WODAK’S CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS APPROACH TO NATIONAL IDENTITY

Ruth Wodak proposes a multidisciplinary approach to CDA that takes into account various factors of human life that influence the entire discourse of the issue under analysis. In their study of the discursive construction of national identity in Austria, Wodak and her colleagues have suggested using an approach that combines multiple methods of CDA and examines the following components:

1. Contents
2. Strategies
3. Means and forms of realisation

Critical content analysis involves the examination of certain features that are believed to accommodate, contain or influence identity. According to Wodak and others, they

¹⁹² Leo Havemann, “Method or Madness? Textual Analysis in Media Studies,” paper presented at the conference of the Australian & New Zealand Communication Association (ANZCA) “Shifting Disciplines: Communication, Discourses and Identities” at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand, July 7–9, 1998, 13, accessed April 26, 2022, http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10289/8180/Havemann_Method_or_Madness_ANZCA98.pdf?sequence=1.

include politics, culture, history and traditions of nation-building, landscapes and natural heritage that are associated with a certain nation.¹⁹³

The next step in the analysis concerns strategies. They are understood here after Pierre Bourdieu as an “unconscious relationship between a *habitus* and a field.”¹⁹⁴ However, Wodak and her colleagues do not agree with the French sociologist that strategies are actions, arguing that actions are what make strategies real. Strategies are thus goal-oriented, even if those goals are unconscious or implicit,¹⁹⁵ and can vary depending on the goal they seek to achieve. Among the most common are constructive strategies, strategies of justification, strategies of transformation, dismantling or destructive strategies and strategies of assimilation or dissimulation.¹⁹⁶ If we assume that CDA encompasses the entire spectrum of what is, has been and can be said in a given situation, society or culture, then strategies help in analysing the limitations or extensions of the analysed material, which provides perspectives for further components of the process of CDA.¹⁹⁷

One more CDA tool is the analysis of cultural stereotypes or *topoi*, which are a repertoire of images of social, political and cultural life that influence the construction of certain discourses – especially in the media.¹⁹⁸ Very often, *topoi* serve as

¹⁹³ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 30–31.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 32.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 33.

¹⁹⁷ Jäger, “Discourse...,” 35.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

justification for an argument, explaining the goals of a strategy. If the justification is not rational, it is flawed.¹⁹⁹

As indicated above, strategies have to be implemented. There are particular forms of their realisation in constructing one's national identity. In this study, national identity is constructed from the outside, from the perspective of people who are not members of the group. It is a **perceived identity**, so the strategies are somewhat different from those used when identity is constructed by members of the given group. A vivid example of the construction of perceived identity is the phenomenon that Edward Said called "Orientalism."²⁰⁰ The identities of colonial territories that existed in the Western imagination were first perceived and then reconstructed by non-members of the group. Although the identity did not always coincide with reality, it existed and served a common perception of the territories that were colonised. The same idea appears in Larry Wolff's concept of the invention of Eastern Europe and the creation of its identity among the non-members of the group.²⁰¹ A third example is Maria Todorova's analysis of the creation of Balkan identity by the West.²⁰² Therefore, referring to Wodak's method of analysing means and forms of strategies' realisation, Ukrainian identity in the Polish press will be analysed in relation to the following aspects:

1. **Personal references.** I will analyse how social actors are represented in the text and what is the linguistic, syntactic

¹⁹⁹ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 35.

²⁰⁰ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

²⁰¹ Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe...*

²⁰² Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

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and morphological discourse of their representation. This will involve analysing what parts of speech are used to indicate social actors, what their place is in the text and what semantic role they play. I will also examine the tropes used because they represent the author's emotional and semantic view, which is an important part of discourse analysis.²⁰³ Lastly, I will analyse the agencies of identity that are represented in the text.

2. **Spatial references.** I will examine what toponyms and geonyms Polish journalists use to refer to Ukraine and how they do it, especially what additional descriptions, explanations or tropes they include.

3. **Temporal references.** I will analyse which periods, also historical, are mentioned in the text.

1.2.5. THEO VAN LEEUWEN'S METHOD OF ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ACTORS

The representation of social actors occupies one of the key places in CDA, especially in identity studies, as in this case. John E. Richardson points out that the way people are named or represented in the text affects the way they are perceived.²⁰⁴ Identities depend on social practices that entail the actions of actors (agents). As Ron Scollon writes, action is an extremely complex phenomenon that can never be analytically separated from human identity.²⁰⁵ Hence, to understand identity, one must analyse the actors.

²⁰³ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 35.

²⁰⁴ Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers...*, 49.

²⁰⁵ Scollon, "Official and Unofficial Discourses...", 21.

Theo van Leeuwen suggests that we should ask how social actors are represented – “impersonally or personally, individually or collectively, by reference to their person or their utterance.”²⁰⁶ Analysing this is very important because representation encompasses many different aspects, which enables us to obtain relevant material and data. Firstly, it can lead to the analysis of exclusion and inclusion, which is very important in the question of identity. Secondly, the analysis of representation introduces the concept of **nomination** and **nominalisation**. The difference between them lies in the dimensions to which they refer: nomination refers to the sociological sphere and nominalisation to the linguistic one.²⁰⁷ Finally, examining the ways in which social actors are represented also throws light on the reallocation of roles and the rearrangement of social relations between participants. Therefore, during the analysis, it is important to identify whether social actors are “agents” (actor) or “patients” (goal),²⁰⁸ i.e. whether they are active or passive players. This can be examined grammatically or semantically (passive/active voice; relationships with other social actors).

Another issue to consider when studying the representation of social actors is whether they are represented as a group or class (**assimilation, genericisation**) or as specific individuals (**individualisation, specification**).²⁰⁹ Analysing such references is very important for this study because they may reflect a certain perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press.

²⁰⁶ Van Leeuwen, “The Representation...,” 33.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 34.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 43.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 46–48.

Actors can also be represented as groups through **association** (the opposite is **dissociation**). It occurs when people are portrayed as a certain group with features that distinguish them from others as a whole (e.g. bureaucrats, civil servants, politicians).²¹⁰

From the perspective of identity research and this study, the following two aspects of analysing social actors are the most important: nomination and categorisation, as well as functionalisation and identification. **Nomination** occurs when actors are named directly using their proper names or unique identity; the opposite phenomenon is **categorisation**, when actors are presented using the identity which they share with others. **Functionalisation** and **identification** are used to represent social actors in terms of “what they do” and “who they are,” respectively.²¹¹ We can thus study their identity through classification, physical or cultural identification, etc. One more way of representing social actors that is also related to the study of identity is through **personalisation** (e.g. “the Ukrainians) or **impersonalisation** (e.g. “Ukraine”).²¹²

1.2.6. ANALYSIS OF NARRATIVE

In the analysis of the discursive construction of identity, I will also address the issue of the general “narrative” about Ukrainians and Ukraine that exists in the Polish press. Wodak and her colleagues devote much attention to the analysis of

²¹⁰ Ibid., 50.

²¹¹ Ibid., 52–54.

²¹² Ibid., 59.

narrative.²¹³ The narrative is part of communicative interaction and, therefore, part of social practices. As a genre, it is yet another aspect of discourse analysis that belongs to the macro-level of CDA.²¹⁴

It should be noted at the beginning that analysts distinguish between narrative content (the sequence of events, plot and action) and narrative form (the order in which events are presented).²¹⁵ The narrative can be produced through spoken, written, kinesthetic, pictorial and musical modes of representation.²¹⁶ Peter Larsen, referring to Roland Barthes, argues that narrative texts appear in all kinds of discursive forms and all kinds of media. He offers the following definition of the narrative:

As a textual type, however, the narrative is defined solely by its content: a narrative is a representation of events in time and space. These events are organised in series of causes and effects, and viewed in relation to human projects which they either further or impede.²¹⁷

Put more simply, narratives are stories constructed from “elementary sequences”:²¹⁸ situations, main characters, general states of affairs and so on, which are transformed throughout the development of the story by the consequences of the events and actions in which the characters participate or which they

²¹³ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 83.

²¹⁴ Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers...*, 47.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 71.

²¹⁶ Elinor Ochs, “Narrative,” in *Discourse as a Structure and Process*, edited by Teun A. van Dijk, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997, 185.

²¹⁷ Peter Larsen, “Mediated Fiction,” in *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research. Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies*, edited by Klaus Bruhn Jensen, London–New York: Routledge, 2002, 124–125.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 125.

perform. Thus, media texts can be analysed using the method of attentive “close reading” because they are narratives²¹⁹ and, consequently, can be treated as stories.²²⁰

In media studies, narrative analysis attempts to identify the ways in which authors express themselves. It differs from other discursive models of analysis, such as the study of the relationship between language and social practices, by, to paraphrase Barbara Johnstone, its ability to make sense of the world through telling stories.²²¹ The analysis of narrative allows the researcher to discover communicative modalities of the text. For instance, Elinor Ochs explains that “rather than using different modes of communication, the narrator implies these modes through stylistic variation.”²²² This variation may indicate a change in the mode of expression, such as a shift from descriptive or indirect speech to direct quotation. All these interpretive elements lead to different levels of CDA, shifting the focus to a narrower context of intertextuality, analysis of social actors and emotional context.

A vivid example of evaluating a narrative about a specific event or person in a media report is the commentary of an expert who assesses the situation and social actors, rates it and

²¹⁹ Gaye Tuchman, “The Production of News,” in *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research. Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies*, edited by Klaus Bruhn Jensen, London–New York: Routledge, 2002, 81.

²²⁰ Gunter, *Media...*, 90. It should be noted that Barbara Johnstone makes a distinction between these two terms: for her, a “narrative” describes events in the past, while a “story” is a narrative with a point, Barbara Johnstone, “Discourse Analysis and Narrative,” in *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, edited by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen and Heidi E. Hamilton, Oxford–Malden: Blackwell, 2001, 639.

²²¹ Johnstone, “Discourse Analysis...,” 639.

²²² Ochs, “Narrative,” 186.

proposes solutions. Such particularisation is not ideal, but it fits the analysis conducted as part of this study.

In conclusion, understanding the narrative is very helpful, especially when analysing the historical factors that influence the construction of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press, i.e. what historical events and figures are associated with the Ukrainian nation, its origins and development and how they affect the perception of Ukrainians. All these elements contribute to the plot and coherence of texts in the Polish opinion-forming press.

* * *

Discourse studies prove that the media can and do play an instrumental role in power relations. Moreover, identities are a social construct of the power holders. By conducting a textual analysis and CDA, one can obtain relevant data from the entire range of such a multifaceted source of information as the opinion-forming press. Based on the main CDA approaches described above, I developed specific category keys and a tree of codes (see Appendices 1 and 2), which allowed me to identify the main patterns of Ukrainian identity in the Polish opinion-forming press.

MEDIA COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND OPINION-FORMING PRESS

2.1. MASS MEDIA IN THE PROCESS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

The modern world is completely dependent on media of all kinds. It is hard to imagine something important happening and not being described, reflected upon, interpreted or explained by the media. Mass communication has an even longer history than mass media since prehistoric people used cave paintings to send messages about their activities. Indeed, as Marshall McLuhan has stated, “the medium is the message” and “the ‘content’ of any medium is always another medium.”¹

Referring to the constructivist approach in identity research, we can assume that identity is also constructed by the media. It is not enough to be self-identified; one’s self-identity must be recognised and accepted by others in order to be

¹ Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man*, London–New York: Routledge Classics, 2002, 1.

legitimised.² This “perception by others” and “legitimation by others” is also a social construct, shaped by external factors such as, in this case, the media. This is what I call here **perceived identity**.

Researchers agree that the issue of identity usually becomes vivid when it is threatened or when some violent social or political events occur. Identity is then constructed by the media in the process of social communication, which is not only communicative but also discursive and depends on the context and political, economic, cultural and civilisational conditions.³ Thus, to understand the role of the media in the construction of identity, I need to outline how the media reflect the world.

First of all, it should be noted that the media do not present reality as it actually is. They construct, produce and reproduce knowledge about the world. In the process of communication, especially through the media, people learn who other people and nations are, what qualities they possess and what their good and bad sides are. Communication enables being in two dimensions: internal and external, individual and collective.⁴

The distortion between reality and its image in the media is due to the nature of media communication: the media, just like

² Maria Miczyńska-Kowalska, “Konsumpcja formą komunikowania tożsamości i przynależności społecznej jednostki,” in *Tożsamość i komunikacja*, edited by Justyna Szulich-Kałuża, Leon Dyczewski and Robert Szwed, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011, 58.

³ Maja Megier, “Współczesna tożsamość narodowa jako wytwór działań politycznych i komunikacyjnych,” in *Tożsamość i komunikacja*, edited by Justyna Szulich-Kałuża, Leon Dyczewski and Robert Szwed, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011, 30–31.

⁴ Monika Podkowińska, “Tożsamość jednostki a proces komunikowania,” in *Tożsamość i komunikacja*, edited by Justyna Szulich-Kałuża, Leon Dyczewski and Robert Szwed, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011, 21.

people, cannot perceive reality without constructing it.⁵ Niklas Luhmann emphasises that there is a difference between what is observed and how it is observed, between what really is and what must be. The media text is “second-level observation” or “observation of the observation” within a specific media framework.⁶ Hence, identity in the media ceases to be an attribute of human beings and becomes a product of the information society.⁷ This highlights the multifunctionality of the media, in which identity is generated according to time, place and situation, becoming symbolic and metaphorical.⁸ This applies also to the concept of perceived identity.

The issue of identity in the media can be addressed in relatively implicit ways. Helen Wood proposes to use a set of dichotomies: text and audience, isolation or connection, reason and emotion. These pairs also refer to other sets of dichotomies – transmission or ritual, old and new.⁹ The specificity of the relationship between identity and media lies in existing approaches to identity: primordialism and constructivism. Wood argues that identity is something that already exists – the media can only add to it or subtract from it.¹⁰ Manuel Castells, in turn, states that there are three ways of identity building: legitimising

⁵ Michael Fleischer, *Ogólna teoria komunikacji*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2007, 12.

⁶ Niklas Luhmann, *Realność mediów masowych*, translated by Joanna Barbacka, Wrocław: GAJT, 2009, 81–89.

⁷ Sylwia Jaskuła, “Informacyjna przestrzeń tożsamości,” in *Tożsamość i komunikacja*, edited by Justyna Szulich-Kałuża, Leon Dyczewski and Robert Szwed, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011, 14.

⁸ Ibid., 16–19.

⁹ Helen Wood, “From Media and Identity to Mediated Identity,” in *The Sage Handbook of Identities*, edited by Margaret Wetherell and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2010, 259.

¹⁰ Ibid.

identity, resistance identity and project identity.¹¹ It thus seems more reasonable to assume that identity is socially constructed and then processed in the media with inevitable changes depending on the ideology and tradition of a given medium.

Let us now return to the issue of discourse in identity studies. Wood rightly notes that identities in the media are provisional and function as attachment to the subject position that is constructed by discursive practices. It means that identities in the media are flexible, reflecting only the existing discourse, which, however, is more stable and very often depends on the continuing historical and mental traditions of the area under study. Thus, the media create attachments according to existing models and also involve social actors in identity practices.¹²

These identity practices become more pronounced when they are exposed in the media and present the view of a group that shares similar beliefs and uses similar media,¹³ which is a key aspect of my study, in which I explore the concept of perceived identity.

In conclusion, I agree with Maja Megier that “identity is the result of communication and cooperation within a certain political community to which we want to belong or think we have some reason to belong.”¹⁴ This explains why studying identity construction in the media is relevant; in the case of perceived identity, the only thing that changes is the object

¹¹ Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, vol. 2), 2nd ed., Malden–Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 8.

¹² Wood, “From Media...,” 258–259.

¹³ Michael D. Slater, “Reinforcing Spirals. The Mutual Influence of Media Selectivity,” *Communication Theory* 17 (3) (2007), 291.

¹⁴ Megier, “Współczesna tożsamość...,” 32.

of study, which is one's identity constructed by "others" in order to present it to "others." Thus, identity is inevitably reconstructed through locally existing discourse, and the discourse of identity is, in turn, created in the communication paradigm.¹⁵

2.2. POLISH OPINION-FORMING PRESS AND THE DISCOURSE OF OPINION JOURNALISM (PUBLICYSTYKA)

The democratisation of the public sphere in Poland after 1989 meant a transformation of the Polish press from a monopoly to pluralism and the emergence of different types of ownership in the media market.¹⁶ According to Tomasz Mielczarek, the main trends in the development of the Polish media during that period were the concentration of media ownership with a simultaneous homogenisation of content, media specialisation and audience segmentation, as well as digitalisation of media messages. Moreover, the abolition of censorship allowed the Polish media to become actors in social life and to have a real impact on the shaping of public opinion.¹⁷ The current media discourse in Poland is thus characterised by a significant level

¹⁵ Justyna Szulich-Kałuża, Leon Dyczewski and Robert Szwed, "Introduction," in *Tożsamość i komunikacja*, edited by Justyna Szulich-Kałuża, Leon Dyczewski and Robert Szwed, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011, 5.

¹⁶ Zbigniew Bajka, "Rynek mediów w Polsce," in *Dziennikarstwo i świat mediów*, edited by Zbigniew Bauer and Edward Chudziński, 4th ed., Kraków: Universitas, 2012, 184–186.

¹⁷ Tomasz Mielczarek, "Kierunki rozwoju polskich mediów po 1989 roku," in *W kręgu 'Merkurysza Polskiego'. Studia i szkice w 350-lecie prasy polskiej*, edited by Krzysztof Woźniakowski, Grażyna Wrona and Tadeusz Sierna, Katowice: "Śląsk" Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2012, 144–145.

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of conventionalism and various forms of representation.¹⁸ In this study, I will focus on the opinion-forming press (*prasa opiniotwórcza*), which occupies a prominent place in Polish media studies.

Many researchers agree that the dominant feature of texts published in the opinion-forming press is the journalistic style. A very close term appearing often in Polish media studies is opinion journalism (*publicystyka*). In contrast to the more general term “journalism” used in Western media studies, “opinion journalism” has a very narrow meaning, usually signifying an editorial column, an op-ed (“opposite the editorial page”) or an opinion piece, in which journalists or experts, usually called pundits, present their views on important social, political and economic issues.¹⁹

In general, Polish media analysts consider opinion journalism to be a public statement about some important event. This differs from, for instance, German and English understanding of the term. German *publizistik* indicates various communication techniques, which is closer to English *public relations*.²⁰

The *Dictionary of Literary Terms* edited by Stanisław Sierotwiński gives the following definition: “Opinion journalism is a type of writing that discusses current events, for example, political, economic, social, cultural. The purpose of opinion

¹⁸ Maciej Mrozowski, *Media masowe. Władza, rozrywka i biznes*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2001, 304.

¹⁹ Brian McNair, *An Introduction to Political Communication*, London–New York: Routledge, 2011, 72–73.

²⁰ Zbigniew Bauer, “Gatunki dziennikarskie,” in *Dziennikarstwo i świat mediów*, edited by Zbigniew Bauer and Edward Chudziński, 4th ed., Kraków: Universitas, 2012, 269.

journalism is to shape public opinion.”²¹ A similar definition can be found in the *Handbook of Literary Terms* edited by Janusz Sławiński and others: “Opinion journalism (Latin: *publicus* – widespread, social) encompasses articles, comments, polemical texts on current social, economic, cultural events and issues, published in the press, broadcast on the radio or television.”²²

A broader definition is given in the *Dictionary of Literary Terms* edited by Janusz Sławiński:

Opinion journalism is a statement on political, social, cultural and other issues of the moment; it uses persuasive methods and aims to influence public opinion. Opinion journalism is a basic form of journalistic work; it differs from information in that it not only conveys facts in an objective form but also illuminates them from a certain point of view, comments on them and explains them. The development of opinion journalism depends on the development of the media. Before the advent of the press, the term opinion journalism referred to political treatises and other rhetorical forms of expression. In its modern sense, opinion journalism was formed with the development of the press. Today, in addition to the press, opinion journalism has developed in radio, television and film. Very often, opinion journalism finds itself at the junction with literature.²³

As for the opinion-forming press, the *Encyclopedia of Press Knowledge* edited by Julian Maślanka proposes a definition very similar to that of opinion journalism: “Opinion-forming press comments on events with the purpose of shaping public opinion and attitudes.”²⁴ Mielczarek, in turn, lists the attributes

²¹ Stanisław Sierotwiński, ed., *Słownik terminów literackich. Teoria i nauki pomocnicze literatury*, 3rd ed., Wrocław–Kraków–Warszawa: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1970, 253.

²² Janusz Sławiński, ed., *Podręczny słownik terminów literackich*, Warszawa: Oficyna Polska Encyklopedia Niezależna OPEN, 1997, 254.

²³ Janusz Sławiński, ed., *Słownik terminów literackich*, 4th ed., Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2002, 445.

²⁴ Julian Maślanka, ed., *Encyklopedia wiedzy o prasie*, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976, 179.

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of the opinion-forming press: opinion-forming editorial board, focus on socio-political, cultural and even literary issues and domination of the opinion-forming style.²⁵ Thus, opinion journalism is a feature of the opinion-forming press, a media genre and a structural component of the communication. In this study, I will use the terms opinion journalism and opinion-forming press interchangeably.

In Polish media studies, Michał Szulczewski was the first to classify genres of media communication following Aristotle's classification of literature. Szulczewski argued that all information that people receive serves to reduce the level of uncertainty and optimise the decision-making process. Therefore, communication as a way of acquiring information consists of three main parts:

- Informative communication, which conveys information;
- Explanatory communication, which systemises and generalises information in order to draw conclusions;
- Stimulative communication, which creates incentives for certain behaviours and actions.

This explanation allows us to better understand the complex phenomena of reality and the role that social communication plays in it. Therefore, Szulczewski assigns informative communication to the informative genre of journalism, stimulative communication to propaganda, and he links explanatory communication with opinion journalism, which is the core of opinion-forming journalism.²⁶

²⁵ Tomasz Mielczarek, "Współczesna polska prasa opinii," *Rocznik Historii Prasy Polskiej* 16 (1) (31) (2013), 81.

²⁶ Michał Szulczewski, *Publicystyka. Problemy teorii i praktyki*, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1976, 22.

In order to explain what opinion journalism is, one should take as the starting point the nature of opinion-forming press. This nature, as Szulczewski explains, is to show facts, events and phenomena from a certain point of view, to persuade the reader and evoke a certain reaction. However, as Zbigniew Bauer emphasises, the main rule is not to offend anyone; moreover, the author should respect other opinions and views, as long as it increases the level of trust in his text.²⁷ The essence of opinion-forming press, according to Szulczewski, is that it has current relevance and reports on important social issues in a public, intentional way. If information only reflects reality, then opinion journalism reacts to reality. Information is the outside of reality, while opinion journalism is its inside.²⁸

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Szulczewski traces the origins of the opinion-forming style to the speeches of Cicero and Quintilian. But, in fact, opinion journalism originated in literature. Writers of belles-lettres were the first opinion journalists because they commented on important social, political or cultural events. The main difference between opinion journalism and literature is that the latter refers to the spiritual culture of the audience, while the former to its intellectual culture. Indeed, very often, opinion-forming texts use the linguistic means of literary genres. As Andrzej Kaliszewski and Kazimierz Wolny-Zmorzyński emphasise, such texts do not create a fictional reality; they do not atomise the world but “deepen the knowledge about reality.”²⁹

²⁷ Bauer, “Gatunki...,” 274.

²⁸ Szulczewski, *Publicystyka...*, 23–25.

²⁹ Andrzej Kaliszewski and Kazimierz Wolny-Zmorzyński, “Rodzaje i gatunki dziennikarskie. Próba ustaleń genologicznych,” in *W kręgu 'Merkurysza Polskiego.' Studia i szkice w 350-lecie*

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Hence, the author's task in opinion journalism is to persuade the reader, to make him think, and not to leave him indifferent.³⁰

Szulczewski also lists the following qualities of opinion journalism: accessibility, curiosity, regularity, inventiveness, accuracy, clarity, diversity, impactfulness, selectiveness, constant interaction.³¹ However, journalists are not the only ones to write in the opinion-forming style. It is also used by scientists and scholars, allowing them to be less constrained by formal academic requirements, address new topics and fields, make risky hypotheses and go beyond their narrow area of research. In this way, they can gain new readers in the non-academic sphere.

The definitions of opinion journalism and opinion-forming press have not changed much since the 1970s, but with the development of media technology, the importance of opinion journalism has increased, and new forms of it have emerged. Following Szulczewski's thought, contemporary analysts agree that the most widespread genres of journalism are informative journalism and opinion journalism.³² The main difference between them lies in the functions they perform. Opinion-forming press interprets reality by making people think, ask questions and answer them, while informative press just relays

prasy polskiej, edited by Krzysztof Woźniakowski, Grażyna Wrona and Tadeusz Sierna, Katowice: "Śląsk" Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2012, 134–135.

³⁰ Szulczewski, *Publicystyka...*, 51–53.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 70–80.

³² Kazimierz Wolny-Zmorzyński, Andrzej Kaliszewski and Wojciech Furman, *Gatunki dziennikarskie. Teoria, praktyka, język*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2006, 25–31.

the news.³³ The latter presents events objectively, while the former includes strongly motivated individual evaluation and interpretation based on the analysis of facts. According to Bauer, informative journalism enriches people's knowledge of the world, and the opinion-forming press deepens this knowledge by stimulating an intellectual and emotional reaction to the presented facts.³⁴ It is allowed to reach subjective conclusions and pose questions, i.e. to provoke readers to think. In opinion-forming texts, the author is very visible.³⁵

In the book *Bible of Journalism*, journalist Kamil Durczok states that opinion journalism asks the question "why?" so the opinion-forming press collects arguments and draws conclusions in an attempt to answer this question.³⁶ Jerzy Baczyński and Mariusz Janicki argue that opinion journalism deals not with news but with issues, presenting, interpreting and analysing them from the journalist's point of view. The essence of opinion journalism is thus the expression of the author's own opinion, which may be direct or implied.³⁷

There is no doubt that the opinion-forming press is a persuasive form of communication; it influences, shapes and projects people's opinions.³⁸ It has evolved from a source of media

³³ Agnieszka Kula, "O pewnych zasadach sztuki publicystycznej w prasie opiniotwórczej: temporalność i argumentacyjność," *Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Językoznawcza* 20 (40) (1) (2013), 31.

³⁴ Bauer, "Gatunki...", 263.

³⁵ Wolny-Zmorzyński, Kaliszewski and Furman, *Gatunki...*, 29.

³⁶ Kamil Durczok, "Widowisko na poważny temat," in *Biblia dziennikarstwa*, edited by Andrzej Skworz and Andrzej Niziołek, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2010, 587.

³⁷ Jerzy Baczyński and Mariusz Janicki, "Jak chleb z ekstraktem," in *Biblia dziennikarstwa*, edited by Andrzej Skworz and Andrzej Niziołek, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2010, 599.

³⁸ Marian Filipiak, *Homo Communicans. Wprowadzenie do teorii komunikowania masowego*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003, 37.

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coverage to an opinion-maker and agenda-setter, becoming part of the social and political world.³⁹ The agenda-setting function of the media is to tell people “what to think about” and thus influence public opinion.⁴⁰ Due to their genesis and social functions, journalistic texts belong to social codes.

However, there are also other definitions of the opinion-forming press. In recent years, it has begun to be considered as the press that is most often cited, which does not necessarily mean most persuasive and thought-provoking. This approach is widely criticised by researchers because not all frequently referenced texts show the characteristics of the opinion-forming style described above. To develop a proper definition of the opinion-forming press, Agnieszka Kula suggests taking into account the following criteria:⁴¹

1. Scope of coverage. The opinion-forming press pays attention to political, cultural, economic and social issues.

2. Perspective of presenting the topic. In the case of the opinion-forming press, texts are written with a public perspective in mind, addressed to a wide audience of non-specialists and cover a wide range of issues, including non-temporal ones.

³⁹ McNair, *An Introduction...*, 72.

⁴⁰ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (2) (1972), 177; Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action”, in *The Communication of Ideas. A Series of Addresses*, edited by Lyman Bryson, New York: Harper, 1964, 95–118.

⁴¹ Agnieszka Kula, “Media opiniotwórcze – próba definicji,” in *Przeobrażenia w języku i komunikacji medialnej na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, edited by Małgorzata Karwatowska and Adam Siwiec, Chełm: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa; Chełmskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 2010, 291.

3. Producer. The person who aspires to create opinion-forming material must be an expert with a broad outlook, argue his point of view and stimulate discussion and the emergence of different thoughts.

4. Audience. The reader must be able to receive, understand and interpret the information sent by the producers, which involves being on an appropriate intellectual level.

In this study, I will therefore use the following definition of the opinion-forming press: all texts in the printed media that not only convey news and facts but also interpret and explain them by providing evaluations, arguments and statements. These texts directly or indirectly (depending on the genre) show the opinion of their authors and bring up issues for further discussion in society with the purpose of shaping public opinion. Opinion journalism must be tendentious, factual and engaged in the actual problems of the society. It is an essential element of public discourse and is addressed to a wide, non-specified audience in order to shape public opinion.

2.3. OPINION-FORMING PRESS ON THE POLISH MEDIA MARKET

The Polish *Encyclopedia of Press Knowledge* divides the opinion-forming press into socio-cultural and socio-political periodicals.⁴² Below, I will briefly characterise the Polish socio-political magazines selected for this study. Some of them are widely popular, while others are read only by particular

⁴² Maślanka, ed., *Encyklopedia...*, 179.

social groups. However, they all throw light on the public discourse that is the object of my research.

As Agnieszka Kula rightly states, nowadays, with the development of Information and Communication Technologies, the printed press faces new challenges. It is not the only source of current and up-to-date information anymore, so it needs to attract readers by offering them an analytical view and commentary on events. The opinion-forming press comes in different forms: broadsheet and small-format newspapers, ambitious weeklies, elite media, etc.⁴³ Top-selling daily newspapers, which in Poland include *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Rzeczpospolita*, *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* and *Nasz Dziennik*, however, are considered to have less impact and continuity than, for example, opinion-forming weeklies.⁴⁴ Tomasz Mielczarek views even the high-quality ones as not fully opinion-forming.⁴⁵ In his book *Report on the Death of Polish Newspapers*, he presents a thorough analysis of the various factors that did not favour the existence of the daily press in Poland and led to its decreasing popularity among readers since it lost the status “of a cultural value and was transformed into a commodity, distributed in the same way as soap, mayonnaise or washing powder.”⁴⁶

Iwona Hofman, in turn, points out that the magazine segment of the opinion-forming press is characterised by a more stable

⁴³ Kula, “Media...,” 287.

⁴⁴ Kaliszewski and Wolny-Zmorzyński, “Rodzaje...,” 125.

⁴⁵ Tomasz Mielczarek, *Monopol, pluralizm, koncentracja. Środki komunikowania masowego w Polsce w latach 1989–2006*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2007, 80–81.

⁴⁶ Tomasz Mielczarek, *Raport o śmierci polskich gazet*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2012, 184.

financial and publishing situation due to having stable target groups – the well-educated middle and upper classes.⁴⁷ In contrast to the daily press, weeklies have been more resistant to changes in the economic situation. Due to wider commercial and promotional opportunities, this segment managed to maintain its leading position among Polish press outlets.

Opinion weeklies (*tygodniki opinii*) thus play a key role among the opinion-forming press in Poland.⁴⁸ Krzysztof Podemski argues that they are “the optimal form of expressing public discourse,”⁴⁹ giving the following reasons:

1. Representatives of the symbolic elites, top pundits and commentators, political leaders and intellectuals (foreign and domestic) write for the weeklies;
2. Weekly magazines have a high circulation rate and relatively large readership;
3. Texts from the weeklies are quoted in other media;
4. Articles from the weeklies are read and discussed in intellectual and opinion-forming circles.

Ryszard Żabiński notes that there was a significant increase in the number of magazine titles in Poland between 1990 and 2009 (from 3,007 to 7,160). This happened despite the widespread trend of the printed media losing their importance and being dominated by the electronic media due to unfavourable

⁴⁷ Iwona Hofman, “Rynek mediów w Polsce. Stan obecny. Próba oceny perspektyw rozwoju,” *Media Dawne i Współczesne* 4 (2009), 75.

⁴⁸ I have already presented an analysis of some of the weekly magazines, describing their characteristics and history, in the article: Olha Tkachenko, “The Perception of Ukrainian Identity during Euromaidan in Polish Opinion-Making Press,” *Studia Medioznawcze* 1 (64) (2016), 76–79.

⁴⁹ Krzysztof Podemski, “Świat w polskich tygodnikach opinii,” *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny* 3 (2011), 243.

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economic conditions (slowdown of the economy in 2000–2003, 2009 and 2011), which strongly affected the situation in the advertising market. Since 1995, the total circulation of magazines in Poland has exceeded that of daily newspapers (in 2009, it amounted to 1,504.7 million and 1,168.3 million copies, respectively). Compared to newspapers, the magazine segment is more diversified. It is also very attractive to advertisers. Żabiński writes that in 2009, PLN 795 million was paid for advertising in magazines, which was more than in the daily press (PLN 620 million) but still less than on the television and the Internet – PLN 3,779 and 846 million, respectively.⁵⁰

Magazines thus play an important role in shaping public opinion, especially the opinion-forming ones. Żabiński divides the development of the Polish segment of weekly magazines in the 21st century into three stages:⁵¹

1) 2001–2003. The period before Poland's accession to the European Union was characterised by unfavourable macro-economic conditions, which had a strong impact on press readership, the advertising market and the economic situation of newspaper publishers. Although the number of magazines increased from 5,771 in 2001 to 6,240 in 2003, the total average circulation decreased from 74,043 thousand copies in 2001 to 69,491 thousand copies in 2003.

2) 2004–2008. During these years, macroeconomic indicators improved, the rate of economic growth increased, and

⁵⁰ Ryszard Żabiński, "Tendencje na rynku czasopism w Polsce w XXI wieku," *Rocznik Historii Prasy Polskiej* 15 (1) (29) (2012), 135.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 136–139.

unemployment fell. These factors had a positive impact on the advertising market, which resulted in the development of the media market. Between 2004 and 2008, the number of magazines increased from 6,425 to 7,013. Total average circulation also increased from 69,122 thousand copies in 2004 to 79,443 thousand copies in 2008. From 2008, opinion-forming weeklies such as *Newsweek*, *Polityka* and *Wprost* started losing their advertising revenue to lifestyle and entertainment magazines.

3) 2009–2010. The fall of 2008 marked the beginning of the economic crisis in the US and Europe, which very quickly moved from the financial sector to the real economy. Already at the end of 2008, the GDP growth rate in Poland decreased to just 2.7%, and then further declined, reaching 1% in the third quarter of 2009. All this affected the advertising market. Newspaper publishers also recorded lower demand from individual consumers. In 2009, sales indicators of opinion-forming journals dropped by 3.21% compared to 2008, but the ad revenues of the most popular weeklies – *Polityka*, *Wprost* and *Newsweek* – remained relatively high. Żabiński believes it was due to their strong influence on shaping public opinion and the fact that their readers were an attractive target group for advertisers.

If social and economic conditions were more or less favourable to the socio-political press, the situation of socio-cultural periodicals was much worse. Thus, the new media market in Poland was dominated by the former because the latter lost reader interest and popularity. Already in 1989, the weekly *Polityka* was the top-selling magazine with a record circulation of 426,000 copies. In the second place was the opinion-forming

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socio-political weekly *Wprost*, which in the new socio-political circumstances had a total circulation of over 200,000 copies.⁵²

Mielczarek ascribes the decline of the socio-cultural opinion-forming press in Poland to the lack of interest among readers and lack of money to publish printed magazines. That is why cultural issues, alongside the socio-political ones, have found their way onto the Internet. However, two influential magazines that dealt with cultural topics remained in the media market for quite a long time. These were *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Przekrój* (the latter stopped appearing in 2013).

Tygodnik Powszechny is a Catholic magazine addressed to lay people, which was created with the idea of “saving Polish intelligentsia, not only the Catholic one.”⁵³ The peak of its popularity came in the 1980s when the journal declared itself to be leftist, liberal and anticommunist. However, as Mielczarek writes, it raised controversies also in Catholic circles. Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II), who had collaborated with *Tygodnik Powszechny*, wrote in a letter to editor Jerzy Turowicz that “the Church did not feel sufficiently respected.”⁵⁴

In 1999, after the death of Turowicz, Rev. Adam Boniecki took over the position of editor-in-chief. Mielczarek writes that under Boniecki’s leadership, the magazine became too conservative. Despite some changes, it did not gain new readers. In 2011, Piotr Mucharski became the new editor-in-chief and

⁵² Mielczarek, “Współczesna polska prasa...,” 81.

⁵³ Marcin Pera, “‘Tygodnik Powszechny.’ W poszukiwaniu mądrości. Refleksje,” *Pismo Naukowe Studentów i Doktorantów WNPiD UAM* 2 (2010), 46, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/jspui/handle/10593/1523>.

⁵⁴ Mielczarek, “Współczesna polska prasa...,” 82–83.

faced challenges related to distribution. The journal's audience continued to diminish – in 2012, only 40,000 people bought it every month. Surveys showed that they were mainly women and people over 55 years old, with average income, living in small towns.⁵⁵ To gain new readers, *Tygodnik Powszechny* changed its format from a broadsheet newspaper to the popular A4 format for weeklies and launched a user-friendly website. It also started to publish thematic supplements.

As already mentioned, the 1990s were a period of the growing influence of the socio-political opinion-forming press, but nowadays, the overall circulation of such magazines has decreased significantly.⁵⁶ It must be pointed out, however, that the expansion of the Internet has favoured opinion-forming magazines regardless of the topics they covered. While entertainment and advice journals dominated the sales of printed media, the popularity of online versions of the opinion-forming press increased significantly. In times of economic crisis, people could not afford to buy the expensive printed versions and looked for cheaper alternatives online.⁵⁷ For a long time, the most influential and popular opinion-forming weeklies were *Polityka*, *Wprost* and *Newsweek*.⁵⁸

Polityka was founded in 1957 as a newspaper representing the point of view of the young team of the First Secretary of

⁵⁵ Ibid., 85.

⁵⁶ Bajka, "Rynek...", 196.

⁵⁷ Żabiński, "Tendencje...", 142–144.

⁵⁸ Beata Romiszewska, "Obraz parlamentarnej kampanii wyborczej 2011 roku w tygodnikach społeczno-politycznych 'Newsweek. Polska,' 'Wprost,' 'Polityka,'" *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 4 (40) (3) (2012), 96.

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the Polish United Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka.⁵⁹ After 1989, the weekly became the property of the "POLITYKA Spółdzielnia Pracy" journalistic cooperative and has retained this status until today.⁶⁰ At the beginning of the 1990s, it was losing readers, but the situation improved after the change of layout. Starting with issue no. 41 (2006) of November 11, 1995, the format of the weekly was reduced to A4, the colour print was introduced, articles were shortened, and the number of photos was increased. The effects were immediate. Already in 1995, the magazine sold 157,000 issues, and six years later – 250,000 issues.⁶¹ The stable financial situation of the publisher allowed it to make investments. In March 2000, the cooperative bought the monthly magazine *Res Publica Nowa* and in April 2001 – the weekly *Forum*.

Mielczarek writes that for many years, *Polityka*'s areas of interest did not change. However, at different times, journalists focused on different issues. For example, at the beginning of the 1990s, the weekly described problems related to the political transformation. Then, in the middle of the decade, economic issues became the most widely analysed topic. At the turn of the century, journalists were more concerned with science and culture. In the following years, slightly more attention was paid to the issues of history and society.

The significance of *Polityka* as an opinion-forming magazine is proved by the fact that it is a bestseller on the Polish media

⁵⁹ Tomasz Mielczarek, *Od 'Nowej Kultury' do 'Polityki.'* *Tygodniki społeczno-kulturalne i społeczno-polityczne PRL*, Kielce: Wydawnictwo Akademii Świętokrzyskiej, 2003, 251–253.

⁶⁰ Podemski, "Świat...", 248.

⁶¹ Mielczarek, "Współczesna polska prasa...", 87.

market. Since the times of the Polish People's Republic, it has had a great influence on Polish public opinion.⁶² *Polityka*'s readership has shifted towards people with higher than average incomes, living in large cities, mainly men. Its impact and importance are evidenced by the fact that it publishes statements of the most influential domestic and foreign politicians, cultural activists, athletes and other famous people. In terms of political preferences, *Polityka* has a close relationship with the liberal party Civic Platform.⁶³ It has often been attacked by various right-wing circles.⁶⁴

The second popular magazine that can be called opinion-forming is the weekly *Wprost*. Its first issue was published on December 1, 1982. The first print run was only 30,000 copies, but the journal gained new readers very quickly. In 1996, 238,000 of 338,000 copies were sold. In 2005, 278,000 copies were printed, 177,000 of which were sold, while in 2006, readers bought 145,000 copies.⁶⁵

Throughout its history, *Wprost* experienced difficult moments due to court trials and conflicts between media holdings and corporations. Eventually, in 1993, the weekly was bought by the Advertising and Publishing Agency. Its head, Marek Król, was also the editor-in-chief of *Wprost* from 1988 to 2006. Under his management, the magazine comprised 112–130 columns in A4 format and included the following sections: Poland,

⁶² Marcin Kotras, "Dwa światy, dwie narracje. Retoryka tygodników opinii 'wSieci' i 'Polityka,'" *Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Sociologica* 46 (2013), 92.

⁶³ Mielczarek, "Współczesna polska prasa...", 88.

⁶⁴ Kotras, "Dwa światy...", 97.

⁶⁵ Mielczarek, "Współczesna polska prasa...", 89.

Business – People and Money, Life and History, Science and Health, World and Culture. Among other things, it published texts written by famous Polish politicians, artists, writers, etc.

Wprost's audience was similar to *Polityka's*, although slightly younger (under 45 years old). Readers were interested in the situation in Poland (86%) as well as international affairs (83%). As for political preferences and ideological orientation, in the 1990s, *Wprost* was perceived more as a liberal journal (42%) than centre-right (25%). Currently, it is more centrist.

In 2005, *Wprost* got involved in yet another legal dispute and had to pay a \$5 million fine, which resulted in the loss of readers and a drop in sales. Due to the unfavourable economic situation, the magazine started to look for an investor. In 2009, when only 60,000 copies were being sold, it was bought by the Media Platform Point Group. With the change of ownership, editor-in-chief Stanisław Janecki and several journalists left the magazine and started their own weekly called *Wręcz Przeciwnie*. However, only three issues of it were published.

