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Kultura Pedagogiczna Pedagogical Culture



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Adres Redakcji / Editorial Correspondence

Wydział Pedagogiczny / Faculty of Education
Uniwersytet Warszawski / University of Warsaw
ul. Mokotowska 16/20
00-561 Warszawa, Polska
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Projekt okładki i stron tytułowych / Cover Design

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Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

ul. Nowy Świat 4
00-497 Warszawa
wuw@uw.edu.pl
Dział Handlowy: tel. (48 22) 55-31-333
dz.handlowy@uw.edu.pl
Księgarnia internetowa: www.wuw.pl/ksiegarnia

Skład / Composition

Beata Stelągowska

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The current issue of *Kultura Pedagogiczna / Pedagogical Culture* reflects the main policy of the journal: to shed critical light on the most problematic aspects of educational theory and practice and to create a discussion forum for researchers taking different approaches in exploring pedagogical fields of interest. The journal invites academics and practitioners to reflect on current professional cultures in different countries and regions all over the world. It seeks to include in the debate on education voices from different disciplines of knowledge and also perspectives from educational practice in a wide range of settings and circumstances.

The launch issue of the journal in 2014 was a special collection of papers dedicated to the ethical aspects of education. I am very glad to introduce in this current issue a new collection of papers that represent different approaches and interests in educational research from seven different countries – Canada, Belgium, Poland, South Africa, the United Kingdom, USA, and Germany. Some of the themes included are quite specific, others discuss educational ideas in a wider sense. They all, however, pinpoint crucial issues and phenomena in educational research and action. Each provides the reader with some interesting food for thought. Among the questions explored are: dialogue and the ability to listen to the voices of others; violence and its impact on democratic citizenship education; teachers' professional education in the context of personal development; open access policy and the way it changes our understanding of the university and the researcher. Some challenging perspectives on issues that are all too often inadequately recognized, are offered in these pages. I highly recommend the collection to readers and welcome colleagues to respond to these inspirations.

As the journal seeks to build a platform for critical reflection on the most urgent issues in pedagogy, teaching and learning practices, it is necessary to foster critique and robust discussion. I hope that this collection of papers from colleagues representing different pedagogical cultures and approaches will open a discussion that we can continue to promote in our journal.

Rafał Godoń

EDUCATION, CONVERSATION, AND LISTENING

Paul Fairfield

Queen's University, Kingston, Canada

Abstract: At the most fundamental level of analysis one may speak of educating as the act of someone saying and showing something to another in a way that leads the mind from where it is to where it might be, in the process widening horizons and fashioning habits of thought that make it possible for students to participate in the conversation that is their culture. The student stands to this conversation not only as learner but as initiate. Students appropriate habits, ideas, and questions that have their origin in the world of the ancients while the overriding imperative of the learning process is to take the conversation further in some respect and to find their voice within it. In what sense, however, is conversation the heart and soul of education, and what is the nature and role of listening in education so conceived? At a time when qualitative matters place a distant second to quantifiables such as test scores, information retention, and marketable credentials, it falls to education theorists to remind us of what philosophers since ancient times have in one fashion or another maintained: that this practice has an identifiable orientation and purpose that transcends the order of the utilitarian.

Keywords: education, conversation, dialogue, listening

The conversational structure of education

At the most fundamental level of analysis one may speak of educating as the act of someone saying and showing something to someone in a way that leads the mind from where it is to where it might be, in the process widening horizons and fashioning habits of thought that make it possible for students to participate in the conversation that is their culture. This notion, or something like it, has found favor among those who speak of education as dialogical or some form of initiation into what Michael Oakeshott called “the conversation of mankind.” The student stands to this conversation not only as learner but more

specifically as initiate, as Aristotle was initiated into the world of ideas by Plato, who was initiated by Socrates, and so on. Though students of today are situated at considerable remove from the conversation these thinkers began, in a more fundamental sense they appropriate habits and ideas, questions and methods that have their origin in the world of the ancients while the overriding imperative of the learning process is to take the conversation further in some respect. The student's task is to find their voice in the dialogue and to offer a contribution that is distinctive. This requires a meeting place in which as many perspectives as possible are brought to bear on a common subject matter in a common inquiry.