The new editor-in-chief Tomasz Lis hired a new team of journalists and reoriented *Wprost* towards social and political issues seen through the prism of individual people's lives. Interviews, conducted mainly with politicians of centrist and leftist views, were the most popular type of texts published in the magazine. Changes in the form and orientation of the journal renewed the interest of readers, and sales figures rose to 100,000 copies. In 2012, however, Lis left *Wprost* to become the editor-in-chief

of *Newsweek Polska*.⁶⁶ He was replaced by Michał Kobosko, who had previously been deputy editor of *Puls Biznesu* and editor-in-chief of such journals as *Forbes*, *Newsweek Polska*, *Dziennik Polska–Europa–Świat*, *Dziennik. Gazeta Prawna*, *Bloomberg Businessweek Polska*. At the beginning of 2013, *Wprost* gained a new editor-in-chief, Sylwester Latkowski, former deputy editor and investigative journalist, who was replaced by Tomasz Wróblewski in March 2015. Since August 2016, *Wprost* has been headed by Jacek Pochłopeń.

The third significant socio-political weekly is *Newsweek Polska* (hereafter also *Newsweek*), the Polish franchise of the American *Newsweek*, which was founded in 1933 in New York. *Newsweek Polska* is published by German Axel Springer, the largest media company in Poland.⁶⁷ Its first issue appeared in September 2001; 400,000 copies were sold, thanks to intensive promotion. *Newsweek*'s first editor-in-chief was Tomasz Wróblewski, previously deputy editor of *Wprost*. He was followed by Jarosław Sroka, Michał Kobosko, Wojciech Maziarski and finally, Tomasz Lis, who has been holding this position since 2012. The first editorial team of *Newsweek* consisted of former journalists of *Wprost*, *Życie* and *Gazeta Wyborcza*.⁶⁸

From the very beginning, *Newsweek* was a serious rival to the other large opinion-forming weeklies, *Wprost* and *Polityka*. It was published on Mondays, while *Wprost* and *Polityka* appeared

⁶⁶ Ibid., 92.

⁶⁷ Podemski, "Świat...", 247.

⁶⁸ Mielczarek, "Współczesna polska prasa...", 93.

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on Wednesdays. Its first price was also competitive: PLN 3.5.⁶⁹ In the first year, its print run was 492,000 copies, of which 325,000 were sold. In 2002, 251,000 of 411,000 copies were sold. In the following years, interest in the journal declined, and in 2006, only 138,000 copies were sold. Various marketing tricks were then used to increase sales. *Newsweek* had a varied layout, not very long texts and many illustrations. Nevertheless, its success was not always stable. Between 2007 to 2012, from 138,000 to 130,000 copies were sold.⁷⁰

A special place among the opinion-forming press with a long publishing tradition is occupied by the Catholic weekly *Gość Niedzielny*. It has been published since 1923 by the Metropolitan Curia in Katowice.⁷¹ The editor-in-chief is Rev. Marek Gancarczyk. The editorial board consists of journalists and collaborators, including scholars, poets, politicians and academics. The readers are mostly elderly people living in small towns and villages, with low incomes.⁷² It should be pointed out that in recent years, *Gość Niedzielny* had the highest circulation. It was also the only opinion-forming weekly that did not record a significant drop in sales between 2005 and 2015 (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

⁶⁹ Żaneta Polowczyk, “‘Newsweek Polska’ – próba bilansu po pięciu latach,” *Media Dawne i Współczesne* 1 (2006), 186–187.

⁷⁰ Mielczarek, “Współczesna polska prasa...,” 93.

⁷¹ Grzegorz Łęcicki, “Media katolickie w III Rzeczypospolitej (1989–2009),” *Kultura. Media. Teologia* 2 (2010), 117.


⁷² Podemski, “Świat...,” 245.

**TABLE 1. AVERAGE MONTHLY SALES OF OPINION-FORMING WEEKLIES IN POLAND
FROM 2005 TO MAY 2015**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Jan-May 2015
<i>Gość Niedzielný</i>	123,553	129,792	131,667	130,500	136,136	142,930	143,086	141,596	141,990	141,503	139,355
<i>Polityka</i>	175,773	168,103	165,126	152,347	144,597	143,089	134,562	126,068	125,290	121,280	118,473
<i>Newsweek Polska</i>	164,984	145,560	137,997	121,135	105,750	112,626	104,046	119,794	126,187	118,486	111,680
<i>W Sieci</i>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	199,364	94,232	77,030	73,900
<i>Tygodnik Do Rzeczy</i>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	86,614	60,446	52,478
<i>Wprost</i>	165,466	138,151	144,431	112,864	86,570	87,887	96,591	74,257	61,981	58,226	45,584
<i>Gazeta Polska</i>	–	–	26,394	25,542	24,928	50,180	70,496	65,421	55,235	42,848	37,077
<i>Tygodnik Powszechny</i>	27,571	21,006	20,177	20,425	19,009	17,899	17,396	16,572	17,469	18,035	18,906
<i>Przegląd</i>	34,803	31,038	28,292	24,137	24,137	22,848	21,930	20,292	18,567	18,313	17,185

Source: Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy, cited after <http://www.virtualnmedia.pl/artukul/wprost-o-72-proc-w-dol-a-polityka-o-32-proc-sprzedaz-tygodnikow-opinii-od-2005-roku-raport> (accessed September 21, 2016)

FIGURE 1. AVERAGE MONTHLY SALES OF OPINION-FORMING WEEKLIES IN POLAND
FROM 2005 TO MAY 2015



Source: Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy, cited after <http://www.wirtualnenedia.pl/artukul/wprost-o-72-proc-w-dol-a-polityka-o-32-proc-sprzedaz-tygodnikow-opinii-od-2005-roku-raport> (accessed September 21, 2016)

Uważam Rze. Inaczej pisane was a relatively short-lived right-wing magazine. Its first issue appeared on February 7, 2011, without any promotional campaign. The texts were partially prepared in cooperation with the right-wing daily newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*. In November 2011, it sold 131,600 copies, slightly more than *Polityka*, which was the most popular magazine in this segment. The emergence of *Uważam Rze* is associated with the development of right-wing media, centred primarily around the Internet portal wpolityce.pl published by the Jan Liszewski Association for Media and Social Education.⁷³ The following year, the magazine gained a new owner and publisher – Grzegorz Hajdarowicz. Due to the conflict between Hajdarowicz and editor-in-chief Paweł Lisicki, about 30 journalists left the journal and, in 2012, founded a new weekly *wSieci*, which in terms of layout and worldview was a continuation of *Uważam Rze* (which eventually stopped appearing in November 2016). Despite its short history, *wSieci* quickly became a top-selling magazine, competing with *Wprost* and *Newsweek*. In 2012, it sold over 119,000 copies on average, although later, this number decreased to 70–77,000 copies.⁷⁴

Ideologically similar to *wSieci* is the magazine *Do Rzeczy*. It was founded in 2013, and its current editor-in-chief is Paweł Lisicki. *Do Rzeczy* adheres to a conservative ideology based on Christian values but declares a liberal approach to economic matters.

⁷³ Kotras, “Dwa światy...,” 91.

⁷⁴ Michał Kurdupski, “‘Wprost’ o 72% w dół, a ‘Polityka’ – o 32%. Sprzedaż tygodników opinii od 2005 roku,” *Wirtualne Media*, August 3, 2015, accessed April 26, 2022, <http://www.wirtualnemedial.pl/artykul/wprowadzenie-o-72-proc-w-dol-a-polityka-o-32-proc-sprzedaz-tygodnikow-opinii-od-2005-roku-raport>.

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A completely different weekly that will be analysed in this study is *Przegląd*, until 1999 called *Przegląd Tygodniowy*. It expresses strong left-wing views and beliefs, very often criticising Polish conservative political and Catholic circles. Nevertheless, it belongs to the most popular Polish weeklies (see Table 1).

To sum up, the Polish market of the opinion-forming press is dominated by colourful socio-political weeklies, most of which are almost identical both in terms of subject matter and layout. They focus on current socio-political events, sometimes mention history and very rarely publish poetry or prose.

Mielczarek concludes that generally, Polish opinion journalism's situation is stable, especially when compared to the printed daily newspapers, which are losing readers in the Internet era. Even socio-political weeklies, however, are not able to compete with the Internet in terms of priority in creating news. The only thing they can offer readers is a commentary on reality and events. Therefore, since the opinion-forming press still occupies the first place among Polish readers, this commentary constitutes an important material for research.

**“UKRAINE IS NOT RUSSIA”:¹
THE ORANGE REVOLUTION
AND CHANGES IN UKRAINIAN
IDENTITY IN THE POLISH
OPINION-FORMING PRESS**

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which took place between November 2004 and January 2005, reverberated through the media abroad, especially in Poland. In the book entitled *Polish Bibliography of the Orange Revolution*,² the authors list more than 3,000 bibliographical entries concerning texts about these events published in Poland. For Polish-Ukrainian relations, the Orange Revolution held great significance in both spheres: politics and society. Although it was a continuation of

¹ *Ukraine is not Russia* is the title of a book by Ukraine's second president, Leonid Kuchma. It was first published in Russian (*Ukraina – ne Rossiia*) in 2003 by the “Vremia” publishing house in Moscow. A year later, it was translated into Ukrainian and published by the same publishing house. Because of its contradictions and ambiguities, the book was criticised both in Ukraine and Russia. In Poland, it was published in 2004 by the PLATAN Publishing House under the title *Ukraina to nie Rosja*.

² Robert Potocki and Agnieszka Stec, *Polska bibliografia pomarańczowej rewolucji*, Częstochowa: Instytut Geopolityki, 2008.

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the post-Soviet development of an “unexpected nation”³ that underwent an “unfinished revolution”⁴ in 1991, it took many observers by surprise.

The analysis of how Ukrainian identity was presented in the Polish press during the Orange Revolution will be conducted using the methodology described in Chapter 1. A combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Critical Discourse Analysis, CDA) using category keys (see Appendix 2) and a tree of codes (see Appendix 1) was chosen since purely descriptive data is not meaningful without deeper reflection on the meanings contained in the analysed units.⁵

Issues related to the Orange Revolution were discussed in about 80 Polish periodicals;⁶ however, I have focused only on the following opinion-forming weeklies: *Gość Niedzielny*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Polityka*, *Wprost*, *Przegląd*, *Newsweek Polska*. When compiling the corpus of texts, I used the specification and reduction method⁷ and took into account only paper versions of the magazines, not their websites. It should be noted that priority was given to the qualitative part of the analysis; therefore, only those genres which could be described as “opinion-forming” (see Chapter 2) were included.

³ Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*, 4th ed., New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2015.

⁴ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine. The Unfinished Revolution*, London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1992.

⁵ Walery Pisarek, *Analiza zawartości prasy*, Kraków: OBP, 1983, 29.

⁶ Potocki and Stec, *Polska bibliografia...*, 10.

⁷ Gerlinde Mautner, “Analyzing Newspapers, Magazines and Other Print Media,” in *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, New York–Hampshire: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008, 36.

To obtain relevant data, I decided to browse through the issues of the selected magazines published from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2005. In this way, I aimed to present a comprehensive picture of how Ukraine was portrayed in the Polish opinion-forming press before, during and after the Orange Revolution. Employing CDA methods to analyse the journalistic discourse meant focusing on the language of a given text and the journalist's attitude towards the described social processes (in this case, the Orange Revolution, its causes and consequences). I paid special attention to the rhetorical devices used in articles, such as metaphors, metonymy, personification, synecdoche, comparisons, since they are not just a matter of language but represent the author's conceptual system.⁸


In 2004 and 2005, a total of 194 articles on Ukrainian topics was published in the analysed magazines (see Figure 2). The number of such articles in a given journal depended on its profile.

Ukrainian issues were discussed in the following main thematic categories: politics, society, history, economy, culture and religion. Some of the articles could not be ascribed to any of these and were classified as “other.” Table 2 shows the distribution of analysed articles according to these categories (half numbers mean that an article was assigned to more than one category).

⁸ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980, 4–6.

3. . “UKRAINE IS NOT RUSSIA”: THE ORANGE REVOLUTION...

FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF ARTICLES ON UKRAINE IN POLISH OPINION-FORMING WEEKLIES IN 2004–2005



Source: own elaboration.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF ANALYSED ARTICLES ACCORDING TO THEMATIC CATEGORIES


Category Title	Politics	Society	History	Economy	Culture	Religion	Other
<i>Tygodnik Powszechny</i>	39.5	14.5	4	2	4	3	6
<i>Przegląd</i>	21	7	1	0.5	0.5	0	0
<i>Polityka</i>	16.5	1.5	6	1.5	1	0.5	1
<i>Newsweek Polska</i>	13.5	6	3.5	1	1	0	1
<i>Wprost</i>	17	1.5	2	3	0	0	7
<i>Gość Niedzielny</i>	4.5	1.5	2.5	0	0.5	2	1

Source: own elaboration.

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Figure 3 shows the percentage share of these thematic categories across the analysed weeklies. Ukraine was most often commented upon in the Polish press in the context of politics – 57.7% of analysed articles belonged to this category. Society was in second place with 16.5% of articles. Historical issues, which have always been important in relations between Poland and Ukraine, were also addressed frequently (9.8%). Culture and economy were represented in similar numbers – 3.6% and 4.1%, respectively. Less attention was paid to religion (2.8%) and other topics (0.5%).

**FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THEMATIC CATEGORIES
ACROSS THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES**



Source: own elaboration.

In the following sections, I will present the actors and agencies – i.e. the situations in which social actors are presented

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as “agents” or “patients”⁹ of identity – that most frequently appeared in the Polish press and the discursive markers of identity that were attributed to them.

3.1. REPRESENTATION OF UKRAINE BEFORE THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

3.1.1. THE POLITICIANS

As shown in Figure 3, politics was the leading theme of the articles on Ukraine in all the analysed weeklies. Therefore, it was the decisive factor in the representation of Ukrainian identity. Since political institutions were the main agencies of identity, politicians were the main actors of identity.

In 2004, prior to the Orange Revolution, journalists paid considerable attention to the then president, Leonid Kuchma. He was the second president of Ukraine, elected in 1994 and re-elected in 1999. During his presidency, he pursued what he called a “multivector” foreign policy, which meant both a pro-Russian and pro-Western orientation. For example, Kuchma declared that Ukraine wanted to join NATO but, at the same time, signed economic treaties with Russia and sent Ukrainian troops to Iraq. During his second presidential term, Kuchma was more pro-Russian than pro-Western.¹⁰

⁹ Theo van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors,” in *Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard, London–New York: Routledge, 1996, 32.

¹⁰ Taras Kuzio, “Zovnishnia polityka trich osnovnykh kandydativ u prezhydeny,” *Ukrainsjka pravda*, November 30, 2009, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/kuzyo/4b13cd505d2f0/>.

Kuchma's presidency is also known for the restriction of media freedom, numerous corruption scandals and the rise of the Ukrainian oligarchy. Ukraine during this period was portrayed in the analysed magazines as a state of blackmail, totally corrupt political elites and flourishing Soviet-style secret service operations, with a post-Soviet and pro-Russian identity.

In an ironic essay "How Will It Be, Sashka?" published in *Polityka*, Edwin Bendyk described Kuchma's geopolitical views by comparing Ukrainian foreign policy towards Europe to the country's national dance, *hopak*: "But what to do when the partner is dancing the *hopak* all the time: coming closer, then running away again."¹¹ Even then, in late February 2004, the author wondered whether something similar to the Georgian Rose Revolution¹² was possible in Ukraine. He thought not because, in his opinion, Ukraine was far from European standards, larger and more divided than Georgia, and the Russian influence was more visible there. Nevertheless, Bendyk considered the Georgian example to be the most suitable variant of transition to democracy for Ukraine.

These elements – postcolonial dependence on Russia, corrupt elites, internal division and uncertainty in Ukraine's foreign policy under Kuchma – formed the context in which the president was portrayed in all the analysed weeklies.

¹¹ "Tylko co robić, gdy partner cały czas tańczy hopaka: to zbliża się, to znów ucieka." Edwin Bendyk, "Jak to będzie, Saszka?", *Polityka* No 9, 28.02.2004, 54.

¹² The Rose Revolution in Georgia was the first bloodless change of power in the Caucasus and is often called the end of the Soviet era in Georgia. The revolution began as a protest against electoral fraud and ended with the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. In early 2004, pro-Western politician Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president. For more, see Dov Lynch, *Why Georgia Matters*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006, accessed March 22, 2022, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep07058.1>.

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In the Polish opinion-forming press, Kuchma and his “hybrid” state with a “competitive authoritarian regime”¹³ represented Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity and unwillingness to overcome it. Ukraine was depicted as a post-Soviet region where nothing had changed during the Kuchma era, and the lack of democracy and a fair judicial system contributed to its non-European supranational identity.

The main actor in the discourse of the post-Soviet representation of Ukraine was Kuchma, who was described as behaving ostensibly like a democrat but in reality acting like a dictator.¹⁴ Hence, the political regime in Ukraine was called the “Kuchma dictatorship” (“Ukraina kuczmosko-dyktatorska”¹⁵). Polish journalists emphasised his post-Soviet style of governance and the presence of a completely Soviet political elite that made no effort to join Western structures. On the contrary, Kuchma clearly strove for a closer relationship with Russia; during a meeting with the Russian president on July 26, 2004, for instance, he presented a new defence doctrine for Ukraine, which did not mention the country’s earlier willingness to join NATO and the EU. This act was widely commented on by political scientists and experts as well as journalists. In the analysed magazines, it was seen as a rejection of the “multivector” foreign policy

¹³ Taras Kuzio, “Regime Type and Politics in Ukraine under Kuchma,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (2005), 168.

¹⁴ Kuchma’s negative image was also enhanced by the murder of Georgii Gongadze, who was a Ukrainian opposition journalist during the Kuchma presidency. He disappeared in September 2000, and two months later, his decapitated body was found near Kyiv. Later, a tape recording was made public, in which a voice similar to Kuchma’s could be heard ordering the journalist’s kidnapping. More: Yurii Shapoval, “Sprava Gongadze,” in *Politychna entsyklopediya*, Kyiv: Parlamentske vydavnytstvo, 2011.

¹⁵ Jagienka Wilczak, “Lifting Kuczmy,” *Przegląd* No 12, 21.03.2004, 46–48.

and proof of Kuchma's pro-Russian orientation. That is why the term "multivector" was often used ironically and put in quotation marks. Kuchma's policy was described with vivid metaphors, such as "Kuchma fell into the arms of Russia," "he emphasised the close ties between brothers Slavs,"¹⁶ "Kuchma renounced Europe."¹⁷

To indicate the country's dependence on external actors, especially Russia, the passive voice was used so that Ukraine was not a subject but an object of sentences. However, despite the dominant discourse of passivity and dependence, Ukraine was sometimes portrayed as an actor of its pro-Russian orientation and post-Soviet identity. Referring to Kuchma's decision to not mention the country's preparations to join NATO and the EU in the new defence doctrine, *Przegląd* wrote that "Ukraine did not betray the West last week! It has never been loyal to it."¹⁸ It means that the journalist completely rejected the idea of any European identity existing in Ukraine, which proves that *realpolitik* is a decisive factor in the process of identity construction.

Social agencies determining everyday life were the topic of problem reportages in *Tygodnik Powszechny*. In the article "Ukraine between Spirit and Matter," the author described the procedure of crossing the border between Poland and Ukraine and the situation when Ukrainian border guards told journalists that it was forbidden to write books about people in power in

¹⁶ Andrzej Łukowski, "Od ściany do ściany," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 32, 08.08.2004.

¹⁷ Bartosz Głębocki, "Kuczma pokazał Europie figę," *Przegląd* No 32, 01.08.2004, 24.

¹⁸ "Ukraina wcale nie zdradziła Zachodu w ostatnim tygodniu! Ona nigdy nie była mu wierna." Ibid.

3. . “UKRAINE IS NOT RUSSIA”: THE ORANGE REVOLUTION...

Ukraine.¹⁹ The lack of freedom of speech indicated an undemocratic, authoritarian state and confirmed its post-Soviet identity with no ambition for change and transformation.

The problems of border crossing were widely discussed in articles written after May 1, 2004, i.e. after the enlargement of the EU to include Poland, among others. The corruption and bureaucracy related to the functioning of the customs system became one of the more visible and tangible elements of post-Soviet identity in Ukraine. The issue of institutional identity was highlighted, for instance, by Marek Grocholski. According to him, the fact that Ukraine was not in the EU automatically did not allow it to have a European identity. In this case, the actual border between the two states turned into a symbolic line separating “better Europe” from the rest of the continent. The former was embedded in the economic formation that was the European Union. Although the author regretted that Ukraine was on the other side of that border, he was nevertheless aware that its post-Soviet identity was enforced not only by bureaucracy and corruption but also by the tangible remains of the previous era, such as the Soviet military facilities in Ukraine.²⁰

The Polish press depicted Ukraine’s institutional identity as dependent to a large degree on external actors – Russia and the EU.²¹ Much attention was paid to the country’s prospects

¹⁹ Grzegorz Przebina, “Ukraina między duchem a materią,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 12, 21.03.2004, 8.

²⁰ Marek Grocholski, “Zakordonnaja Jewropa,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 20, 16.05.2004, 5.

²¹ Marcin Król, “Bezradność,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 44, 31.10.2004.

of joining the European Union.²² Therefore, in the geopolitical context, Ukraine was presented not as an actor determining its strategies of identity but rather as their object. I am referring here to a supranational identity: European or pro-Russian, which is a combination of certain values and geopolitical orientation. Europe saw Ukraine as belonging to the same category as the countries that geographically belonged to Asia and Africa,²³ and the western border of the former USSR was considered the eastern border of the EU. Ukraine thus found itself on the other side of the new Iron Curtain dividing Europe.

Apart from the border between the EU and non-EU countries, which divided the European continent into two distinct parts, there was also another border, which, according to the Polish journalists, did not divide but united and imposed a different identity discourse that inscribed Ukraine in the Russian sphere. It was the border with Russia, which was not yet properly organised and guarded. As *Przegląd* noted, "Ukraine still does not have a marked out and guarded border with Russia, which keeps it away from the EU and the Schengen area. Besides, there is no indication that it will strive for such a demarcation."²⁴

Another indicator of the post-Soviet identity and pro-Russian orientation in the period before the Orange Revolution was the lack of Ukrainian language in the public sphere and the lack of freedom of speech. According to the Polish journalists, the

²² Its situation was compared to that of Turkey, which had long ago signed an association agreement with the EU.

²³ Krzysztof Burnetko, "Nie zamykajcie drzwi," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 22, 30.05.2004, 5.

²⁴ Wilczak, "Lifting...", 46–48.

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omnipresence of Russian in the Ukrainian media was evidence of an undemocratic regime and proved that the real actor was Russia, not Ukraine. The public sphere, an agency of identity, was thus dominated by the external identity of the former coloniser. In terms of the postcolonial theory, Ukraine was presented as a subaltern, a minority, imitating the culture and political culture of the coloniser, which usually resulted in what Homi Bhabha called a “mimicry,” being “almost the same, but not quite.”²⁵ In politics, postcolonial relations manifested themselves in the constant dependence on Russia in decision-making that was very apparent to external observers. Journalist Andrzej Łukowski, in an article on Russian-Ukrainian relations and the construction of the Odesa-Brody pipeline, used the metaphor of horseback riding to describe Ukrainian politics: “it will be difficult to turn back the horses, no longer just rushing towards Moscow but running in her team.”²⁶

The lack of democracy became plainly visible just before the Orange Revolution. The Polish media widely covered the case of Viktor Yushchenko’s poisoning²⁷ and the entire pre-election campaign. A journalist stated in *Przegląd* that “the situation in this country is still far from democracy ... voters are intimidated and give wrong answers during anonymous polls.”²⁸

²⁵ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994, 127.

²⁶ “...trudno będzie zawrócić konie, już nie tylko pędzące w stronę Moskwy, ale biegnące w jej zaprzęgu?”. Łukowski, “Od ściany...”.

²⁷ Ukraine’s third president Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin during the pre-election campaign. Yevhen Solonyna, “15 rokov iz dnya otruyennya Yushchenka: chy ye «svitlo v kintsi spravy»?” *Radio Svoboda*, September 5, 2019, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30148147.html>.

²⁸ Paweł Snarski, “Ukraina rozdarta na pół,” *Przegląd* No 44, 31.10.2004, 28–29.

Russia-oriented Ukraine and its inability to overcome Russian influence were portrayed differently in different journals. For instance, *Tygodnik Powszechny* used mild wording when describing the country's post-Soviet identity, referring only to the political ruling elites, whereas other analysed magazines were not so moderate. Their journalists wrote explicitly about the pro-Russian identity and pro-Russian orientation in Ukraine, often pointing to it in the very headlines of their articles: "The Ukrainian Republic of Russia" ("Ukraińska republika Rosji"), "Chipping the Trident" ("Szczerbienie tryzuba") with a subtitle – "Russians Elect Ukraine's President" and "Ukraine vs Ruskraine" ("Ukraina kontra Ruskraina"). The first example clearly shows that Ukraine, a *de jure* independent state, *de facto* was perceived as a satellite of Russia, moreover, as one of the units of the Russian Federation. These titles suggested that Ukraine was not an independent state with a strong national identity, and the issues concerning it were presented in colonial categories of centre and periphery. In all of these texts, Ukraine was portrayed as dependent on Russia and manipulated and directed by it. However, the journalists did not differentiate between the people of Ukraine and the politicians. They used the word "Ukraine" to generalise and indicate that the entire identity of the country depended not on individual actors but on political, or rather geopolitical, agendas.

In the article "The Ukrainian Republic of Russia," Jerzy Marek Nowakowski referred to Ukraine as "the pearl in Russia's imperialist crown." The internal actors were President Kuchma and the group of oligarchs that had emerged during his term

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in office. Ukraine's identity was represented by Kyiv's agendas and its foreign policy – supposedly oriented to the West but, in reality, post-Soviet and backward. Comparisons to Alexander Lukashenko's Belarus were very frequent. Ukraine before the Orange Revolution was presented as a Russified and Russian-speaking state. For the journalist, the real actor in Ukrainian politics was Russian President Vladimir Putin. He was the one with the real power and the one who dictated the discourses. Nowakowski compared him to one of the former First Secretaries of the USSR, Yuri Andropov, who had once said that NATO wanted to take Ukraine away from “Matushka Rossiya” (“Mommy Russia”).²⁹

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European identity was associated with European standards and democratic politics. Therefore, Ukraine did not possess it and, moreover, was reluctant to make any changes and reforms, thus getting closer to Russia and becoming invisible to the West: “only differentiation from Russia will allow Ukraine to exist (especially in the eyes of the West).”³⁰

Many references to the Soviet times were made in the context of Viktor Yanukovich, who was called “Putin's candidate” and “Russia's candidate.” For example, Jagienka Wilczak stressed in *Polityka* that Yanukovich's policy as prime minister resembled the Soviet period because of its paternalism: he raised salaries for people working in the public sector, but the prices, especially of meat, also rose: “As in communist times, meat

²⁹ Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, “Ukraińska republika Rosji,” *Wprost* No 32, 08.08.2004, 80–83.

³⁰ “Tylko odróżnienie się od Rosji pozwoli Ukrainie zaistnieć (zwłaszcza dla Zachodu).” Ibid.

is again playing a political role.”³¹ This portrayal of Ukrainian identity as pro-Russian and post-Soviet was not limited to the analysed Polish press. Political scientist Taras Kuzio also agreed that Yanukovych’s image corresponded to Shulman’s “East Slavic” identity complex, which was “less supportive of reform and cooler towards Ukraine’s integration into the West.”³²

3.1.2. THE OLIGARCHS

A very important factor in the perception of Ukrainian identity as post-Soviet and pro-Russian was the country’s economic dependence on Russia, which introduced the second large group of actors besides politicians – the oligarchs. They appeared in many articles, which means that they played a crucial role in creating Ukraine’s image abroad and the perception of its identity.

As Anders Åslund notes, oligarchs (big businessmen who are involved in politics and decision-making and have close relations with higher state authorities, usually the president) are not a unique phenomenon limited to Ukraine and Russia; they are common in the economy and politics of middle-income countries. They are usually associated with Latin America or post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan.³³ In post-Soviet countries, oligarchs emerged as a result of the privatisation of large state-owned industrial concerns. Sławomir

³¹ Jagienka Wilczak, “Pomarańczowa alternatywa,” *Polityka* No 44, 30.10.2004, 56–58.

³² Taras Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine. Understanding the Orange Revolution,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43 (2010), 286.

³³ Anders Åslund, “Comparative Oligarchy. Russia, Ukraine and the United States” (paper prepared for the international conference “Europe after the Enlargement,” organized by CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, 8–9 April 2005).

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Matuszak, an expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, in his short study on the Ukrainian oligarchy, states that although oligarchy is widespread in other countries as well, nowhere does it have such a significant influence as in Ukraine.³⁴

The oligarchs in Ukraine as a class were formed in the early post-Soviet years, in the mid-1990s. In brief, three main clans of oligarchs emerged in the political arena: the Donetsk clan headed by Rinat Akhmetov; the Dnipropetrovsk clan, whose main actor was Pavlo Lazarenko, with Yulia Tymoshenko as a close partner; and the Kyiv clan, represented by Viktor Medvedchuk and the Surkis brothers, Hryhorii and Ihor.³⁵ During Kuchma’s presidency (1994–2004), they held a strong position in Ukrainian politics, media and business. They not only owned large industrial companies but also controlled the main Ukrainian media, which were used to consolidate their power and minimise criticism of the establishment.³⁶ Moreover, the oligarch-controlled TV channels influenced the opinions and views of Ukrainian citizens, which did not facilitate the transition to democracy and entry into the framework of European identity.

Before the Orange Revolution, the oligarchs were portrayed as symbols of post-Soviet identity. In addition, due to the fact that much of their financial activity depended on Russia, they were depicted as creators of pro-Russian identity in Ukraine.

³⁴ Sławomir Matuszak, “The Oligarchic Democracy. The Influence of Business Groups on Ukrainian Politics,” *OSW Studies* 42 (2012), accessed April 26, 2022, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_42_en_0.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Marta Dyczok, “Was Kuchma’s Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 58 (2) (2006), 216.

In addition, other symbols of post-Soviet identity and mentality, such as corruption, feudalism in political structures and nepotism, were also associated with them.

In the period of “pre-Orange Ukraine,” two oligarchs were mentioned most frequently in the analysed Polish weeklies. The first one was Rinat Akhmetov, who dealt mainly in metallurgy, media, banking, transport, conventional power engineering, insurance and retail trade. The second was Viktor Pinchuk, Kuchma’s son-in-law, whose main business was related to metallurgy, namely, the production and distribution of pipes, but who was also a media owner.

Polish journalists used the words “clan” or “mafia” when describing Ukrainian oligarchs, implying the existence of organised criminal groups that influenced politics. Although the oligarchs’ position was strong already in the Kuchma era, during the political crisis following the Orange Revolution, some of them became actors of the new identity and were referred to in the Polish press as “Orange oligarchs” or “Yushchenko’s oligarchs.” It is hard not to agree with Matuszak that “the Orange Revolution caused a reshuffle among the oligarchs, but the system itself remained unchanged.”³⁷


Figure 4 shows the number of articles in which oligarchs were mentioned. They most frequently appeared in the weekly *Wprost*, which emphasised their pro-Russian identity, writing that they either did not speak Ukrainian at all or spoke it very badly, like Pinchuk and Akhmetov. The latter was presented

³⁷ Matuszak, “The Oligarchic Democracy...”

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as the head of the Donetsk clan with close ties to Kuchma and Yanukovych. *Wprost* portrayed the oligarchs as representatives of post-Soviet paternalism and nepotism in politics and the economy. Kuchma was shown as their patron and called “Papa Kuchma.” On the other hand, it was mentioned that there were small and medium-sized businesses, which constituted an attempt at free-market economic development. The oligarchs were also associated with a non-transparent economy, a grey area full of corruption, which is what linked Ukraine to Russia and separated it from Europe. The expression “an economic umbilical cord connecting Kyiv with Moscow”³⁸ implied that the relationship between the two countries was like the relationship between a mother and a child and was used to show Ukraine’s colonial dependence in terms of identity.

FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF ARTICLES IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES IN WHICH OLIGARCHS WERE MENTIONED EXTENSIVELY



Source: own elaboration.

³⁸ “Gospodarcza pępowina łącząca Kijów z Moskwą.” Juliusz Urbanowicz, “Wolny rynek pomarańczy,” *Wprost* No 52–53, 26.12.2004, 58.

The post-Soviet and anti-Western identity of the ruling establishment during the Kuchma era was also directly pointed out in *Przeegląd*:

Ukrainian oligarchs feel good in the post-Soviet system; they finance the current government in exchange for the opportunity to get rich with impunity at the expense of the state (which, incidentally, is also true of Kuchma's immediate family). For this group, Ukraine's entry into Europe or NATO would be a disaster because the days of murky waters would be over.³⁹

In most cases, oligarchs were mentioned in connection with the large cities of Eastern Ukraine, such as Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv. Their areas of operation were also post-Soviet and pro-Russian. Moreover, they were perceived by Polish journalists as those who supported Russia's imperial aspirations toward Ukraine and as a threat to democracy and an obstacle to creating Ukraine's institutional European identity. This identity, related to the country's entry into the European Union, depended on the level of democracy in every sphere of life, but Polish journalists emphasised that, in this case, the most important spheres were politics and the economy.⁴⁰

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3.1.3. THE SOCIETY

Before the Orange Revolution, ordinary society was also considered an agency of post-Soviet identity. In this context,

³⁹ "W postradzieckim systemie dobrze czują się ukraińscy oligarchowie, którzy finansują obecną władzę – w zamian za możliwości bezkarnego bogacenia się kosztem państwa (co dotyczy notabene także najbliższej rodziny Kuczmy). Dla tej grupy wejście Ukrainy do Europy czy NATO byłoby katastrofą – bo skończyłyby się czasy mętnej wody." Głębocki, "Kuczma...", 24.

⁴⁰ Małgorzata Nocuń and Andrzej Brzezicki, "Ukraina – nadzieje i Realpolitik," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 8, 20.02.2005, 7.

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Polish journalists paid attention to Ukrainian people's appearance and behaviour, emphasising certain visual features of *homo Sovieticus*. This designation appeared mainly in articles about the Eastern or some parts of Western Ukraine, although in *Przegląd*, it was also used to describe the inhabitants of the Western Ukrainian town of Drohobych: “Homo Sovieticus walks down the street, humiliated by poverty, rude and gruff towards strangers.”⁴¹

Besides people, other attributes of Ukraine's post-Soviet identity were monuments of Lenin and the Soviet-style buildings. The former, being symbols, were in particular portrayed as an obstacle to the transition to democracy and Europe. The author of the article “With Lenin to Europe” in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, for instance, described the ordinary life in the central Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia during the Orange Revolution, and the first thing he drew attention to was the monument of Lenin in the central square. This sign was incompatible with Europe and Ukraine's aspiration to acquire a new identity.

The lack of changes in identity can be seen in the wording of the articles about Eastern Ukraine. For example, *Newsweek* clearly indicated the identity of the Donbas region through the title “We Are a Soviet People.”⁴² The journalist described the people living there as if they were still living in the USSR, knew all the local secretaries of the communist party and did not identify with a particular state:

⁴¹ “Po ulicy chodzi homo Sovieticus upodlony biedą, wobec obcych szczególnie burkliwy, nieprzyjazny.” Helena Kowalik, “Jaki znak twój?”, *Przegląd* No 47, 21.11.2004, 22–25.

⁴² Michał Kaciewicz, “My, sowiecki naród,” *Newsweek* No 50, 12.12.2004, 8.

“We are a Soviet people, not Russian or Ukrainian,” he argues. For people like him, the only thing that matters is their backyard; strangers are a threat. Strangers, then, are the Orange people from the streets of Kyiv, who brazenly fraternise with Poles and call on the forces of evil from America for help.⁴³

The quoted passage implies that the people living in Donbas have neither a civic nor ethnic Ukrainian identity.

Religion was yet another factor of the post-Soviet and pro-Russian identity of Ukrainian society mentioned in the Polish press, although it was one of the less popular topics (see Figure 3). Stereotypically, followers of the Orthodox Church, especially of the Moscow Patriarchate, were portrayed as Yanukovich’s electorate and, therefore, pro-Russian and post-Soviet. On the contrary, those of the Greek Catholic faith were represented as supporters of pro-Western values and Yushchenko.⁴⁴ Małgorzata Nocuń in *Tygodnik Powszechny* wrote about Orthodox religious organisations that supported Yanukovich. The wording of the article clearly indicated their post-Soviet identity, which involved a pro-Russian orientation and the desire for the unification of the Slavic people of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Religion was thus seen as an instrument of identity construction.

⁴³ “My jesteśmy narodem sowieckim, nie rosyjskim ani ukraińskim – dowodzi. Dla ludzi takich jak on liczy się tylko domowe podwórko, obcy są zagrożeniem. Obcy są więc pomarańczowi z kijowskich ulic, gdy bezczelnie bratają się z Polakami i wzywają na pomoc siły zła z Ameryki.” Ibid.

⁴⁴ In fact, Greek Catholic voters constituted a minority among Yushchenko’s electorate (10–15%), whereas Orthodox Christians, including those from the Moscow Patriarchate, were divided between supporting Yanukovich and Yushchenko. Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011, 162.

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The brotherhood resembles the Communist Party and its procession a May 1 march. Nearby, an elderly woman hands out leaflets printed in Russian with a prayer for Yanukovych. ... And what is the purity of the Orthodox Church? It is a close relationship between the Church and Moscow.⁴⁵

It is worth noting that, in reality, such cases were rare. According to L. Riazanova's research, more Orthodox voters voted for Yushchenko (52.9%) than Yanukovych (31.6%) in the second round of elections on November 21, 2004.⁴⁶

3.2. RE-INVENTING UKRAINE. THE DISCOURSE OF THE “BIRTH OF A NATION”


Out of the 194 articles on Ukrainian topics that appeared in the analysed weeklies in 2004 and 2005 (see Figure 2), 96 were published between November 2004 and January 2005, i.e. during the period of the Orange Revolution (see Figure 5).

The Orange Revolution was depicted positively in the Polish press, with journalists describing its peaceful character and festive atmosphere. Accordingly, the emphasis was put on the identity changes that were taking place in Ukraine: the fact that Ukrainians began to see themselves as a nation and, consequently, the new image of their identity abroad that it

⁴⁵ “Bractwo przypomina partię komunistyczną, a jego procesja 1 majowy pochód. Obok starsza kobieta rozdaje wydrukowane w języku rosyjskim ulotki z modlitwą w intencji Janukowycza. ... A co to jest czystość prawosławia? To ścisły związek Cerkwi z Moskwą.” Małgorzata Nocuń, “To Bóg dał nam Kuczmę,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 2, 09.01.2005, 6.

⁴⁶ L. Riazanova, “Politychni preferentsii nerelighiynykh ta konfesiyno identyfikovanykh hromadian u prezydentskiy kampanii,” in *Ukrayinske suspilstvo 1994–2005*, edited by V. Vorona, M. Shulhyi, Kyiv: Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, *Dynamika Sotsialnykh Zmin*, 2005, 183–192 (cited after Kuzio, “Nationalism...,” 287).

FIGURE 5. NUMBER OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES DURING THE ORANGE REVOLUTION (NOVEMBER 2004 – JANUARY 2005)



Source: own elaboration.


created. This new identity, demonstrated during the Orange Revolution, was described in the discourse as the “birth of a nation,” to which phrase the adjective “new” was sometimes added. There were thus two narratives about Ukrainian identity. The first viewed Ukrainians as a nation that had existed before and only redefined itself during the Orange Revolution. The second narrative, on the other hand, implied that the Orange Revolution had created a “new” nation with a completely new identity.

Figure 6 shows how many times the “birth of a nation” discourse appeared in the analysed magazines. This issue was associated in the Polish press with the electoral behaviour of Ukrainians and their discontent with the election fraud that

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triggered mass protests. The first article to note that a political and social event such as the presidential elections in Ukraine could cause identity changes was published in *Gość Niedzielny* on November 11, 2004:⁴⁷ “Now citizens have realised that by voting they can really make a difference in the state. This is a lot. In communist times, such thinking was not possible.”⁴⁸ This quote indicates that the Orange Revolution was a turning point in the perception of Ukrainian identity.

FIGURE 6. NUMBER OF ARTICLES DISCUSSING THE “BIRTH OF A NATION” IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES IN 2004–2005



Source: own elaboration.

⁴⁷ However, it should be emphasised that these changes mean that people have accepted themselves as actors in the nation-building process and have come to believe in their ability to influence the situation. Of course, Ukraine’s presidential election was treated as an identity choice long before the Orange Revolution. This will be analysed below, in the section on the actors of identity.

⁴⁸ “Teraz obywatele zrozumieli, że głosując mogą naprawdę coś zmienić w państwie. To dużo. W czasach komunistycznych takie myślenie nie było możliwe.” Irena Jermak, “Druga tura wyborów na Ukrainie. Wreszcie,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 47, 21.11.2004, 30.

Even after gaining independence, Ukraine was still perceived by its Western neighbour as part of the Soviet identity space, despite the fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed. The change in 2004 occurred primarily in the perception of agencies of identity. Before the Orange Revolution, the role of agents of identity in the international arena was played by individual politicians and political institutions and the Ukrainian political regime in general. The people's disagreement with the election results shifted the focus, and henceforth Ukrainians began to be perceived as actors of identity and those who constructed it.

The new agents of identity were primarily young people. It was emphasised that they belonged to a new generation who did not remember the previous regime and therefore embodied a new identity. In the discourse of the "birth of a new nation," young people who no longer had so many stereotypes about Ukraine were given the opportunity to "invent" it, which ties in to the constructivist theory in identity studies that places an emphasis on civic engagement in the process of identity-making. In the context of agencies, a great role was attributed to the Ukrainian youth NGO "Pora" ("It's Time"), which was described as an engine of the revolution and a symbol of Ukrainian national identity in both civic and ethnic variants: "'Pora' has become a symbol of youth and nascent national consciousness. They want television to be broadcast in Ukrainian. They want to be Ukrainians."⁴⁹

⁴⁹ "'Pora' stała się symbolem młodzieży i rodzącej się świadomości narodowej. Chcą, by telewizja nadawała w języku ukraińskim. Chcą być Ukraińcami." Małgorzata Nocuń and Andrzej Brzeziecki, "Pomarańczowe dzieci rewolucji," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 50, 12.12.2004, 6.

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In the articles, the phrase “Ukrainian nation” was used frequently (“naród Ukrainy,” “ukraiński naród”). From the point of view of the CDA theory, as Norman Fairclough has emphasised, this expression indicates a shift in power relations, consisting in putting first social practices performed not by the ruling state authorities but by another actor – society. The general wording of the discourse of the “birth of a nation” in different magazines is shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3. WORDING OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE “BIRTH OF A NATION” IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES

<i>Tygodnik Powszechny</i>	Civic society, the birth of democracy, democratic Ukraine, similarity to “Solidarity,” resistance to post-Soviet and pro-Russian elites, Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, free Ukrainian nation, Ukrainians awakened, civic identity born, 1989 and the revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe, Georgian option, the awakening of the Ukrainian nation, 1989 Spring of Nations, struggle for sovereignty of the people of Eastern and Central Europe, dismantling the pillars of the old system, the nation got up from its knees, Ukraine is and will be, civic nation
<i>Wprost</i>	Awakening of Ukraine, Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian people, Ukraine is similar to “Solidarity,” reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine, sovereign state, free Ukrainian people, the European system of values, Ukraine is a sovereign state, conscious member of the national community
<i>Polityka</i>	Maidan of freedom, new Ukrainian nation, the birth of a nation, a struggle for democracy, Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation
<i>Newsweek Polska</i>	A new nation was born, an independent and democratic nation, democratic elections, free Ukraine, the road to freedom and democracy, Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, freedom is born
<i>Gość Niedzielny</i>	Conscious citizens, changes in the state, a stronger sense of citizenship, a new Ukraine
<i>Przegląd</i>	Awakening of the nation, civic awareness, freedom of speech, the rule of law, democracy, great social movement

Source: own elaboration.

After the first protests in Kyiv, in most of the analysed weeklies, the identity changes were presented in two juxtapositions: Ukrainian civic identity versus Soviet identity and Ukrainian ethnic identity versus Russian identity. The new Ukrainian civic identity was, on the one hand, different from the Soviet one and, on the other hand, close to the Ukrainian national cultural element, which showed that Ukraine was not Russia. In many cases, the phrase “Ukraine is not Russia” was used to claim that it had the right to declare its Europeanness.⁵⁰

The data show that the biggest interest in the discussion about building a new identity in Ukraine and the influence of the Orange Revolution on this process was expressed by *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Very relevant descriptions of the birth of a new Ukrainian identity could also be found in *Wprost* and, to a lesser extent, in *Polityka* and *Newsweek*. While *Gość Niedzielny* did not devote much attention to these events, *Przegląd* covered them but without drawing conclusions about the “birth of a new nation.” These different approaches can be explained by the editorial policy and specificity of particular weeklies. *Tygodnik Powszechny* was very engaged in Ukrainian issues and paid much attention to the process of forming the Ukrainian nation-state, including during the Orange Revolution. The other weeklies, although they reported on those events, did not analyse their narratives and significance in depth.

When the first protests in Ukraine began, *Tygodnik Powszechny* demonstrated collective support for Ukrainians in

⁵⁰ Jacek Cichocki, “Polska z Unią dla Kijowa,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 50, 12.12.2004, 6.

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its editorial. Identity markers that were used referred to people's civic activity and their awareness that they were actors in political and social processes: “Both in the central and western parts, as well as in the east of the country, a civic society is being created today, rejecting the corset of Soviet times.”⁵¹

To highlight the issue of Ukraine's identity, *Tygodnik Powszechny* published an article by prominent historian Norman Davies. He wrote about the “awakening of the Ukrainian nation” and placed Ukrainian national identity in discourse not of “nascent” but “renaissance,” stating that Ukrainian history had been distorted by Russian imperial and then Soviet historiography, which did not recognise Ukraine as a separate nation.⁵²

In *Wprost*, on the other hand, the discourse of the “birth of a nation” was not as romanticised as in *Tygodnik Powszechny*. The emphasis was placed on the birth of civic identity, with particular stress on the transition from post-Soviet identity and the role of Yushchenko in this process.

A series of reports on Ukrainian events was published in the 49th issue of *Polityka* on December 4, 2004. The fact that something new had emerged was reflected by the name of the column in which these articles appeared: “The Spring of Ukraine.” The allegory of spring was used for two reasons – to link Ukraine with the revolutions of 1989 in Europe and to indicate

⁵¹ “Zarówno w jej części centralnej i zachodniej, jak na wschodzie kraju – tworzy się dziś społeczeństwo obywatelskie, odrzucając gorset pochodzący z sowieckich czasów.” Editorial, “O wolność waszą. I naszą,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 49, 05.12.2004, 1.

⁵² Norman Davies, “Pytanie Wałęsy,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 49, 05.12.2004, 13.

the beginning of a “new Ukraine” that was created by “Kyiv intelligentsia and Western Ukrainian nationalism.”⁵³

In *Newsweek*, the discourse of the “birth of a new nation” was presented as a juxtaposition of supranational identities, pro-Russian (post-Soviet) and European:

It was as if many politicians in Europe suddenly realised what had been clear in Warsaw for a long time – that Ukraine is not just another backward post-Soviet province, forever attached to great Russia, but an important area whose civilisational, cultural and political belonging to our part of the world is worth striving for.⁵⁴

Newsweek also used the metaphor of awakening from a long sleep: “Ukraine has not experienced similar demonstrations since becoming an independent state in 1991. Afterwards, almost the entire society sank into a lethargy, only to wake up now.”⁵⁵ The new identity was thus linked to people’s civic engagement in political affairs.

Unlike the mainstream portrayal of Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, the left-wing *Przegląd* did not use figures of speech and rich vocabulary to praise the movement and did not describe the events as the birth of a new nation. Only one text, “I Feel Orange” by Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz, clearly indicated that Ukraine had gained a new identity:

⁵³ Jagienka Wilczak, “Nas nie podołaty,” *Polityka* No 49, 04.12.2004, 20–22.

⁵⁴ “Tak jakby nagle do wielu polityków w Europie dotarło to, co w Warszawie było jasne od dawna – że Ukraina to nie jeszcze jeden zapyziały kawałek postsowieckiej prowincji, na wieki przyrośnięty do wielkiej Rosji, lecz ważny obszar, o którego cywilizacyjną, kulturową i polityczną przynależność do naszej części świata warto zabiegać.” Wojciech Maziarski, “Pomarańczowa alternatywa,” *Newsweek* No 49, 05.12.2004, 30–33.

⁵⁵ “Ukraina nie zaznała podobnych demonstracji od czasu odzyskania niepodległości w 1991 r. Potem niemal całe społeczeństwo zapadło w letarg, by się teraz obudzić.” Michał Kaciewicz, “Barwna rewolucja na wschodzie,” *Newsweek* No 49, 05.12.2004, 33–36.

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Ukraine wants democracy, the rule of law and freedom of speech, which is a legitimate right of every nation. The great social upheaval both in Kyiv and in Donbas suggests that there has been a real civic awakening, which is always a value.⁵⁶

Although *Przegląd* also highlighted people's civic engagement during the Orange Revolution, it did not make any optimistic assumptions.

The “birth of a new nation” during the Orange Revolution was further addressed in the discursive representation of **values** and **transition**. These two concepts appeared in all the analysed weeklies, even those that did not use the phrase “birth of a nation” very often, i.e. *Gość Niedzielny* and *Przegląd*. The issue of values was presented in the context of democracy, which was a value in itself and which defined a shift in the identity from a post-Soviet, authoritarian and non-free to a European, democratic and free one. To underline this shift, I will use the word “transition” because the Polish media portrayed the events in Ukraine by referring to its past.

The discursive indication of transition was marked by pointing out the common benefits from the Orange Revolution. Polish journalists used references to the past and metaphors that recalled social and national movements in their country. A conspicuous example was the editorial in *Tygodnik Powszechny* “For Your Freedom. And Ours” (“Za wolność waszą. I naszą”). It was a paraphrase of the famous Polish revolutionary motto “For

⁵⁶ “Ukraina chce demokracji, państwa prawa, wolności słowa, co jest słusznym prawem każdego narodu. Wielkie poruszenie społeczne zarówno w Kijowie, jak i w Donbasie pozwala przypuszczać, że nastąpiło tam rzeczywiste obywatelskie przebudzenie, co zawsze jest wartością.” Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz, “Pomarańczowo mi,” *Przegląd* No 50, 12.12.2004, 74.

our freedom and yours,” which originated after the Partitions. Later, it became a battle cry in various Polish uprisings and also signified the common struggle of oppressed nations in the Russian Empire. In addition, these words expressed the views of the Polish Romantics, who saw their nation as a “chosen one” with a special mission to liberate other nations oppressed by Russia.⁵⁷ Since the Orange Revolution was perceived in the Polish press as the liberation of Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence, this slogan became relevant again. It had also been popular during the “Solidarity” movement that had opposed the Soviet regime in Poland, as well as in Eastern and Central Europe.

In addition, three articles were entitled “The Orange Alternative,”⁵⁸ which was a reference to Waldemar “Major” Fydrych and his Orange Alternative, a Polish anticommunist underground movement in the 1980s.⁵⁹ The events on the Kyiv Maidan were also compared to the Polish “Solidarity.” Moreover, such Polish actors of the transformation as Lech Wałęsa, Leszek Balcerowicz and Jacek Kuroń were mentioned: “Ukrainians resemble the people of the first ‘Solidarity,’” “the atmosphere on the Maidan is similar to that of the early 1980s in Poland.”⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Stefan Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, New York–London: Routledge-Curzon, 2004, 60.

⁵⁸ E.g. Wilczak, “Pomarańczowa alternatywa,” 56–58.

⁵⁹ Paweł Kowal and Maciej Wapiński, “Wolność i pomarańcz. Obraz pomarańczowej rewolucji w polskich mediach,” in *Obraz współczesnej Ukrainy w mediach w Polsce*, edited by Iwona Hofman and Justyna Maguś, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2014, 181.

⁶⁰ “Ukraińcy przypominają ludzi pierwszej ‘Solidarności’”; “Atmosfera na Majdanie przypomina tę z początku lat 80 w Polsce.” Marek Król, “Człowiek na pętałów,” *Wprost* No 1, 09.01.2005, 1.

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The discourse of transition was very aptly pointed out in *Wprost* by Leszek Balcerowicz, the former Polish minister of finance who had led Poland from a Soviet shortage economy to a capitalist free market economy. His text “Ukraine in Transition” (“Ukraina w przemianach”) presented the carnival of the Orange Revolution as a prerequisite for carrying out tangible structural changes in the economy.

Journalists also used the word “transformation” in an economic sense, as in Poland. Although Andrzej Brzeziecki indicated in *Tygodnik Powszechny* that the post-Soviet identity was far from European standards, the title of his article – “Before the Second Transformation”⁶¹ – implied a discourse of transition.


The economic factor was associated with the value of freedom, in this case – with the freedom of private ownership and the free market, which could inscribe Ukraine into the Western identity system. The word “normal” appeared very often in the context of the value system and everyday life of citizens. Such expressions as “normal life of people,” “normal state,” “normal economy” were used to mark the difference from “abnormal,” which had been caused by Ukraine’s Soviet heritage.

The discourse of transition found in Polish texts about Ukraine written during the Orange Revolution is shown schematically in Figure 7.

In its coverage of the events in 2004 and 2005, *Wprost* stressed that peaceful protests were a sign that Ukraine belonged to Europe. Democracy and the possibility to freely express one’s

⁶¹ Andrzej Brzeziecki, “Przed drugą transformacją,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 2, 09.01.2005, 6.

FIGURE 7. DISCOURSE OF TRANSITION IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES DURING THE ORANGE REVOLUTION



Source: own elaboration.

opinions were presented as the main goals of the revolution. In his article “Squeezing Oranges,” Juliusz Urbanowicz portrayed the Orange Revolution as a social struggle for domination because the one who dominated defined identity: “the biggest achievement of the Orange Revolution ... is to have broken Russia’s cultural domination and the post-Soviet mentality.”⁶²

⁶² “Najważniejszą zdobyczą pomarańczowej rewolucji ... jest przełamanie kulturowej dominacji Rosji oraz mentalności postsowieckiej.” Juliusz Urbanowicz, “Wyciskanie pomarańczy,” *Wprost* No 50, 12.12.2004, 99.

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The discourse of transition in Ukraine was not possible without juxtaposing Ukraine with Russia. The separation from Russia and the portrayal of Ukraine as having a sense of its own identity had a very symbolic meaning in the Polish press. Journalists excluded Ukraine from the circle of Russian identity and inscribed it into the circle of identity of postcommunist states that had been able to transform and become members of the European Union.⁶³ This emphasised the significance of institutional identity, which was related to values, namely, the values of freedom – “a free Ukraine can only develop as part of a free Europe.”⁶⁴

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Ukraine’s distancing from Russia was presented as a social process that indicated the end of the Russian empire and the real demise of the Soviet Union. Polish writer and thinker Stanisław Lem pointed out in his article in *Przegląd* that the Orange Revolution was a “failure of President Putin’s imperial policy.”⁶⁵ The move away from the Russian sphere of influence was highlighted by civic activism, with journalists stressing that in Ukraine, unlike in Putin’s Russia, citizens “decide what to do with politicians.”⁶⁶

Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution were portrayed as actors who were able to construct their identity themselves: “Ukrainians have undergone an accelerated transformation.

⁶³ Juliusz Urbanowicz and Anita Blinkiewicz, “Kijów w Warszawie,” *Wprost* No 2, 16.01.2005, 8–11.

⁶⁴ “Wolna Ukraina może rozwijać się jedynie jako część wolnej Europy,” Joachim Trenkner, “Chwilowo na pomarańczowo,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 12, 20.03.2005, 6.

⁶⁵ Stanisław Lem, “Polska i Ukraina,” *Przegląd* No 12, 28.03.2005, 3.

⁶⁶ Witold Laskowski, “Pomarańczowe domino,” *Wprost* No 3, 23.01.2005, 80–83.

From a post-Soviet mass, they became a modern, community- and goal-conscious, truly independent nation. Meanwhile, Russians long for the Soviet Union, as they have for the past 15 years.”⁶⁷ This is an example of a discourse of constructing an imagined community of Ukraine that differs from Russia in terms of its transition efforts.

In *Przegląd*, the distance towards Russia and the departure from the Soviet mentality were also acknowledged but as the voice of the other, i.e. in the form of an interview with Viktor Yushchenko.⁶⁸ And in a series of reports about the Orange Revolution entitled “The Battle for Ukraine,” journalist Mirosław Głodowski wrote that Ukraine was transforming from a mass into a nation, increasingly “aware of its peculiarity and own interests.”⁶⁹ Also in *Przegląd*, the discourse of transition was presented as a crossroads where Ukrainian identity was being chosen. The title of one article read, “Ukraine between Russia and... the World,” implying that Ukraine was on the border when it came to identity.

In the majority of articles, the Orange Revolution was presented as a way to legitimise the very existence of Ukraine, which until that point had been dependent on Russia. Therefore, the discourse of transition was used to prove to the world, Russia and the Ukrainians themselves that they were a separate, sovereign nation:

⁶⁷ “Ukraińcy przechodzili przyspieszoną transformację. Z postsowieckiej masy stawali się nowoczesnym, świadomym swoich celów i wspólnoty, prawdziwym niezależnym narodem. W tym czasie Rosjanie, podobnie jak przez ostatnich 15 lat, tęsknili za Związkiem Radzieckim.” Ibid.

⁶⁸ Waldemar Piasecki, “Prawo do Europy,” *Przegląd* No 44, 14.11.2004, 8–11.

⁶⁹ Mirosław Głodowski, “Bitwa o Ukrainę,” *Przegląd* No 49, 5.12.2004, 8–9.

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It is still difficult for Russians to accept, first, that the democratisation processes in Ukraine were, to a decisive extent, the result of events in that country and not of “sabotage” on the part of the West; second, Russians do not really want to come to terms with the fact that, despite being culturally and historically close, the Russian and Ukrainian people are today ethnically, politically and nationally distinct.⁷⁰

In terms of institutional identity, all the weeklies except *Przegląd* expressed support for Ukrainian aspirations to join the European Union.⁷¹ *Przegląd*’s journalists accepted that Ukraine was on a path of transition but stressed that it was still dependent on the Russian economy, so Europe might not want to “take Ukraine completely away from Russia” to preserve good relations with the latter.⁷²

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One more important concept associated with the transition in the “birth of a nation” discourse was free media. The issue came to the front after the murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgii Gongadze (see above). During his presidential campaign, Yushchenko promised to find the perpetrators and punish them. The question of punishment for those responsible for this crime became thus a symbol of the changes.

The analysed weeklies acknowledged that one of the visible achievements of the Orange Revolution was freedom of speech. A widely reported example was Yushchenko apologising after

⁷⁰ “Rosjanie cały czas z trudem przyjmują do wiadomości – raz – że demokratyzacyjne procesy na Ukrainie w decydującym stopniu były efektem wydarzeń w tym kraju, a nie rezultatem ‘sabotażu’ ze strony Zachodu, a dwa – nie bardzo chcą się do końca pogodzić z faktem, że choć bliskie kulturowo i historycznie, to narody rosyjski i ukraiński są dzisiaj etnicznie, politycznie i państwowo odrębne.” Bartosz Głębocki, “Ukraina między Rosją a... światem,” *Przegląd* No 1, 09.01.2005, 31–33.

⁷¹ Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, “Euroklapa,” *Wprost* No 23, 12.06.2005, 88–90.

⁷² Głębocki, “Ukraina...,” 31–33.

being rude to a journalist who had asked him an uncomfortable question about his son's income and lifestyle. It was also emphasised that in Kuchma's time, it had been forbidden to even ask politicians about their private lives. The apology was considered a sign of change, and the media began to play the role of controllers.⁷³

Until recently, the children of Ukrainian elites lived in blissful peace, undisturbed by the press. The media were not supposed to be interested in them. But since the scandal around young Yushchenko broke out, journalists have not stopped looking for new bombshells.⁷⁴

Free media were linked to the value of freedom, which, as Figure 7 shows, was one of the most frequent attributes of the Ukrainian transition mentioned in the Polish press: the article "The Screen of Freedom,"⁷⁵ for example, was devoted to the only opposition channel during the Ukrainian presidential elections – 5th Channel.

Journalists agreed that new free elections, opposition-building and opportunities for the development of civic society were evidence of a political transition. They also expressed hope that Ukrainians would fight corruption and nepotism to make the transition from a post-Soviet identity to a democratic state,⁷⁶ comparing the country's situation to that of Georgia after 2003.

⁷³ Bronisław Tumilowicz, "Jakie są owoce pomarańczowej rewolucji na Ukrainie?", *Przegląd* No 15, 17.04.2005, 22–23.

⁷⁴ "Dzieci ukraińskich elit żyły do niedawna w błogim spokoju, nie niepokojone przez prasę. Mediom nie wypadało się nimi interesować. Ale odkąd wybuchł skandal wokół młodego Juszczenki, dziennikarze nie ustają w poszukiwaniach nowych sensacji." Jagienka Wilczak, "Pomarańcze od jabłoni," *Polityka* No 41, 15.10.2005, 48–50.

⁷⁵ Michał Kaciewicz, "Ekran wolności," *Newsweek* No 51, 19.12.2004, 56–57.

⁷⁶ Kaciewicz, "Barwna rewolucja....," 33–36; Jagienka Wilczak, "Czy z korupcją można wygrać?", *Polityka* No 10, 12.03.2005, 18.

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The “birth of a nation” and transition discourses were very often accompanied by references to Poland’s role in building Ukrainian identity, especially the contribution of Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995–2005) during the Orange Revolution and the historical influence of *Kultura* and Jerzy Giedroyc on the perception of Ukraine in Poland. The Orange Revolution was perceived as a legitimisation of Giedroyc’s ideas: “Giedroyc was right – Poland lost lands in the East but gained friends and allies there.”⁷⁷ In this context, Polish-Ukrainian relations were treated as Poland’s positive contribution to Ukrainian European identity, as expressed in *Tygodnik Powszechny*: democracy in Ukraine depended on the quality of democracy in Poland.⁷⁸

Another topic addressed in the analysed weeklies in the context of the “birth of a nation” discourse and re-inventing Ukraine, though not as often as politics, was culture. It appeared most frequently in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (see Table 3). For example, the first article about Ukraine in 2004 was devoted to its culture in the context of Polish-Ukrainian relations on the occasion of the celebration of the Polish Year in Ukraine.⁷⁹ However, in addition to cultural issues, it also described the political and social situation in Ukraine. The journalist portrayed Ukraine as a European country in terms of literature and intellectual thought but stated that the political and social conditions were not conducive to the development of a European identity in Ukraine.

⁷⁷ “Giedroyc miał rację – Polska straciła ziemię na wschodzie, ale zyskała tam sojuszników i przyjaciół.” Maziarski, “Pomarańczowa alternatywa,” 30–33.

⁷⁸ Burnetko, “Nie zamykajcie drzwi,” 5.

⁷⁹ Przebina, “Ukraina...,” 8.

The other three articles on this topic in *Tygodnik Powszechny* were published in 2005. The first was written in connection with the creation of a new magazine in Lviv that was to be addressed to Poles and inform them about Ukraine in order to eliminate negative connotations and challenge stereotypes.⁸⁰ The second article was devoted to an art exhibition at the Kyiv National Gallery, "Ukrainian Portrait of the 16th–18th Century." This exhibition presented images of important figures of Ukrainian culture and history together with portraits of such persons from Poland, Belarus, Lithuania and Russia. The article's author, Piotr Kosiewski, agreed that the title of the exhibition could be perceived as a declaration of the organisers, who apparently had in mind portraits of Ukrainians or painted by Ukrainians and other important figures living on the territory of the present Ukrainian state. Next, he reflected on Ukrainian culture in the context of Polish state tradition and the role of history, especially the heritage of the First Polish Republic, in shaping this culture. Referring to Ukrainian identity, Kosiewski concluded that the cultural tradition of the First Polish Republic should be understood as a common heritage of both Poland and Ukraine.⁸¹ In the third article, "The Majority in the Minority,"⁸² Andrzej Brzezicki discussed the role of language in the Orange Revolution and the role of Ukrainian music bands that accompanied the protests.

⁸⁰ This magazine was entitled *Ukraina* and was edited and funded exclusively by the Ukrainian side. Piotr Kosiewski, "Niebanalnie o Ukrainie," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 23, 05.06.2005, 7.

⁸¹ Piotr Kosiewski, "Batory, Chmielnicki i inni," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 41, 09.10.2005, 14.

⁸² Andrzej Brzezicki, "Większość w mniejszości," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 51, 18.12.2005, 11.

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In the other weeklies, cultural issues were presented very rarely. During the Orange Revolution, there were only a few articles devoted entirely to Ukrainian culture, therefore defining culture as a factor of identity. In two of them, Ukrainian contemporary literature was recognised as European and the writers as actors of identity. For instance, Yurii Andrukhovych was presented as a symbol of Ukraine's search for a European identity and confrontation with the post-Soviet style. "His protagonist is a European with a story to tell, a Galician with a past, and a Ukrainian who feels like a stranger in his own Russified and Sovietised country. That is, Andrukhovych himself."⁸³

In addition, Polish journalists emphasised in their texts that contemporary Ukrainian culture was an elite, high-quality culture, while Russian or Russian-speaking culture in Ukraine was a mass culture of low quality.⁸⁴

3.3. ACTORS OF IDENTITY DURING THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

3.3.1. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO, THE HETMAN OF FREEDOM

In CDA, it is very important to analyse the actors of identity. In the "birth of a nation" discourse during the Orange

⁸³ "Jego bohaterem jest Europejczyk po przejściach, Galicjanin z przeszłością, a zarazem Ukraińiec, czujący się obco we własnym zrusyfikowanym i zsowietyzowanym kraju. Czyli sam Andrukhovych." Aleksander Kaczorowski, "Balkon na podwórzu," *Polityka* No 19, 14.05.2005, 72–74.

⁸⁴ Anna Sańczuk, "Kultura na pomarańczowo," *Newsweek* No 1, 09.01.2005, 56–57.

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Revolution, the actors were individualised and specified,⁸⁵ in contrast to the generalisations used to refer to the people representing post-Soviet Ukraine, called simply “oligarchs,” for example. The main actor was Viktor Yushchenko.

Yushchenko played the role of an identity marker for the Polish press. He was described as a personification of Ukraine’s Western and European orientation. The fact that passive voice was not used in relation to him meant that he was perceived as an active independent figure. *Tygodnik Powszechny* wrote, for example, “Thousands came to ‘our Maidan’ to hear Viktor Yushchenko declare victory. And he thanked the people for persevering, for proving to the world that they are a European nation.”⁸⁶ Only active voice was used here. Yushchenko “declared,” and people “proved” their European identity. So the actor was Yushchenko, and the agency of identity was the Maidan, which was also active. European identity was associated with “victory,” which, however, did not mean Yushchenko’s presidential win (the article was written on December 19, before the third round of elections). It referred to the Constitutional Court’s decision to hold the second round of elections again because the previous one had been deemed unfair by the Court. Therefore, in this case, European identity meant the values of the rule of law and the right to a fair choice for citizens.

⁸⁵ Van Leeuwen, “The Representation...,” 48.

⁸⁶ “Tysiące przyszły na ‘nasz Majdan,’ by usłyszeć, jak Wiktor Juszczenko ogłasza zwycięstwo. A on dziękował ludziom za wytrwanie, za to, że udowodnili światu, iż są narodem europejskim.” Małgorzata Nocuń and Andrzej Brzeziecki, “Pada ‘sterowana demokracja,’ idzie demokracja,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 51, 19.12.2004, 6.

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Interesting texts from the perspective of the discourse of the actors of identity were published in *Wprost*. The first issue from 2005 was devoted in its entirety to Yushchenko as the winner of the "Man of the Year" prize, awarded annually by this magazine. His image in the Polish press was also built on references to Cossack traditions, e.g. *Wprost* entitled one of its articles about him "The Hetman of Freedom."⁸⁷ "Hetman" was the highest position in the hierarchy of Ukrainian Cossacks, who had their own state of Hetmanshchyna, considered a proto-Ukrainian state. The noun "freedom" referred to the common discourse of values, as described earlier, where freedom was seen as an attribute of liberal European identity.

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In the same article, *Wprost* also used interesting linguistic devices that alluded to the discourse of religion, comparing Yushchenko to Jesus and Moses: "the last supper with dioxins" (a reference to his poisoning), "he will lead Ukrainians through their Red Sea."

Yushchenko was also portrayed as one who could bring about reconciliation between the Polish and Ukrainian states and help overcome the difficult historical memory of ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and Operation "Vistula."

Liberal weeklies portrayed Yushchenko as a true leader and nation builder. Before he was elected president, he had been described as Ukraine's only reasonable choice, which defined its identity for the future. Therefore, Yushchenko was presented in a dichotomy of the old regime versus a new one:

⁸⁷ Juliusz Urbanowicz, "Hetman wolności," *Wprost* No 1, 09.01.2005, 24–32.

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Yushchenko is an experienced politician. Called the father of the Ukrainian currency, hryvnia, he was the head of the Central Bank. When he became prime minister, he stopped the looting of the state, forced the oligarchs to pay taxes and paid overdue salaries, pensions and annuities. But the clans never forgave Yushchenko for depleting their fortunes. Kuchma dismissed him from his post.⁸⁸

The wording of the articles also characterised Yushchenko as a pro-Western opposition leader who was associated with change and success. Furthermore, he embodied Ukrainian national identity, speaking the Ukrainian language and upholding traditions. His pro-Western orientation was stated unambiguously: “Yushchenko is a pro-Western, pro-European,” “democratic” and “anti-Russian” politician; therefore, he was perceived as the one who could oppose Russia, namely Putin. In the article “Striking Putin on the Nose,”⁸⁹ Yushchenko was portrayed as the leader of GUAM, an association of the post-Soviet states of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova that was supposed to resist Russia’s influence.

In the context of European identity, he was very often compared to successful leaders of Western societies. For example, one of the articles devoted to him was entitled, “Ukraine on the Threshold of the Victorian Era.”⁹⁰ A trace of extrapolation of meaning is evident here, involving a comparison with the

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⁸⁸ “Juszczenko jest politykiem doświadczonym. Zwany ojcem ukraińskiej waluty hrywny był szefem Banku Centralnego. Gdy został premierem, powstrzymał rozkradanie państwa, zmusił oligarchów do płacenia podatków, wypłacał zaległe pensje, renty i emerytury. Ale klany nigdy nie darowały Juszczenko uszczuplonych fortun. Kuczma odwołał go z funkcji.” Wileczak, “Pomańczowa alternatywa,” 56–58.

⁸⁹ Michał Kaciewicz, “Cios Putina w nos,” *Newsweek* No 20, 22.05.2005, 40.

⁹⁰ Andrzej Łukowski, “Ukraina na progu epoki wiktoriańskiej,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 46, 14.11.2004, 1.

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Victorian era in Great Britain. The phrase "Victorian era" is an allegory of prosperous times as it refers to the time when Queen Victoria ruled the British Empire, which is considered the best period in the history of the British state.

Similar rhetorical figures were to be found in other texts as well. On December 4, 2004, *Polityka* published Adam Szostkiewicz's commentary entitled "The Tale of Viktor's Campaign."⁹¹ The title was an allusion to "The Tale of Igor's Campaign" – a historical epic about a Rus' prince who led a campaign against the Polovtsians, a wild nomadic tribe inhabiting the south of today's Ukraine. The poem mentions that Igor failed in his endeavour, but the Polish journalist left the finale of Yushchenko's story open-ended, leaving the reader unsure whether the comparison was full or partial.

An interesting role was attributed to Yushchenko as the actor who organised the revolution. Michał Kaciewicz wrote in *Newsweek* that Yushchenko had been persuaded by his political advisors from the West to run a political campaign of a new type, using the methods of colour revolutions:

Viktor Yushchenko was persuaded to launch a new type of political campaign by his American advisors, such as Mark Brzezinski, advisor to John Kerry, and the famous financier George Soros. He was also persuaded by his wife, Kateryna Chumachenko, who is an American. It is no secret that Yushchenko did not invent a clever plan for a peaceful revolution but merely improved it.⁹²

⁹¹ Adam Szostkiewicz, "Słowo o wyprawie Wiktora," *Polityka* No 49, 04.12.2004, 19.

⁹² "Do kampanii politycznej nowego typu Wiktora Juszczenkę przekonali amerykańscy doradcy, tacy jak Mark Brzeziński, doradca Johna Kerry'ego, czy słynny finansista George Soros. Namawiała go też żona, Amerykanka Jekateryna Czumaczenko. Nie jest tajemnicą, że Juszczenko nie konstruował sprytnego planu pokojowej rewolucji, a jedynie go udoskonalił." Michał Kaciewicz, "Marketing rewolucyjny," *Newsweek* No 2, 16.01.2005, 64–65.

Yushchenko was also presented as a representative of a new, non-ideological type of elite: “he is a technocrat – not a dissident or an apparatchik,” a “Ukrainian Balcerowicz,” which placed him in the discourse of reforms and transformation described in the previous subchapter. Also, the transition from post-Soviet to Western identity was emphasised linguistically, highlighting the value of humanism by portraying Yushchenko as a “human being”: “The Orange Revolution was led by a man, not a post-Soviet apparatchik.”⁹³ This discourse also put an emphasis on the role of elites in nation-building.

The notion of civic identity was underlined by calling Yushchenko a “president of the citizens.” Even the sceptical *Przegląd* compared him to Martin Luther King and his words to the latter’s famous speech, which began with “I have a dream...”:

“I believe that from this autumn, the Ukrainian people will finally begin to live in prosperity and happiness, that the authorities will serve the people and not their own interests, and that Ukraine will become a member of a strong, united Europe.” It reminded me of Martin Luther King’s famous 1968 speech “I have a dream...,” similar in its idealism.⁹⁴

There were also very interesting references to Greek mythology. Mirosław Głodowski’s article in *Przegląd*, entitled “The 12 Labours of Viktor,”⁹⁵ compared him to the divine hero

⁹³ “Na czele pomarańczowej rewolucji stanął człowiek a nie post-sowiecki aparatchyk.” Król, “Człowiek...,” 3.

⁹⁴ “‘Wierzę, że naród ukraiński już od jesieni zacznie wreszcie żyć w dobrobycie i szczęściu, że władza służyć będzie ludziom, a nie swoim interesom, a Ukraina stanie się członkiem silnej, zjednoczonej Europy.’ Przypomniało mi się wtedy podobne w swoim idealizmie słynne wystąpienie ‘I have a dream...’ Martina Luthera Kinga z 1968 r.” Piasecki, “Prawo...,” 8–11.

⁹⁵ Mirosław Głodowski, “12 prac Wiktora,” *Przegląd* No 4, 30.01.2005, 28–29.

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Hercules, who had twelve extremely difficult tasks to complete. The new president faced a similar challenge due to the complicated situation in the Ukrainian economy, politics and society. *Gość Niedzielny*, however, reminded its readers that during the Soviet era, Yushchenko belonged to the Soviet youth group "Komsomol" and was a member of the Communist Party when other people were dissidents.⁹⁶

In conclusion, Yushchenko was portrayed as a pro-Western actor of identity who represented both ethnic and civic types of Ukrainian identity.

3.3.2. YULIA TYMOSHENKO, JOAN OF ARC OR THE "GAS PRINCESS"

Yulia Tymoshenko was portrayed in more interesting and more contradictory ways than Yushchenko, not only as his right hand during the Revolution but as an independent actor, in some cases more decisive and determined than the presidential candidate. The multiple discourses of her representation in the Polish press were created with the use of various metaphors and tropes.

In addition to being portrayed as a political actor who represented a similar discourse to Yushchenko, i.e. pro-Western orientation and democratic values, Tymoshenko was presented in at least two other roles. The first was a feminine person-alisation of the political situation in Ukraine and its society in general. The second was associated with the discourse of

⁹⁶ Andrzej Grajewski, "Pomarańczowa zagadka," *Gość Niedzielny* No 49, 05.12.2004, 22.

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revolution. For instance, journalists used many descriptive adjectives to emphasise Tymoshenko's revolutionary temperament – “demagogic,” “inspiring and passionate,” “Ukrainian Joan of Arc.” She was often portrayed as the face of the Orange Revolution, a so-called fighting woman who was not afraid of anything.

However, Tymoshenko was also presented as a very ambiguous and even dangerous person. To emphasise this, journalists used the Polish proverb: “Where the Devil cannot go himself, there he will send a woman” (“Gdzie diabeł nie może, tam babę pośle”). She was thus perceived as a very controversial figure in Ukrainian politics but with euphoria and adoration because it was believed that all the problems of Ukraine could be solved by the devil called “Iron Yulia.”

In face of such contradictions, much attention was paid to Tymoshenko's appearance. Journalists focused on her style before and during the Orange Revolution. An article in *Polityka* entitled “White Lady, Black Lady”⁹⁷ described her change of hair colour when she joined the opposition (from dark to light) as coming over to the good side. Jagienka Wilczak portrayed her as someone more important than Yushchenko and with a rather ambiguous biography, full of secrets and suspicious events. The journalist claimed that there were two Yulias. The first (the black-haired one) amassed her capital because “she was stealing like the rest of them,” and the second (the light-haired one) headed the opposition party “Batkivshchyna” and started

⁹⁷ Jagienka Wilczak, “Biała dama, czarna dama,” *Polityka* No 51, 18.12.2004, 51–53.

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to build the image of a politician who wanted to emphasise her connection with Ukrainian culture.

In another article, entitled in Polish “Talia Julii,” Wilczak placed Tymoshenko at the centre of the political process in Ukraine.⁹⁸ Since the Polish word “talia” has two meanings, the title could be translated either as “Yulia’s Waist” or “Yulia’s Set of Playing Cards.” This metaphor both signifies Tymoshenko’s power as a player and implies a feminine discourse of identity in Ukrainian politics.

In addition, Tymoshenko was compared to prominent Ukrainian and foreign women, such as Joan of Arc, Margaret Thatcher and the famous Ukrainian poet and playwright Lesia Ukrainka. In allusion to Thatcher, she was called “Ukraine’s Iron Lady.” There were also references to other women politicians who were associated with change and radicalism. One of the articles described Tymoshenko as “La Pasionaria,” which linked her to the Spanish revolutionary discourse. References to the French Revolution were also present – *Tygodnik Powszechny* mentioned caricatures that depicted Tymoshenko as Liberty leading people to the barricades from the well-known picture of Eugène Delacroix.⁹⁹ The references to Joan of Arc also tied in to the discourse of the nation’s struggle for freedom.

An interesting choice of words was calling Tymoshenko “the only man among the Ukrainian oppositionists,” which was a paraphrase of what Ukrainian writer and thinker Ivan Franko had said about Lesia Ukrainka to emphasise the strength of her

⁹⁸ Jagienka Wilczak, “Talia Julii,” *Polityka* No 7, 19.02.2005, 50–51.

⁹⁹ Andrzej Łukowski, “Pomarańcze i Realpolitik,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 50, 12.12.2004, 6.

talent: "She is perhaps the only man in Ukrainian literature."¹⁰⁰ On the one hand, Tymoshenko was portrayed as a person with links to world-famous discourses and, at the same time, as someone who was closely connected to the Ukrainian national cultural heritage. Even her characteristic braid was presented as an allusion to Lesia Ukrainka, who had worn a similar hairstyle.

One more reference to outside people appeared in *Tygodnik Powszechny*. The title of Gerhard Gnauck's article, "Iron Yulka," referred to the movie by the Polish director Andrzej Wajda, "Man of Iron": "This, to refer to Wajda's film, is truly a woman of iron."¹⁰¹ The movie in question tells the story of the revolutionary events in Gdansk in the 1980s, specifically during the strike of Polish labour workers in the shipyard. In the article, Tymoshenko was also described as the "engine" and "generator" of the changes that were taking place.

Tymoshenko was thus portrayed as the one who would carry out reforms in Ukraine that would lead it to democracy. *Newsweek* called her "Radical Yulia,"¹⁰² which suggested her decisive nature. The magazine also showed her as someone who would accomplish the transformation of the Ukrainian system¹⁰³ by using the metaphor "Iron Lady." *Newsweek* emphasised Tymoshenko's desire to become as independent from Russia

¹⁰⁰ Ivan Franko, "Lesia Ukrainka," in Ivan Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh. Tom 31. Literaturno-krytychni pratsi (1897–1899)*, edited by H. Verves and O. Moroz, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1981, 271.

¹⁰¹ "To, by odwołać się do filmu Wajdy, jest naprawdę kobieta z żelaza." Gerhard Gnauck, "Żelazna Julka," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 3, 16.01.2005, 11.

¹⁰² Kacewicz, "Barwna rewolucja...", 33–36.

¹⁰³ In an interview (Oleg Szama, "Tymoszenko. Made in Ukraine," *Newsweek* No 2, 16.01.2005, 66), Tymoshenko stated that the new agenda of her government included carrying out reforms as well as fighting corruption and the oligarchy. This places her in the discourse of transition.

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as possible, describing the situation of the Ukrainian arms industry and its dependence on Russia as a legacy of the Soviet era. Tymoshenko was thus presented as someone who wanted to separate Ukraine from Russia and enter the Western structures, which inscribed her in the discourse of Ukraine’s pro-European identity:

Until now, the defence industry of both countries lived in the old Soviet symbiosis. There was no room for dreams of NATO. Today, everything has changed. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko proposes to privatise the defence industry within the next two years. She wants Ukraine to become independent in the arms trade on world markets.¹⁰⁴

182 It has already been mentioned that journalists were eager to underline Tymoshenko’s feminine traits. For this reason, new wording was introduced, e.g. “beautiful Yulia.” In addition to using traditionally masculine adjectives, such as “radical,” “decisive” and “firm,” journalists referred to her appearance and elegance. Juliusz Urbanowicz proposed an interesting metaphor, calling Tymoshenko Diana Thatcher – “an Eastern European mix of Lady Di and Margaret Thatcher,”¹⁰⁵ emphasising her ability to be loved by people because of her beauty and openness and to be a strong political actor who would credibly lead the country to success. Krystyna Kofta in *Przegląd* paid much attention to her appearance, pointing out her elegant outfits

¹⁰⁴ “Do tej pory zbrojeniówki obu krajów żyły w starej radzieckiej symbiozie. Nie było miejsca na marzenia o NATO. Dzisiaj wszystko się zmieniło. Premier Julia Tymoszenko proponuje prywatyzację przemysłu obronnego w ciągu dwóch najbliższych lat. Chce, żeby Ukraina usamodzieliła się w handlu bronią na światowych rynkach.” Michał Kaciewicz, “Pożegnanie z bronią,” *Newsweek* No 6, 13.02.2005, 87–88.

¹⁰⁵ “Wschodnioeuropejska mieszanina Lady Di i Margaret Thatcher.” Juliusz Urbanowicz, “Diana Thatcher,” *Wprost* No 6, 13.02.2005, 98–99.

and even calling her “ukraińska krasawica,”¹⁰⁶ which means “Ukrainian pretty woman”; however, the word “krasavica” is not Ukrainian but Russian.

Very often, Tymoshenko was presented at the intersection of feminine and masculine discourse by means of comparisons to Yushchenko. On the one hand, she was described as the Mother-Saviour of the Orange Revolution in terms of spiritual values and called the conscience and the “good spirit of the revolution.”¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, she was inscribed into the masculine discourse by being called an “otaman.” Otaman was the leader of the Cossack army and definitely a man. Hence, “at the time when Yushchenko was prime minister, and Tymoshenko was deputy prime minister, Ukrainian commentators wrote with relish that it was brave Yulia who wore the trousers in this tandem.”¹⁰⁸ In conclusion, masculinity prevailed in the discourse: Tymoshenko was called the most assertive politician in Ukraine. In the article “Viktor versus Iron Yulia,”¹⁰⁹ the power holder was definitely Tymoshenko, who was described with the strong adjective “iron,” which automatically inscribed her in a specific discourse of power relations.

All in all, compared to Yushchenko, who was more often presented in the context of the values of democracy and freedom, Tymoshenko was portrayed in the context of radical

¹⁰⁶ Krystyna Kofta, “Pomarańczowa alternatywa,” *Przegląd* No 50, 12.12.2004, 40.