Paulo Freire (2004) and Nicholas Burbules (1993) are among the philosophers of education who have made a decisive contribution to the dialogical model, but questions remain about its full implications.¹ In what sense is conversation the heart and soul of education? What is the nature and role of listening in education so conceived? What is becoming of the will to communicate, to hear and be heard in the cultural conditions in which we find ourselves? That education has a purpose that transcends the utilitarian is lost sight of when imperatives of managerial efficiency and scientific rationality reign supreme in many an institution of learning. When qualitative matters including the intellectual virtues, habits of reflection, and initiation into the conversation place a distant second to quantifiables such as test scores, information retention, and marketable credentials, it falls to education theorists to remind us of what philosophers since ancient times have in one fashion or another maintained: that this practice has an identifiable orientation and purpose that transcends the order of the utilitarian.

That the classroom is the site not only of instruction but of conversation or intellectual investigation in some sense of the term is not a new idea. One finds traces of it already in Plato while in the modern literature it is a hypothesis especially associated with John Dewey, for whom education at all levels properly operates on a model of experimental inquiry. When Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989) wrote of the art of conversation, he consistently emphasized the manner in which, phenomenologically speaking, interlocutors are swept along in a process that they do not control. There is a certain receptivity that characterizes our authentic participation in any dialogue that is worthy of the name. One of the most important passages on this topic from *Truth and Method* reads as follows:

We say that we 'conduct' a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the

one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. The way one word follows another, with the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows in advance what will 'come out' of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it — i.e., that it allows something to 'emerge' which henceforth exists.² (Gadamer, 1989, p. 383)

Gadamer was not speaking of education in this context, although the relevance of this description to our theme is clear. When it succeeds, education involves a voluntary relinquishing of control comparable to the at once active and passive nature of conversation, oriented as it is toward a critical examination of the subject matter and not any merely expertocratic bestowing of information. Insofar as anyone or anything presides over the conversation in an educational setting, it is the subject matter itself that does so – the text, problem, or question that orients the discussion — rather than any particular participant, be it professor or student.

Indeed, all of the conditions of hermeneutical dialogue of which Gadamer spoke have a direct application to the university classroom where the subject matter lies within any field of the human sciences. Good will, for instance, is indispensable to any classroom discussion and is a disposition that applies equally to the text and to the participants in the conversation. Inseparable from this is the anticipation that what our interlocutor has to say may be true and that our own point of view may be radically mistaken. Without the anticipation that the text that orients the discussion is saying what is true, or possibly true, and that the interpretations or judgments of a given student might be true as well, dialogue cannot succeed and in the usual course of things deteriorates into its opposite. Open-mindedness may well be the most essential condition of educational success in general; without it the mind is unteachable apart from the straightforward acquisition of information that merely confirms what one knows. This is not education in the preeminent sense of the word or possibly in any sense. Education makes demands upon us, and in the absence of a hospitality to ideas and the Socratic recognition of ignorance it cannot succeed.

Conversation requires as well a good deal of background knowledge, including a basic knowledge of the relevant field and its history, as well as

a well-formulated question. Conversation receives its basic orientation from a line of questioning — one that arises from the text or responds in a critical way to what emerges there. Most often it is the educator who introduces this, generally after having lectured for some period of time. Lecturing on the text or whatever subject matter is being discussed serves the dialogical purpose not of speaking in place of the text but of providing an interpretation of its major themes and clarification of some finer points as well as any relevant considerations that will help make the discussion an informed one. Lecturing is not an alternative to reading or thinking for oneself but is a means of ensuring that such thinking and discussion are based on an adequate understanding of the subject matter.