¹⁰⁷ Gerhard Gnauck, “Dni które wstrząsnęły światem,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 49, 05.12.2004, 9–10.

¹⁰⁸ “W czasach gdy Juszczenko był premierem, a Tymoszenko wicepremierem, ukraińscy komentatorzy z uciechą pisali, że w tym tandemie portki nosi bojowa Julia.” Łukowski, “Pomarańcze...,” 6.

¹⁰⁹ Mirosław Głodowski, “Wiktor kontra Żelazna Julia,” *Przegląd* No 39, 02.10.2005, 29.

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
change, i.e. revolution. The most frequently used adjectives that marked the discourse about her were “beautiful,” “iron” and “radical.” Also, unlike Yushchenko, she did not represent Ukrainian ethnic or cultural identity; she can be interpreted as an actor of civic identity, which involves social movements and social and political activism of citizens. However, from the point of view of supranational discourse, both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were perceived in the Polish press as actors of the transition from Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity to a European one.

3.4. DISCOURSE OF A “DIVIDED UKRAINE”

The second current of identity discourses that appeared in the analysed weeklies was the discourse of a “divided Ukraine” or the discourse of “two Ukraines.” In articles written before and during the Orange Revolution, the discourse of two Ukraines was closely linked to the actors. Journalists described the inhabitants of Eastern and Western Ukraine as the electorate of Yanukovych and Yushchenko, respectively. Therefore, the eastern part of the country was portrayed as a place where people did not identify strongly with Ukraine: they spoke Russian and supported Yanukovych, who was presented as pro-Russian, anti-European and consequently undemocratic. Western Ukrainians, on the other hand, were depicted as representatives of proper Ukrainian identity with its main ethnic feature, the Ukrainian language, showing a strong sense of citizenship and a pro-European orientation.

Figure 8 shows the number of articles highlighting the discourse of divided Ukraine in the analysed weeklies. They appeared most frequently in *Polityka* (8) and *Tygodnik Powszechny* (7). Comparison with the total number of articles in each magazine (see Figure 2) shows that perceiving Ukraine as a country with no common national identity was a popular view.

FIGURE 8. NUMBER OF ARTICLES HIGHLIGHTING THE DISCOURSE OF “DIVIDED UKRAINE” IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES IN 2004–2005



Source: own elaboration.

For external observers, the main and most visible factor that divided Ukraine was language, which corresponded to Mykola Riabchuk’s hypothesis about “two Ukraines.”¹¹⁰ This problem was often emphasised because from the perspective of the monolingual Polish society, two languages understandably

¹¹⁰ Riabchuk, *Dwie Ukrainy*. Polish journalists often referred to this book in their articles.

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implied the existence of problems with identity. Therefore, Ukraine was presented as two antagonistic worlds: the Russian-speaking East and the Ukrainian-speaking West.

Yanukovych says it is time to stop pretending that Ukraine is a linguistic monolith and wants to give Russian the status of a second official language. For Western Ukrainians, it is a slap in the face – no one wants to go back to using the hated “language of Muscovites.”¹¹¹

To emphasise the discourse of “two Ukraines,” journalists used the following expressions: “two Ukraines,” “two faces of Ukraine,” “Ukraine is divided,” “Eastern and Western Ukraine are two different worlds,” “Ukraine is torn into two parts.” However, after the outbreak of the Orange Revolution, they began voicing the expectation that the protests would unite the two separate parts of the country into one monolith with a common goal – a democratic and just state with favourable living conditions. For instance, in *Polityka*, the author of the article “Trident with Orange” gave examples of Russian-speaking Ukrainians who thought of themselves as Ukrainians because of their distinctiveness from Russians. Ukraine was thus portrayed as a state with different ethnic features but a single civic identity.¹¹²

At the same time, most of the articles, even those about the first protests on the Maidan, included statements that Ukraine was not united, that there was another Ukraine, which was

¹¹¹ “Janukowycz twierdzi, że czas przestać udawać, iż Ukraina jest językowym monolitem i chce nadać rosyjskiemu status drugiego oficjalnego języka. Dla zachodnich Ukraińców to policzek – nikt nie chce wracać do znienawidzonego ‘języka Moskali.’” Michał Kaciewicz, “Dwie twarze Ukrainy,” *Newsweek* No 44, 04.11.2004, 82–87.

¹¹² Adam Szostkiewicz, “Trójząb z pomarańczą,” *Polityka* No 49, 04.12.2004, 76–78.

anti-European and unwilling to change. The two parts of the country were juxtaposed, with Eastern Ukraine literally portrayed as the USSR and Western Ukraine idealistically identified with Europe and the West in general. Journalists also emphasised the historical role of Poland as a European structure that had influenced Ukraine’s identity.

Then there is Eastern Ukraine, which voted for Yanukovych, is averse to Europe and looks with sympathy toward Moscow. This Ukraine has no experience of living in European state structures like the Austro-Hungarian monarchy or the Second Polish Republic. Donbas in the east and Galicia in the west are two different worlds.¹¹³

In *Tygodnik Powszechny*, for example, it was clearly stated that the line that divided Ukraine ran along the eastern border of the First Polish Republic. Thus, the west and centre of Ukraine, which had formed part of the Polish state, supported Yushchenko and the Western values of democracy and civic society, while the inhabitants of the territories in the east of Ukraine, which had never belonged to Poland, lacked the sense of civic belonging and national Ukrainian identity.¹¹⁴

The discourse of “divided Ukraine” was also highlighted by Polish journalists by drawing attention to separatist tendencies in Eastern Ukraine. This topic was raised repeatedly both before and during the Orange Revolution. Journalists even used

¹¹³ “Jest jeszcze Ukraina wschodnia, głosząca na Janukowycza, niechętna Europie i spoglądająca z sympatią w kierunku Moskwy. Ta Ukraina nie ma za sobą doświadczenia życia w europejskich strukturach państwowych, jak monarchia Austro-Węgierska czy II Rzeczpospolita. Donbas na wschodzie i Galicja na zachodzie to dwa różne światy.” Maziarski, “Pomarańczowa alternatywa,” 30–33.

¹¹⁴ Piotr Kosiewski, “Trzecia Ukraina,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 49, 05.12.2004, 12.

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a metaphor, calling Eastern Ukraine “Ukrainian Sudetenland,” which placed it in a historical context dating back to before the Second World War.¹¹⁵

Historical memory was yet another factor that contributed to Ukraine’s division. Journalist Jagienka Wilczak showed that historical memory regarding the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was the reason why Ukraine was divided – in Western Ukraine, people considered the soldiers of UPA to have been fighters for the Ukrainian state, while in Eastern Ukraine, they were called murderers and fascists. Differences also stemmed from the opinions on what Soviet Ukraine had been – a socialist “paradise” (the view held in the east) or “hell” (the view held in the west). Nevertheless, even though Eastern Ukraine was presented as a post-Soviet and pro-Russian territory that supported Yanukovich, there were also some attempts to portray Russian-speaking Ukrainians as having a civic attachment to the Ukrainian state. At the same time, despite presenting Western Ukraine mainly as pro-European with a strong sense of national identity, Polish journalists also pointed out the Ukrainian nationalism of Yushchenko’s supporters and were critical of them displaying symbols of UPA, such as red-and-black banners.

Explicit references to nationalistic identity can be seen in *Przegląd* in the article “52% of Ukraine.” Its author stated that Ukraine was divided by voting for different candidates, which indicated the existence of an identity discourse. The journalist

¹¹⁵ Jagienka Wilczak, “Prawda spod farby,” *Polityka* No 46, 19.11.2005, 58–60.

emphasised that Poles should be aware that there may be former UPA soldiers and Ukrainian nationalists in Ukraine, using the word “Banderites” to describe them:

... among these 52 per cent were groups that traced their genealogy back to Ukrainian fascism, UPA and OUN and had no reason to dissociate themselves from the genocide that took place in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, or at least acknowledge that it was a fact.¹¹⁶

The author referred to the results of the second round of presidential elections on December 26, 2004, suggesting that 52% of Ukrainians who voted for Yushchenko had a positive attitude toward UPA soldiers. In reality, the number of people who considered UPA soldiers as fighters for Ukrainian independence had never reached 50% across Ukraine. For example, in the 2000s, systematic monitoring of attitudes toward UPA was conducted by the Ukrainian State Institute of Social and Political Psychology. In 2005, after Yushchenko, who explicitly supported UPA, came to power, 33.5% of Ukrainians supported the idea of recognising UPA soldiers as a belligerent party during the Second World War, while 43.7% opposed it. And already in 2006, the numbers were almost equal – 35.9% versus 41.1%. But the number of supporters of UPA did not rise.¹¹⁷ Indeed, most of them hailed from Western Ukraine, according to a public opinion poll conducted in 2007 by Ilko Kucheriv

¹¹⁶ “... wśród tych 52 procent znajdowały się ugrupowania wywodzące swoją genealogię od ukraińskiego faszyzmu, od UPA i OUN i niewidzące powodu, aby się odcinać od ludobójstwa, jakie miało miejsce na Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej, lub przynajmniej przyznać, że było ono faktem.” Bronisław Łagowski, “52 procent Ukrainy,” *Przegląd* No 2, 16.01.2005, 35.

¹¹⁷ Vitaly Chervonenko, “From Hatred to Support. Why Has the Attitude Towards the UPA Changed?”, *BBC Ukraine*, October 13, 2017, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-41597497>.

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“Democratic Initiatives” Foundation (DIF) and the Ukrainian Sociology Service. In the west of Ukraine, 73.7% of Ukrainians fully or conditionally supported the granting of benefits and status to OUN-UPA soldiers. In the centre and northeast, this figure was 37.9%, the same as the number of opponents. In the south and southeast, 21.9% of respondents supported the granting of special status to UPA soldiers, fewer in Donbas and Crimea – 13.4%.¹¹⁸

The discourse of divided Ukraine appeared mainly before and during the Orange Revolution as a description of society and people’s way of life. Articles after February 2005 were mostly devoted to new political processes and related issues.

3.5. POST-ORANGE DISAPPOINTMENT: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

Although in most cases the Orange Revolution was described with euphoria as a turning point in Ukraine’s history that would link it to the identity of European states, the political process after Yushchenko had been inaugurated as president and Tymoshenko had been appointed as prime minister was assessed more sceptically and critically. Only in *Tygodnik Powszechny* did the discourse of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution focus on its

¹¹⁸ “The attitude of the population of Ukraine to granting UPA soldiers the status of participants in national liberation struggles.” Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation, “Stavlennya naselennya ukraini do nadannya voyakam UPA statusu uchashnikiv natsionalno vizvolnikh zmagani,” January 28, 2008, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://dif.org.ua/en/article/stavlennya-naselennya-ukraini-do-nadannya-voiakam-upa-statusu-uchashnikiv-natsionalno-vizvolnikh-zmagani>.

belonging to Europe and the ways in which the institutional European identity could be realised. In the other magazines, the crisis was shown as an inevitable part of the transition period, with mentions of the Soviet mentality of the Ukrainian political elite, although journalists expressed a strong belief that a new nation had indeed been born.

The summer of 2005 brought a new political crisis to Ukraine, which provoked an external reaction, particularly evident in the conflict between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. As a result, Tymoshenko was dismissed from the post of prime minister in September 2005. It is not the aim of this study to analyse Ukrainian politics after the Orange Revolution, so only the reactions of the Polish media to this situation will be presented. Journalists were shocked by the events and no longer presented Ukraine as a new, successful nation.

In terms of language, the most interesting discourses could be found in *Wprost*. In August 2005, it published an article entitled “The Rotting of Oranges.”¹¹⁹ Its author continued to emphasise that European orientation was the core of Yushchenko’s policy, but the lack of deep changes and reforms spoke of a return to Kuchma-style politics. Moreover, *Wprost* pointed out that Yushchenko’s camp started using methods similar to those employed by Yanukovych. That is why Agnieszka Korniejenko titled her article “Blue Orange,”¹²⁰ mixing the symbol of the Orange Revolution and Yanukovych’s pre-election emblems, which were blue and white. She mentioned future parliamentary

¹¹⁹ Agnieszka Korniejenko, “Gnicie pomarańczy,” *Wprost* No 32, 14.08.2005, 86–88.

¹²⁰ Agnieszka Korniejenko, “Niebieska pomarańcza,” *Wprost* No 40, 09.10.2005, 106.

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elections and stated that Ukraine was losing the image of “Maidan” and its greatest value, which was freedom.

The disappearance of factors of identity change, such as structural transformation, from Ukrainian politics after the Orange Revolution caused a rapid disillusionment with this movement. Consequently, actors who had previously been portrayed as symbols of change and new identity were shown as powerless and weak, and so the era of Kuchmism continued: “Tymoshenko’s and Yushchenko’s rule proved too weak to upset the Kuchma-era status quo.”¹²¹

Hence, the word “neokuchmism” was mentioned more and more frequently in the journalistic discourse. It indicated a return to the Kuchma era with its main features: corruption and oligarchy. *Wprost* wrote about it explicitly in the article “Orange Neokuchmism?,”¹²² which described how new oligarchs, “Orange oligarchs,” appeared in the political arena, how the fight against corruption had failed and how the political elites with their interpersonal conflicts brought back the post-Soviet identity. Almost simultaneously, *Newsweek* published the article “Orange Oligarchy,”¹²³ in which the author stated that the new oligarchs had replaced the old ones.

Polityka’s journalists also ironically emphasised the oligarchs’ role in nurturing Eastern and non-European elements of Ukraine’s identity even after the Orange Revolution:

¹²¹ “Rządy Tymoszenko i Juszczenki okazały się zbyt słabe, by naruszyć status quo z epoki Kuczmiizmu.” Juliusz Urbanowicz, “Straszenie Króla Donbasu,” *Wprost* No 32, 14.08.2005, 89.

¹²² Agnieszka Korniejenko and Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, “Pomarańczowy neokuczmizm?,” *Wprost* No 37, 18.09.2005, 84–86.

¹²³ Wołodymyr Pawliw, “Pomarańczowa oligarchia,” *Newsweek* No 37, 18.09.2005, 64–65.

The oligarchs are a permanent feature of the landscape. Former President Kuchma's son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk, the king of pipes and steel products, is one of the richest people in the country, and hardly anyone seems to mind. Ukrainians are forgiving; they understand that politicians, important people in the state, not only can but even should be rich. Wealth is not surprising: who will have money if not the politicians? There is a climate of acceptance for enrichment. The Byzantine lifestyle is something as natural as snow in November.¹²⁴

Michał Kaciewicz, in an article in *Newsweek* metaphorically entitled "Sharing Oranges,"¹²⁵ argued that the lack of reforms and "strange relations on the junction of business and politics" had been an obstacle on Ukraine's road to Central Europe. In his opinion, another indicator of a return to the old days was the presence of the old post-Soviet elites that had been active during the Kuchma era. In this process of moving away from Europe after the Orange Revolution, the journalist emphasised the distinguishing role of "Orange oligarchs." He described them as those who controlled President Yushchenko and thus power.

Since national identity is constructed by elites, this was a clear example of portraying Ukraine as a post-Soviet state. However, in another article, Kaciewicz acknowledged that there were different agencies of identity. On the one hand, there were politicians with their post-Soviet methods and, on the other hand, a society that was maturing in terms of civic identity.

¹²⁴ "Tak jak stałym elementem krajobrazu są oligarchowie. Zięć byłego prezydenta Kuczmy, Wiktor Pińczuk, król rur i wyrobów ze stali, jest jedną z najbogatszych osób w kraju i mało komu to przeszkadzało. Ukraińcy są wyrozumiali, politycy, ważni ludzie w państwie, nie tylko mogą, ale nawet powinni być bogaci. Bogactwo nie dziwi: kto będzie miał pieniądze, jeśli nie politycy? Jest tu klimat przyzwolenia na bogacenie się. Bizantyjski styl życia to coś naturalnego jak śnieg w listopadzie." Wilczak, "Pomarańcze...", 48–51.

¹²⁵ Michał Kaciewicz, "Dzielenie pomarańczy," *Newsweek* No 39, 02.10.2005, 56–57.

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Interestingly, journalists also compared the Ukrainian events to the political situation in Poland in the early 1990s and the quarrels in the democratic camp, using phrases such as “wars at the top” or “round table” that had been very common during the Polish transformation. This kind of metaphor introduces intertextuality and correlation into political discourse,¹²⁶ making it easier for the reader to see the context.

* * *

In conclusion, the analysis of Polish opinion-forming weeklies showed that Ukraine had been rediscovered by Polish public discourse during the Orange Revolution. These events, as the first significant manifestation of Ukrainian civic activism, were seen as a fundamental difference between Ukraine and Russia. When describing the protests in Ukraine, Polish journalists were, on the one hand, supportive and mostly presented them in a positive light, but, on the other hand, they were surprised to learn that “Ukraine was not Russia.” Therefore, the title of this chapter, although identical to the controversial title of the book by Ukraine’s second president, Leonid Kuchma, describes the paradoxical situation in which an independent state has to prove its uniqueness and separateness from others.

¹²⁶ Jörg Zinken, “Ideological Imagination. Intertextual and Correlational Metaphors in Political Discourse,” *Discourse & Society* 14 (4) 2003, 507.

**“GOODBYE LENIN”:
THE EUROMAIDAN AND UKRAINIAN
IDENTITY IN THE POLISH
OPINION-FORMING PRESS**

The mass protests in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014, known as the Euromaidan, resonated in the foreign press. This chapter analyses how these events were portrayed by the Polish mass media, how they were perceived outside the Ukrainian context and what historical, cultural and political references they evoked. Since Poland has always been a symbolic “gateway to Europe” for Ukraine, it is important to examine how Polish media perceived such significant changes in the latter country.

The Euromaidan appeared to be a new stage in the construction of Ukrainian identity. It was generally seen as an attempt to challenge the entire post-Soviet system in Ukraine.¹ In short, the demonstrations that began in response to the Ukrainian

¹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis. What it Means for the West*, New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2014 (Kindle Edition), 98.

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government's refusal to sign the association agreement with the European Union resulted in a complex protest against the political order in Ukraine, which operated according to the old Soviet habits of the ruling elite and the new oligarchic ones.²

I selected eight of the most popular Polish weekly magazines for the analysis – *Polityka*, *Newsweek Polska*, *wSieci*, *Wprost*, *Przegląd*, *Do Rzeczy*, *Gość Niedzielny* and *Tygodnik Powszechny*. In content analysis theory, it corresponds to varying probability sampling, which is used to detect the possible influence of information on public opinion.³ Thus, the magazines were chosen based on their circulation rates and ideological orientation.

The texts were selected according to the principle of data stratification in content analysis.⁴ It means that I included texts that corresponded to a particular stratum, or layer, defined by three criteria: time period, media type and journalistic genre. The second principle applied in the selection was relevance or purposive sampling,⁵ i.e. all textual units that might contain an answer to a given research question were included in the analysis. In this case, these were articles on Ukrainian topics published at the time of the discussed events, from the period between the first report on the Euromaidan and reports on the Russian occupation of Crimea (but excluding the latter), i.e.

² Yuriy Shveda and Ho Joung Park, “Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity. The Dynamics of Euromaidan,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7 (2016), 86.

³ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*, 2nd ed., London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004, 117.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 115.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 119.

from November/December 2013 to February/March 2014. As for genres, I analysed those articles that contained not only news reports but also assessments and interpretations of events in Ukraine with the intention of influencing public opinion, i.e. essays, problem reportages and interviews.

The following categories were distinguished for the analysis:

- voices in the coverage of the events in Ukraine
- social actors and agencies
- the image of the “Maidan”
- the wording of representation

4.1. VOICES OF REPRESENTATION

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
First of all, I was interested in the way the Euromaidan was covered: what voices were included in the reports,⁶ which genres journalists chose to present the events in Ukraine and what were the quantitative indicators of the materials.

The number of articles devoted to the Euromaidan differed between the analysed weeklies, as shown in Figure 9. *Tygodnik Powszechny* devoted the most attention to Ukraine during these events (29 articles). *Gość Niedzielny* and *Przegląd* both published 21 articles on Ukrainian topics. Almost the same number of articles appeared in *Polityka* (18), *Do Rzeczy*, *Newsweek* and *wSieci* (17 articles each). The fewest articles were published in *Wprost* – 12.

⁶ By “voices,” I mean speakers and “deliverers” of the outlets. I analysed whether the authors were Poles or Ukrainians, whether they conducted any interviews and with whom, and what experts they asked for their opinion.

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**FIGURE 9. NUMBER OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED
IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES DURING THE EUROMAIDAN
(NOVEMBER 2013 – MARCH 2014)**



Source: own elaboration.


The journalistic genres also varied across the analysed samples. Events in Ukraine during the Euromaidan were portrayed in the Polish press most frequently in the form of articles, problem reportages, interviews and columns or commentaries. The number of texts belonging to each category is shown in Figure 10.

The most popular forms of presenting Ukrainian events were article (44%) and column or commentary (25%), i.e. genres that allow the author to be less objective and present their own point of view. Problem reportage and interview were chosen in 18% and 13% of the cases, respectively. However, this distribution was not the same across the analysed weeklies (see Table 4), indicating the editorial boards' preferences on how to cover the events in Ukraine.

The data show that *wSieci*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Gość Niedzielny*, *Do Rzeczy* and *Przegląd* chose genres that allow for some subjectivity in representation – article and column

4.1. VOICES OF REPRESENTATION

FIGURE 10. MOST POPULAR JOURNALISTIC GENRES OF TEXTS ABOUT UKRAINE PUBLISHED IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES DURING THE EUROMAIDAN (NOVEMBER 2013 – MARCH 2014)



Source: own elaboration.

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TABLE 4. NUMBER OF TEXTS ABOUT UKRAINE PUBLISHED IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES DURING THE EUROMAIDAN (NOVEMBER 2013 – MARCH 2014) BROKEN DOWN INTO JOURNALISTIC GENRES

	Article	Problem reportage	Interview	Column/ commentary
<i>wSieci</i>	11	2	0	4
<i>Tygodnik Powszechny</i>	12	5	5	7
<i>Polityka</i>	7	7	1	3
<i>Newsweek Polska</i>	8	4	5	0
<i>Gość Niedzielny</i>	10	5	3	3
<i>Wprost</i>	6	2	2	2
<i>Do Rzeczy</i>	6	1	1	9
<i>Przegląd</i>	7	2	2	10
Total	67	28	19	38

Source: own elaboration.

4. . "GOODBYE LENIN": THE EUROMAIDAN...

or commentary. In contrast, *Polityka*, *Newsweek* and *Wprost* preferred to balance between subjective and objective genres or tended to be more objective, so problem reportages and interviews predominated in these weeklies.

The third characteristic of the way the Euromaidan was represented is the voice of the press outlets. For my research, it is critical whether these were exclusively Polish voices or whether the editors gave external experts or observers, including Ukrainians, the opportunity to speak.

Most of the texts in the analysed weeklies were written by Polish journalists. Only 10 were authored by Ukrainians: three by Tatiana Kolesnichenko (*Wprost*), two by Bohdana Kostiuk (*Tygodnik Powszechny*), two by Krystyna Berdyskych (*Wprost*), one by Vitalii Portnikov (*Polityka*), one by Dmitrii Chekalkin (*Tygodnik Powszechny*), one by Tymofii Gavryliv (*Tygodnik Powszechny*) and one by Myroslav Marynovych (*Tygodnik Powszechny*). As we can see, it was *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Wprost* that reported on Ukrainian events from different perspectives, providing non-Poles the opportunity to engage in their presentation.

When analysing the representation of voices, I took into account interviews with people about the situation in Ukraine. As Figure 10 shows, the interview was the least frequently used genre, which means that journalists or editors of the weeklies decided to present the discussed events to their readers from their own point of view. Out of 19 interviews in the analysed weeklies, 11 were conducted with people from Ukraine, including:

- Vitalii Klichko (current mayor of Kyiv, MP at the time, political party UDAR), *Newsweek*
- Yurii Lutsenko (politician, political party Petro Poroshenko Bloc, former political prisoner), *Tygodnik Powszechny*
- Lubomyr Huzar (archbishop, former head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church), *Tygodnik Powszechny*
- Yurii Andrukhovych (Ukrainian writer), *Newsweek*
- Vitalii Portnikov (Ukrainian journalist), *Newsweek*, *Gość Niedzielny*
- Myroslav Marynovych (Ukrainian intellectual), *Tygodnik Powszechny*
- Inna Bogoslovska (former MP, Party of Regions, which she left during the Euromaidan), *Wprost*
- Serhii Rudenko (Ukrainian journalist), *Wprost*
- Sviatoslav Shevchuk (archbishop, head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church), *Gość Niedzielny*
- Stanislav Shyrokoradiuk (Catholic bishop of Kharkiv and Zaporizhia, active participant in the Euromaidan), *Gość Niedzielny*

Interviewees from the Polish side included:

- Tadeusz Olszański (Polish expert on Ukrainian affairs), *Tygodnik Powszechny*
- Adam Daniel Rotfeld (former Polish foreign minister), *Newsweek*
- Aleksander Kwaśniewski (former president of Poland), *Newsweek*
- Andrzej Zapałowski (Polish historian), *Przegląd*

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- Bohdan Cywiński (Polish intellectual, philosopher, social activist), *Do Rzeczy*

In addition, British political scientist Mark Leonard was interviewed by *Polityka*, and one article was written by American historian Timothy Snyder (*Tygodnik Powszechny*).

4.2. SOCIAL ACTORS, AGENCIES AND THE FRAMING OF THE PROTESTS

202 The importance of actors of identity in CDA was already mentioned in Chapter 3. Here, I will expand the analysis to include broader concepts ranging from actors to agencies and frames. The exclusion or inclusion of particular social actors in representation is thought to imply some interest in those actors on the part of the readers.⁷ In CDA of identity, the inclusion or exclusion of a social actor from a text marks a particular social practice that creates particular discourses of identity. In addition, the representation of actors defines a certain framing of the whole social process that took place during the Euromaidan. As Robert Entman states, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”⁸

⁷ Theo van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors,” in *Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard, London–New York: Routledge, 1996, 38.

⁸ Robert M. Entman, “Framing. Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* 43 (4) (1993), 52.

The media would be thus “part of the system of creation and transmission of frames.”⁹ Baldwin Van Gorp argues that frames are a central part of culture and that culture “refers to an organized set of beliefs, codes, myths, stereotypes, values, norms, frames, and so forth that are shared in the collective memory of a group or society.”¹⁰ Consequently, frames define agency, which in turn shapes social actions.¹¹ Therefore, analysing social actors and their actions in the context of frames and agencies will help to organise the Ukrainian identity discourses that were represented in the Polish press.

Compared to the portrayal of the Orange Revolution, the Euromaidan was presented with almost no mention of politicians. The main message was that people who participated in the protests did not trust politicians and other structures representing state authorities, so there was a change in attitudes: from dependence on the state to dependence on themselves.¹² The real actors of the Euromaidan were people with no particular political sympathies.

I divided the main actors of the Euromaidan, as portrayed in the analysed weeklies, into the following categories: young people, people of culture, activists, clergy, oligarchs, politicians and radical nationalists. Figure 11 shows the share of these categories in the overall discourse. Of course, it does not mean

⁹ Alberto Ardèvol-Abreu, “Framing Theory in Communication Research in Spain. Origins, Development and Current Situation,” *Revista Latina de Comunicación Social* 70 (2015), 425.


¹⁰ Baldwin Van Gorp, “The Constructionist Approach to Framing. Bringing Culture Back,” *Journal of Communication* 57 (2007), 62.

¹¹ Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, “What Is Agency?,” *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (4) (1998), 963.

¹² Sviatoslav Sviatnenko and Alexander Vinogradov, “Euromaidan Values from a Comparative Perspective,” *Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal* 1 (1) (2014), 44.


4. . “GOODBYE LENIN”: THE EUROMAIDAN...

FIGURE 11. CATEGORIES OF SOCIAL ACTORS IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE EUROMAIDAN IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES



Source: own elaboration

FIGURE 12. NUMBER OF ARTICLES PRESENTING THE SOCIAL ACTORS OF THE EUROMAIDAN IN THE ANALYSED WEEKLIES BROKEN DOWN INTO CATEGORIES



Source: own elaboration

that an article was always devoted to just one actor; it could discuss several of them. Furthermore, this distribution was not the same across the magazines, e.g. some weeklies mentioned particular categories of actors more frequently than others (see Figure 12).

4.2.1. ACTIVISTS AND YOUNG PEOPLE

Figure 11 shows that the main actors of the Euromaidan portrayed in the analysed weeklies were people belonging to the category of “activists,” which included journalists, NGO activists, middle-class representatives, civic activists and others. This group predominated in all of the magazines except *Przegląd*, where it was mentioned in only one article, and *Newsweek*, where it appeared the same number of times as “politicians.”

A category similar to “activists” were “young people” – born already in independent Ukraine, i.e. after 1991. Such designation suggested that identity could be changed through generational change. It was implied particularly in interviews with Ukrainians about their expectations for the future. The phrase “new generation” was used to indicate a different identity from the post-Soviet one, namely, national Ukrainian and Western-oriented. Journalists emphasised that such a new generation was not burdened by the past and was “Western in the political and cultural sense.”¹³

Students were most often portrayed in the articles as the engine of the revolution. Journalists admitted that these young people “were already in Europe.” Other nominations used

¹³ Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, “Nowe pokolenie Ukrainy,” w *Sieci* No 49, 09.12.2013, 97–99.

4. „GOODBYE LENIN”: THE EUROMAIDAN...

included “young Ukraine,” “well-educated Ukraine,” “new generation of Ukrainians,” “the Maidan of students.”

These two categories (“activists” and “young people”) appeared in the texts about the Euromaidan to indicate mainly the civic identity of the participants and to demonstrate their commitment to the idea of citizenship. This latter concept was particularly prominent in descriptions of the social and political changes that the Euromaidan was likely to bring about. Journalists often stressed that it was the citizens of Ukraine who decided about these changes – “not the state, not the president, not the political parties or politicians are the agents of this change but the citizens.”¹⁴

The second common element of the categories “activists” and “young people” was the discourse of values (“European values,” “values of a democratic state and society”). Therefore, actors fighting for European values were contrasted with post-Soviet politicians. That is why the young people who protested on the Maidan were perceived as the ones who would tear Ukraine away from its post-Soviet identity and turn it towards Europe. “... these days, the streets of Kyiv are filled with young people who, if not today, then in the future, will lead Ukraine out of the post-Soviet zone and make possible what they call its ‘return to Europe.’”¹⁵ Such a discourse created the frames of Ukraine’s

¹⁴ “Nie państwo, nie prezydent, nie partie polityczne i politycy są sprawcami tej zmiany, ale obywatele.” Andrzej Grajewski, “Majdan nas zmienił,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 1, 05.01.2014.

¹⁵ “... w tych dniach na ulicach Kijowa demonstrują młodzi, którzy jeśli nie dziś, to w przyszłości wyprowadzą Ukrainę ze strefy postsowieckiej i umożliwią jej to, co sami nazywają ‘powrotem do Europy.’” Andrzej Grajewski, “Ukraina na rozdrożu,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 48, 01.12.2013, 48–49.

new identity, based on the principle of struggle for democracy, civic society and European values.

The deaths of young people on the Maidan were often described with emotionally-shattering wording. For instance, *Gość Niedzielny* published a separate article entirely devoted to the first victim on the Maidan – Sergii Nigojan.¹⁶ It was written to elicit an emotional response from readers while portraying the multiethnic and multinational identity of the Maidan, pointing out that Nigojan was ethnically Armenian but was shot for his European values as a Ukrainian, which proved that national identity should not be treated as primordial.

4.2.2. RADICAL NATIONALISTS

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After the events on the Maidan became a violent protest, Polish journalists focused their attention on a third group of social actors – radicals and right-wing organisations, emphasising their role in shaping the nationalistic discourse of Ukrainian identity. The visible presence of signs and symbols of Ukrainian nationalists was widely noted in the analysed weeklies in their coverage of the Euromaidan events. However, representatives of such groups were not always seen as agents of the social process, and the overall image of the Euromaidan was generally not nationalistic. Nevertheless, it was very common to refer to those participating in the protests as “nationalists.”

“Radical nationalists” appeared in the same number of articles as “young people,” and most of these texts were published

¹⁶ Artur Nowaczewski, “Bohater Majdanu,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 5, 02.02.2014.

in the left-wing *Przegląd* (see Figures 11 and 12). It was the only magazine to portray the Euromaidan as solely nationalistic, describing the protesters as exclusively radical nationalists, heirs to the traditions of Stepan Bandera and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, called the Banderites (*banderowcy* in Polish). According to this rhetoric, the protests were an illegal rebellion against the legally elected president, and the driving force behind these unlawful actions were nationalists.

Other magazines also referred to radical nationalists but did not always present them as a threat or decision-makers. The main attributes that were mentioned very often were the black-and-red flag, which used to be the flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!” They were perceived badly by Polish journalists, even those who wrote about Ukraine in a very positive way. These elements were depicted as incompatible with European values.

On the other hand, the presence of nationalistic elements during the Euromaidan caused the Polish public discourse to rethink the issue of the tradition of UPA in Ukrainian historical memory and to reflect on its meaning for contemporary Ukraine. Since the same event makes “different sense, depending on the frame applied,”¹⁷ some magazines portrayed Ukrainian nationalists as a threat to Poland and the Euromaidan, while others stated that the nationalists participating in the protests were either adverse only to Russia and not Poland or were provocateurs controlled by Russian special forces.

¹⁷ Van Gorp, “The Constructionist Approach...,” 63.

A polemic even developed in the pages of one magazine. The conservative and right-wing *Do Rzeczy* published its first article about the Ukrainian Euromaidan under the title “Ukrainian Oxymoron.” It was a column written by Waldemar Łysiak, a Polish writer and essayist.¹⁸ Commenting on the way Polish political and cultural elites were supporting Ukraine during that time, Łysiak voiced an opinion that it was misguided because Ukraine had never been friendly to Poland. In his argument, he referred to the historical uprising of Ukrainian Cossacks against the Polish nobility and the more recent Volhynia Massacre. Moreover, Łysiak portrayed Ukrainians as nationalists who hated Poles. He even said that Tymoshenko, as a politician, was an anti-Polish nationalist. Furthermore, Łysiak explicitly stated that Ukraine had no right to call itself a European state because “Ukraine is a bestial Asian savage.”¹⁹

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This article sparked a lively discussion. In the same magazine, the most persistent polemist was the essayist of *Do Rzeczy*, Bronisław Wildstein, who wrote that Ukrainians were not anti-Polish, and if nationalistic elements were present on the Maidan, they were very marginal and insignificant. In his opinion, those who portrayed Ukrainians in the Polish press as eternal enemies of Poles were working for the benefit of Moscow:

Meanwhile, alongside gestures of solidarity, quite a number of voices have appeared in our country that point to the Ukrainians as Poland’s eternal enemies and question Polish involvement on their behalf. These

¹⁸ Waldemar Łysiak, “Ukraiński oksymoron,” *Do Rzeczy* No 4, 20.01.2014, 99.

¹⁹ “... Ukraina to zezwierzęcona azjatycka dzicz.” *Ibid.*

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statements, which perfectly meet Moscow's expectations, are not, after all, solely the result of the work of its agents. Many of them are made by "useful idiots," who, locked in the cages of phobias (even the most justified ones), do not understand that the past should be remembered but also transcended.²⁰

In another article, Wildstein emphasised the need to remember history but not be a prisoner of it and argued that this should be the key to Polish-Ukrainian relations. He stated that Poles and Ukrainians should transcend history to enable further development. As an example, he gave Germany and France, which managed to exist nowadays without mutual malice. Admitting that there were black-and-red flags on the Maidan, he nevertheless pointed out that they all referred to the tradition of the fight for independence and did not have any anti-Polish meaning.

With time, symbols of UPA began to appear there as well. They were, however, only a reference to the tradition of the struggle for independence. Poles were welcomed by Ukrainians with enthusiasm and gratitude and were never met with dislike. Even during the fights with the militia, I saw Polish flags flying among the most radical rebels.²¹

In turn, other polemist of the same magazine persisted in their opinions and stressed that the black-and-red flags and the

²⁰ "Tymczasem – obok gestów solidarności – pojawiły się w naszym kraju całkiem liczne głosy wskazujące Ukraińców jako odwiecznych wrogów Polski i kwestionujące polskie zaangażowanie na ich rzecz. Te wystąpienia, które doskonale spełniają oczekiwania Moskwy, nie są przecież wyłącznie efektem funkcjonowania jej agentury. Spora część z nich jest autorstwa 'pożytecznych idiotów,' którzy zamknięci w klatkach (choćby najbardziej uzasadnionych) fobii nie rozumieją, że o przeszłości należy pamiętać, ale należy ją także przekraczać." Bronisław Wildstein, "Bunt Ukrainy," *Do Rzeczy* No 5, 27.01.2014, 70–72.

²¹ "Z czasem zaczęły się pojawiać na nim także symbole UPA. Miały one jednak charakter wyłącznie odwołania do tradycji walk niepodległościowych. Polacy przyjmowani byli przez Ukraińców z entuzjazmem oraz wdzięcznością i nigdy nie spotkali się z niechęcią. Nawet w trakcie walk z milicją wśród najbardziej radykalnych buntowników widziałem powiewające polskie flagi." Bronisław Wildstein, "Ukraina i polska racja stanu," *Do Rzeczy* No 8, 17.02.2014, 54–56.

slogan “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!” could not be accepted by Poles. For instance, in his article “Polishness as a Sect,” Tomasz Kwaśnicki stated that what was happening in Ukraine during the Euromaidan was a “Banderites’ revival” (“odrodzenie banderowskie”). The author’s point of view was thus completely different from Wildstein’s. He also condemned the fact that Polish politicians, such as the leader of the then opposition Law and Justice party, Jarosław Kaczyński, were shouting “Glory to Ukraine!” on Kyiv’s Maidan.²²

A similar stance was taken by another Polish essayist, Rev. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski. He stated that the UPA symbols on the Maidan and the Polish support for such events were “selling out the memory of those killed”²³ during the Volhynia Massacre. Interestingly, in the same issue of *Do Rzeczy*, yet another Polish essayist, Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, presented an opposite point of view on the nationalists on the Maidan. He wrote that contemporary Ukrainian nationalists, depicted as “hungry for Polish blood,” were the creation of “Russian propaganda.”²⁴

An article in *wSieci* entitled “Just Not Little Russia,”²⁵ written by Polish intellectual Piotr Skwieciński, was another voice of this polemic. It had a subtitle: “Ukraine of the Banderites but not of Putin.” The author argued that supporting the Ukrainian

²² Tomasz Kwaśnicki, “Polskość jako sekta,” *Do Rzeczy* No 7, 16.02.2014, 60–63.

²³ Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, “Sprzedana pamięć zamordowanych,” *Do Rzeczy* No 9, 24.02.2014, 32–33.

²⁴ Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, “Putin musi przegrać,” *Do Rzeczy* No 9, 24.02.2014, 26–29.

²⁵ Piotr Skwieciński, “Byle nie Małorosja,” *wSieci* No 6, 03.02.2014, 82–84.

revolution was more important for Polish geopolitics than paying attention to the nationalists on the Euromaidan. He polemicised with Isakowicz-Zaleski and Łysiak in this respect. While Skwieciński did not question the visible and sometimes numerous presence of nationalistic elements on the Maidan, he admitted that they did not dominate Ukrainian politics and that their nationalism was directed against Russians, not Poles.

There were thus two types of articles about nationalists at the Euromaidan. The first one included texts that disproved the notion that Ukrainians who participated in the protests were radical nationalists and only mentioned the fact that some nationalists took part in the events, without any additional implications.

The second category, on the contrary, portrayed the nationalists as agents and decision-makers, supporting and nurturing the image of Ukrainians as radical anti-Polish nationalists, which was associated with historical memories of UPA's violence against the Polish population.

In general, the issue of UPA and the fear of growing Ukrainian nationalism were very noticeable in the analysed weeklies during the Euromaidan. Even the neutral liberal press did not fail to mention the presence of symbols, such as red-and-black flags and portraits of Bandera, that intimidated the Polish public. For example, *Newsweek* and *Gość Niedzielny* published interviews with the same Ukrainian journalist, Vitalii Portnikov, who had left Ukraine sometime before and was living in Poland because of the political persecution he had faced during the Euromaidan. Both weeklies asked him the same question about the participation of radical nationalists in the events but in

different words. Jacek Dziedzina from *Gość Niedzielny* asked, “Is it true that radical nationalists now dominate the Maidan?”²⁶ and Michał Kaciewicz from *Newsweek* referred directly to Polish fears: “Aren’t you afraid of what some people in Poland are afraid of? Of growing nationalist radicalism of the protests, of those UPA flags flying over the Maidan?”²⁷ In response, Portnikov said that as a Ukrainian of Jewish descent, he should fear Ukrainian nationalism as well but assured his interviewer that Ukrainian nationalists also wanted European integration:

I understand Poles’ anxiety. As a Ukrainian of Jewish descent, I should fear Ukrainian nationalism no less than you do. But during the last two months, I worked with Oleh Tyahnybok²⁸ and other leaders of Svoboda without any problems. We had a warm and professional relationship. Nationalists also say that they want European integration and that they are ready to accept European values. When normal, European law comes into force in Ukraine, Svoboda, like any other party, will be able to discuss its views. Yes, nationalists from Svoboda are called fascists. But they want a European Ukraine, unlike the so-called internationalists, antifascists from the Party of Regions, who consider each of us to be a criminal. This begs the question, who should I stick with?²⁹

²⁶ “Czy to prawda, że radykalni nacjonaści zdominowali teraz Majdan?” Jacek Dziedzina, “Państwo kryminalne,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 7, 16.02.2014.

²⁷ “Nie obawiasz się tego, czego boją się niektórzy w Polsce? Rosnącego nacjonalistycznego radykalizmu protestów, tych upowskieł flag powiewających nad Majdanem?” Michał Kaciewicz, “Ukraina na krawędzi,” *Newsweek* No 5, 27.01.2014, 50–53.

²⁸ Oleh Tyahnybok is the leader of the Ukrainian nationalist and right-wing party Svoboda. Before the Euromaidan, the party had 37 seats in the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Parliament, having won 10.44% of the votes in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Since 2014, Svoboda has been losing support among voters. In the parliamentary elections in October 2014, the party failed to cross the 5% vote threshold and won only six seats in plurality voting. In the next parliamentary elections in 2019, Svoboda did not gain any seats in parliament, maintaining support only in some regions of Western Ukraine. Oksana Halkevych, Dmytro Cheretun and Ihor Feshchenko, “Khroniky ‘Svobody,’” *Chesno*, January 1, 2020, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://web.archive.org/web/20211107142722/https://www.chesno.org/post/3763/>.