Dewey maintained that educational inquiry leads the students not to any final *telos* but to habits of mind that incline them toward further inquiry and to a love of ideas for their own sake. The point is to train students to join the conversation that is their culture, or some specialized discourse within it, and to cultivate the means of taking it further. Much of the point as well is to demonstrate the value of dialogue itself and to cast doubt on the notion that inquiry and education are mere means to an end — usually gaining a credential which itself is but a means. If understanding is indeed not only what we do but in a fundamental sense what we are, and if dialogue provides the wherewithal for understanding far more than any technique, then dialogue is a value unto itself which students in all fields must be made to see.

Among the more salient characteristics of dialogue as it occurs both within and without educational institutions is the lack of formal structure. Gadamer was correct to liken the structure of dialogue to that of play, with its repeated movement back and forth. What is to be noted about this play structure is its relative informality and fragility. Too much structure or control prevents a game from coming into its own and effectively removes the freedom of the players to invent novel moves, to use their judgment, form questions, and think outside the framework of rules laid out in advance. There is a haphazard quality in every genuine conversation. As the professor steps out of the role of the one who knows and assumes the role of interlocutor and Deweyan leader of inquiry, there is a relinquishing of control that allows the conversation to take on a life of its own and, in the usual course of things, to lead in a direction that no one anticipated. As the transition is made from lecturing to discussion, it behooves us — usually the professor — to pose a line of questioning and to invite students either to hazard

a reply or to refine the question. If the appropriate conditions are in place, the conversation unfolds according to a dynamic of its own and all alike are swept along in a process over which no one altogether presides. If it falls to the educator to keep matters on the rails and prevent the conversation from deteriorating into the pedestrian and pointless, still the professor is neither authoritative judge, orchestral director, expert, nor preacher. The educative quality of such conversation consists precisely in articulating questions and judgments that others may challenge and in the testing of prejudices. Often for the first time in a student's experience, opinions are formed and they are compelled to produce reasons for their views that others may challenge. They are taken out of the role of spectators and obliged to account for their views. Educative conversations generally remove our intellectual comfort by eliciting from us the semi-articulated judgments of which so much of our intellectual life consists. Real knowledge is never more than the tip of the iceberg of what we believe, gather, and suspect, and much as we may wish to limit our utterances to such knowledge, conversation has a way of drawing out of us the rest of the iceberg, sometimes at our peril and always in a haphazard way. The discussion is never quite the one that the professor anticipated — or when it is, it is likely due to overt or covert manipulation on the latter's part. The mind that refuses to relinquish control and to allow judgments to be made that conflict with one's own is unteachable, whether it be student or educator. If it falls to the latter to ensure that the conversation is properly informed, oriented by an intelligent line of questioning, and on the rails, it is not their role to ensure the conversation reaches a predetermined conclusion or indeed any conclusion.

It belongs to the structure of conversation, as of wonder, to begin and to end on a note of uncertainty and openness to further inquiry. The educative value of the conversation may lie in the question itself, posed from the student's point of view for the first time and which will lead one to read texts one otherwise would not have or to pursue the question in private reflection. What is urgent above all is that the student be taken out of the role of spectator — a role to which many are far too accustomed — and become an agent in their own intellectual life and in the larger conversational process. Educators need not and ought not concern themselves more than a little with the content of their students' beliefs but with whether they attain virtues of open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, and reasonableness that largely define intellectual agency.

Whether we are speaking of the conversation of mankind in a large sense or of the ordinary conversations of daily life, the process of conversing involves rather more than uttering propositions. The act of speaking is often awarded primacy and regarded in isolation from the larger process that is someone saying something to someone about something in the world. The conversational process contains two dialectical poles: the first is speaking while the second is a matter about which philosophers traditionally have had remarkably little to say. It is the act of listening. Even the Cartesian meditator, one supposes, anticipates that someone is listening to its otherwise private ratiocinations. Sooner or later the thinking thing must exit the privacy of the mind and say what it imagines it knows. René Descartes himself was after all not only a thinker but an author and a highly skilled rhetorician. So skilled in fact as to lead us at times to forget a few elementary particulars about the very project of thought in which he was engaged. Even the *Meditations*, that quintessentially modern tribute to pure reason, was no private soliloquy but a literary work written and published with the anticipation that someone might read it and respond with a yea or a nay. The vital matter is that they respond, and not only whether we have hit upon the truth or beheld a clear and distinct idea. We speak in order to be heard, but in what sense? To be heard often means to win a convert, to bring low our critic and reassure ourselves that our hypothesis is not as precarious as we feared. But there is more to it than this. What is it to listen, to hear and be heard, given that this modest act is no less vital to the conversation of mankind, and to education, than its more celebrated dialectical counterpart?

Listening – its overlooked educational importance

Students are listeners. “Listen and learn” is a logical pairing in a way that “speak and learn” is not. The latter phrase strikes us as incongruous, even while it has long been implicit to the practice of many educators to esteem speaking over listening. My aim in the second half of this paper is not to reverse the primacy of speaking over listening that is implicit to the standard practice of many educators but to provide a brief phenomenology of the listening act, a consequence of which is in effect to make a case for it. That this case needs to be made is odd given that there is not one paradigmatic conversational act but two, and it is their mutual presence that constitutes participation. On what I am tempted

to call the standard view, it is the speaker who participates in the sense of offering a positive contribution while the listener more or less passively absorbs it. Many a university course syllabus today reads that students will be rewarded for being what is termed “active participants” rather than “passive listeners.” The verb “to educate” is now often used in precisely the sense of speaking and informing. How has it come to pass that the act of listening has been not only assigned a secondary place relative to speaking but relegated to passivity, as if it were a kind of intellectual and perhaps psychological and moral failing? The speaker, on the standard view, is participating in earnest, exhibiting creativity, critical capacity, and a virile character while the listener merely sits there. It is the speaker who advances the conversation and participates in what is called “active learning” while the listener at best is dragged along in the wake of others’ ideas, on the model of the master and the disciple. The former we admire; the latter is at best an enigma but most often an unoriginal and docile mind.

Wherein lies the error in the standard view? My hypothesis is that the underappreciation of listening is rooted in a profound misunderstanding of this act and its significance. Listening, it must be said, is an act, and a highly complex one. It is an act of receptivity to be sure, and receptivity has long been associated if not conflated with passivity. To receive is not to surrender the will and be acted upon but is a mode of engagement. Its salient feature is openness, but this is not the openness of an empty container waiting to be filled. It more resembles an active hospitality and gesture of welcome to an anticipated guest. Listening is an out-going — precisely not a withdrawal into the self or a frightened retreat but a venturing beyond one’s private convictions and into the convictions of an interlocutor and a meeting of minds. Here one’s attention is fully absorbed by the other, or by the claim that the other is addressing to us, in a process that demands a kind of self-forgetfulness. To listen is to acknowledge that we are being addressed, that someone is not only speaking but speaking to us. They are claiming something not only in the sense of uttering a proposition that may be true or false but making a claim upon our attention and capacities. It behooves us to listen and respond, and where the former must be understood with constant reference to the latter.

We may respond in this way or that, but what is essential is the response and the preparation that is bound up with it, that we are poised one way or another and in a way that is the opposite of passive. We prepare a response in the way

that we prepare for a guest. Receiving guests once again is not a passive matter. If one is to be at all hospitable there is considerable work to be done. So too is listening a form of work, and of a no less creative kind than speaking. We may indeed speak of the art of listening. One who practices it not only opens oneself to what another has to say but ventures oneself. It is a question of risk, and of a kind that is comparable to the risk of speaking. It is well known that to speak and write is to risk oneself, to venture a hypothesis or an idea, and to expose one's point of view to the scrutiny of others. This partially explains the fear so many have of public speaking; we fear being exposed, criticized in open debate, and badly thought of. We do not think badly of the listener, or not in the same way that our opinion of the speaker may plummet once we begin to hear their message. At worst we might believe the listener has nothing to say or lacks the courage to venture something of themselves. But we do not fear listening in the way that we fear speaking, or so it seems. If we do not exactly fear listening, however, the question we must ask is why there are so few good listeners. Listening requires that we stop speaking, a seemingly elementary (perhaps even non-) act which requires no skill and no judgment. Yet it is not uncommon that one should not have mastered this act, an odd and fascinating phenomenon. A common expression has it that such individuals are in love with the sound of their own voice, yet it is far less a matter of love than dread. The object of such dread is not silence but that someone else might speak, that we might be addressed and obliged precisely to risk our point of view. We might therefore ask whether it is the speaker or the listener who ventures more of themselves. The work of listening, in any event, is to risk being called into question and to prepare a response to a claim that we may not have anticipated. It is the foreign guest who puts us to work most, the strange and unanticipated claim that calls on our resources.