²⁹ “Rozumiem niepokój Polaków. Jako Ukraińiec żydowskiego pochodzenia powinienem obawiać się ukraińskiego nacjonalizmu nie mniej niż wy. Ale w czasie ostatnich dwóch miesięcy bez problemów współpracowałem z Ołehem Tiahnybokiem i innymi liderami Svobody. Mieliliśmy

These words imply the meaning of the Euromaidan semiotics. Signs and symbols that referred to the traditions of UPA were perceived in Poland through the lens of historical memory. Although some publicists accepted that those traditions in today's Ukraine were nothing more than a symbol of the struggle for independence and that some of the people holding portraits of Bandera and banners of the UPA might not have even known about the slaughter of Poles during the Second World War, the presence of nationalistic elements was perceived mainly negatively.

While explaining the nature and cause-and-effect relationships of Ukrainian nationalism and trying to present it as not anti-Polish, journalists nevertheless used very strong negative wording to refer to actors of nationalistic identity – "neo-Banderites," "football hooligans," "radical nationalists." Thus, nationalists, even when viewed not entirely negatively, created a decidedly negative image of Ukraine.

Paweł Pieniążek from *Newsweek* devoted an entire article to describing the nationalistic identities of the Maidan, admitting that they referred to the symbolic power of UPA. However, he tried to show that these signs did not have any anti-Polish connotations:

In Ukraine, UPA is identified with a steadfast struggle, which is why it has become a symbol of resistance for many Ukrainians – not necessarily only those with nationalistic views. This is all the more so because,

bardzo ciepłe i profesjonalne relacje. Narodowcy też mówią, że chcą europejskiej integracji, że są gotowi zaakceptować europejskie wartości. Gdy na Ukrainie zapanuje normalne, europejskie prawo, Swoboda jak każda partia będzie mogła dyskutować o swoich poglądach. Owszem nacjonalistów ze Swobody nazywa się faszystami. Ale oni chcą europejskiej Ukrainy w odróżnieniu od tzw. internacjonalistów, antyfaszystów z Partii Regionów, którzy mają każdego z nas za przestępcę. Rodzi się pytanie, z kim mam trzymać?" Kaciewicz, "Ukraina...", 50–53.

both in the history and in the present of the country, there are not many such figures or symbols to which young people could refer. They look at Bandera through rose-coloured patriotic glasses, often knowing little about him.³⁰

The Euromaidan also caused the rejection of the historical image of Ukraine as wild and hostile, which originated mainly from the negative stereotype of Cossacks, created chiefly by the Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz and confirmed by the memory of the Banderites. *Newsweek* journalist Rafał Kalukin wrote an article with a very telling title: “A Banderite Also Reads Mickiewicz,”³¹ in which he stated that the average image of a Ukrainian in Polish society was derived from Sienkiewicz’s novels, as well as from the colonial attitude towards the Ukrainian people, imposed mainly during the Second Polish Republic by Polish national democrats.

The journalist first showed that the image of a Ukrainian was associated with such descriptions as “wildness that broke free,” “people of wild nature,” “rabble hungry for blood and murder,” which is what the average Polish child read in Henryk Sienkiewicz’s *With Fire and Sword*, a novel included in the school curriculum. Kalukin then explained that there was a continuity between the stereotype of a Cossack and a Banderite.

In the Second Polish Republic, even the parties favouring Ukrainian aspirations were unable to rid themselves of mentorship. As always,

³⁰ “Na Ukrainie UPA utożsamiana jest z niezłomną walką, dlatego stała się symbolem sprzeciwu dla wielu Ukraińców – niekoniecznie jedynie tych o nacjonalistycznych poglądach. Tym bardziej że zarówno w historii, jak i współczesności kraju nie ma wielu takich postaci, symboli, do których młodzi mogliby się odwoływać. Na Banderę patrzą przez różowe patriotyczne okulary, często niewiele o nim wiedząc.” Paweł Pieniążek, “Majdan się wściekł,” *Newsweek* No 6, 03.02.2014, 54–57.

³¹ Rafał Kalukin, “Banderowiec też czytał Mickiewicza,” *Newsweek* No 13, 24.03.2014, 18–20.

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an enlightened Polish master lectured the Ruthenian on how to take care of his own interests. This tone has returned even now, after the Maidan, when representatives of the Polish elite, full of good intentions, were considering whether Ukrainians finally had their “Solidarity revolution.” It is as if they had not already gained their own unique experience.³²

Kalukin also stated that these stereotypes were used by Poles to maintain their superiority over Ukrainians. As the journalist emphasised, Ukrainians were deprived of their own subjectivity as a nation and were rather perceived as peasants, implying a relationship of “Polish master and Ruthenian servant.”

This discourse of paternalism and superiority could be seen in postcolonial terms.³³ All this implied a discrepancy between Polish support for the building of the Ukrainian state and the image of Ukrainians in Polish society. Therefore, in Kalukin’s opinion, it was time for Poles to revise their perception of Ukrainians that was based on two stereotypes: wild Cossack and furious Banderite.³⁴

4.2.3. POLITICIANS

As the analysed material shows, “politicians” were seldom portrayed in the Polish press as agents of the Euromaidan. They were certainly mentioned less frequently than “activists,”

³² “W II RP nawet stronnictwa sprzyjające ukraińskim aspiracjom nie potrafiły pozbyć się mentorstwa. Jak zawsze – światły polski pan pouczał Rusina, jak ma zadbać o swe interesy. Ten ton powrócił nawet teraz, po Majdanie, gdy przedstawiciele polskich elit, pełni dobrych intencji, rozważali, czy Ukraińcy mają wreszcie swoją ‘solidarnościową rewolucję.’ Tak jakby nie zdążyli już nabrać własnych unikalnych doświadczeń.” Ibid.

³³ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979, 37.

³⁴ Kalukin, “Banderowiec...,” 18–20.

“young people” and “radical nationalists”; still, they appeared more often than “clergy” and “oligarchs” (see Figure 11). In the articles about the events, Ukrainian politicians were rarely interviewed and were not the protagonists. Only three articles were entirely devoted to the opposition leaders on the Maidan – Vitalii Klichko, Oleh Tyahnybok and Arsenii Yatseniuk. However, these texts presented only the political biographies of these figures, without indicating the actual role they played in the events, with the minor exception of Klichko.

Two of the weeklies (*Newsweek* and *Wprost*) presented him as an actor who could have led Ukrainian politics after the Euromaidan. In the article by Michał Kacewicz in *Newsweek*,³⁵ Klichko was portrayed as a determined and assertive politician who could viably influence the process of reforms. The article appeared right after the protests broke out in December 2013. Its wording was very expressive – the title “Doctor Iron Fist” referred to Klichko’s nickname “Iron Fist,” which he had earned during his boxing career. *Newsweek* also published an interview with the politician,³⁶ in which he was portrayed as the one who could oppose Yanukovich and lead the Ukrainian people. Another separate article about Klichko appeared in *Wprost* (also after the outbreak of the protests),³⁷ in which the author presented him as a possible candidate for president. Among other politicians, Yurii Lutsenko was interviewed in *Tygodnik Powszechny* and Inna Bogoslovska in *Wprost*. In general, the

³⁵ Michał Kacewicz, “Doktor żelazna pięść,” *Newsweek* No 50, 09.12.2013, 59–60.

³⁶ Michalina Skoryk, “Nie wierzę Janukowyczowi,” *Newsweek* No 9, 24.02.2014, 22.

³⁷ Krystyna Berdyskich, “Boks na majdanie,” *Wprost* No 50, 15.12.2013, 83–85.

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role of politicians was mentioned marginally, and they were not presented as decision-makers.

Yulia Tymoshenko received special, though not considerable, attention. After her release from prison, there was either an article or a separate section of an article about her in every analysed magazine. She was presented in a decidedly negative way, described with such epithets as “populist” and “actress.” For instance, *Tygodnik Powszechny* published a text about her with the headline “Perfect Populist.”³⁸ She was no longer the “spirit of the Revolution” or “Ukrainian Joan of Arc,” as this magazine had called her during the Orange Revolution. Another separate article on Tymoshenko appeared in *Newsweek* with the title “Yulia’s Shadow.”³⁹ She was portrayed as a politician of the old regime who did not understand the current Maidan and as the first among the oligarchs, mentioned even before Yanukovych’s people. In general, references to Tymoshenko appeared only after she had come to the Maidan, and she was perceived in a very negative way. However, all the articles acknowledged that she was striving for power and was able to control the opposition, even while in prison.

4.2.4. OLIGARCHS

One more category of actors were the “oligarchs.” Unlike politicians, they were portrayed as agents on the Maidan in a political sense because many decision-making processes

³⁸ Wojciech Konończuk, “Populistka doskonała,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 9, 02.03.2014, 9.

³⁹ Michał Kaciewicz, “Cień Julii,” *Newsweek* No 10, 03.03.2014, 54–57.

depended on them. Furthermore, in some articles, it was stated that oligarchs might have been supporting the Euromaidan because of their financial interests in Europe. Although they were mentioned in only 6% of the analysed material (see Figure 11), their role was described using very direct wording, indicating that their influence was quite big.

For example, one of the articles in *Do Rzeczy* suggested in its very title what role oligarchs played on the Maidan – “The Fate of the Maidan Is in the Hands of the Oligarchs.”⁴⁰ The journalist described the situation in Ukraine as completely dependent on oligarchs in the economic and political sense and even pointed out that there were absolutely no free media since almost all of them were owned by oligarchs. One more separate article was published in *Newsweek* by Miłosz Węglewski and entitled “The Slalom of the Oligarchs.”⁴¹ The author portrayed Ukrainian oligarchs as neutral and satisfied with the status quo of Ukraine, which was “in-between” – neither in the European Union nor in the Eurasian Customs Union. The significant role of the oligarchs was also acknowledged by others – an article in *Gość Niedzielny* cited the words of Ukrainian journalist Vitalii Portnikov: “The people on the Maidan will gain nothing unless the oligarchs come over to their side.”⁴²

⁴⁰ Piotr Kościński and Jewhen Worobiow, “Los Majdanu w rękach oligarchów,” *Do Rzeczy* No 7, 10.02.2014, 74–77.

⁴¹ Miłosz Węglewski, “Slalom oligarchów,” *Newsweek* No 50, 09.12.2013, 68–70.

⁴² Jacek Dziedzina, “Kruszenie Ukrainy,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 51–52, 22.12.2013, 56–58.

4.2.5. PEOPLE OF CULTURE

The role of culture in the events on the Euromaidan, and thus of the people of culture, was explicitly mentioned in only 9% of the analysed material, mostly in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (see Figure 11). However, the discourse of cultural change in Ukraine in a global context and in terms of overall identity was very prominent. For example, in one of the first reports about the Ukrainian revolution, the conservative weekly *wSieci* stated: “Ukraine is undergoing a not only political but also cultural revolution, making the great Eastern European state increasingly Western from within and moving towards the West in its international relations.”⁴³ It is clear from this passage that Ukrainian identity was perceived as European, or Western, because of the cultural factor.

In the further coverage of protests in Ukraine, all the weeklies, with the exception of *Przegląd*, mentioned the role of culture. Some of them devoted separate articles to this topic. Compared to those written during the Orange Revolution, they were not introductory but explained the deep connection between Ukrainian culture and Europe and the social and political changes.

For instance, *Wprost* journalist Tatiana Kolesnichenko presented artists, singers, writers and intellectuals as actors of European identity. She pointed out that the main difference between the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan was that

⁴³ “Na Ukrainie dokonuje się rewolucja nie tylko polityczna, lecz także kulturowa, czyniąc wielki wschodnioeuropejski kraj coraz bardziej zachodnim od wewnątrz i dążącym ku Zachodowi w stosunkach międzynarodowych.” Kostrzewa-Zorbas, “Nowe pokolenie...”

the former had been dominated by politicians, and the latter was driven by artists.⁴⁴ Among the main actors, she listed artist Strongowski, play director Troitsky, singers Polozhynskyi, Burmaka and Ruslana. The latter was particularly singled out and called the “Ukrainian Amazon” because of her commitment and strong will to participate in the Euromaidan.

Another article in which people of culture were presented as actors appeared in *wSieci* and was entitled “With Pen and Banner.”⁴⁵ It showed Ukrainian culture as superior to Russian culture; according to the author, Ukrainisation meant Europeanisation. Thus, the problem lay in the language. Although the Maidan was bilingual, the works written in Ukrainian were perceived as superior and, as such, connecting Ukraine to European culture. However, this was not just about the ethnic attributes of identity of which language is a feature. It was about Ukrainian authors and people of culture being portrayed as actors of civic identity and drivers of the civic movement and the development of civic society in Ukraine.

The third and final article entirely devoted to the role people of culture played in the protests was published in *Gość Niedzielny* under the title “The Maidan of Artists.” The Maidan was described as a sphere of creativity and a field of art. Artists were presented as civic activists who expressed their civic position with their art:

⁴⁴ “Główna różnica między pomarańczową rewolucją sprzed dziewięciu lat a Euromajdanem: pierwsza była zdominowana przez polityków, motorem drugiej są artyści.” Tatiana Kolesniczenko, “Rewolucja kulturalna,” *Wprost* No 51–52, 29.12.2013, 96–99.

⁴⁵ Grzegorz Górny, “Piórem i transparentem,” *wSieci* No 7, 10.02.2014, 90–91.

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The Maidan is rich in artistic initiatives: “Barbican of Art” (organised by the gallery “Bacteria”), “ArtMajdan” (initiators: students and graduates of the Lviv National Academy of Arts, curator: Yulia Ostrovska), Open University, “Straikplakat” – a group that distributes satirical posters attacking the regime on the Internet.⁴⁶

222 The most popular representative of Ukrainian culture in the Polish discourse on the Euromaidan was Yurii Andrukhovych. Apart from him, journalists mentioned the following figures: writers Oksana Zabuzhko, Yurii Vynnychuk, Irena Karpa, Andrii Bondar, Serhii Zhadan, Ostap Slyvynskiy, as well as artists Lesia Khomenko and Oleksii Zolotariov. However, out of all Ukrainian artists, only Andrukhovych was interviewed, i.e. given the opportunity to speak. *Newsweek* talked to him about the final period of the Maidan, during the bloodshed. However, Andrukhovych was speaking as a social activist rather than as a writer, which confirms his role as an actor and his commitment to building the image of civic identity in Ukraine.

As for capturing the mood in Eastern Ukraine, the main actor among people of culture was Serhii Zhadan. For example, in *Polityka*, Polish writer and journalist Ziemowit Szczerek wrote a series of reportages about Ukraine, including its eastern part. The text in the 11th issue of the magazine in 2014, entitled “Journey to Mordor,” depicted mainly the post-Soviet identity of the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv but also noted its European and Ukrainian identities, which, although less visible,

⁴⁶ “Majdan obfituje w artystyczne inicjatywy: ‘Barbakan Sztuki’ (organizator: galeria ‘Bacteria’), ‘ArtMajdan’ (inicjatorzy: studenci i absolwenci Lwowskiej Narodowej Akademii Sztuki, kurator: Julia Ostrowska), Otwarty Uniwersytet, ‘Strajkplakat’ – grupa, która rozpowszechnia w internecie satyryczne plakaty atakujące reżim.” Artur Nowaczewski, “Majdan artystów,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 6, 09.02.2014.

were strong enough. This identity discourse was represented by people of culture, of whom Zhadan was the most prominent one.

It is worth noting that during the Euromaidan, the role of people of culture as creators of identity received a lot of attention thanks to the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko, whose 200th birthday anniversary fell on May 9, 2014. This date coincided with the Euromaidan, and the topic was addressed in the Polish press. Two separate articles were devoted to Shevchenko – one in *Polityka* and the other in *Tygodnik Powszechny* – and minor mentions appeared in almost all the analysed weeklies.

In *Polityka*, Shevchenko was portrayed as the one who gave rise to the idea of a modern Ukrainian nation and who inspired modern Ukrainian culture. This is an example of personal references in the discursive construction of national identity.⁴⁷ Well-known Polish journalist and essayist Edwin Bendyk entitled his article “They All Come from Him.”⁴⁸ “They” were contemporary Ukrainian people of culture, and thus, Bendyk presented them as Shevchenko’s successors. He traced the dividing line between the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which connected Ukraine to Europe, and Shevchenko’s importance as a European poet in the tradition of Ukrainian literature. Bendyk described his role and his symbolic and even mythological place in Ukrainian discourses of national identity. The article expressly portrayed people of culture as constructors of European identity. Indeed, Shevchenko was the one who was influenced by the Western

⁴⁷ Ruth Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 2nd ed., translated by Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten and J.W. Unger, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

⁴⁸ Edwin Bendyk, “Oni wszyscy z niego,” *Polityka* No 10, 05.03.2014, 76–79.

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Romantic tradition and the one who opposed the colonial discourse in the Ukraine-Russia dichotomy.⁴⁹ In this context, he was contrasted with the writer of Ukrainian descent, Mykola Gogol, who gained worldwide fame because of his works written in Russian and who took up the colonial discourse:

Nikolai Gogol and many other representatives of the Ukrainian elite agreed to this colonial project, becoming de facto creators of Creole culture. Shevchenko took up the anticolonial struggle, with time supporting his artistic activity with political involvement.⁵⁰

The author emphasised Shevchenko's role in Ukrainian literature, calling him the originator of Ukrainian as the language of the modern nation. Thus, the poet was presented as the one who created texts about the power of national myth and became a myth himself. Next, the article described Ukrainian culture as struggling against the Russian oppressive colonial regime. People of culture were therefore portrayed as those who connected Ukraine to Western, "real" Europe. This fact placed Ukraine in the context of the process of national identity-building in Central and Eastern Europe, in which cultural elites or "intelligentsia" played a significant role.⁵¹

Among other personal references in the creation of Ukrainian European identity through culture, Bendyk introduced the Polish

⁴⁹ Mykola Riabchuk, *Vid Malorosii do Ukrainy. Paradoksy zapizniloho naciivtorennia*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2000, 64.

⁵⁰ "Mikołaj Gogol i wielu innych przedstawicieli ukraińskiej elity przystało na ten kolonialny projekt, stając się de facto twórcami kultury kreolskiej. Szewczenko podjął antykolonialną walkę, z czasem aktywność artystyczną wspomagając zaangażowaniem politycznym." Bendyk, "Oni wszyscy..." 76–79.

⁵¹ Tomasz Zarycki, *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*, London–New York: Routledge, 2014, 68.

reader to the figures of the Ukrainian cultural uprising of the 1920s–1930s. These included playwright Les Kurbas and writers Mykola Khvylovyi, Valerian Pidmohylnyi, Mykola Kulish and Mykola Zerov, who did not survive Stalin’s repression and were later dubbed the “Executed Renaissance.”⁵²

Bendyk, citing Ukrainian scholar Tamara Hundorova, referred to the Chornobyl trauma as another factor influencing Ukrainian culture. The nuclear disaster of 1986 was a signal to rethink the concept of national identity in Ukrainian literature. It was one of the catalysts for changes in society and identity; as Ola Hnatiuk states, it was an appeal “to save the national substance.”⁵³ The actors of this identity were the creators of the Ukrainian avant-garde literary group “Bu-Ba-Bu” (“Burlesk, Balagan, Bufonada”) – Yurii Andrukhovych, Oleksandr Irvanets, Viktor Neborak, as well as Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko. All of them were portrayed as those who fought against the colonial syndrome in Ukrainian literature, inscribing it into the European cultural scope.

The second article that presented Shevchenko as a symbol appeared in *Tygodnik Powszechny* and was entitled “And a Fire Will Flame Anew.”⁵⁴ This phrase was taken from Shevchenko’s poem *Cold Ravine* (*Holodnyi yar*):

⁵² *The Executed Renaissance* (Ukr. *Rozstriliane Vidrodzhennia*) was the title of an anthology of Ukrainian literature of the first decades of the 20th century. It was published in Paris by the Polish émigré intellectual Jerzy Giedroyc. Writers of this period were also known for their pro-Western and anti-Moscow stance. For that reason, they were called “Ukrainian occidentalists.” Ukrainian scholar Solomia Pavlychko also calls them “hidden modernists.” Solomia Pavlychko, *Teoria literatury*, Kyiv: Osnovy, 2002, 175.

⁵³ Ola Hnatiuk, *Proshchannia z imperiieiu. Ukrainski dyskusii pro identychnist*, translated by Marta Boianivska, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005, 116.

⁵⁴ Tadeusz A. Olszański, “I powieje ogień nowy,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 10, 09.03.2014, 11.

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*For judgment, in your day of joy,
Will suddenly be seen,
And Freedom's fires will flame anew
Out of the Cold Ravine!*⁵⁵

226 The Cold Ravine is an area in central Ukraine where Ukrainian rebels, the haidamaks, gathered to fight against the Polish nobility in the 18th century. The largest and final uprising broke out there in 1768. Historian Paul Robert Magocsi claims that it was the only revolt of the haidamaks that “seemed to have specific social and political goals.”⁵⁶ The main ones were to obtain greater freedoms for the Orthodox Church and autonomy for the Cossacks under the Polish Crown. The rebellion, known as Koliivshchyna, led by Cossacks Maksym Zalizniak and later Ivan Gonta, was portrayed in Ukrainian folklore as well as by Shevchenko as a heroic attempt to liberate the Ukrainian people. In the first years after the First World War, Ukrainian insurgents were also active in the Cold Ravine, hoping to establish an independent Ukraine. They proclaimed an unrecognised republic, the Cold Ravine Republic, which was modelled on the Cossack Sich and whose battle cry was “Freedom for Ukraine or Death.”⁵⁷ In a broader sense, the Cold Ravine became a symbol of the struggle for freedom and independence of the Ukrainian people.

⁵⁵ Translated by C.H. Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnel.

“Бо в день радості над вами

Розпадеться кара.

І повіє огонь новий

З Холодного Яру.”

⁵⁶ Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, Toronto–Buffalo–London: University of Toronto Press, 1996, 296.

⁵⁷ Yurii Horlis-Horskyi, *Kholodnyi Yar*, Vinnytsia: DP Derzhavna kartohrafichna fabryka, 2011.

The article by Polish essayist Tadeusz Olszański that used the quote from Shevchenko's poem about the Cold Ravine in its title was written in March 2014, i.e. after the cruellest acts of violence against the insurgents – the mass sniper shootings in February – and after the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych and his flight from Ukraine. A symbolic illustration for the article was the portrait of Shevchenko on the shields of the Maidan protesters. The title alone showed the implementation of the value of freedom in the discourse of Ukrainian identity.

In this way, as a symbolic figure of Ukrainian culture, Shevchenko was presented as the one who had influenced the contemporary civic engagement of the Ukrainian people in state affairs. He was also one of the symbols of the Euromaidan; his portraits and contemporary art stylizations were ubiquitous during the visual representation of the Euromaidan.⁵⁸ Moreover, 2014 was the 200th anniversary of Shevchenko's birth, which made his person that much more important in the context of Ukrainian identity.

Apart from the national civic identity, there were thus two other Ukrainian identity frames in the discourse of the Polish press: a national cultural identity associated with poetic and historical tradition and a cultural identity frame in which freedom was the greatest value. In the latter case, the discursive strategy of justification⁵⁹ was used to link Ukraine to the European

⁵⁸ Anja Lange, "Taras Shevchenko at the Maidan in Kyiv," *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal* 1 (2014), 251–263.

⁵⁹ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 33, 36.

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liberal frame, which stemmed from the slogan of the French Revolution, where “Freedom” came first.

4.2.6. CLERGY

The data shows that religion and the role of the clergy were mentioned the least frequently, appearing in only 6% of the articles, mainly in conservative weeklies, especially *Gość Niedzielny* (see Figures 8 and 9). However, clergymen predominated among the people interviewed.

Describing the events on the Euromaidan, *Gość Niedzielny* often used such expressions as “the Maidan is praying” and “prayer is stronger than bullets.” The overall impression is that the journalists wanted to show that people of different denominations participated in the Euromaidan, which emphasised its ecumenical aspect. Even so, the articles focused on the special role of the Greek Catholic Church as the main supporter of the protesters. In contrast, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was presented mainly as pro-Russian.

4.3. AGENCY. THE IMAGE OF THE EUROMAIDAN

The place where the core of the revolution was located played an important role in the portrayal of Ukraine during the Euromaidan. It was, of course, the Maidan, Independence Square in Kyiv, which was seen as the agency. It was mainly liberal socio-political weeklies that rejected writing about the ideological representations and opinions in favour of describing

the everyday life on the Maidan, usually in the form of problem reportages.

Three main images of the Maidan can be distinguished in the analysed texts: the Maidan as the Zaporizhian Sich, the Maidan as the site of a “new Ukraine” and the republic of the Maidan. First of all, it should be noted that no article was devoted exclusively to one of these categories; all three images were usually intertwined. For this reason, it is difficult to present quantitative data. The portrayal of the Maidan also defined the agencies in which the events took place. Most articles described the everyday life on the Maidan, admiring its good organisation. Therefore, the social actors of the Euromaidan described in the analysed weeklies were ordinary people, social activists and journalists. Each of these representations reflects a certain identity discourse of Ukraine as perceived by the Polish press.

4.3.1. THE MAIDAN AS THE ZAPORIZHIAN SICH

The Maidan was presented in many articles as the Zaporizhian Sich – the Cossack state that was a symbol of Ukrainian aspirations for freedom and the struggle for independence. Particular attention was paid to the way the Euromaidan was organised. Like the Cossack state, it was divided into structural units – the sotnyas (the hundreds) – which were described in detail in the analysed magazines and presented as a symbol of freedom. In this representation, the word “freedom” was used alongside the word “Maidan” to indicate values.

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Indeed, some of the journalists describing everyday life on the Maidan used the word “sotnyas” very often. In *Newsweek*, Michał Kacewicz entitled one of his many reportages on the protests “The Hundreds of Freedom,”⁶⁰ which was a direct reference to Cossack times. Kacewicz also used very Cossack-esque wording to describe the civic movement, calling it an uprising.

Milena Zatylna in *Tygodnik Powszechny* called the Maidan the Kyivan Sich and described its various representatives and their motivations for protesting.⁶¹ The most common one was the desire for a new Ukraine, which made the Maidan the site of a “new Ukraine” (see below).

In *Polityka*’s reportage “The Camps of the Maidan,” Katarzyna Kwiatkowska-Moskalewicz portrayed the Maidan as both the Zaporizhian Sich and a new alternative state. “What is Maidan? ‘It’s so simple!’ exclaims 30-year-old Serhii. ‘Maidan is a modern-day Zaporizhian Sich, a Cossack camp. The territory of free people.’”⁶² The values of freedom were also emphasised here.

An interesting depiction of the Maidan appeared in a reportage by Ziemowit Szczerek in *Polityka*. The author described a few images of it: at first, the Maidan was hipster, then a Cossack Sich and then it turned into a “postapocalyptic world of Mad Max.”⁶³

⁶⁰ Michał Kacewicz, “Sotnie wolności,” *Newsweek* No 9, 24.02.2014, 12–21.

⁶¹ Milena Zatylna, “Umrzeć za Macochę,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 5, 02.02.2014, 25.

⁶² “Czym jest Majdan? – Ależ to proste! – wykrzykuje 30-letni Serhij. – Majdan to jest współczesna Sicz Zaporoska, obóz kozacki. Terytorium wolnych ludzi.” Katarzyna Kwiatkowska-Moskalewicz, “Tabory Majdanu,” *Polityka* No 6, 05.02.2014, 100–105.

⁶³ Ziemowit Szczerek, “Bandera, zombie i Zakerzonie,” *Polityka* No 12, 19.03.2014, 16–18.

The image of the Maidan as the Sich was clearly shown in *wSieci*. Grzegorz Górny juxtaposed the scope of Western values, i.e. the pro-European Maidan, with the Eastern, post-Soviet identity discourse. This was expressed in the article's title: "The Cossack Sich against the Eastern Satrapy."⁶⁴ To point out the difference between the pro-Western and post-Soviet identity, the author contrasted the organisation of the Maidan, which was similar to the Cossack Sich, with such elements of Easternness, in his opinion, as nepotism, corruption and oligarchy.

Thus, the discourse of the Cossack state in the representation of the Euromaidan inscribed Ukraine into the pro-European identity discourse through references to the value system of democracy: the fight for freedom, equality and organisation of society. To present the image of the Maidan as the Sich, constructivist strategies of national identity based on historical references were used. However, when the Maidan turned into the Sich, some journalists acknowledged the presence of radical elements among the protesters and expressed fear of a split in Ukrainian society that could lead to a civil war.

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4.3.2. THE MAIDAN AS THE SITE OF A "NEW UKRAINE"

The second way in which the Maidan was represented was as a place where a new Ukraine and new Ukrainian identity were born. Consequently, it had significance not just as the location

⁶⁴ Grzegorz Górny, "Kozacka Sicz przeciw wschodniej Satrapii," *wSieci* No 9, 24.02.2014, 28–29.

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of the protests but as a social actor. Therefore, Polish journalists used metonymy when referring to the protesters: “the Maidan is in a fury,” “the Maidan demands,” “the Maidan has decided.” The name “Maidan” appeared even more often than “Ukraine” or “Ukrainians.” The Maidan was thus presented as an arena of struggle against the state structures of the time. Hence, the entire ideology of the Maidan protests was represented as an opposition: civic structures against state structures, which indicated the birth of the civic identity and civic society.

The Maidan was shown as a place where a new Ukraine was born, Ukraine with a civic identity that wanted to rid itself of postcommunism and thus of its post-Soviet identity. For instance, in her first reportage about the Maidan in *Polityka*, “Ukraine in a Helmet,”⁶⁵ Jagienka Wilczak compared the Euromaidan with the Orange Revolution. In her opinion, the latter was carried out by politicians, while the Euromaidan was proof of a new civic identity of the Ukrainian people based on nationality. The reportage described the Maidan as a community of civic initiatives, which inscribed it into the frame of civic society. Similar rhetoric appeared in *Newsweek*, where Paweł Pieniążek explicitly pointed out that “a new, independent Ukraine is being born on the Maidan.”⁶⁶ This discourse of a new Ukraine, however, was not as strong as during the Orange Revolution.

The Maidan as the site of a new Ukraine was also mentioned by interviewees. Talking to *Gość Niedzielny*, Sviatoslav

⁶⁵ Jagienka Wilczak, “Ukraina w kasku,” *Polityka* No 50, 11.12.2013, 10–11.

⁶⁶ “Na Majdanie rodzi się nowa, niepodległa Ukraina.” Pieniążek, “Majdan...,” 54–57.

Shevchuk, head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, often used the word “society” when describing the Maidan, adding that it also meant civic identity. The discourse about the birth of the new Ukraine was related to the new organisation of citizens, which made the Maidan a community. Andrzej Grajewski in his article “All that Maidan”⁶⁷ used the following phrases: “a phenomenon of civic organisation and activity,” “the community of the Maidan,” “the citizens of the Maidan.” This last expression introduces the third image of the Maidan – the Maidan as a republic.

4.3.3. THE REPUBLIC OF THE MAIDAN

The third image of the Maidan depicted a free, well-organised and well-functioning republic. Journalists metaphorically called it a “state,” arguing that it had its own services, military forces, logistics, medical department, food department and others. A good example of this is Jerzy Baczyński’s article in *Polityka*:

We watched in amazement as the Maidan turned first into a camp straight from the Zaporizhian Sich, then into a mini-republic, with its own services, a council of deputies, endless debates but also extraordinary self-discipline and ability to mobilise. Direct democracy, which modern Europe has not seen at home.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Andrzej Grajewski, “Cały ten Majdan,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 5, 02.02.2014.

⁶⁸ “Patrzyliśmy ze zdumieniem, jak Majdan zmienia się najpierw w obozowisko rodem z zaporoskiej Siczy, potem w minirepublikę, z własnymi służbami, radą deputatów, niekończącymi się debatami, ale i niezwykłą samodyscypliną i zdolnością mobilizacji. Demokracja bezpośrednia, jakiej współczesna Europa u siebie nie widziała.” Jerzy Baczyński, “Wszyscy jesteśmy Ukraińcami,” *Polityka* No 9, 26.02.2014, 9.

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Similarly, Paweł Reszka in *Tygodnik Powszechny* made his opinion of the Maidan clear by entitling his reportage “Maidan, the State.”⁶⁹ In its everyday life and functioning, the journalist noticed the civic identity of the people and presented the Maidan as a smoothly run state.

4.4. GEOGRAPHY OF REPRESENTATION

In the study of identity and discourse, the geography of representation has a significant meaning. It was of particular interest to me because although the protests took place in Kyiv, a country’s identity cannot be limited to its capital city alone. Therefore, I included this aspect in my analysis.

Generally, only the pro-Western parts of Ukraine, namely Kyiv (central Ukraine) and Lviv (Western Ukraine), were represented, although those weeklies that described the Ukrainian revolution in the form of reportages paid attention to other parts of the country as well.

Newsweek published an article by Michał Kacewicz entitled “A Very Small Revolution,”⁷⁰ in which the author described life in the city of Chernihiv, located 120 km from Kyiv, as completely different from that in the capital. For people from the peripheries of Ukraine, Europe was a phantom. Their identity was uncertain, and they had no supranational aspirations. The visual elements of the city pointed to its post-Soviet identity.

⁶⁹ Paweł Reszka, “Państwo Majdan,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 6, 09.02.2014, 22.

⁷⁰ Michał Kacewicz, “Bardzo mała rewolucja,” *Newsweek* No 50, 09.12.2013, 62–65.

Here, even the university and students, who were the engine of the revolution in Kyiv, had no European aspirations, showing a passive attitude towards the changes on the Maidan and a weak civic awareness. The author even noted that the student government was sometimes referred to as “komsomol,” as it had been called in the USSR. In addition, the city was presented as very poor; people could not afford to go to Kyiv, so Europe was very distant, lying “beyond mountains, beyond seas.”⁷¹ The journalist also drew attention to the corrupt traffic police – *militia*, which was, for him, another proof of Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity.

Another reportage on Eastern Ukraine, entitled “Journey to Mordor,” was published in *Polityka* by Ziemowit Szczerek. The author used a name from J.R.R. Tolkien’s saga to ironically demonise the Ukrainian East. He described Kharkiv as post-Soviet but also tried to understand the people without demonising them. However, the symbols and signs of post-Soviet identity in the city were very visible. They were found in people’s everyday lives, such as old Soviet “zhyguli” cars, people dressed only in dark or grey clothes, the huge monument of Lenin with fresh flowers always laid before it. The students were described as passive and indifferent to what was happening in Kyiv. However, the journalist concluded that he had not seen Mordor in Kharkiv; even in the streets, you could often hear the Ukrainian language. He also mentioned the alternative, cultural side of Kharkiv, which I have discussed earlier.

⁷¹ Ibid.

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The second city Szczerek described was Donetsk, where he noticed a very pro-Russian mood and a deeply-ingrained post-Soviet identity (he even called the inhabitants "Soviet people"). He often saw inscriptions on the walls, such as "Putin, help us" and "the Berkut⁷² are heroes." He also described the celebration of holidays that dated back to the Soviet Union, which was another evidence of the pro-Russian and post-Soviet identity: "On the second day, All Women's Day, during Lenin's time, there was a demonstration with Russian and Soviet flags."⁷³

Generally, in Kharkiv and Donetsk, the journalist saw a common East Slavic identity complex embedded in the "russkii mir" ("the Russian world"), which signifies the Russian circle of interests and cultural superiority in countries such as Ukraine and Belarus in particular and the entire post-Soviet area in general. The phrase "Russian world" also has connotations with Russian neo-imperial aspirations.

"Listen, Pole," an older man with a grey goatee approached me. "We do not support Putin. We are simply close to Russia. This is the 'Russian world' – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. It is all one and the same. We share a common history, language and way of thinking. Why divide us?"⁷⁴

⁷² Berkut is the name of the department of the former Ukrainian riot police that pacified protesters during the Euromaidan with violent measures. Afterwards, it was dissolved by the new Ukrainian government.

⁷³ Ziemowit Szczerek, "Podróż do Mordoru," *Polityka* No 11, 12.03.2014, 100–105.

⁷⁴ "Słuchaj, Polak – podszedł do mnie jakiś starszy pan z siwą kocią bródką. – My nie za Putinem. Nam po prostu Rosja bliska. To jest 'ruski świat' – Rosja, Ukraina, Białoruś. To jest wszystko jedno i to samo. Historia u nas wspólna, język, myślenie. Po co nas dzielić?" Ibid.

4.5. WORDING

Just like during the Orange Revolution, the language of journalists during the Euromaidan was full of metaphors, comparisons, metonymies and other figures of speech. Hence, it is worth showing what kind of wording with regard to Ukrainian identity was used in the analysed Polish weeklies.

To emphasise the post-Soviet Ukrainian identity, Polish journalists compared the Ukrainian reality during the Euromaidan to that of the Polish People's Republic when people rebelled against the communist authorities. Thus, Viktor Yanukovych was often compared to General Wojciech Jaruzelski⁷⁵ and the Ukrainian special police force Berkut to the Polish communist Motorized Reserves of the Citizens' Militia (ZOMO).⁷⁶

For example, *wSieci* wrote that both Jaruzelski in 1981 and Yanukovych in 2013 did not pay attention to the "will of the people" but to what "Moscow said":

However, both for Jaruzelski in December 1981 and for Yanukovych in December 2013, a source other than the "will of the people" or the "democratic verdict of the voters" was more important than their "right" to rule, the power of life and death. This source flows from Moscow. Without the support of Brezhnev's Moscow, Jaruzelski would not have held on in Poland, the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) would

⁷⁵ Wojciech Jaruzelski was a Polish military politician during the Polish People's Republic. He was the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party from 1981 to 1989, Prime Minister from 1981 to 1985 and the Chairman of the Council of State from 1985 to 1989. He was responsible for introducing martial law on December 13, 1981, when the authoritarian communist government led by him restricted daily life in an attempt to suppress political opposition, in particular the "Solidarity" movement.

⁷⁶ It was a paramilitary-police formation during the communist era in Poland. These units became known for brutally quelling civil rights protests. Michał Dąbrowski, "Długa droga do wolności. Zakazane fotografie z lat 80." *Culture.pl*, December 13, 2017, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://culture.pl/pl/artykul/dluga-droga-do-wolnosci-zakazane-fotografie-z-lat-80>.

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not have “won” consecutive elections, no martial law would have been introduced, and if it had, its author would have eventually had to stand trial for causing the death of dozens of his country’s citizens. Not in the same way but similarly (because it is no longer a totalitarian Moscow but an authoritarian one, though still imperial), Yanukovych would not have won the elections if it were not for Putin’s openly shown support.⁷⁷

However, this analogy is not complete, as there were also several differences, pointed out by Aleksander Kwaśniewski in his interview with *Newsweek*:

In Poland, we had a simple division: them and us. In Ukraine, there are us, i.e. the people from the Maidan; those whom we are willing to accept but do not fully identify with, or the opposition; and them – those who are unacceptable, that is, the authorities. In Kyiv – unlike in Warsaw 25 years ago – there is neither the popular, respected, conciliatory Prime Minister Mazowiecki nor President Jaruzelski, ready to step down due to a sense of responsibility for the state and social peace. Yanukovych not only does not want to resign but also still hopes for re-election in 2015.⁷⁸

The most interesting wording concerns references to Ukraine as a state. There were several ways in which Polish journalists called Ukraine apart from its proper name, e.g. “the state on

⁷⁷ “Jednak i dla Jaruzelskiego w grudniu 1981 r., i dla Janukowycza w grudniu 2013 r. ważniejsze było inne niż ‘wola narodu’ czy ‘demokratyczny werdykt wyborców’ źródło ich ‘prawa’ do sprawowania władzy, władzy życia i śmierci. To źródło bije z Moskwy. Bez oparcia o Moskwę Breżniewa Jaruzelski nie utrzymałby się w Polsce, PZPR nie ‘wygrywałaby’ kolejnych wyborów, nie udałby się żaden stan wojenny, a gdyby do niego doszło, to w końcu jego autor musiałby stanąć przed sądem za doprowadzenie do śmierci dziesiątków obywateli swojego kraju. Nie tak samo, lecz podobnie (bo to już nie jest totalitarna Moskwa, tylko autorytarna, ale wciąż imperialna), Janukowycz nie wygrałby wyborów, gdyby nie jawnie okazywane poparcie Putina.” Andrzej Nowak, “Krwawe szachy z Putinem,” w *Sieci* No 9, 24.02.2014, 23–27.

⁷⁸ “W Polsce mieliśmy prosty podział: my i oni. Na Ukrainie są: my, czyli ludzie z Majdanu; ci, których jesteśmy w stanie zaakceptować, ale nie do końca się z nimi utożsamiamy, czyli opozycja; i oni – ci nie do zaakceptowania, czyli władza. W Kijowie – w odróżnieniu od Warszawy sprzed 25 lat – nie ma ani popularnego, szanowanego, koncyliacyjnego premiera Mazowieckiego, ani prezydenta Jaruzelskiego gotowego odejść w poczuciu odpowiedzialności za państwo i pokój społeczny. Janukowycz nie tylko nie chce rezygnować, lecz także wciąż liczy na reelekcję w wyborach w 2015 r.” Jacek Pawlicki, “Trzy Ukrainy,” *Newsweek* No 6, 03.02.2014, 58–61.

the Dnipro River,” “in the East,” “our eastern neighbour.” This moved the discourse to Ruth Wodak’s concept in CDA – spatial references. On the other hand, describing Ukraine with the spatial reference “in the East” often carried negative connotations and implied a certain unconscious orientalised of Ukraine, although sometimes it simply denoted the country’s geographical location.

It should be noted that the identification of a state with geographical terms, especially rivers, is significant for Polish society. The phrase “the state on the Dnipro River” was used mainly in articles with a positive attitude towards Ukraine, where it symbolised the beginning of a new society and a new state system. References to Polish history helped to explain Ukrainian events through concepts familiar to Poles. Indeed, journalists used the phrase “the Miracle on the Vistula River”⁷⁹ and transformed it into “the Miracle in Kyiv” or “the Miracle on the Dnipro River.” Journalists also recalled the Polish experience of the “round table” and “wars at the top,” but to a lesser degree than during the Orange Revolution.