This form of work requires something additional of us. Gadamer spoke of the anticipation of truth as a vital precondition of interpretation in general. We must anticipate, at least in a preliminary way, that the text or speaker is right. To see this, let us imagine what it is like to listen without this anticipation. Somehow we know — or, if this is impossible, expect — the speaker to be mistaken even before they have begun to speak. Why, then, are we listening, and what manner of listening is this? If we anticipate that the interlocutor's claim lacks either truth, value, or meaning then we need not listen at all, and this is precisely what characterizes the bad listener: not that they are incapable of doing so but that they

need not. They need only gather evidence that they were correct all along and may accordingly settle back in their knowledge. In all listening there is invention and a judgment of confidence that the claim to which one is attending is worth the effort. This is readily seen in an aesthetic context. In listening to music we are anticipating again that there is something in this, not merely a pleasure to be derived or propositional knowledge to be had but something far more interesting: some meaning to be glimpsed, something to be shown, and in a way that resonates and potentially transforms us. When the anticipation of meaning or truth is suspended, listening is at an end.

To listen is not yet to speak, but it is to be on the way to speaking. This is the basis for describing this as an act of invention. Someone has addressed us, and since conversation has the structure of a dialectic it behooves us to fashion a response. As the musical example illustrates, listening is a responsive as well as a complex and learned activity. We learn how to listen, what to listen for, and the art of discerning increasingly subtle qualities. Our attention is appropriately directed and discerning. Listening invariably has a purpose, but if we are listening in a genuine sense our purpose is the speaker's purpose. Listening in a critical spirit still requires an anticipation of truth and a shared purpose; it is no fault-finding mission or purely strategic posture. The purpose of listening in an educational context is no different in this respect. The point is to listen and learn, where to learn means to be formed and transformed. The student not only understands what has been said but is able to respond in an intelligent way, which always means with a thought of their own. They are able to participate in the back-and-forth of dialogue and at times to move the conversation in a different direction.

To listen is to take in creatively and to take seriously what another has to say, and this is inseparable from the questioning act. Conversation involves a questioning that runs in two directions; as the speaker calls into question the standpoint of the listener, the latter must actively interrogate, interpret, and judge what is being said. Where there is interpretation there is interrogation, a search for connections, a negotiating of the hermeneutical circle, and an estimation of importance. The interpretive function of the question is to bring a phenomenon into the open and to reveal it as this or that kind of thing. No rule governs how we do this, how to see what is questionable and then formulate the question that allows the thing itself to be shown. This again is a creative act, and it belongs as much to listening as to speaking. It is only when regarded as abstractions that

listening, discerning what is questionable, and fashioning a productive question are separate acts. Phenomenologically, listening already anticipates the latter.

The undervaluing of listening by educators may be traced in part to an epistemological problem — how is one to know whether the student who does not speak is listening in earnest or tuning out? But I suspect that a deeper explanation lies in a larger cultural phenomenon. Ours, I believe it is fair to say, is not a culture of listeners. What it prizes is the sort of venturing that is directly conducive to utility — “putting oneself out there,” as it is said, in such a way that is calculated to bring gain, most especially reputation. Being well thought of, and often sheer visibility, is the point, and while there is nothing particularly new in this it is a phenomenon that has a darker aspect. In the cultural conditions we now face, including the ubiquity of mass communication technology, what is becoming of the will to communicate, where this means not only the will to speak and be visible but to listen in a process that is dialectical rather than one-way? One does not listen to the mass, and when one speaks to them, what manner of speaking is this? However interactive mass communication technology often claims to be, what form of interaction is this? Does it include the listening act in any sense that includes creativity and freedom or does our freedom here mean selecting between options that have been planned and laid out in advance?