When describing the processes associated with the Euromaidan, journalists often used the specification “Ukrainians” instead of the genericisation “Ukraine.” This gave the impression that they were presenting Ukraine as a community of people acting in that place and that time but not a country as a whole. A discursive representation of social actors called assimilation can be observed here.⁸⁰ It means that people are not presented

⁷⁹ The Miracle on the Vistula River is a popular term for the Battle of Warsaw fought between Polish and Soviet troops in 1920, which was decisive for Poland’s regaining independence.

⁸⁰ Van Leeuwen, “The Representation...,” 48.

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as individuals but as actors who are united by a common social practice.

Journalists also used the word “nation” in reference to the events in Ukraine during the Euromaidan. In this case, the nation was treated as a community of people, and the state structures of the time were not identified with it. For instance, the following phrases were often used: “the Ukrainian nation against Yanukovich,” “the Ukrainian nation does not want to turn to the East.” Thus, the government of the time was not identified with the “nation” at all. President Yanukovich and the ruling elite were described as pro-Russian. The post-Soviet way of functioning of state structures was described as something different from the nation – embedded in the will of the people.

4.5.1. UKRAINE AS A “FAILED STATE”

As acknowledged above, not all of the analysed articles portrayed the Euromaidan as a positive event in the construction of Ukrainian identity. The most explicit criticism appeared in *Przegląd*. Beginning with historical references and ending with the Euromaidan, Ukraine was presented there as a “failed state.”

It is worth noting that the wording and narrative about Ukraine in *Przegląd* were completely different from that in other magazines. First, in late 2013, there were only articles about the political situation in Ukraine, with no mention of the protests. The first texts about the Euromaidan started to appear in 2014, presenting it in a very negative light as a rebellion

of a radical nationalistic mob against legitimate authorities.⁸¹ Hence, the journalists were very sceptical of it, even calling it “Orange Revolution-bis.”

Moreover, texts about the Euromaidan were interspersed with historical ones about Ukrainian nationalists from the UPA period. Both the articles about contemporary and past Ukraine portrayed these people as radical nationalists with a decidedly anti-Polish attitude. The country itself was presented as a “failed state,” for which the dissolution of the USSR had been a great tragedy since its entire economy had collapsed. Hence, *Przegląd* described Ukraine as a very poor country: “corruption, even famine. This is how life in Ukraine can be characterised.”⁸²

Historical references were often used to portray Ukraine as a failed state. While in other weeklies, the words *Kresy* and “Wild Fields” appeared mainly in a historical context, in *Przegląd*, they described contemporary Ukraine. For example, in his column “Wild Fields of Europe,” Jan Widacki presented Ukrainian-European relations as a struggle over Tymoshenko. To emphasise this, he invoked a comparison with Henryk Sienkiewicz’s novel.

The heroes of *With Fire and Sword* used to say that the war with the Cossacks was a war for Mrs Khmelnytska vel Czaplińska’s “red braid.” Today, Europe is fighting with Ukraine for a different ‘braid,’ maybe this time not a red one but a blond one wrapped around the head.⁸³

⁸¹ Bronisław Łagowski, “Przepraszam, zdenerwowałem się,” *Przegląd* No 1, 06.01.2014, 13.

⁸² “Korupcja, nawet głód. Tak można by scharakteryzować życie na Ukrainie.” Barbara Jagas, “Ukraińcy nad Wisłą,” *Przegląd* No 1, 06.01.2014, 14–16.

⁸³ “Bohaterowie *Ogniem i mieczem* mawiali, że wojna z Kozakami to wojna o ‘ryżą kosę’ pani Chmielnickiej vel Czaplińskiej. Dziś Europa toczy z Ukrainą wojnę o inną ‘kosę,’ może tym razem nie o ryżą, ale blond i okręconą wokół głowy.” Jan Widacki, “Dzikie Pola Europy,” *Przegląd* No 49, 02.12.2013, 13.

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The most popular wording in *Przegląd* was that Ukraine should remain between Moscow and Brussels because its economy was backward and would collapse under the onslaught of a strong economy of the EU.

4.5.2. “TWO UKRAINES”

The idea of “two Ukraines” was revived somewhat during the Euromaidan. It was not as strongly expressed as in the articles about the Orange Revolution but visible enough to be analysed. There were warnings about the division of Ukraine in all the weeklies. Journalists acknowledged that Ukraine was divided culturally, linguistically and historically. Those who participated in the Euromaidan were thus portrayed in terms of civic identity and the formation of a civic nation, while those who did not support the protests were described as Soviet and pro-Russian. Usually, the discourse of divided Ukraine was associated not only with the geographical division between East and West but also with the representation of social actors already mentioned above.

The discourse of a divided Ukraine also appeared in interviews with Ukrainians. Talking to *Newsweek*, journalist Vitalii Portnikov confirmed the differences between the two Ukraines as understood by Mykola Riabchuk. Nevertheless, he urged not to generalise because “there are people with Ukrainian consciousness in the east and many pro-Russian ones in the west.”⁸⁴ In the wording of two Ukraines, the phrase “Soviet people” often

⁸⁴ Kacewicz, “Ukraina...,” 50–53.

appeared. These Soviet people were portrayed as those who did not want any changes, were passive and missed the Soviet times.

4.5.3. VALUES

When describing Ukraine during the Euromaidan, journalists very often used the word “values” to represent it as a state developing a civic identity and a civic society oriented towards the European tradition, e.g. stating that the Euromaidan stood “in defence of European values.” The second, also quite frequent, usage referred to the values of the state and citizenship. *Do Rzeczy* described Ukrainians as people who had begun to appreciate their own state as a value. This fact, according to Polish journalists, narrowed the gap existing in Ukraine and brought Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking citizens closer together. Therefore, civic elements prevailed over ethnic ones, such as language.

The phrase “European values” was usually used to refer to the desire of Ukrainians to enter the circle of European culture. The expression “values of democracy and a fair state system” appeared equally often. A journalist of the conservative *Do Rzeczy* wrote that the Ukrainians’ aspiration to sign an association agreement with the EU was not dictated by political or economic factors alone: “The desire to associate with the EU does not stem from political calculations or knowledge about this institution but from the desire to find oneself in a European culture.”⁸⁵

⁸⁵ “Pragnienie stowarzyszenia się z UE nie wynika z politycznych rachub czy wiedzy na temat tej instytucji, ale z chęci odnalezienia się w europejskiej kulturze.” Wildstein, “Bunt...,” 70–72.

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The texts also addressed the contradiction of values: on the one hand, there was an oligarchic political system, which did not equal democracy, and on the other hand, people were fighting for European values, which were often associated with democracy and a transparent, corruption-free political and economic system. Journalists were keen to quote ordinary people who said that Poland was a major point of reference for them as a successful country in the EU: "We want to join the European project because we know that it works, that you in Poland have succeeded. This knowledge is a sufficient guarantee for us."⁸⁶ This also placed Ukraine within the identity frame of Central and Eastern Europe, epitomised by the former Soviet bloc countries that had joined the EU.

The people participating in the Euromaidan were sometimes portrayed as unaware of what Europe really was and what the association agreement really meant for them but firmly believing that it would completely change their country: "They assure quite seriously that signing the association agreement alone will change their country beyond recognition. Corruption and disorder will disappear, and opportunities will arise for every young and ambitious person."⁸⁷

In terms of values cultivated in Ukraine, Polish journalists noticed differences between Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. In *Polityka*, Andrzej Brzeziecki wrote:

⁸⁶ "Chcemy się przyłączyć do europejskiego projektu, bo wiemy, że on działa, że wam w Polsce się udało i ta wiedza jest dla nas wystarczającą gwarancją." Michał Kaciewicz, "Majdan Europa," *Newsweek* No 49, 02.12.2013, 62–65.

⁸⁷ "Całkiem poważnie zapewniają, że samo już podpisanie umowy stowarzyszeniowej zmieni ich kraj nie do poznania. Zniknie korupcja i bałagan, pojawią się szanse dla każdego młodego i ambitnego." Ibid.

Ukraine is not Russia, Leonid Kuchma used to say, and apparently, he was right. What passes smoothly in Minsk and Moscow is met with strong resistance in Kyiv. The society here is different, infected with the bug of democracy and freedom of speech.⁸⁸

* * *

To sum up, the Euromaidan was presented in the Polish press as a civic protest driven by the need of the Ukrainian society to move away from the post-Soviet order and rid itself of the postcommunist identity frame. Polish journalists portrayed Ukrainians mainly as a European nation with the social will to carry out a systemic transformation. A particular feature of the coverage of the Ukrainian events was a relative lack of attention paid to politicians as decision-makers, which put them in the background of the revolution.

However, the image of Ukraine during the Euromaidan in the Polish opinion-forming press was not uniform. In particular, the issue of Ukraine's national identity was influenced by Polish historical, cultural and political discourse, which resulted in references to a few stereotypes about Ukraine related to the common historical heritage.

⁸⁸ "Ukraina to nie Rosja – mawiał Leonid Kuczma i najwyraźniej miał rację. To, co gładko przechodzi w Mińsku i w Moskwie, w Kijowie wywołuje zdecydowany opór. Tu społeczeństwo jest inne, zarażone bakcyłem demokracji i wolności słowa." Andrzej Brzeziecki, "Miałeś Wiktor złoty koleczyk," *Polityka* No 6, 05.02.2014, 46–48.

**MODELS AND PATTERNS OF
UKRAINIAN IDENTITY REPRESENTED
IN POLISH OPINION-FORMING
PRESS: COMPARISONS, NARRATIVES,
EXPLANATIONS**

In this chapter, I will present the final stage of Norman Fairclough's method of CDA – explanation. I will also refer to the narratives of the analysed journalistic texts and present the relation of the data obtained from the analysis to the research on Ukrainian identity, their correspondence to certain patterns and models of identity, as well as references to historical and contemporary discourses.

Before going into the details of the third stage of CDA, I will briefly explain the difference between the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan from the perspective of identity construction.

5.1. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION VERSUS THE EUROMAIDAN AND THE PROCESS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN UKRAINE

The Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan should be considered breakthrough moments in the process of identity formation in Ukraine. These two events were the starting and ending points of a certain political and social period. Therefore, it is important to examine the academic discourse on the issue of identity during that time. According to the constructivist approach to identity, historical breakthroughs or important turning points in the existence of a society create the most appropriate conditions for constructing, reconstructing or reestablishing identity. In this subchapter, I will compare the changes or problems with identity that occurred during the Orange Revolution with those that emerged during the Euromaidan.

Firstly, I will examine the main scholarly trends focusing on Ukrainian identity during the Orange Revolution. These events were perceived as a time of significant development of civic society in Ukraine and, consequently, the emergence of civic nationalism.¹ Different types of national identity found in different types of nationalism can result in different consequences. For example, the Soviet, great-power, imperial and anti-Western nationalisms in post-Soviet states led to ethnic conflicts, xenophobia and the establishment of authoritarian regimes in some of them.

¹ Mykola Riabchuk, "Ukraine: The Not So Unexpected Nation," *Eurozine*, April 4, 2005, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/ukraine-the-not-so-unexpected-nation/>.

5.1. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION VERSUS THE EUROMAIDAN...

Researchers argue that civic nationalism in Ukraine played a significant role in mobilising mass protests against electoral fraud in the 2004 presidential elections, which became known as the Orange Revolution. Taras Kuzio states that, like in the case of the Rose Revolution in Georgia, civic nationalism during these events provided the basis for Ukraine's aspirations towards European integration and distanced it from Russia.² However, during the Orange Revolution, those with a strong Ukrainian ethnic identity were more supportive of democratic change than those with an East Slavic identity, disproving the notion that ethnic national identity is always "hostile to democracy."³ The relationship between types of national identity and support for reforms was also studied by Holley Hansen, Vicki Hesli and Stephen Shulman, who examined the correlation between the type of people's identity in Ukraine and their willingness to support democratic and market reforms.⁴

The geographical distribution of these identity types was closely related to the candidate one voted for and the voter turnout. Ethnic Ukrainian identity was most often manifested in the western and central parts of Ukraine⁵ and resulted in pro-Western and anti-Soviet political and social discourse.⁶ At the same time, East Slavic identity or East Slavic nationalism

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² Taras Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine. Understanding the Orange Revolution," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43 (2010), 285.

³ Ibid., 286.

⁴ Stephen Shulman, "National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine," *Slavic Review* 64 (1) (2005), 74–75; Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli, "National Identity, Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised Individuals," *Europe-Asia Studies* 61 (1) (2009), 1–28.

⁵ Stephen Shulman, "The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 56 (1) (2004), 35–56.

⁶ Kuzio, "Nationalism...", 291.

developed among eastern Ukrainians and in Crimea. There was also a special type of identity in the Ukrainian society, called Soviet identity. Speaking about the Orange Revolution and the presidential elections that triggered it, Kuzio states that people who voted for Yanukovych defined their identity as Soviet (neither Ukrainian nor Russian) – “an identity that crossed ethnic allegiances.”⁷ Therefore, “only western-central Ukrainians believed that their candidate, Yushchenko, was honest, not corrupt and thereby morally superior to other candidates, particularly to Yanukovych. Yanukovych’s twice-criminal record did not flummox eastern Ukrainians to vote for him...”⁸ This illustrates the level of civic and political awareness of people during the Orange Revolution. Because the very people who voted for the “honest” candidate disagreed with the election results and organised protests against the fraud.

However, many researchers argue that despite the differences in the level of civic and ethnic national identity of the participants, the Orange Revolution was the first attempt to unite both left- and right-bank Ukraine. For instance, Andrew Wilson states in *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution* that these protests were not sparked by the West or by Western Ukraine. He argues that it was Yushchenko who took advantage of “this civic mood, winning broader support across Ukraine, uniting the west and centre, the Right Bank and the Left, and winning sufficient antiregime protest votes in parts of the east and south.”⁹

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 288.

⁹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2005, 199.

Whether Yushchenko was the driving force behind the Orange Revolution can be debated, but it was definitely not the split in regional identity in Ukraine.

Ukraine was therefore a profoundly different country in 2004 than it had been even in 1991. All previous elections had been “the west (of Ukraine) versus the rest,” with the west a natural minority. Now central Ukraine was on board, and at the wheel.¹⁰

As described earlier, Ukrainians with a stronger ethnic identity were more active in the democratic transition. However, the readiness to introduce democratic changes in the state by changing or restructuring institutions, high social activity and participation in social and political events are features of the civic component of national identity. Therefore, people with a strong ethnic adherence also had a strong civic identity. This was first demonstrated in a broad sense during the Orange Revolution.¹¹

In addition to the ethnic and civic components of identity, the supranational one was also important in Ukrainian civic movements. Because there were two supranational identities competing with each other, East Slavic and European, people’s attitudes towards Europe played a significant role during almost all of Ukraine’s shifts towards democracy. During the Orange Revolution, although it was caused by internal political events, the pattern of Ukrainian identity as European was widely demonstrated. For the Ukrainian society, European identity meant, above all, a recognition of European values and the

¹⁰ Ibid., 200.

¹¹ Ibid., 201.

principles of freedom and democracy. Europe did not exist in Ukraine in an ethical and cultural sense but in the sense of values. Therefore, one of the most important identity changes during the Orange Revolution was that “the Ukrainian people transformed, declared European values into reality through their individual and collective actions.”¹²

Thus, during and immediately after the Orange Revolution, these events were compared to the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, when the people of those countries also declared their European identity. In 2004, Timothy Snyder stated that the opposition protests in Ukraine were unlike anything seen in Europe since 1989. Therefore, he argued that

there are moments in history, as in 1945 throughout western Europe, as in 1975 in Spain, as in 1989 throughout eastern Europe, as in Ukraine today, when one must think broadly and ambitiously. To secure democracy in Ukraine is in the interest of the European Union, because democratic neighbors are peaceful and prosperous neighbors.¹³

Hence, the Orange Revolution in post-Soviet Ukraine was perceived in the context of identity changes in the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy.

Disillusionment with the Orange Revolution came when the “transition/transformation frame” was not supported by deep changes in the sphere of the institutional identity in post-Orange Ukraine. Geir Flikke explains that the transition period is never easy: “elites may conflict over regime issues, that

¹² Yurii Andrukhovych, “Shche ne vmerla Yevropa,” *Krytyka* 1–2 (2007), 8–9.

¹³ Timothy Snyder, “Ukraine: An Opportunity for Europe,” *Eurozine*, November 26, 2004, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/ukraine-an-opportunity-for-europe/>.

these differences may be overcome through pacts, and that new elections compel all to abide by the ‘only game in town’ – that of democracy.”¹⁴ However, the new elites did not “conflict with the regime,” and democracy did not become the “only game in town” in post-Orange Ukraine. The lack of institutional changes, constant disagreements and an unstable political system were obstacles to Ukraine’s full integration into the European, i.e. Western, identity frame that was demonstrated at the societal level during the Orange Revolution in the form of values. From this point of view, Ukraine was not a “nation-state” but a “state-nation.”¹⁵

The failure of institutional identity after the Orange Revolution was reinforced by Viktor Yanukovich, who became president in 2010. He abolished all attempts to create a European institutional identity in Ukraine with “Soviet ideological weapons: anti-Americanism and hostility to Ukrainian nationalism.”¹⁶

In 2012, describing the uncertainty of national identity in Ukraine during the postcommunist transition, Mykola Riabchuk argued that the Orange Revolution was an opportunity for identity change. But unfortunately, “the window of opportunity was never used and closed.”¹⁷ Riabchuk additionally predicted that “another window” would open for Ukraine in the next two

¹⁴ Geir Flikke, “Pacts, Parties and Elite Struggle. Ukraine’s Troubled Post-Orange Transition,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (3) (2008), 376.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 395.

¹⁶ Taras Kuzio, “Soviet Conspiracy Theories and Political Culture in Ukraine. Understanding Viktor Yanukovich and the Party of Regions,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44 (2011), 230.

¹⁷ Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s ‘Muddling Through.’ National Identity and Postcommunist Transition,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45 (2012), 446.

decades. He was right. It happened even sooner, nine years after the Orange Revolution.

Naturally, the Euromaidan was initially compared to the Orange Revolution. However, the main difference between these two events lay in their character. The Orange Revolution was more political and dedicated to a single politician. In contrast, the Euromaidan had antiregime aspirations. At first, people demonstrated a strong European supranational identity, which was later merged with national identity. Therefore, Ukraine lost its geopolitical ambiguity.¹⁸ The revolution of the Euromaidan was thus simultaneously European and national.¹⁹ It is worth adding that during the Euromaidan, civic identity prevailed over the ethnic one, as evidenced by Olga Onuch's survey conducted during the protests. Activists responded that they wanted to frame the Euromaidan as a protest "in terms of civil and human rights."²⁰

The main identity issue during the Euromaidan was civic national identity and European supranational identity. However, right-wing radical nationalistic parties and organisations such as the Svoboda party and the Right Sector caused a controversial backlash. They used symbols of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and were therefore perceived as fascists. The nationalists' march

¹⁸ Ivan Krastev, "Who Lost Ukraine?" *Eurozine*, December 13, 2013, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/who-lost-ukraine/>.

¹⁹ Anton Shekhovtsov, "The Ukrainian Revolution is European and National," *Eurozine*, December 13, 2013, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/the-ukrainian-revolution-is-european-and-national/>.

²⁰ Olga Onuch, "Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan," in *Ukraine's Euromaidan. Analyses of a Civil Revolution in Ukraine*, edited by David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills, Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2015, 31.

on January 1 to mark the anniversary of the birth of Stepan Bandera, the nationalistic leader of UPA during the Second World War and for several years thereafter, also had significant resonance.

Due to their visibility, the presence of nationalistic elements during the Euromaidan was effectively exploited by Russian media propaganda, although they did not, in fact, constitute the majority of the protesters. As for the slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” it was not a mere expression of nationalistic pathos, and the response “Glory to the heroes” did not refer to the heroes of UPA but to “all the heroes of the centuries-long Ukrainian struggle for independence ... including the current struggle on the Maidan.”²¹ Onuch also presents evidence that further undermines the assumption about the key role of right-wing forces during the Euromaidan.

The rush to identify the Right Sector, and other right-wing groups, as the central force behind the latter stages of the EuroMaidan has unfortunately resulted in analysts not only misinterpreting the ideology of the typical protester, but also the broader political mood in Ukraine. Most importantly, these much-discussed right-wing groups have not been able to win over many voters, and recent parliamentary election results indicate that such groups have actually even lost much of their own electoral support.²²

Another identity issue during the Euromaidan was the relationship between the East Slavic and European identities.

²¹ Volodymyr Kulyk, “Divisive Nationalist Actions Cannot Devalue Democratic Euromaidan,” *Eurozine*, January 24, 2014, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/divisive-nationalist-actions-cannot-devalue-democratic-euromaidan/>.

²² Olga Onuch, “What Have We Learned in the Year since Ukraine’s EuroMaidan?,” *The Washington Post*, November 26, 2014, accessed April 26, 2022, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/26/what-have-we-learned-in-the-year-since-ukraines-euromaidan/>.

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As Volodymyr Kulyk writes, people with an East Slavic identity opposed the Euromaidan because, for them, integration with Europe meant a betrayal of the East Slavic unity. In their eyes, all the participants of the Euromaidan were “Banderites,” whom they very often associated with all those who supported the Western orientation of Ukraine.²³

The Euromaidan also saw a significant identity shift in terms of expanding civic adherence. Protesters were not only from central and western Ukraine and were not only Ukrainian speakers.

Since the Orange Revolution failed to realise the project of “the birth of the Ukrainian nation,” the Euromaidan was more aptly compared to the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and became the Ukrainian equivalent of a return to Europe.²⁴ Tatiana Zhurzhenko also emphasised a very important aspect of the identity change in Ukraine during the Euromaidan – the symbolic one. There were still many symbols of the old era and Soviet identity in Ukraine, such as an active communist party and numerous monuments of Lenin. During the Euromaidan and afterwards, those monuments were dismantled in many Ukrainian cities, and the Communist Party did not win seats in the Ukrainian parliament for the first time.

²³ Kulyk, “Divisive Nationalist Actions...”

²⁴ Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “The Autumn of Nations 1989 and the Ukrainian Winter 2013–14,” *Eurozine*, June 13, 2014, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://www.eurozine.com/the-autumn-of-nations-1989-and-the-ukrainian-winter-2013-14/>.

5.1.1. DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES AND MODELS OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITY CONSTRUCTED IN THE POLISH PRESS

Ukraine's identity during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan was represented in the Polish press in the form of national and supranational identity, as has been shown in previous chapters. Based on the main theoretical studies on Ukrainian identity described earlier and the data obtained from the analysed magazines, Ukrainian identity in the Polish press was categorised following detailed patterns (see Appendix 1). First, two main categories were identified: **supranational identity** and **national identity**. They were further divided into two subcategories: supranational identity into European identity and East Slavic identity, while national identity into ethnic identity and civic identity. Each subcategory was then divided into codes: European identity into materialistic and idealistic codes; East Slavic identity into pro-Russian and post-Soviet codes; ethnic identity into nationalistic and cultural codes; civic identity into political and axiological codes. These codes made it possible to examine the discourse in order to piece together the overall image of Ukrainian identity that Polish journalists presented to the Polish public. I have previously used this approach in the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the perception of Ukrainian identity in several Polish weeklies during the Euromaidan²⁵ and in the analysis of the evolution

²⁵ Olha Tkachenko, "The Perception of Ukrainian Identity during Euromaidan in Polish Opinion-Making Press," *Studia Medioznawcze* 1 (64) (2016), 79.

of the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish intellectual periodicals *Arcana* and *Res Publica Nowa*.²⁶

Supranational identity

As mentioned in the previous chapters, supranational identity is the result of late nation-building and an inferiority complex resulting from the post-Soviet legacy. In Ukraine, supranational identity has for many years been represented mainly in two vectors: European identity and East Slavic identity.²⁷

Based on the results of the analysis of the Polish weeklies, it can be concluded that the European identity of Ukraine was presented in a way that referred to how people imagined Europe. In this narrative, journalists used strategies of inclusion to make Ukrainians “more like us.”²⁸ During the Orange Revolution, the subcategory of supranational European identity appeared in almost all of the analysed weeklies, though not very often. I divided it into materialistic and idealistic codes. The former was associated with keywords and phrases that described Ukrainians as people whose ideas about Europe were limited to the realm of wealth and a booming economy (e.g. the desire to be included in European institutional structures that could, for example, abolish EU visas and help with carrying out economic reforms). In contrast, the idealistic code was identified using keywords indicating values of democracy, freedom, justice and

²⁶ Olha Tkachenko, “Reinventing Ukraine. Ukrainian National and Supra-National Identity in Contemporary Polish Opinion-Forming Press,” *Colloquia Humanistica* 5 (2016), 147, 154.

²⁷ Tkachenko, “The Perception...,” 80.

²⁸ Ruth Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 2nd ed., translated by Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten and J.W. Unger, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009, 37.

cultural or historical affiliation with Europe (e.g. culture, mentality, democracy, human rights, absence of corruption, “normal” life, freedom, freedom of the press, equal rights). During the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, the analysed Polish press mainly featured an idealistic expression of the Ukrainian people’s European identity. The materialistic aspect was either omitted altogether or presented in a very limited way. In many cases, Ukrainians were portrayed as being unaware of what Europe really was. Journalists often described the protesters as people who did not know the economic and political details of what they were fighting for. This overlapped with the portrayal of Ukrainians as ignorant and unprepared to be Europeans. For example, in his first article about the Euromaidan protests in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Andrzej Brzeziecki wrote that Ukrainians had an idealistic vision of Europe – they equated it with a better life, unaware of how difficult the period of transition would be. Ukrainians were also presented as not being familiar with such European values as tolerance. The journalist wrote that only one in 200 Ukrainians accepted homosexuals, and half of Ukrainians wanted to close their borders to them. Ukrainians were thus not ready to accept the “Other” as one of the European values.²⁹

Other mentions of the supranational European identity referred to its meanings and values. For example, in the first sentence of an article in *Polityka* “The Road to Europe,” its author described Ukraine’s aspirations toward Europe. The journalist wrote: “Kyiv is now the only city in Europe where

²⁹ Andrzej Brzeziecki, “Przygnębieni i zdeterminowani,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 50, 15.12.2013, 22–23.

the European flag is kissed.”³⁰ It was this identity that was demonstrated during the protests that had begun as the first antigovernment demonstrations before the Vilnius summit. Although Ukraine during the Euromaidan was described mostly as a homogenous formation with a strong desire to defend or establish its European identity, this article also presented different identities of Ukraine, not only the one epitomised by the Maidan: “We should remember that not all Ukrainians have supported and support integration with Europe. The East [is] economically and mentally closer to Russia.”³¹

The last example leads to the representation of the East Slavic identity in the articles about Ukraine. As I have already stated, the East Slavic identity was interpreted by Mykola Riabchuk as “Little Russian,”³² an identity that was characterised by a clear affiliation with Russia or sentiment towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet mentality, as well as the specificity of a corrupt political and social environment that was “rooted in post-Soviet political and business culture.”³³ Therefore, in this study, the subcategory of East Slavic identity was divided into pro-Russian and post-Soviet codes.³⁴

East Slavic identity appeared very often in articles about the Orange Revolution. This was due to the fact that Ukraine during

³⁰ “Kijów jest dziś jedynym miastem w Europie, w którym całuje się europejską flagę.” Jagienka Wilczak, “Droga do Europy,” *Polityka* No 49, 28.11.2013, 124.

³¹ “Trzeba też pamiętać, że nie wszyscy Ukraińcy popierali i popierają integrację z Europą. Wschód, gospodarczo i mentalnie bardziej zbliżony do Rosji ...” *Ibid.*, 125.

³² Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s ‘Muddling Through’...,” 442.

³³ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis. What it Means for the West*, New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2014 (Kindle Edition), 70.

³⁴ Tkachenko, “The Perception...,” 81.

this period was not presented only in the context of protests on Independence Square in Kyiv but with significant attention paid to the Donbas region and the Ukrainian oligarchy. The code “pro-Russian” was used to refer to the political and business affiliation with Russia of the current Ukrainian authorities and business elite. The situation in Eastern Ukraine was described solely in terms of the post-Soviet code: people manipulated by the authorities; regret over the dissolution of the USSR (“we have already lost one of our homes – the USSR,” “we do not want Yushchenko to deliver us into the hands of America and Western imperialists”); symbols of the Soviet era – monuments of Lenin and topographical names (even the title of one article about Donbas was illustrative of it – “We, the Soviet People”³⁵).

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During the Euromaidan, foreign media, including the Polish press, did not pay much attention to post-Soviet or pro-Russian sentiments. The appearance of these discourses depended on the attitude of the editors to Ukrainian events, i.e. whether the journalists decided to write not only about the central events in Kyiv and pro-European Western Ukraine but also about the eastern part of the country. The pro-Russian orientation was represented in articles that described the actions of former President Yanukovych, the Ukrainian oligarchs and their relations with Russia, the activity of state structures during the Euromaidan and the geopolitical preferences of the inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine. The post-Soviet discourse, on the other hand, referred more to the mentality of the people. It was used when journalists

³⁵ Michał Kaciewicz, “My, sowiecki naród,” *Newsweek* No 50, 12.12.2004, 8.

portrayed Ukrainians as not free, uncertain of their national identity or feeling nostalgic for the USSR.

National identity

The analysis of the Polish opinion-forming press showed that the category of Ukrainian national identity was perceived in ethnic and civic terms, in line with theoretical research on identity, as already described earlier in this book.

For the purpose of this study, the subcategory of ethnic identity was divided into nationalistic and cultural codes. This division was made based on the most popular patterns of Ukrainian national ethnic identity described in the analysed texts. The nationalistic code was identified through such keywords as “radical nationalists,” “Banderites,” “Stepan Bandera,” “Ukrainian Insurgent Army,” “fascists,” etc. The cultural code referred to the perception of Ukrainian identity in the discourse of national cultural values and common historical symbols that unite people, alongside popular contemporary culture and religion.

During the Orange Revolution, the subcategory of ethnic identity appeared in very few instances and mainly in its cultural code. There were no mentions of Ukrainians as radical nationalists or Banderites, except for one reference to the nationalistic motives of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and very few comments in *Przegląd* about former UPA soldiers who were also Yushchenko’s supporters.

This changed during the Euromaidan. Discursively, the word “Banderites” was used in a negative way, with fear of

Ukrainian nationalism. However, some journalists pointed out that UPA symbols were not used to demonstrate anti-Polish sentiments but were merely symbols of the Ukrainian struggle for full independence from Russia. It should also be noted that during the Euromaidan, Polish journalists very often inscribed the discourse of Ukrainian cultural tradition or history into the current political changes. This embedded the entire narrative in the heroic ideological struggle for independence and fostered Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.

All of the analysed weeklies paid considerable attention to the cultural component of both protests. There were fewer articles on culture during the Orange Revolution, while the role of intellectual and cultural elites and the clergy was clearly emphasised during the Euromaidan.

The cultural discourse of representation was consistent with the one reflecting the civic component of national identity, which was based not on the ethnic attachment but on the values of citizenship and the state. In the analysed Polish opinion-forming press, civic identity was represented in two codes: political and axiological.

The subcategory of civic identity appeared with great frequency both during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan. The protests against electoral fraud were treated by Polish journalists as a manifestation of the Ukrainian people's desire to live in a strong state that follows all the procedures of a democratic society. Such passages as "a new Ukraine is being born on the Maidan," "they are fighting for a new, independent Ukraine," "they want to decide for themselves who will be president,"

“they want fair elections,” “Ukraine has decided not to follow Russian instructions,” “Ukrainians do not want to see a ‘miracle’ over the ballot boxes” were assigned to the political code. Thus, in this study, it encompasses the portrayal of Ukrainians as people who are aware of their rights and have a strong sense of citizenship and responsibility for the state in which they live. In short, the political code illustrates the civic identity of Ukrainians with institutional adherence to the state. In the case of the Euromaidan, journalists referred to civic identity according to the same patterns, even using the same words and expressions about civic society or the “birth of a new Ukraine.” Very often authors of articles on the Orange Revolution also wrote about the Euromaidan.

The axiological code of civic identity prevailed over the political one both during the Euromaidan and the Orange Revolution, although it appeared most often during the latter, represented by such passages as “people stand for the value of democracy,” “people do not want corruption,” “civic consciousness of Ukrainians is growing.” This discourse represented the set of civic values that Ukrainians were demonstrating. The main keywords associated with it were: civil society, human rights, discipline in the state, absence of corruption, self-organisation during the Euromaidan, cooperation between all people without language and ethnic differences, etc. The axiological discourse can be very similar to the political code, but the difference lies in the description of the ideals and ideas of civic society during the Euromaidan. For instance, such passages as “these people do not take bribes and do not give them,”

“they do not throw litter on the streets and keep their staircases clean,” “they gave their lives for the new Ukraine,” “they want a clear and transparent authority” were assigned to the axiological code of civic identity, while expressions about the adherence to the state – to the political code (new nation, new political nation).

5.2. POLISH-UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL DISCOURSE AND THE PERCEPTION OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

Historical representations in the text are a key aspect in discourse studies. Due to the common history of Poland and Ukraine, historical vocabulary was frequently used in the analysed weeklies, including metaphorically. Some patterns have already been presented in the section analysing actors and agencies of identity, but it is important to clarify which historical references appeared most often in the Polish press, influencing the perception of Ukrainian identity.

To explain Polish-Ukrainian relations, it is necessary to go back to the times of the medieval state of Rus', or rather its weakening and collapse. It was Polish King Casimir III the Great, whose armies waged military campaigns against Galicia and Volhynia in 1340 and 1349,³⁶ who initiated the expansion into the territory of former Rus'.

³⁶ Paul Robert Magocsi, *Ukraine. An Illustrated History*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007, 56.

Polish historian Władysław Serczyk writes that after the annexation of the lands of Sanok and Przemyśl in 1344, Casimir the Great even called himself “Lord and Heir of Rus’.”³⁷ In 1349, he seized the city of Lviv, the entire Halych Rus’, Chelm, Belz, Brest and Volodymyr Volynski and continued to fight with the Duchy of Lithuania and Hungary for Galicia and Volhynia. As a result of the war between Poland, Lithuania and Hungary, the territories of Rus’ that were not under the control of the Golden Horde, including most of today’s Ukraine, were divided between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.³⁸ Thus, from the late 14th century, Ukraine developed its national identity within foreign state formations,³⁹ being a minority group within larger state structures.

Historians agree that after the dissolution of Rus’, a sense of separateness emerged among the ethnic groups formed on its ruins. In the territories west of the Moscow state border, which belonged to Lithuania and Poland, two groups felt distinct from the Poles and Lithuanians and also from each other. These were the future Belarusians and Ukrainians. British historian Andrew Wilson claims that Ukrainian identity originated in Kyiv Rus’ but that true national consciousness emerged only in the later 16th century.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Serczyk sees the beginnings of the national consciousness of future Ukrainians in the period

³⁷ Władysław Serczyk, *Historia Ukrainy*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1979, 53.

³⁸ Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2003, 105.

³⁹ Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*, 4th ed., New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2015.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 58.

just after a large part of Rus' was incorporated into the Polish and Lithuanian state structures. "At that time, the term 'Ukraine' gradually began to establish itself in the public consciousness as a separate territory, inhabited by a population that differed from its neighbours in language and customs."⁴¹

Therefore, the incorporation of the former Rus' lands into early modern European state structures had a decisive impact on the formation of Ukraine's identity. Historians acknowledge Poland's role in shaping Ukrainian European identity but also emphasise that it did not create it *ex nihilo*. Wilson, for example, states that despite being influenced by the Byzantine tradition, Rus' was always open to Central and even Western Europe.⁴²

In 1569, after the Union of Lublin, Volhynia and the lands of Braclav and Kyiv joined Galicia, Belz and Podolia as territories under Polish rule. The creation of a new state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, resulted in new challenges and changes in identity. Paul Robert Magocsi estimates that the

number of inhabitants in the Ukrainian territories annexed by Poland in 1569 was approximately 937,000. To this number can be added the approximately 573,000 inhabitants of the western, largely Ukrainian-inhabited palatinates of Rus' (Galicia), Belz, and Podolia, which were already part of Poland, with a Polish legal system and Polish as the official language.⁴³

The main manifestation of identity at that time was religion. Those lands of former Rus' that belonged to the new

⁴¹ Serczyk, *Historia...*, 55.

⁴² Wilson, *The Ukrainians...*, 40.

⁴³ Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, Toronto–Buffalo–London: University of Toronto Press, 1996, 136.

Commonwealth were usually Orthodox. The link between the Orthodox religion and the political and cultural elite was very strong. This fostered the development of culture and tradition separate from Polish and Lithuanian.⁴⁴ In 1596, the Union of Brest introduced a new religious paradigm – the Uniate Church, a framework in which the Orthodox Church recognised the supremacy of the Pope. From then on, the Kyivan Metropolitanate split in two – one part remained under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the other began to recognise the authority of the Pope of Rome.⁴⁵

In his book *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, Timothy Snyder states: “Just as the history of medieval Rus’ begins with the Orthodox baptism of Grand Prince Volodymyr in 988, so the history of early modern Ukraine begins with conversions of Ukrainian nobles to Western Christianity after 1596.”⁴⁶ Indeed, after the Unions of Lublin and Brest, the term “Ukraine” came into political usage as a name for the territories inhabited by Orthodox Christians in the Commonwealth.⁴⁷ All in all, after heated disputes among Orthodox senior church officials, many Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nobles and clergy embraced the Uniate Church to save their lands and political influence, as it was clearly supported by the Polish king, while the Orthodox religion was “virtually outlawed.”⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid., 151.

⁴⁵ Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 65.

⁴⁶ Snyder, *The Reconstruction...*, 106.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 110.

⁴⁸ Plokhy, *The Cossacks*, 86.

Nevertheless, disputes continued for quite a long time after the Union of Brest, and many Orthodox parishes managed to resist and maintain their status in the Ukrainian lands of the Commonwealth. An example is the Kyivan Cave Monastery, which remained under Orthodox control, and later, through the efforts of the Orthodox nobility, the Orthodox Church was formally recognised by the Polish authorities, although the Uniates enjoyed greater preference.⁴⁹

After the religious crisis, the Cossacks became the new force of the Orthodox religion. Serhii Plokhyy writes that its revival began after the Cossacks transformed from a military to political power in 1620–1621.⁵⁰ This entailed the consolidation of the Orthodox elite, which conditioned the emergence of a separate identity of the Ruthenians at the turn of the 16th and the 17th centuries.⁵¹ Moreover, from the 1630s, Ruthenians began to feel like a separate group with a specific identity.⁵²

It is difficult to overestimate the role of Ukrainian Cossacks in the history of Ukraine and other states, including Poland. They were the real starting point for the process of building Ukrainian identity, while their neighbours – neither the Poles nor later the Muscovites – never recognised them as a separate, independent institutional unit. In the case of the Polish state, where the king and nobility were unable to control the Cossacks, the revolts of the latter and their ideas of a separate Ukrainian

⁴⁹ Ibid., 87.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 88.

⁵¹ Wilson, *The Ukrainians...*, 53–54.

⁵² Ibid., 55.

statehood weakened the Polish state and were one of the many reasons for the Partitions of Poland.⁵³ Later, after the alliance with Russia, the Cossacks were seen as a dangerous force and were treacherously eliminated by the Muscovites and then the Russian imperial authorities.

The legend of the Cossacks has created a particular myth for the Ukrainians and their current national identity as people of free, independent will who do not submit to any external authority. The word “Cossack” is of Turkish origin and means “free warrior.” Initially, Ukrainian Cossacks were people who escaped from the daily life of serfdom and settled beyond the thresholds (*porohy* in Ukrainian) of the Dnipro River. That is why they were customarily called Zaporizhian Cossacks, which means “beyond the thresholds.” At first, they lived on fishing, hunting, beekeeping and cattle breeding. From time to time, they also went on military expeditions and raids against the rich nobility. Then, as early as the 16th century, the Cossacks began to enter into political alliances.

The main dwelling place of the Cossacks was the Khortytsia Island on the Dnipro River. The Cossack organisation was called Sich – the Ukrainian noun *sich* comes from the verb *sikty*, which means “to chop,” “to cut.” The Cossacks had their assemblies or meetings called *Rada* (the Council), during which they elected the heads of the structural units of the Sich and the head of the entire structure, called a hetman. The hetman held wide power but could easily be dismissed by the vote of the other

⁵³ Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Istorychni ese*, Vol. 1, Kyiv: Osnovy, 1996, 72.

Cossacks. Therefore, as Austrian historian Andreas Kappeler writes, “the political organisation of the Dnipro Cossacks was a peculiar combination of centralised military discipline and democratic order.”⁵⁴

In general, Ukrainian Cossacks are considered a turning point in the process of building Ukrainian identity. According to historian Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, the Cossacks replaced, in a sense, the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nobility, i.e. the upper class. As a result of Polonisation after converting to the Catholic religion, there was a lack of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) “spokesmen,” so the Cossacks took on the role of aristocracy, helped restore the Orthodox Church hierarchy, helped establish Orthodox schools and made political alliances with the remaining Orthodox nobility and clergy. The Cossacks’ attitude to protecting Orthodoxy was crucial to the “emergence of a protonational ethno-religious consciousness”⁵⁵ in the Ukrainian lands of that time. Therefore, Rudnytsky argues that the largest uprising of Ukrainian Cossacks against the Polish-Lithuanian state in 1648 was caused by both social and national factors.⁵⁶ “There is not the slightest doubt that the Ukrainians of the 17th century were fully aware of their difference from the Turks and Tatars, Poles and Muscovites.”⁵⁷

It is thus reasonable to end the overview of the Cossacks’ history on the uprising of 1648, as this is the most prevalent narrative about them in Polish discourse. In Poland, the image of the Cossacks was mainly based on the legends of Bohdan

⁵⁴ Andreas Kappeler, *Mala istoria Ukrainy*, Kyiv: “K.I.C.,” 2007, 49.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵⁶ Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Istorychni ese*, 55–56.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 56.

Khmelnysky's uprising and was reinforced by the great Polish novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz in *With Fire and Sword*, where the Cossacks were portrayed as almost bandits, lawless and disobedient rebels against the Polish authorities. However, as Serczyk admits, there was a lot of violence in the pages of this brilliant book but also some balanced rationalism.⁵⁸

Before Khmelnytsky's uprising, there were several smaller Cossack rebellions against the Polish authorities. The main reason for the Cossacks' dissatisfaction was the restriction of their privileges and rights, or "freedoms" as they were called then. The personal conflict between Khmelnytsky and Polish nobleman Daniel Czapliński was an additional cause of the uprising.⁵⁹

With the outbreak of the uprising, the Ukrainian Cossack state was created. Its official name was "Zaporizhian Army," but it was commonly known as "Hetmanate" after the title of its head, who was Khmelnytsky himself. In this way, Khmelnytsky introduced the idea of freedom into the Ukrainian construction of national identity and statehood.⁶⁰ The Hetmanate was, in a sense, separated from the main body of the Polish state and *de facto* independent,⁶¹ hence it was a source of displeasure for the Polish authorities. In 1651, as a result of the betrayal of the

⁵⁸ Władysław Serczyk, *Na płonącej Ukrainie. Dzieje kozaczyzny 1648–1651*, Warszawa: "Książka i Wiedza," 1999, 6.

⁵⁹ There is a legend that the conflict between Czapliński and Khmelnytsky began because of a woman named Helena, which brings to mind the very romantic, classical explanation of another war (the Trojan War). However, Serczyk is of the opinion that the main cause of the disagreement were unresolved land issues between the two men (*ibid.*, 42).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶¹ Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Istorychni ese*, 73.

Crimean Tatars allied with Khmelnytsky, the Cossack army was severely beaten by Polish forces. After that defeat, the hetman desperately began to look for a new ally. This led him to its eastern neighbour – the Muscovite state. The idea of an alliance with an Orthodox neighbour was not new.⁶² Already in 1648, Khmelnytsky asked the Muscovite tsar to become a patron of the Cossack army. In this way, the hetman wanted to gain an additional ally in case the wayward Tatars betrayed him,⁶³ but Tsar Oleksii Mykhailovych did not agree to this proposal until 1653.⁶⁴

The Ukrainian Cossack state collapsed in 1654 after the Pereyaslav Council when Khmelnytsky signed the fateful treaty with the Muscovite tsar. I will not devote much attention to the historical significance of this agreement here but only point out that Khmelnytsky wanted allies in his war with Poland and did not think that the Pereyaslav Agreement significantly restricted his political freedom.⁶⁵ However, the Cossack state still nominally had autonomy and *de jure* existed until 1775 when it was abolished by Catherine II.

The years after Khmelnytsky's death in 1657 are known in historiography as "the Ruin," a very unhappy period for Ukraine. In 1658, Khmelnytsky's successor, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, signed the Treaty of Hadiach that would have incorporated the Cossack state of Ukraine as a third independent entity of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This time, however,

⁶² Kappeler, *Mala istoria...*, 56.

⁶³ Leszek Podhorecki, *Dzieje Ukrainy*, Warszawa: Bellona, 2015, 113.

⁶⁴ Kappeler, *Mala istoria...*, 57.

⁶⁵ Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Istorychni ese*, 74.

the agreement never came into force. After numerous battles over Ukrainian lands, Poland and Moscovia concluded the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667. As Leszek Podhorecki writes, this treaty divided Ukraine into two parts and gradually reduced Polish influence in the east.⁶⁶ Thus, Ukraine increasingly entered into the Muscovite and later Russian imperial discourse. Hetman Ivan Mazepa made another important but unsuccessful attempt at Ukrainian independence in 1708–1709. After that, the autonomy of the Cossack state dwindled until it was officially abolished. As Lysiak-Rudnytsky notes, Russian influence far outweighed the pro-Polish alternative.⁶⁷

In turn, the common Polish-Ukrainian history continued in right-bank Ukraine. Occasionally, revolts by Ukrainian peasants dissatisfied with social and economic conditions troubled the Polish authorities. The largest revolts took place in 1734, 1750 and 1768. Their participants were called “haidamaks.” In the Polish discourse, the haidamaks were perceived primarily as cruel bandits who destroyed the lands and burned and plundered the estates of the nobility. In Ukrainian culture, on the other hand, they were depicted as people who continued the Cossacks’ struggle for Ukrainian independence. However, in his book *The Haidamaks*, Serczyk admits that

[t]he haidamak movement was not merely a devastating trend that destroyed feudal institutions; quite contrary to popular opinion, it contained constructive elements, for example, making references to Cossack patterns and attempting to create a plebeian state organisation or at least an administration. The aspiration to create an autonomous organisational

⁶⁶ Podhorecki, *Dzieje...*, 125.

⁶⁷ Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Istorychni ese*, 74.

unit, uniform in terms of nationality and religion, was an inherent element of the haidamaks.⁶⁸

References to haidamaks in the analysed weeklies appeared in Tadeusz Olszański's article in *Tygodnik Powszechny* in the context of Ukrainians' struggle for freedom during the Euromaidan,⁶⁹ as described in the previous chapter.

Polish influence persisted not only in the western Ukrainian lands but also in Kyiv until the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795 and later. This has been exhaustively discussed by Roman Szporluk in his argument proving "the Western dimension" of Ukrainian identity,⁷⁰ as already mentioned in Chapter 1.

The next stage of Polish-Ukrainian history occurred during the interwar period. After the First World War, as a result of Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Soviet military actions, the Ukrainian regions of Galicia and Volhynia were incorporated into the newly formed Polish state – the Second Polish Republic.

A new phase in the Polish-Ukrainian historical discourse was marked by the Peace of Riga concluded between Poland and Soviet Russia in 1921 and the establishment of borders at the conference in Paris in 1923. As a result, the lands of Ukraine were divided between the USSR to the east and Poland, Romania and Hungary to the west. The then territories of Eastern Galicia

⁶⁸ Władysław Serczyk, *Hajdamacy*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1972, 7.

⁶⁹ Tadeusz A. Olszański, "I powieje ogień nowy," *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 10, 09.03.2014, 11.

⁷⁰ Roman Szporluk, "The Western Dimension of the Making of Modern Ukraine," *Eurozine*, July 22, 2005, accessed April 26, 2022, <http://web.archive.org/web/20150918233021/http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2005-07-22-szporluk-en.html>; idem, "Ukraine. From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," *Daedalus* 126 (3) (1997).

(Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions) and western Volhynia came under Polish rule.

Notwithstanding the Promethean ideas of liberating the nations suppressed by the Soviet Union, the minority policy of interwar Poland in its eastern territories was far from liberal. For instance, Ukrainian schools were replaced by bilingual schools dominated by the Polish language, while the very word “Ukrainian” was banned, and “Ruthenian” was proposed instead. This caused resistance among the national minorities of the Second Polish Republic, hence in the late 1920s and early 1930s, violent protests against representatives and structures of the Polish state became more frequent. Often there occurred so-called acts of sabotage on the part of Ukrainian nationalists, which resulted in violent responsive actions and a policy of pacification on the part of the Polish authorities. The issue of the Ukrainian university in Lviv was also never resolved. Moreover, in 1934, a camp for political opposition was created in Bereza Kartuska.⁷¹ These factors led to the spread of ultranationalistic ideas in Ukrainian society, which in turn resulted in the most tragic events in Polish-Ukrainian history in the 20th century.

The perception of Ukrainians and Ukraine in Poland has been primarily affected by the actions of the nationalistic Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the tragedy of the Volhynia Massacre, during which Ukrainian nationalists killed approximately 100,000 Poles in Volhynia and Galicia. This act caused

⁷¹ Yurii Zaitsev, *Istoria Ukrainy*, Lviv: Svit, 1998, 273–274.

the Polish Home Army to retaliate against Ukrainian civilians. As a result, UPA is remembered in Poland and Ukraine very differently. Generally, in Polish historiography, the attitude towards the insurgents is unambiguously negative. They are perceived as almost the worst enemies, and their ideology and methods are called fascist.⁷² Meanwhile, in contemporary Ukrainian historiography, they are presented mainly as those who fought against both the Soviet and German occupation for an independent Ukraine. The historical memory of UPA in Ukraine is devoid of anti-Polish connotations, and very often, there is no mention of the atrocities in Volhynia. In the Polish discourse, the mass killing of Poles in 1943 by UPA soldiers is always called a “massacre,” while in the Ukrainian discourse, the phrases “the Volhynia tragedy” or “the Polish-Ukrainian war” are used. As Snyder writes, “the memory of the UPA became an essential element of the Ukrainian identity in post-war Poland.”⁷³ This is not the place for an in-depth analysis of Polish-Ukrainian relations after the Volhynia Massacre, but it is evident that the historical memory of UPA affects the perception of Ukrainian identity today in the Polish opinion-forming press. That is why numerous symbols of UPA, such as red-and-black banners, portraits of the UPA leader Stepan Bandera and the slogan “Glory to Ukraine!” were seen even by liberal weeklies as manifestations of the far right-wing nationalistic identity.

⁷² Tomasz Stryjek, *Ukraina przed końcem historii. Szkice o polityce państw wobec pamięci*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar; Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2014, 334–337.

⁷³ Snyder, *The Reconstruction...*, 203.

The issue of UPA is currently of great importance for the relations between both countries, especially after the Polish parliament passed a resolution recognising the Volhynia Massacre as genocide against the Polish nation.⁷⁴ Among the most radical spokesmen against UPA on the Polish side is Rev. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, while in Ukraine, Volodymyr Viatrovykh, the former head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, staunchly rejects the criticism of the Army's crimes against the Poles. Of course, there are also reasonable voices on both sides. In Polish historiography, the most reliable research on the Ukrainian insurgents, and thus on the crimes of UPA, has been conducted by Grzegorz Motyka. In his writings on the Ukrainian partisan movement⁷⁵ and the book about the Volhynia Massacre and forced resettlements after the war,⁷⁶ the historian shows that the Ukrainian nationalist movement in interwar Poland was the result of inadequate Polish policy towards minorities.

It is worth mentioning the most recent dramatic event that concerned both Ukraine and communist Poland. It was the forced resettlement, called Operation "Vistula," which was one of the general Soviet ethnic cleansings and also involved suppressing the Ukrainian partisan movement. Snyder metaphorically calls

⁷⁴ Full text of the resolution: *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 lipca 2016 r. w sprawie oddania holdu ofiarom ludobójstwa dokonanego przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na obywatelach II Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1943–1945*, accessed April 26, 2022, [http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie8.nsf/nazwa/625_u/\\$file/625_u.pdf](http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie8.nsf/nazwa/625_u/$file/625_u.pdf).

⁷⁵ Grzegorz Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii*, Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN; Oficyna Wydawnicza "Rytm," 2006.

⁷⁶ Grzegorz Motyka, *Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji "Wisła." Konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943–1947*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011.

this operation the “final solution” of communist Poland to their “Ukrainian problem.”⁷⁷ In order to assimilate Ukrainians into Polish culture, the communist-dominated Polish government, in cooperation with the Soviet government, conducted an operation in which 140,000 Ukrainians or people identified as Ukrainians (including the Lemko ethnic group) living in the Carpathian Mountains were forcibly deported to the western and northern regions of Poland, to the so-called Recovered Territories that had previously been German.⁷⁸ In this way, the fight against the remnants of UPA forces in Polish lands was facilitated.⁷⁹

All in all, in Poland, UPA and its leader Stepan Bandera have caused Ukrainians to be perceived as radical nationalists with anti-Polish attitudes. The root cause of the problem lies in the different historical memory about the Ukrainian partisan and nationalist movement. For Ukrainians, it was a protest against the occupation, and one of the many reasons for the failed attempt to create their own state lay in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of the time. Hence, Ukrainians perceive the 1921 Peace of Riga as an occupation of Ukraine by the USSR and Poland. In Poland, on the other hand, these events were always seen as a regaining of Polish lands that had once been taken by Russia and Austria.

During the interwar period, attitudes towards Ukrainians depended on the political and ideological preferences of Poles. The most liberal were the circles centred around Cracow-based periodical *Czas*, as well as *Bunt Młodych* and *Polityka*. They

⁷⁷ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin*, New York: Basic Books, 2010, 312.

⁷⁸ Magocsi, *A History...*, 649.

⁷⁹ Snyder, *Bloodlands...*, 312.

protested against antagonistic actions toward Ukrainians and strove for agreement and reconciliation with them.⁸⁰ Socialists were much more open and liberal in solving the problems of national minorities, including Ukrainians. They opposed bilingual schools and supported the idea of a Ukrainian university in Lviv.⁸¹ The opposite approach was represented by the National Democrats, whose leader Roman Dmowski did not consider Ukrainians to be a nation, calling them a “tribe.” Instead of “Ukraine” or “Ukrainians,” his followers used the word “Ruthenians” and called the Ukrainian language a “dialect.”⁸²

After the Second World War and the Yalta Conference, Poland lost its eastern possessions in Galicia and Volhynia and became one of the satellite states of the USSR, a part of the so-called Soviet bloc. Ukraine, including the lands in the west that had previously belonged to Poland, became part of the USSR in 1939 – the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland was the first country to recognise Ukraine’s independence. The Polish government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and both chambers of the Polish parliament welcomed with joy and goodwill the diplomatic cooperation with the newly independent Ukraine. All the resolutions following Ukrainian independence published in the Polish press were accompanied by positive comments.⁸³

⁸⁰ Barbara Stoczewska, *Ukraina i Ukraińcy w polskiej myśli politycznej. Od końca XIX wieku do wybuchu II wojny światowej*, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM; Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne, 2013, 201.

⁸¹ Ibid., 275.

⁸² Ibid., 246.

⁸³ Krzysztof Fedorowicz, *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2004, 68–69.

The analysis of journalistic texts showed that the image of Ukraine and Ukrainian identity in general was influenced by the common Polish-Ukrainian history and by the fact that part of modern Ukraine had once been incorporated into the structures of the Polish state. The data obtained from the analysed magazines show that historical references appeared more frequently during the Orange Revolution than during the Euromaidan. Most articles with references to Ukrainian history during the Orange Revolution were published in *Polityka*. Their authors were often historians, such as Władysław Serczyk, who wrote the first article about Ukraine in this weekly in 2004, entitled “How the Tsar Outsmarted the Cossacks.” It was devoted to the 350th anniversary of the signing of the Pereyaslav Agreement. The main protagonist was Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who was portrayed as the most important symbol of Ukrainian national self-consciousness. Moreover, Serczyk called the Cossack period the first step toward the development of Ukrainian identity. He wrote that the conflict between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth was caused by the Polish nobility’s lack of acceptance and understanding of the emerging Ukrainian national self-consciousness. In this context, religion was indicated as one of the crucial factors defining identity. The Orthodox Church was portrayed as having a relationship with Russia stemming from the “common descent from Kyiv Rus’,”⁸⁴ but Khmelnytsky’s union with Moscow was presented as a political necessity of the time rather than a result of sympathy for Russia.

⁸⁴ Władysław Serczyk, “Jak car kozaków przechytrzył,” *Polityka* No 5, 31.01.2004, 54.

Although Khmelnytsky was the one who organised an armed uprising against the Polish nobility in the 17th century, he was not presented in a negative way. In another article, devoted exclusively to Ukrainian Cossacks, Serczyk depicted them as the first elites aware of their national identity and, thus, a symbol of freedom. In the other reportages in *Polityka*, especially about the Orange Revolution, Khmelnytsky was presented as the one who created the initial programme of an independent Ukrainian state. By contrast, in *Gość Niedzielny*, he was seen as one who was “loyal to Russia.”⁸⁵

However, throughout the narrative during the Orange Revolution, the Cossack times were portrayed as one of the most flourishing periods in Ukrainian history, while the recent history of 20th-century Ukraine was characterised as “aggressive Ukrainian nationalism.”⁸⁶

The Cossacks represent a very interesting discourse of contradictory symbols against the background of cultural assimilation, which eliminated some cultural layers and imposed others. Andrzej Bobkiewicz in *Polityka* admitted that Ukraine could refer to the traditions of Rus’ and the Cossacks, but nowadays, the latter were defeated by Lenin, who was a symbol of the Ukrainian post-Soviet identity:

Ukraine may refer to the great traditions of Kyivan Rus’, Cossack uprisings or attempts to regain independence after the First World War. But the Cossacks Mamay and Khmelnytsky are symbols that are becoming more and more empty every year. Besides, there are still more monuments of Lenin than of Khmelnytsky. No one remembers the parade of Cossacks

⁸⁵ Andrzej Grajewski, “Gdzie dwóch się biło,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 1, 02.01.2005, 34–36.

⁸⁶ Adam Szostkiewicz, “Trójjąb z pomarańczą,” *Polityka* No 49, 04.12.2004, 76–78.

on Khreshchatyk, the main street of Kyiv, in the early 1990s. The feisty Cossack Mamaj on the monument on Independence Square in Kyiv is the only reminder of that euphoria.⁸⁷

With the spread of the Orange Revolution, journalists increasingly recalled historical events. In *Newsweek*, Jerzy Surdykowski wrote that Rus' was the first independent Ukrainian state. He added that the Orange Revolution was the new Pereyaslav and that Ukraine needed the support of Poland and Europe not to be pushed back into the arms of Russia.⁸⁸

Newsweek also published an article about 20th-century Ukrainian actors who had been murdered by the Soviet secret services. Among them was Bandera, who was portrayed as a fighter for Ukrainian independence and a symbol of anti-Soviet resistance, without a single mention of the Volhynia Massacre.

Such Polish-Ukrainian historical ties as Volhynia, Operation "Vistula" or the war in 1919 were mentioned very rarely during the Orange Revolution. Even then, they were not presented in a negative light but rather in the context of how to attain Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.

This latter issue arose in 2005, when the cemetery of the defenders of Polish Lviv during the war in 1918–1919, called "Eaglets," was restored and reopened. On the night of November 1, 1918, Dmytro Vitovskyj, the commander of

⁸⁷ "Ukraina może nawiązywać do wielkich tradycji Rusi Kijowskiej, powstań kozackich czy prób odzyskania niepodległości po pierwszej wojnie światowej. Ale Kozacy Mamaj i Chmielnicki to z roku na rok symbole coraz bardziej puste. Zresztą pomników Lenina jest nadal więcej niż Chmielnickiego. Nikt nie pamięta już o paradzie Kozaków na Chreszczatyku, głównej ulicy Kijowa na początku lat 90. Zadziorny Kozak Mamaj na pomniku na placu Niepodległości w Kijowie to jedyna pamiątka po tamtej euforii." Andrzej Bobkiewicz, "Tryzub bez zębów," *Polityka* No 50, 11.12.2004, 54–56.

⁸⁸ Jerzy Surdykowski, "Dzieją się dzieje," *Newsweek* No 50, 12.12.2004, 3–6.

a Ukrainian military organisation called the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, and about 1,500 soldiers manned the main strategic points in the city and ordered a blue-and-yellow flag – the banner of independent Ukraine – to be hung from the top of the tower of the Lviv Town Hall. It was an attempt to take over the city. However, after almost three weeks of fighting, Polish forces regained control of it. Among the Polish defenders of Lviv, 1,421 were under 17 years of age. Many lost their lives in the struggle for Lviv to become part of Poland. A famous cemetery was created for them and other people who contributed to this victory. Although the Eaglets Cemetery did not suffer much damage during the Second World War, it was devastated by the Soviet authorities taking over the administration in Lviv after the war. A garbage dump was organised there, and some monuments were destroyed by tanks in 1971. It was only after the dissolution of the USSR that an attempt was made to renovate the cemetery. On June 24, 2005, the Eaglets Cemetery was officially opened by the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, and the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko.⁸⁹

Many articles about this event were published, containing numerous historical references and calls for reconciliation. Most of them appeared in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, which stated that Ukraine was not nationalistic, except for some inhabitants of Western Ukraine. Moreover, the weekly admitted that the Polish policy of assimilation led to the creation of the Ukrainian

⁸⁹ Stanisław Sławomir Nicieja, "Cmentarz Orłąt Lwowskich," *Niepodległość i Pamięć* 13 (3) (24) (2006), 239–266.

Insurgent Army. Therefore, the journalists compared Ukrainian nationalists to Polish nationalists and called them “students of Polish nationalism.”⁹⁰ Małgorzata Nocuń and Andrzej Brzeziecki wrote:

Since the OUN – Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – was founded in 1929, it is largely the child of Polish nationalists. It was the policy of the Second Polish Republic that was the wind, and the year 1943 in Volhynia – the storm that the Poles had to reap.⁹¹

However, some journalists showed in their articles about the Eaglets Cemetery nostalgia for Lviv and presented it as Polish. “Without those volunteers, it would have been much harder to maintain Lviv. Marshal Piłsudski decorated Lviv with the Order of Virtuti Militari – for ‘merit in preserving the Polish character of this city and its belongingness to Poland,’”⁹² *Polityka* wrote. Poles and Ruthenians (the term used instead of Ukrainians) were represented as brotherly nations.

During the Euromaidan, due to the presence of right-wing elements on the Maidan, the most frequent historical references concerned the UPA period and the Banderites. Journalists also referred positively to the Cossack era, comparing the situation on the Maidan to the Zaporizhian Sich (see Chapter 4). At that

⁹⁰ Małgorzata Nocuń and Andrzej Brzeziecki, “Sąsiedztwo z widokiem na Cmentarz,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 13, 27.03.2005, 24.

⁹¹ “Jeśli więc w 1929 r. powstała OUN – Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów – to jest ona w dużej mierze dzieckiem polskich nacjonalistów. To polityka II RP była wiatrem, zaś rok 1943 r. na Wołyniu – burzą, którą przyszło Polakom zebrać.” Małgorzata Nocuń and Andrzej Brzeziecki, “Wyznaczona godzina,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 27, 03.07.2005, 5.

⁹² “Bez tych ochotników Lwów byłoby dużo trudniej utrzymać. Marszałek Piłsudski udekorował Lwów orderem Virtuti Militari – za ‘zasługi położone dla polskości tego grodu i jego przynależności do Polski.’” Adam Szostkiewicz, “Tylko mi Polski żal,” *Polityka* No 25, 25.06.2005, 80–82.

time, the majority of negative historical references appeared in the left-wing *Przegląd*, which devoted several separate articles to the Polish-Ukrainian conflict during the Second World War. Interestingly, in its texts on Polish-Ukrainian history, the weekly focused only on the negative aspects.

5.2.1. DISCOURSE OF *KRESY* (BORDERLANDS)

During the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, the word *Kresy* or “Borderlands” appeared quite often in the context of historical references. This is directly related to the perception of Ukrainian identity in Poland in general, but it requires a broader explanation. Etymologically, the Polish word *kres* means “line,” “boundary,” “end of something.”⁹³ Polish sociologist Antonina Kłoskowska writes that the *Great Universal Encyclopedia* of 1905 explained the word *Kresy* as “a military post on the border between Podolia and Ukraine.”⁹⁴

The word *Kresy* appeared in Polish literature for the first time in Wincenty Pol’s poem *Mohort*, which was written in Cracow between 1840 and 1852.⁹⁵ In this context, it meant the distant eastern borderlands of the First Polish Republic. Jacek Kolbuszewski, in his well-known book *Kresy*, notes that initially, these lands included settlements of Cossacks and Tatar hordes, encompassing the estuary of the Dnipro River and the

⁹³ *Słownik PWN*, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/szukaj/kres.html>.

⁹⁴ *Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna*, vol. 34–40, 1905, 860–861, cited in Antonina Kłoskowska, “Kresy – od pojęcia zamkniętego do otwartego sąsiedztwa,” in *Kresy – pojęcie i rzeczywistość*, edited by Kwiryna Handke, Warszawa: Slawistyczny Ośrodek Wydawniczy, 1997, 232.

⁹⁵ Jacek Kolbuszewski, *Kresy*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1995, 6.

lower Dniester River.⁹⁶ They were often called “Wild Fields” because they tended to have undefined and unstable borders, officially belonged to no one, were raided by Turks and Tatars, and thus were a bone of contention between Poles, Cossacks and Muscovites.⁹⁷ The Polish authorities sent noblemen to protect these territories, which is why *Kresy* also had romantic connotations connected with the memory of the famous knights who guarded the unstable borders.

After the fall of the First Republic and during the Second Republic, the word *Kresy* was used to describe the former possessions of the Polish state – Volhynia, Podolia, Hutsulia, Polesia and the Vilnius Region,⁹⁸ which now belong to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. After the Second World War, when today’s Western Ukraine became part of the USSR, these lands were also called *Kresy* in the Polish discourse. Kłoskowska mentions in this context the “borderlandness of the homeland” (“kresowość ojczyzny”) in 20th-century Polish literature. She also recalls many famous Polish figures who were born there, such as Józef Piłsudski, Tadeusz Kościuszko, Adam Mickiewicz, Stanisław Moniuszko and others. In the postwar period, when many Poles were repatriated from their native lands, the discourse of the “borderlandness of the homeland” of many nations and multiculturalism was particularly vivid in historical memory and in the works of such renowned Polish writers as Stanisław Lem and Czesław Miłosz.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Ibid., 23.

⁹⁷ Kłoskowska, “Kresy...,” 231.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 230.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 235–236.

The word *Kresy* also implies the presumed Polishness of these lands, given the romantic vision of a multicultural and multiethnic First Republic, usually under the Jagiellonian dynasty. The latter creates the discourse of the “Jagiellonian idea,” i.e. a multicultural and multiethnic civic state, the national identity of which was based not on primary values but on the sense of statehood.

A romantic and idealised vision of the *Kresy* is presented by Kolbuszewski. According to him, it is a myth that was created by Polish literature and fine arts to preserve the memory of the former powerful Polish state. Indeed, the myth of the idealised former Polish possessions derives from paintings and writings, such as that of “Ukraine flowing with milk and honey.”¹⁰⁰

However, the use of the word *Kresy* in contemporary discourse to designate the lands of today’s independent states – in this case, Ukraine – is somewhat controversial. From a Ukrainian point of view, the contemporary discourse of *Kresy* implies a kind of colonial perception of today’s independent Ukraine, which has been clearly manifested by Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak in the Polish mass media.¹⁰¹ Among the Poles, however, there are two widely differing opinions on this matter. One has to agree with Polish sociologist Tomasz Zarycki, who divided the opponents in this discourse according to their ideological and political preferences:

¹⁰⁰ Kolbuszewski, *Kresy*, 39.

¹⁰¹ Katarzyna Wężyk, “Kresy. Dla nas piekło, dla was raj. Rozmowa z Jarosławem Hrycakiem,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, July 25, 2015.

The key question here is whether the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth should be considered to be an Empire. In case we recognize the “imperial” status of the Commonwealth, its peripheries and, in particular, its regions where Polish culture and Catholicism were shared by a minority of inhabitants, could be seen as colonies. Consequently, the *Kresy* concept and related discourses could be seen as classic colonial discourses and should be criticized as elements of tools for illegitimate Polish domination over the region. The opposite view, widely shared among the Polish conservatives, is that the First Rzeczpospolita was a voluntary union between Poland and Lithuania, and, at the same time, a multicultural state, whose heritage could be seen as being common for all contemporary states existing on the region’s territory.¹⁰²

The main argument for the non-imperial character of the First Republic is that Poland never killed millions of people to conquer these lands, and the union was voluntary. It is defended in the works of many Polish historians. For instance, Jan Kieniewicz states that *Kresy* are the common heritage of all the lands that were part of the First Republic and that it was a special “civilisational project that shaped Europeanness.”¹⁰³ From this point of view, the *Kresy* discourse confirms that, for example, Belarusian and Ukrainian European aspirations have a solid foundation because those lands had once belonged to European structures.¹⁰⁴ Hieronim Grala, in turn, supports the view that the Commonwealth did not conquer the territories in question and argues that there is no colonial attitude in the *Kresy* discourse since the former Ruthenian

¹⁰² Tomasz Zarycki, *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*, London–New York: Routledge, 2014, 118–119.

¹⁰³ Jan Kieniewicz, “Kresy jako przestrzeń europejska,” in *Dziedzictwo Kresów – nasze wspólne dziedzictwo?*, edited by Jacek Purchla, Kraków: Międzynarodowe Centrum Kultury, 2006, 13.

¹⁰⁴ Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, “Rodzinna Europa,” *Wprost* No 43, 15.12.2006, 166, cited in Zarycki, *Ideologies...*, 121.

magnates and nobles held high positions in the state structures of the Commonwealth.¹⁰⁵

However, the view that the union was peaceful and voluntary is often criticised. Aleksander Fiut, for example, calls the actions of the First Republic “velvet colonisation,” but at the same time states that this term can only be applied to the Lithuanian lands, as there was “much violence and bloodshed” in the Ukrainian lands.¹⁰⁶ This opinion is also supported by French historian Daniel Beauvois, who believes that there is a “fraud of history” in the mythologised idyll of the *Kresy*. In addition, he compares Polish nostalgic admiration for the Borderlands with the attitude of the French towards Algiers. He admits, however, that the nature of property in Ukraine was feudal rather than colonial, but “there was no significant difference in the day-to-day attitude toward the local Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian people.”¹⁰⁷

It should be noted, however, that historians who discuss the nature of the Borderlands, their colonialism or postcolonialism, look only from the point of view of the era that the word signifies. They overlook the discourse of the *Kresy* in different periods *mutatis mutandis*, even though they cannot be considered in the same way. This is confirmed by Hanna

¹⁰⁵ Hieronim Grala, “Rzeczpospolita Szlachecka – twór kolonialny?” *Debaty Artes Liberales* 10 (2016), 282–283.

¹⁰⁶ Aleksander Fiut, “In the Shadow of Empire. Postcolonialism in Central and Eastern Europe – Why Not?” in *From Sovietology to Postcoloniality. Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective*, edited by Janusz Korek, Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2007, 37.

¹⁰⁷ Daniel Beauvois, “Trójkąt ukraiński 1793–1914. Szlachta, carat i lud na Podolu, Wołyniu i Kijowszczyźnie,” in *Dziedzictwo Kresów – nasze wspólne dziedzictwo?*, edited by Jacek Purchla, Kraków: Międzynarodowe Centrum Kultury, 2006, 47.

Gosk in her analysis of Polish interwar non-fiction. She agrees that Poles associate the word *Kresy* with exoticism, multiculturalism and a certain peripherality in relation to the Polish centre.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, by analysing some texts from various years of the interwar period, Gosk concludes that there is a colonial perception of the *Kresy* by Polish writers. In particular, she refers to mocking descriptions of the “indigenous people,” which, according to Homi Bhabha, is a colonial treatment resulting from the relationship of assimilation or the similarity of the suppressed culture to the ruling one.¹⁰⁹

One more thing that is widely criticised by the liberal circles is the description of the Borderlands as an ideal country, specifically the myth of “the land of milk and honey,”¹¹⁰ and the superiority of the ruling culture over the local one and its mission to save the Wild East.¹¹¹ The most critical of this discourse is Polish scholar Bogusław Bakula, who argues that the term *Kresy* is “politically incorrect and describes a type of relationship that could be perceived by the people inhabiting these territories as a symbol of Polish colonialism.”¹¹² He criticises those who hold a nostalgic and mythologised vision of the former Polish possessions as a sacred land without any conflicts. Bakula

¹⁰⁸ Hanna Gosk, “Polski dyskurs kresowy w niefikcyjnych zapisach międzywojennych. Próba lektury w perspektywie postcolonial studies,” *Teksty Drugie* 6 (2008), 23.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹¹⁰ Bogusław Bakula, “Colonial and Postcolonial Aspects of Polish Discourse on the Eastern ‘Borderlands,’” in *From Sovietology to Postcoloniality. Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective*, edited by Janusz Korek, Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2007, 41–60.

¹¹¹ Janusz Korek, “Central and Eastern Europe from a Postcolonial Perspective,” in *From Sovietology to Postcoloniality. Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective*, edited by Janusz Korek, Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2007, 5–22.

¹¹² Bakula, “Colonial and Postcolonial Aspects...,” 44.

underlines the peripheral perception of the *Kresy* and the cultivation of this notion to confirm Polish superiority among the Poles themselves. He also refers to theorists of postcolonial studies such as Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak and Edward Said in order to demonstrate that the contemporary *Kresy* discourse is a colonial discourse in relation to Poland's now independent neighbours.

It is not surprising that the Others, our neighbours, do not want to participate in the multicultural "Borderlands adventure," because it is not their "adventure," and that they so eagerly participate in projects concerning Galicia and Central Europe. ... This is accompanied by nostalgia, paternalism, and idealization. If, however, this seems to us to be just an innocent game with memory, then we are mistaken.¹¹³

All in all, as Zarycki concludes, discussions about the *Kresy* will continue forever because this concept, regardless of the attitudes towards it, has been firmly implanted in Polish identity. It echoed in the interwar ideas of the Promethean movement, the concept of Intermarium, Giedroyc's doctrine (ULB) and even in the programme of the Eastern Partnership and unity against the common enemy – Russia. Zarycki admits, however, that the discourse of the Borderlands is outdated today and that it should be used only in its historical context.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, Jacek Purchla, in his introduction to the book *The Heritage of the Borderlands – Our Common Heritage?*, states that the myth of the *Kresy* should be seen as a nostalgia not for "lost territories" but for a "lost world of values."¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Ibid., 52–53.

¹¹⁴ Zarycki, *Ideologies...*, 150.

¹¹⁵ Jacek Purchla, [Introduction], in *Dziedzictwo Kresów – nasze wspólne dziedzictwo?*, edited by Jacek Purchla, Kraków: Międzynarodowe Centrum Kultury, 2006, 8.

In any case, in Polish public media discourse, the word *Kresy* could be interpreted in terms of “orientalisation”; not in Said’s original sense, however, but as adapted by Michał Buchowski: “... the new European orientalism is a refraction, a derivative or correlate of a phenomenon covered by such concepts as globalization, the expansion of multinational capital, flexible capitalism, transgressions, migrations, transnationalism or the media-covered global village.”¹¹⁶ This form of orientalism is present in everyday life in the perception of the Other in the creation of identity, and not only in the dichotomy of East and West but also in “capitalism and socialism, civility and primitivism, and class distinction into elites and plebs.”¹¹⁷

The discourse of *Kresy* appeared more frequently during the Orange Revolution, mainly in the conservative press, such as *Gość Niedzielny*. The first article about Ukraine in 2004 was entitled “The Myth of the Borderlands”¹¹⁸ and presented Western Ukraine as former Polish territories, with a kind of nostalgia for those lands. Ukraine was described in terms of a postcolonial perception of periphery and centre with a romantic idealisation of the *Kresy*, which were of great importance to the Poles. Particular attention was given to the city of Lviv. The protagonists of the article were people of Polish descent who spoke excellent Polish and taught it to their children. One of the symbols of the Borderlands was Polish architecture in Lviv, alongside the Austro-Hungarian buildings and Jewish symbols. The

¹¹⁶ Michał Buchowski, “The Specter of Orientalism in Europe. From Exotic Other to Stigmatized Brother,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 79 (3) (2006), 465–466.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 466.

¹¹⁸ Włodzimierz Paźniewski, “Mit kresowy,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 4, 25.01.2004, 41.

Kresy were thus presented as a multicultural borderland. Other significant symbols, such as the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv with the Eaglets Cemetery, were mentioned by Ewa and Andrzej Babuchowski as a “true extract of Polishness.”¹¹⁹ The journalists only paid attention to the Polish symbols of Ukraine and signs about Poland that could be inscribed into postcolonial theory. For instance, one of the protagonists, a woman from Lviv, was portrayed as a “true Pole” (“polonuska całą gębą”¹²⁰).

Very often, the authors described the Ukrainian territories from the perspective of their literary discourse and the already-mentioned “borderlandness of the homeland.” One of the articles recalled Polish writers Zbigniew Herbert, Juliusz Słowacki and Henryk Sienkiewicz and Polish patriotic songs. In general, the entire mediated discourse of *Kresy* referred to the myth of Ukraine “flowing with milk and honey,” with the journalists accepting that “the Borderlands are both an invention and the truth.”¹²¹

However, thanks to the *Kresy* discourse, Polish journalists placed Ukraine, at least the part that had once belonged to Poland, in a Central European context. Indeed, the city of Lviv was compared to Central European Prague, Vienna and Cracow. Drogobych was also portrayed as a Central European city in *Przegląd*, with Bruno Schulz being its main representative and symbol.

¹¹⁹ Ewa Babuchowska and Andrzej Babuchowski, “Z gałązką oliwną przez Ukrainę,” *Gość Niedzielny* No 38, 19.09.2004, 14–16.

¹²⁰ “Polonus, -ka” is the Polish word for an emigrant from Poland who respects and cherishes Polish traditions. *Słownik PWN*, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/szukaj/polonus.html>. The expression “całą gębą” means “true,” “real,” “genuine,” “indisputable.” *Wielki Słownik Języka Polskiego*, accessed April 26, 2022, <https://wsjp.pl/haslo/podglad/23436/pelna-geba>.

¹²¹ Babuchowska and Babuchowski, “Z gałązką...,” 14.

Interestingly, Polish journalists perceived Lviv as if it had always been Polish and Ukrainians appeared there by accident. In the article “The Old Lviv Is Sinking,”¹²² Michał Kaciewicz wrote about one of Lviv’s landmarks, the High Castle, emphasising that it had been built by Polish King Casimir the Great and not mentioning anything about the pre-Polish period of the city’s history. In general, Lviv was presented as full of Polishness and Polish monuments.

Alongside *Kresy*, the phrase “Wild Fields” entered Polish discourse as a metonymy which usually meant some kind of difficult, complicated situation, incomprehensible to other people, not always referring to the historical context. For example, Jagienka Wilczak’s article “Wokulski in the Wild Fields” used two metonymies. Wokulski is a character from the novel *The Doll* written by the famous Polish writer Bolesław Prus and metonymy for a Polish entrepreneur, while the Wild Fields represent Ukraine, suggesting the difficult and unclear rules of doing business in that country.¹²³

The word *Kresy* appeared in *Polityka* and *Newsweek* in the politically correct form of “former *Kresy*.” Also in *Polityka*, the author of the article about the Ukrainian writer Yurii Andrukhovych used this term in another sense: “the Ukrainian *Kresy*, which are the borderlands of Europe.”¹²⁴ In this context, *Kresy* meant a borderland – especially a European borderland, which, from the author’s point of view, Ukraine was.

¹²² Michał Kaciewicz, “Stary Lwów tonie,” *Newsweek* No 36, 05.09.2004, 44–47.

¹²³ Jagienka Wilczak, “Wokulski na Dzikich Polach,” *Polityka* No 23, 11.06.2005, 52–55.

¹²⁴ Aleksander Kaczorowski, “Balkon na podwórze,” *Polityka* No 19, 14.05.2005, 72–74.

This interpretation allows us to see Ukrainian identity in a new frame – that of Central and Eastern Europe.

5.2.2. DISCOURSE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The discourse of Central and Eastern Europe is very closely related to history and identity issues in all postcommunist states, including Ukraine and Poland. The whole concept and its significance for Ukrainian identity have already been described in Chapter 1.

The division of Europe into Central, Eastern and Western has always been linked to the political, cultural and economic development of the region.¹²⁵ In academia, the term “Central Europe” was introduced by 19th-century German economist Friedrich List, a representative of the so-called historical school in economics.¹²⁶

During the First World War, in 1915, Friedrich Naumann published a book entitled *Mitteleuropa*, which, according to Polish historian Antoni Podraza, was considered a kind of “Bible of the Central European concept.”¹²⁷ After the Second World War, the term “Central Europe,” in the words of British historian Timothy Garton Ash, “died with Hitler.”¹²⁸

In the 1980s, intellectual and political elites began to view Central and Eastern Europe as a distinct category. In April

¹²⁵ Antoni Podraza, *Europa, Galicja, regiony. Pisma historyczne*, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, 23.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 27.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Timothy Garton Ash, *The Uses of Adversity. Essays on the Fate of Central Europe*, New York: Random House, 1989, 161.

1984, *The New York Review of Books* published an English translation of Milan Kundera's essay "A Kidnapped West or the Tragedy of Central Europe," in which the author addressed the question of the European identity of the countries that made up the former Soviet bloc. In Kundera's opinion, the Europeanness of these states was defined by the cultural factor and tradition. On the other hand, it was a political decision that imposed on them a non-inherent Soviet identity.

The question of the "return" to Europe was further developed by other representatives of the cultural elite, such as Adam Michnik, Czesław Miłosz, Danilo Kiš, György Konrád, Antonín Liehm, Tomas Venclova and Csaba György Kiss. In creating a mental map of Central and Eastern Europe, they very often stressed the influence of national literature on the East-Central European identity and the role of intellectuals. They created a Central Europe that could separate their countries from the Soviet space, emphasising the historical and cultural tradition associated with the "real Europe" and different from the Soviet totalitarian tradition.

When several former Soviet bloc countries joined the European Union in 2004, the discussions about Central Europe became less frequent there because it had lost its symbolic meaning as a transfer zone able to connect Eastern European countries with the "real" Western Europe. These states now had a legal European institutional identity, justified by the *Acquis communautaire*. In Ukraine, however, the debate remained very intensive. Ukrainian intellectuals tried to inscribe their state in a common European heritage and link Ukraine also

with Central Europe. According to Zarycki, being “the East” was infused in intellectual discussion with a certain ideology: Eastern Europe was imagined, dependent on the Western core, not real, lacking the maturity of a region and having a status of a borderland and semi-periphery. However, Zarycki points out that its attribute was the special role played by the intelligentsia in the realm of power.¹²⁹

The discourse of Central and Eastern Europe was still present in the Polish perception of Ukrainian identity at the time of the protests, as shown by the articles in the analysed weeklies. The issue of whether Ukraine belonged to East-Central Europe was more frequently addressed during the Orange Revolution than during the Euromaidan, when it was replaced by the concept of a common European identity with reference to European values.

The most common factors that linked Ukraine to Central Europe during the Orange Revolution were social protests and a developing civic society:

Now everyone in Ukraine – from the west, the centre, the east – can see that it is possible to argue with the authorities, and the dispute does not have to be violent. This is how an ethos is created. It is similar to the ethos of other bloodless revolutions in Central Europe.¹³⁰

In all of the analysed magazines, the Orange Revolution was compared to the civic movements in former communist

¹²⁹ Zarycki, *Ideologies...*

¹³⁰ “Teraz już wszyscy na Ukrainie – z zachodu, centrum, wschodu – widzą, że z władzą można się spierać, a spór nie musi mieć gwałtownego charakteru. Tak powstaje etos. Podobny do etosu innych bezkrwawych rewolucji w Europie Środkowej.” Marek Tobolewski, “Przekroczony próg strachu,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* No 49, 05.12.2004, 10.

states in the 1980s. Particular attention was paid to finding parallels between the Orange Revolution and the “Solidarity” movement in Poland. This comparison placed Ukraine in the discourse of Central and Eastern Europe¹³¹ and plucked it out of the Russian sphere of influence, which revealed a national identity and rejected the post-Soviet one.

In this way, the idea of Central Europe reduced the distance from the identity marker “West.”¹³² The words used were related to the attributes of Western democracies: civic movements, civic activism, pro-Western orientation:

Society did not particularly change either. People were afraid to speak and get involved in politics. For 14 years, the media, obedient to the authorities, told them that there was no alternative to hypocritical authoritarianism and remaining in the post-Soviet structures of the alliance with Russia and Belarus. Today, the old fear and complexes have collapsed. Ukrainians do not want to be deceived any longer. They have bet everything on one card. They were not afraid of the cold and rumours of a special forces attack. And after a week, they won their first victory.¹³³

This passage stresses the role of civic activism and the fact that the author portrays Ukrainians as active people who are actors of identity. This means that the agency has changed.

¹³¹ In fact, this is also confirmed by historians. Yaroslav Hrytsak writes that the Orange Revolution had a Central European context for political and social reasons: the peaceful nature of the protests; the lack of new ideologies; the “round table” as the main symbol of the revolution and the elections as the main instrument of victory. Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011, 155.

¹³² Editorial, “Wiktoria Wiktora,” *Wprost* No 1, 09.01.2005, 20; Marek Król and Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, “Przebudzenie Ukrainy,” *Wprost* No 1, 09.01.2005, 22–23.

¹³³ “Społeczeństwo też się specjalnie nie zmieniło. Ludzie bali się mówić i angażować w politykę. Posłuszne władzom media przez 14 lat wmawiały, że nie ma alternatywy dla zakłamanego autorytaryzmu i pozostawania w postsowieckich strukturach sojuszu z Rosją i Białorusią. Dzisiaj dawny strach i kompleksy runęły. Ukraińcy nie chcą być dłużej oszukiwani. Postawili wszystko na jedną kartę. Nie przestraszyli się ani mrozu, ani plotek o ataku specnazu. I po tygodniu odnieśli pierwsze zwycięstwo.” Michał Kaciewicz, “Barwna rewolucja na wschodzie,” *Newsweek* No 49, 05.12.2004, 33–36.

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It is about constructing a common or similar past with the Central and Eastern European states, which, according to Anthony Smith, is one of the elements of the process of identity construction.¹³⁴ In the case of Ukraine, it is what connects it to the democratic states of the former Soviet bloc and to Europe in general. From the perspective of the identity discourse of Central Europe, this example shows that civic identity encompasses people's ability to organise themselves, participate in social movements and resist the authorities.

5.2.3. DISCOURSE OF UKRAINE AS POLAND'S *RAISON D'ÉTAT*

During the Euromaidan, the context of Central Europe revealed a new pattern of the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press – Ukraine as the Polish *raison d'état*. Indeed, the idea of Central Europe was evoked then with a slightly different meaning. It was not a cultural concept but rather a political one, linked to specific Polish geopolitical views in the past. When talking about Ukraine, Polish public speakers in the media increasingly referred to Józef Piłsudski's idea of federation and Intermarium.

After the First World War and in the interwar period, it was the Polish socialists who were most inclined towards Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. In the book *Advocates of Polish-Ukrainian Reconciliation*, its editor Maciej Marszał states that it was Piłsudski who first put forward this concept.

¹³⁴ Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991.

It originated from his federalist idea, which developed into the Promethean movement and the concept of Intermarium.¹³⁵ These ideas appear quite often in the contemporary discourse on Ukraine in the Central European context. Therefore, they require a more detailed explanation.

The concept of a federation in Polish political thought originated just after the Partitions. Before the First World War, it was the Polish Socialist Party, its leader Piłsudski and his associate Leon Wasilewski who announced the forming of a “voluntary federation” based on absolute equality of the member nations. The first goal was to rebuild the regional power of Poland, anticipating the weakening of Russia, but the concept also supported the national aspirations of the other former members of the Polish Republic, i.e. Lithuanians, Latvians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. In the federalists’ vision, the unification of these nations under the leadership of Poland should have led to the collapse of the Russian empire.¹³⁶ The main ideologist of this concept was Wasilewski. He argued for a “cultural wall” between Russia and Germany, which would stop the Russian and German expansion. To this end, he called for creating conditions for the emergence of independent states from the White Sea to the Black Sea: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland and Romania. Piłsudski

¹³⁵ Maciej Marszał, “Rzecznicy polsko-ukraińskiego porozumienia 1918–1939,” in *Na szlakach zgody. Rzecznicy polsko-ukraińskiego porozumienia 1918–1939*, edited by Maciej Marszał, Polkowice: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskiej Wyższej Szkoły Przedsiębiorczości i Techniki, 2013, 9.

¹³⁶ Lech Wyszczelski, *Polska mocarstwowa. Wizje i koncepcje obozów politycznych II Rzeczypospolitej. Międzymorze, federalizm, prometeizm, kolonie i inne drogi do wielkości*, Warszawa: Bellona, 2015, 34–35.

also supported the idea of eliminating Russia's influence on European politics by separating it from Europe, which could be achieved by a federation of *de jure* independent states under Polish supervision.¹³⁷ In his opinion, it also could reduce the possible Russian threat to Polish independence. Piłsudski was certain that despite the collapse of the empire and the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia would continue its expansionist policy and retain its imperialistic character.¹³⁸

On the Ukrainian side, the leader of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Symon Petliura, saw Piłsudski as an ally against "red" and "white" Russia, but he was not too keen on incorporating Ukraine into a federation under Polish supervision, preferring to see his country fully independent.¹³⁹ In addition, Polish-Ukrainian relations cooled after Ukraine's defeat in the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919, which resulted in the annexation of Galicia by Poland.¹⁴⁰ The idea of a federation was also interpreted differently by Lithuanians. For instance, Marek Maciejewski writes that Lithuanian politicians saw it rather as an "empire of Polish dominions" encompassing former Jagiellonian lands.¹⁴¹ However, researchers studying Polish foreign policy

¹³⁷ Ibid., 42–44.

¹³⁸ Janusz Cisek, "Myśl federacyjna Józefa Piłsudskiego," in *Międzymorze. Polska i kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej XIX–XX wiek. Studia ofiarowane Piotrowi Lossowskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, edited by Andrzej Ajnenkiel, Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 1995, 93–94.

¹³⁹ Wyszczelski, *Polska...*, 55–56.

¹⁴⁰ Ryszard Torzecki, "Piłsudski i Petlura w latach 1919–1923," in *Międzymorze. Polska i kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej XIX–XX wiek. Studia ofiarowane Piotrowi Lossowskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, edited by Andrzej Ajnenkiel, Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 1995, 196.

¹⁴¹ Marek Maciejewski, "Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w poglądach Józefa Piłsudskiego po I wojnie światowej," *Wrocławsko-Lwowskie Zeszyty Prawnicze* 2 (2011), 202.

after the First World War admit that Piłsudski was flexible in dealing with Poland's eastern neighbours; in particular, he "was quite prepared to hand over Wilno to the Lithuanians and to make concessions in Eastern Galicia to the Ukrainians in exchange for close ties between them and Poland."¹⁴²

The second geopolitical idea of interwar Poland, which included Ukraine in the discourse of Central and Eastern Europe and still appears in the Polish press, was the idea of Intermarium. It, too, was promoted by some political thinkers from Piłsudski's circle. Maciejewski explains that it envisioned, in a narrow sense, an alliance of states located between the Baltic and the Black Sea (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Romania) on the terms of a federation or confederation, and in a broad sense – Armenia, Georgia and also states on the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁴³ Therefore, in a broad sense, Intermarium also included the Adriatic region and encompassed such states as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Ukraine, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.¹⁴⁴

The main goal of Intermarium was the same as in the case of the earlier federalist idea – to weaken Russia while creating stable political structures between it and Germany. The concept was popular not only among Polish socialists but

¹⁴² Piotr Wandycz, "Poland's Place in Europe in the Concepts of Piłsudski and Dmowski," *East European Politics & Societies* 4 (1990), 459.

¹⁴³ Maciejewski, "Europa..." 208.

¹⁴⁴ Jonathan Levy, *The Intermarium. Wilson, Madison, & East Central European Federalism*, Boca Raton: Universal-Publishers, 2007, 175.

also among national democrats, liberals, conservatives and some people's activists.¹⁴⁵ However, the geopolitical situation during the interwar period did not favour these ideas, and the concepts of Intermarium and federation were never realised. Nevertheless, they have many interpretations today. Firstly, as already mentioned, these ideas were perceived in some of the analysed journalistic texts as a precondition for a new united Europe. Secondly, they are one of the elements of the imagery of East-Central Europe as a counterweight to both Russia and Germany.¹⁴⁶ During the Euromaidan, these references were invoked in order to show that without Ukraine, there could be no real force against Russia.

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Also frequently mentioned in the context of Central Europe were the geopolitical vision of Polish émigré intellectual Jerzy Giedroyc and the activity of his periodical *Kultura*. Before and during the Second World War, Giedroyc worked in various state and military structures in Poland and abroad. From his youth, he had also worked as a journalist and editor-in-chief of the periodical *Bunt Młodych*.¹⁴⁷ In 1946, he founded in Rome a publishing house named Instytut Literacki and published the first issue of *Kultura* in 1947. Giedroyc then moved to a small town near Paris called Maisons-Laffitte and continued to edit and publish *Kultura* there.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Maciejewski, "Europa...", 209.

¹⁴⁶ Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, *Intermarium. The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas*, New Brunswick-London: Transaction Publishers, 2013, 3.

¹⁴⁷ Przemysław Waingertner, "Jerzego Giedroycia idea ULB – geneza, założenia, próby realizacji. Zarys problematyki," *Studia z Historii Społeczno-Gospodarczej* 15 (2015), 144.

¹⁴⁸ Maciej Marszał and Jacek Srokosz, "Ukraina w myśli politycznej Jerzego Giedroycia," *Wrocławsko-Lwowski Zeszyt Prawniczy* 3 (2012), 57.

The milieu of *Kultura* became a real think-tank that developed various recommendations for Polish policy, including the one concerning its eastern neighbours. It proposed to support the independence of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania in order to have strong neighbours in the east that could serve as a buffer zone between Poland and Russia. Moreover, the new concept rejected the Polish desire to regain the pre-1939 borders, which meant that the lands that had become part of post-war Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania had to remain in the possession of these countries. Poles were meant to agree to this for the sake of their future eventual independence from the Soviets. This concept was very similar to Piłsudski's idea of a federation, except that the milieu of *Kultura* rejected the Jagiellonian idea of a multinational Poland even in the form of a federation, considering it a manifestation of Polish imperialism.¹⁴⁹ The connection between those two ideas stemmed from Giedroyc's attachment to Piłsudski's political views and his rejection of Dmowski's integral nationalism. Moreover, like Piłsudski, he was of Lithuanian descent, born in Minsk, and was also "a pragmatist whose highest value was Polish statehood, and who did not conflate the nationalism of Polish society with the interests of the Polish state."¹⁵⁰

Giedroyc rarely wrote articles himself but would discuss his ideas in correspondence with others.¹⁵¹ In fact, his closest associate Juliusz Mieroszewski was the author of the famous

¹⁴⁹ Maciej Marszał, "Ukraina w myśli politycznej Juliusza Mieroszewskiego," *Wrocławsko-Lwowskie Zeszyty Prawnicze* 3 (2011), 249.

¹⁵⁰ Snyder, *The Reconstruction...*, 219.

¹⁵¹ Marszał and Srokosz, "Ukraina...", 58.

ULB concept of the “Giedroyc doctrine.” In his writings, he criticised the policies of the First and Second Polish Republics towards national minorities, claiming that they had led to the Polonisation of the then Ruthenian nobility and cultural elites, and also rejected the ideas of any federation with Poland.¹⁵² Mioszowski said that Ukrainians and the other “small nations” that made up the USSR did not want to unite in any federation but preferred to “sway to the old song, full, sovereign, independence.”¹⁵³ Hence, they were to be treated as separate nations and equal partners. In addition, Mioszowski supported the idea of Poland refusing to accept Lviv back. He always said that people were more important than cities and territories, although he was aware of the importance of Lviv for many Poles.¹⁵⁴

It should be noted that the idea of refusing to accept Lviv back was first voiced by Józef Z. Majewski in the pages of *Kultura* in 1952.¹⁵⁵ This caused a huge outcry among the Polish intelligentsia abroad, and *Kultura* was accused of betraying the Polish state. Nevertheless, Giedroyc accepted the risk he was taking, did not turn from his path in political thought and developed a new idea of reconciliation with Poland’s eastern neighbours, including Ukraine, and of establishing partnership relations with them.¹⁵⁶ He realised that reconciliation between Ukraine and Poland was difficult because of their common

¹⁵² Marszał, “Ukraina...,” 249.

¹⁵³ Juliusz Mioszowski, *Final klasycznej Europy*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1997, 161.

¹⁵⁴ Marszał, “Ukraina...,” 250.

¹⁵⁵ Iwona Hofman, *Szkice o paryskiej “Kulturze,”* Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004, 157.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 145.

complicated history and the recent memory of the Volhynia Massacre. He appealed for quieting the negative emotions and working for the benefit of future Polish-Ukrainian relations.¹⁵⁷

Apart from Polish eastern policy, the *Kultura* milieu created a particular new concept of Eastern and Central Europe, which was based on the principle of partner cooperation between states liberated from the oppression of Soviet Russia and envisaged cooperation with Germany. It also appealed to those Russians who wanted their country to be democratic. Eastern and Central Europe was thus imagined as a partner of democratic Russia and a neighbour of democratic Germany, which could guarantee security and independence to small and medium-sized nations “striving for democracy and independence.”¹⁵⁸

For Polish observers, Ukrainian identity in the context of Central and Eastern Europe has thus historical references to the above-mentioned concepts of Polish security. In addition, as the analysis of the Polish press has shown, more important than the cultural and historical links with Europe is the new political, social and economic development of Ukraine. Instead of culture, the decisive factor here is the fulfilment of European standards of democracy and human rights and freedoms, civic society, market economy, free media and transparent state policy.

Hence, in the context of Central and Eastern Europe and historical references, Ukraine was described mainly as a Polish *raison d'état*, which corresponded to Giedroyc's view of the

¹⁵⁷ Marszał and Srokosz, “Ukraina...,” 65.

¹⁵⁸ Janusz Korek, “Projekt Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w ‘Kulturze’ (lata siedemdziesiąte),” *Slavica Lundensia* 13 (1991), 27.

role of Poland in East-Central Europe. Giedroyc emphasised that Poland should have good relations with Russia and Germany but at the same time support the aspirations for independence of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. He was certain that the stronger Poland's position in the East, the more respect it would enjoy in the West.¹⁵⁹ Giedroyc also stressed that Poland's future depended on good relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.¹⁶⁰ This discourse was more often present during the Euromaidan than during the Orange Revolution.

The idea of Ukraine as a Polish *raison d'état* was to be found primarily in the conservative weeklies, although it must be noted that they reflected the opinions of their authors and not necessarily the actual political situation at the time, which is not the focus of this book. Creating a common past that produces common goals and actions in the present is a constructive strategy.¹⁶¹ For this reason, Piłsudski's words "There is no free Poland without free Ukraine" were often quoted and paraphrased, e.g. by musician (and later head of the political party Kukiz'15) Paweł Kukiz in right-wing *Do Rzeczy*: "There is no free Poland without free Ukraine, and there is no free Ukraine without free Poland."¹⁶² At the end of his column, Kukiz called for a prayer for Ukraine because it was also a prayer for Poland.

Another essayist of *Do Rzeczy*, Bronisław Wildstein, was of a similar opinion:

¹⁵⁹ Hofman, *Szkice...*, 147.

¹⁶⁰ Iwona Hofman and Leopold Unger, *Teczki Giedroycia*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej; Instytut Literacki Paryż, 2010, 77.

¹⁶¹ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction...*, 33.

¹⁶² Paweł Kukiz, "Widziałem Ukrainę zdradzoną," *Do Rzeczy* No 5, 27.01.2014, 12.

Ukraine's independence is Poland's *raison d'état*. Without Ukraine, the Russian empire will no longer be what it once was and will no longer threaten our sovereignty. Poland and Ukraine share a very dramatic history, but it is important to remember how much we have in common and to realise that together we can not only resist danger but also reshape our region and make it a significant part of Europe.¹⁶³

This passage speaks about the creation of a common goal of Ukrainian and Polish cooperation in Eastern and Central Europe as well as the universalistic idea of the “common past” discourse for the resistance against a common enemy, embodied by Russia. The symbolic Other and non-European here is Russia, while Ukraine is inscribed within the frame of Central and Eastern European identity. However, the wording of an independent Ukraine as the Polish *raison d'état* reveals an implicit perception of Ukraine as not yet independent. Thus, nominal independence and the fact of being a subject of international politics do not make Ukraine fully independent in the indirect sense. Polish public discourse reveals the importance of “symbolic power” in politics that contributes in a real way to the perception of a given state, i.e. despite the fact of nominal independence, Ukraine's actual independence has not yet been established.

It should be pointed out that the recognition of the discourse of the situation in Ukraine as “Polish *raison d'état*” was introduced into the discussion in the Polish press to counter those

¹⁶³ “Niepodległość Ukrainy jest polską racją stanu. Bez Ukrainy imperium rosyjskie nie będzie już tym, czym dawniej, i przestanie zagrażać naszej suwerenności. Polskę i Ukrainę dzieli bardzo dramatyczna historia, ale należy pamiętać, jak wiele nas łączy, i zdać sobie sprawę, że wspólnie możemy nie tylko oprzeć się niebezpieczeństwu, ale także nadać nowy kształt naszemu regionowi, uczynić go znaczącą częścią Europy.” Bronisław Wildstein, “Bunt Ukrainy,” *Do Rzeczy* No 5, 27.01.2014, 70–72.

who, during the Euromaidan, portrayed Ukraine as nationalistic and a threat to Poland. This discourse drew attention to the “struggle against a common enemy,” which would not be possible without “a strong and independent Ukraine.” As described in the previous sections, the most intensive discussion took place in the pages of *Do Rzeczy*, and the most ardent supporters of the idea of Ukraine as a Polish *raison d'état* were Bronisław Wildstein and Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski.

Wildstein even entitled one of his articles “Ukraine and the Polish *raison d'état*,”¹⁶⁴ in which he once again explained that Russia was trying to rebuild the Soviet sphere of influence and spread it to Poland as well. That is why Poland’s main interest was to oppose Russia and support Ukraine because without Ukraine, Russian “imperialistic aspirations” would fail. Ukraine was thus presented not as an actor but as a goal, not as a subject but as an object, very often with the use of passive voice:

The struggle for an independent Ukraine is therefore an action for our independence. By all accounts, it is better for us to wage it on the territory of our neighbour. That is, it is easier to support its actions for sovereignty than to resist direct Russian pressure.¹⁶⁵

Wildstein also referred to the idea of Central and Eastern Europe and the possibility of recreating it. He recalled the broken link between Piłsudski’s idea of a federation and Giedroyc’s geopolitical vision.

¹⁶⁴ Bronisław Wildstein, “Ukraina i polska racja stanu,” *Do Rzeczy* No 8, 17.02.2014, 54–56.

¹⁶⁵ “Walka o niepodległą Ukrainę jest więc działaniem na rzecz naszej niepodległości. Ze wszystkich względów lepiej jest prowadzić ją nam na terenie naszego sąsiada. To znaczy łatwiej wspomagać jego działanie na rzecz suwerenności, niż opierać się bezpośredniej rosyjskiej presji.” Ibid.

The title of Żurawski vel Grajewski's article also suggested that Ukraine was the Polish *raison d'état*: "If the Maidan Wins, Poland Will Win Too."¹⁶⁶ Its wording was similar to Wildstein's: Ukraine, free of Russian political and ideological influences and oriented towards the West, was of paramount importance for Polish geopolitics. Moreover, like Wildstein, Żurawski vel Grajewski viewed the Ukrainian question as crucial for the further geopolitical development of the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, also *Wprost* author Janusz Rolicki described the Euromaidan as a very important phenomenon for the whole European East: "On today's Maidan, not only the fate of Ukraine is being shaped but the fate of the entire European East."¹⁶⁷

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Other weeklies also, though to a lesser extent, pointed to the geopolitical role of the Ukrainian conflict for Poland. For instance, one of the more conservative magazines, *wSieci*, asked, "Can we afford to have Putin ruling in Kyiv?"¹⁶⁸ The issue of Ukrainian identity was thus viewed from the perspective of the benefit to Poland as a state. Therefore, the creation of the Other, embodied by Russia, and its attitude towards Ukraine and Poland permeated all the narratives in the texts about Ukraine as the Polish *raison d'état*. Constructive strategies of inscribing Ukraine within the frame of identity separate from Russia were evident here.

¹⁶⁶ Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, "Jeśli wygra Majdan, to wygra i Polska," *Do Rzeczy* No 6, 03.02.2014, 72–74.

¹⁶⁷ "Na dzisiejszym Majdanie wykuwa się więc nie tylko los Ukrainy, ale i całego europejskiego Wschodu." Janusz Rolicki, "Klucz do cudu w Kijowie," *Wprost* No 7, 16.02.2014, 64–65.

¹⁶⁸ "Czy możemy sobie pozwolić, by w Kijowie rządził Putin?" Piotr Zaremba, "Kijów zdobyty. Z Polską trudniej," *wSieci* No 49, 09.12.2013, 27–29.

In this context, it is worth noting the importance of the state and state institutions for Poland. Another author of the same weekly, Krzysztof Czabański, entitled his article “Kyiv or the Polish *raison d’état*.”¹⁶⁹ Significantly, the author did not use the word “Ukraine,” emphasising instead the importance of Kyiv as a political and cultural centre. Like his colleagues from *Do Rzeczy*, the essayist from the ideologically similar *wSieci* underlined that from the times of Piłsudski, Ukraine had been crucial for Poland’s security. He also admitted that there was a fear of Russia and that Polish support for the Ukrainian struggle was necessary because it was for the good of Poland and all of Central and Eastern Europe. This narrative was strongly opposed to Russia: without Ukraine, Russia would limit its imperial aspirations; hence, Ukraine was presented as important for the EU in terms of security. *wSieci* also recalled Giedroyc to criticise the then Polish liberal government, stating that it was not taking sufficient measures to support Ukraine and oppose Russia. In the already-mentioned article “Just Not Little Russia” in *wSieci*, journalist Piotr Skwieciński stated (in the context of the above-mentioned discussion about Ukrainian nationalism) that for Polish foreign policy, it was paramount that Kyiv should not be ruled by the Russians.

When portraying Ukraine as the Polish *raison d’état*, references were made to history and to Poland’s influence on the formation of Ukrainian identity. For example, Żurawski vel Grajewski wrote that the protests on the Maidan took place

¹⁶⁹ Krzysztof Czabański, “Kijów, czyli polska racja stanu,” *wSieci* No 49, 09.12.2013, 84–85.

mainly on lands that belonged to the First Polish Republic. In this sense, Poland put itself in the role of a mediator between the past and the present.

On January 23–24, the protests moved from the Maidan to the province. They covered not only the west of the country – which belonged to Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia or Hungary until the Second World War – but also its centre. Everything that ever belonged to the First Republic, and was not the Wild Fields during that time, revolted against Yanukovych and his Moscow patrons.¹⁷⁰

The metaphor of the “Wild Fields” (described above) is here an indirect reference to the far eastern and southern Ukraine.

A similar view of Poland’s influence on the construction of Ukrainian identity was presented in *wSieci* in the article “Partition of Ukraine – Almost the Worst Solution.” According to Piotr Skwieciński, the Poles who were experts in Ukrainian issues said that some people in Lviv assumed that it was better to establish a border beyond the Ukrainian town of Sarny, i.e. where the Second Polish Republic ended before the Second World War. But this would be the worst solution.¹⁷¹

During the Euromaidan, not only was Poland’s role emphasised but journalists invoked many historical symbols and figures to inscribe Ukrainian identity into the European discourse. For

¹⁷⁰ “W dniach 23–24 stycznia protesty wyszły z Majdanu na prowincję. Objęły nie tylko zachód kraju – do II wojny światowej należący do Polski, Rumunii i Czechosłowacji lub Węgier – ale także centrum. Wszystko, co kiedykolwiek należało do I Rzeczypospolitej, a nie było za jej czasów Dzikimi Polami, zbuntowało się przeciw Janukowyczowi i jego moskiewskim protektorom.” Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, “Jeśli wygra Majdan...”

¹⁷¹ “Nigdy w to nie wierzyłam, jednak teraz coś się naprawdę zmienia – mówi Polka intensywnie zajmująca się Ukrainą od ponad 20 lat. – Teraz we Lwowie naprawdę zaczynają mówić, że może lepiej dać sobie spokój z całym tym dzikim wschodem i postawić granicę za Sarnami (czyli tam, gdzie przed wojną kończyła się II Rzeczpospolita, a zaczynał ZSRR).” Piotr Skwieciński, “Podział Ukrainy: rozwiązanie prawie najgorsze,” *wSieci* No 9, 24.02.2014, 29–32.

example, Andrzej Saramonowicz stated in *Wprost* that if Kyiv ever came within the European reach, Poland would not have to worry about its security. He also referred to Piłsudski, writing that the idea of Intermarium could be called a prototype of the European Union and emphasising the necessity for Ukraine to have this institutional identity.¹⁷²

In liberal weeklies such as *Polityka* or *Newsweek*, there were almost no articles in which Ukraine was perceived as Poland's *raison d'état*. Only a column in *Polityka*, written by Cezary Michalski, addressed this issue when describing contemporary Polish politics and the internal quarrel between the opposition and the ruling party of the time since the differences between them could be seen in their attitude towards the Euromaidan. Michalski compared the latter with the Smoleńsk tragedy and argued that both these events had a similar impact on Polish politics, referring to Polish messianism.

“Smoleńsk mourning” and “Ukrainian enthusiasm” are similar not only because ad hoc party politics so quickly absorb them. The similarities are deeper. In the same way, they encourage Poles to return to the past. “Smoleńsk mourning” to the martyrological past, “Ukrainian enthusiasm” to the “Jagiellonian” past, to the time of the First Polish Republic as “a regional empire.”¹⁷³

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¹⁷² Andrzej Saramonowicz, “Cztery Córy i Międzymorze,” *Wprost* No 10, 02.03.2014, 6.

¹⁷³ “‘Żałoba smoleńska’ i ‘ukraiński entuzjizm’ są do siebie podobne nie tylko dlatego, że doraźna polityka partyjna tak szybko je wchłania. Podobieństwa są głębsze. Tak samo zachęcają Polaków do powrotu do przeszłości. ‘Żałoba smoleńska’ do przeszłości martyrologicznej, ‘ukraiński entuzjizm’ do przeszłości ‘jagiellońskiej,’ do czasów I RP jako ‘regionalnego imperium.’” Cezary Michalski, “Przypadłość jagiellońska,” *Polityka* No 10, 05.03.2014, 17–18.

5.2. POLISH-UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL DISCOURSE...

To sum up, the Euromaidan and the Orange Revolution created specific patterns of Ukrainian identity that were presented in the Polish press. Many of these discourses also evoked images of Ukrainian identity based on historical references.

CONCLUSIONS

In this book, I analysed the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish opinion-forming press by conducting a media linguistic study with the help of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). I chose two turning points in the history of independent Ukraine: the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan and analysed how they were portrayed in the most popular Polish opinion-forming weeklies. In the case of the Orange Revolution, I analysed texts from that period published in six magazines: *Polityka*, *Wprost*, *Newsweek Polska*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Gość Niedzielny* and *Przegląd*. In the analysis of the perception of the Euromaidan, I also included the newly established *wSieci* and *Do Rzeczy*. I collected data for my study using quantitative content analysis of texts and then described and interpreted it using the methodological tools of CDA.¹

In addition, I examined the concept of the opinion-forming press in the context of Polish media studies and presented the

¹ Ruth Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 2nd ed., translated by Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten and J.W. Unger, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009; Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Harlow: Longman, 2001; Jan Blommaert, *Discourse*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Theo van Leeuwen, "The Representation of Social Actors," in *Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard, London–New York: Routledge, 1996.

diversity of the Polish media market, highlighting its uniqueness and importance for international communication. I also explained the concept of discourse, which I used in my analysis, and demonstrated the importance of discourse in media identity studies. The analysis would not have been possible without the theoretical study of identity, and Ukrainian identity in particular, which was presented in Chapter 1. This knowledge allowed me to identify the issues of Ukrainian identity in the discourse of the Polish press.

The theoretical and methodological insights also exposed the concepts that I used and discovered during my research and made the study deeper and more thorough. The most important thing that I discovered was the **perceived identity** of Ukraine. A perceived identity is an identity constructed not by its bearer but by an outside observer, the “Other.” This is similar to Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, but in this case, it can be applied not only to the dichotomies: colony–coloniser; centre–periphery, but to different social structures. Hence, as I stated in Hypothesis 1, texts about Ukrainian issues in the Polish opinion-forming press create a particular discourse, through which the identity of one group (Ukraine) is constructed in the environment of another group (Poland).

Perceived identity, like “regular” identity, is also a matter of construction. Therefore, it may vary depending on the reader. The media, as agenda setters, create specific discourses of identity. For instance, liberal weeklies such as *Polityka*, *Wprost*, *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Newsweek* created Ukrainian identity as similar to Polish and Central European identities during

the period of social movements, while the left-wing *Przegląd* constructed it as nationalistic or even fascist.

The results of my research proved that the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish opinion-forming press was not uniform, which confirms Hypothesis 2. I distinguished two main types: **national identity** and **supranational identity**. The former was manifested in both civic and ethnic terms, and the latter was evident in pro-European and East Slavic orientations, as described in detail in Chapter 5.

During the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian identity was portrayed as if it had just been discovered as separate from Russia, and many articles emphasised the differences between the two countries. In a way, the events from 2004–2005 made Ukraine appear on the scene as a nation-state. Terms such as “nation,” “transition” and “values of freedom and democracy” were used to describe what happened during the protests. Very often, journalists made comparisons with the liberation movements in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, referring especially to the “Solidarity” movement in Poland. In the majority of cases, Ukraine was presented in terms of civic national identity and a pro-European orientation, as described in Chapter 3.

During the Euromaidan, the main identity discourse was European supranational identity intertwined with civic national identity. As in the case of the Orange Revolution, Polish journalists referred to the social processes associated with the “Solidarity” period, comparing the situation in Ukraine to the one in Poland in the 1980s. However, the comparison was not always complete due to the lack of strong political opposition

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in Ukraine and the low level of trust in it. Liberal-centrist and right-wing weeklies tended to compare Ukraine during the Euromaidan to the revolutions in the Soviet bloc countries, placing it outside the discourse of post-Soviet identity in general. Therefore, in addition to moving it away from the post-Soviet identity, the Euromaidan also inscribed Ukraine into the concept of Central and Eastern Europe, as described in Chapter 4.

One more identity discourse that was presented in the Polish press during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan was that of East Slavic identity, which included national uncertainty, civic passivity, pro-Russian orientation and regrets about the fall of the Soviet Union. This identity was represented in two categories: the pro-Russian foreign orientation and the post-Soviet mentality of the described actors. This discourse appeared more often during the Orange Revolution than during the Euromaidan. Importantly, Polish journalists paid considerable attention to what people were thinking and what was happening not only on the Kyiv Maidan and in Western Ukraine but in Eastern Ukraine as well.

The results of my analysis showed that discourses of representation in two main categories: Ukrainian national civic identity and supranational European identity were similar in all the weeklies. The only divergence appeared in the portrayal of Ukrainian nationalistic identity, which was always associated with the massacre committed by Ukrainian nationalists against Poles in 1943 in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.

During the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians were not portrayed as radical nationalists, with the exception of the left-wing

Przegląd, which emphasised that the protesters might have been nationalists and successors of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The situation was different during the Euromaidan. All the analysed weeklies noted the presence of nationalistic elements in the movement, but it was not the main discourse in liberal magazines such as *Polityka*, *Newsweek*, *Wprost* and *Tygodnik Powszechny*. The Catholic weekly *Gość Niedzielny* and the right-wing conservative *wSieci* did not create an image of Ukraine as nationalistic either. *Do Rzeczy*, in turn, presented more than one attitude towards the nationalists on the Euromaidan. Some journalists emphasised that Ukraine was nationalistic and not European, while others tried to show that radical nationalists were a marginal element.

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Przegląd, however, presented Ukraine as a completely nationalistic country, highlighting the actions of right-wing elements. It was the only magazine among the analysed which created an image of the Euromaidan as a nationalistic and illegal rebellion against the legitimate authorities. In addition, throughout this period, *Przegląd* published articles on historical topics about Ukrainian nationalists, creating a terrifying image of Ukraine for Polish readers.

In CDA, actors are responsible for creating a particular discourse, in this case, a discourse of identity, which is why they were central to this study. The Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan differed in terms of the representation of actors of identity. During the 2004–2005 protests, actors of identity were more often specified. In addition to the generalization of “Ukraine” or “Ukrainian people,” the main actors were the

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politicians Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. They represented Ukrainian national and European identity, newly discovered during the Orange Revolution. Many articles were devoted to them, and the journalists' language was full of references and metaphorical figures that were supposed to connect Yushchenko with the European discourse and Ukrainian history and culture (for instance, calling him "Hetman" or saying that Ukraine would enter the "Victorian era"). As for Tymoshenko, she was compared to successful leaders of Western democracies and Ukrainian culture (she was called "Iron Yulia" or compared to the Ukrainian writer Lesia Ukrainka).

During the Euromaidan, in turn, actors were not specified. The difference was that the political opposition at the time was presented as a power that was not credible enough for the Ukrainian people. Therefore, it was often noted that the protests of 2013–2014 differed from the Orange Revolution in that they were not a political but a civic movement. The actors who were described as representatives of Ukrainian identity were thus civic activists, students, people of culture and members of the clergy.

During both the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, the post-Soviet identity discourse was represented in the Polish press by politicians who were in power at the time and oligarchs. These actors were mainly portrayed in a negative light, although during the Euromaidan, the oligarchs were perceived more ambiguously. When describing the events of 2013–2014, journalists emphasised that the oligarchs had financial interests in Europe, so some of them supported the European aspirations of the protesters. The post-Soviet identity also appeared in

descriptions of the everyday life of the people living not in Kyiv and Western Ukraine but in eastern Ukrainian towns.

The factors influencing the perception of Ukrainian identity were similar during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan. Polish journalists perceived Ukrainians as people aware of their national identity when they demonstrated civic responsibility for their state, i.e. during social movements. Thus, the factor of civic activism was the most important in portraying Ukraine as an independent nation-state. However, both political and economic factors caused it to be perceived as a backward remnant of the Soviet Union. These three factors were equally represented in the media discourses during both the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan.

The situation differed in the case of religious and cultural factors. During the Orange Revolution, religion was rarely mentioned. Only one article in *Tygodnik Powszechny* described Yanukovich's supporters in the context of their religious affiliation, noting that they belonged to the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. During the Euromaidan, religion and the participation of the members of the clergy in the protests were commented upon in all the analysed weeklies except *Przegląd*. The Catholic weekly *Gość Niedzielny*, in particular, regularly published articles on the religious aspect of the Euromaidan and interviews with representatives of the Ukrainian clergy. The markers of Ukrainian national identity were the Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Representatives of the clergy were portrayed not only as spiritual leaders but also as civic activists during the Euromaidan.

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The Ukrainian ethnic national identity was also represented in its cultural aspect through references to history and contemporary Ukrainian culture. However, the portrayal of the cultural factor during both protests differed. During the Orange Revolution, a few journalists “discovered” Ukrainian culture and presented it to the readers of the analysed weeklies, but it was not often mentioned in general articles about those events. During the Euromaidan, in turn, the cultural factor was highlighted to a much greater extent. There were many articles and interviews with Ukrainian intellectuals and writers that portrayed them as prominent actors of identity. Culture played an important role also because 2014 was the 200th anniversary of the birth of Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko.

Summarising the factors of identity, it is worth emphasising that despite active cultural and civic elements, political and economic factors mattered more in the representation of the Ukrainian identity in the Polish press. It is not surprising since both the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan were civic movements, and such movements usually aim to change the current political situation – in this case, also the geopolitical and economic one. Therefore, journalists often stressed that Ukraine would remain in the post-Soviet ideological space and the Russian sphere of influence unless deep changes in the political and economic spheres were carried out, such as eliminating corruption and nepotism in the state structures and the bureaucratic system and abolishing links between business and politics.

The discourse of the Ukrainian identity in the Polish press was full of linguistic devices and expressions, which proved the

usefulness of CDA as a methodological tool, again confirming Hypothesis 1. Journalists used metaphors such as “awakening of the nation,” “birth of the nation,” “Maidan of freedom” and “Ukraine rises from its knees.” In addition, when describing the social movements in Ukraine, journalists made references to the period of Polish transition from communism to democracy, using such phrases as “the round table,” “wars at the top” and “Ukrainian ZOMO.” They also generalised the actors, calling them “the people of Ukraine” (*naród* in Polish, which is equivalent to the word “nation”). Hence, “people” as a “nation” were also represented as the social action. Therefore, the nomination “people of Ukraine” represented the perception of Ukrainian identity as a nation-state.

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The study also showed which discourses of common Polish-Ukrainian history still influence the perception of Ukraine in Poland, creating specific attitudes towards it and maintaining stereotypes. There were many historical references in the analysed articles about the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, and Polish journalists used historical narratives to metaphorically present contemporary Ukraine. It should be noted that historical references, together with spatial and personal ones, are one of the three concepts of Ruth Wodak’s approach to analysing identity constructed in discourse.

Most frequently, historical references were made to the Cossack era. The Cossacks represented the Ukrainian will for democracy and freedom. During the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko was called the Hetman, which was the title of the leader of the Cossack state, who was elected in free elections

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by other Cossacks. During the Euromaidan, there were fewer articles on historical topics, but references to the Cossack era were still numerous, mainly because the camp on the Maidan was divided into sotnyas, structural and military elements of the Cossack state and army. The Euromaidan was thus compared to the Cossack state, the Zaporizhian Sich.

The second most frequent historical reference was to the Second World War and the Volhynia Massacre committed against Poles by Ukrainian nationalists, soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Due to the presence of nationalistic elements and symbols of OUN-UPA on the Maidan, some of the Polish journalists portrayed Ukrainians as radical nationalists, although, as mentioned earlier, this discourse was not dominant in the analysed weeklies.

References to history were also made in the form of specific nominalisations. Journalists often called Ukraine *Kresy* (Borderlands) and sometimes the Wild Fields, the meaning of which was explained in Chapter 5. This discourse was more frequent during the Orange Revolution than during the Euromaidan. It proved that, as I claimed in Hypothesis 3, history played a significant and even central role in the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press.

Considerable attention was also paid to Ukraine's place among the states of Central and Eastern Europe. In the texts of Polish journalists, this discourse was highlighted in the context of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation and support for Ukraine's European aspirations. Subsequently, the Ukrainian revolutions, both the Euromaidan and the Orange Revolution, were compared

to the Central European anticommunist uprisings. Polish journalists invoked the particular vision of Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine in Józef Piłsudski's idea of federation and later in the idea of Intermarium by presenting Ukraine as a Central European state. They even called Piłsudski's concept of Intermarium the predecessor of the contemporary European Union and emphasised the need for a Ukrainian institutional European identity.

In addition, references to Central and Eastern Europe revealed one more identity discourse, which I have called "Ukraine as the Polish *raison d'état*." This discourse was clearly alive during the Euromaidan. From this point of view, Ukraine was described as a nation-state that Poland needed as an ally against Russia. In this context, Jerzy Giedroyc's ideas about Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation were very often recalled. The narrative of Ukraine as the Polish *raison d'état* situates it in at least two identity discourses. The first one is the European discourse, which connects Ukraine to the idea of Central and Eastern Europe or the "European East." It links Ukraine to the way in which the former Soviet bloc countries made their transition to democracy, placing it in the "return to Europe" discourse that was so popular in the 1980s. The second identity narrative is that of Ukraine as a buffer zone or a "place in between." In this approach, Poland supports Ukraine because of the need to protect itself from Russian influence.

In addition to historical references, Polish journalists used spatial references in portraying Ukraine to indicate its geographical location for example, by calling it "our eastern neighbour."

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In conclusion, Ukrainian identity was perceived in the most positive way in the liberal *Tygodnik Powszechny*. This weekly devoted the largest number of articles to the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan and presented Ukraine in terms of national identity with a strong civic adherence and a national Ukrainian cultural element. The most negative image of Ukrainian identity was presented in the left-wing *Przegląd*. The country was portrayed as backward, with a low level of economic and political development, not deserving to be included in the European identity discourse, and as a “failed state” for which the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a tragedy. Moreover, *Przegląd* always emphasised the nationalistic identity discourse and recalled the history of the Volhynia Massacre.

The analysis of Polish journalists’ perception of Ukraine also opened up the practical application of this research in intercultural and political communication between the two states. It showed which qualities of Ukrainian society worked in favour of perceiving Ukraine as an equal state and an equal partner and which, on the contrary, portrayed Ukraine as insecure in its identity and as a weak partner in the international arena. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was also proven: the social and political changes during the social movements resulted in a positive representation of Ukraine as a strong and self-aware nation-state with an element of European supranational identity. As a result, the Euromaidan and the Orange Revolution fostered the perception of Ukrainian identity in the Polish press as national with a strong civic and cultural component and a pro-European orientation.

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. UKRAINIAN IDENTITY MODELS. TREE OF CODES



APPENDIX 2. THREE STAGES OF CDA. CATEGORY KEYS

1. Description

Genre
Category
Main topic
Subtopics
Wording
Linguistic features (if relevant)

2. Interpretation

Topoi
Actors
Agencies
Factors
Symbols
Personal references
Spatial references
Temporal references

3. Explanation

Strategies of identity
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Analysis of the actors
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LIBAL MONOGRAPHS

VOLUME V



This book presents a media linguistic analysis of the discourses of Ukrainian identity predominating in the Polish opinion-forming press during the period of Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. Special attention is paid to the theoretical and methodological part of the research in order to introduce new methods of textual and linguistic analysis of the media. This book uses the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis to show how the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan were perceived in the Polish press in terms of identity and what linguistic tools were used by Polish journalists and opinion-makers in the press to examine events in Ukraine. It also explains historical and political contexts of relations between Poland and Ukraine which influenced contemporary perception of Ukraine in the Polish media discourse.



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