Inseparable from the will to listen is the will to read, and here as well is a matter that warrants concern for educators. Conservatives like Allan Bloom undoubtedly exaggerate when remarking that “Today’s select students know so much less, are so much more cut off from the tradition, are so much slacker intellectually, that they make their predecessors look like prodigies of culture.” (Bloom, 1987, p. 58). This is overstated, but what is not is the observation now frequently made by professors that our students are not reading for pleasure and interest in the way they once did, and books in particular. If Bloom’s criticisms are harshly stated, it is nonetheless true that knowledge of the canon has eroded among university students of today. A declining number of students appears to believe that the canon is where they may expect to find truths more profound than in popular culture or the mass media. The love of reading and expectation of personal and intellectual growth through exposure to quality literature appear to be in decline and are being replaced by more immediate forms of information acquisition and entertainment. In the university as well, many professors are increasingly reluctant to assign books of any difficulty or length on the premise

that students will not read them, that they lack either the interest, work ethic, or attention span necessary for the task, and instead assign textbooks that, in a field such as philosophy, include descriptive accounts of certain philosophers' views supplemented by brief passages from the primary texts. Dewey maintained that the well-educated mind is inquisitive, broadly curious, and motivated to learn and to continue learning long after formal education is at an end. It exhibits habits of mind that incline it to read in a variety of fields and as an end in itself, yet what habits of mind are instilled when students may achieve high grades without being expected by their educators to read more than short selections or third-person accounts? When books and ideas no longer change the lives of the young, the prospect of education achieving any ends higher than the utilitarian is dim indeed.

The educated mind is not only well informed but able and inclined to participate in a genuine sense in the conversation that is their culture, and the structure of participation itself is fundamentally dialectical. One speaks — one is capable of speaking, of having something to say — only on the basis of having listened for some considerable period of time, and where listening is no mere preliminary to what matters but is of the essence of education. It is the constant tendency of educators to undervalue the intangibles of their practice, and this is especially true of the act of listening. It is not a mere means to an end, where the end is to be informed. The current reign of utilitarian rationality, with its continual emphasis on mastering information and training the next generation of producers and consumers, leaves little room for what Gadamer has called “living with ideas” or learning to participate in the conversation of mankind (Gadamer, 1992, p. 48).⁴ To live with ideas means to listen and continue listening until it comes the student's turn to participate in that other sense of advancing views of their own. Martin Heidegger emphasized that to think is always to be “on the way,” and this is the salient quality of the listening act. We are on the way to speaking, attending to what matters, and preparing to be persuaded or to resist depending not on any prior disposition but on what another has to say. In the listening act no less than in speaking, we venture ourselves, catch hold of what is said, and undertake to take it further.

Correspondence

Paul Fairfield

e-mail: paul.fairfield@queensu.ca

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THE LIFE OF REASON – R.S. PETERS' STOIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Stefaan E. Cuypers

KU Leuven — University of Leuven, Belgium

Abstract: Although R.S. Peters is one of the founding fathers of the analytical paradigm in the philosophy of education, in this paper I develop his less known synthetic view on education. To that purpose, I explore Peters' integrative view on the relationship between reason and passion (the emotions), his view on the levels of life, and even his view on religious education. What emerges from this exploration is the claim that Peters is, in an important sense, not a Kantian philosopher and the thesis that Peters' work on the analysis and justification of education gets its ultimate inspiration from an anthropological and metaphysical background, which Ray Elliot identified as Peters' Stoic attitude.

Keywords: R.S. Peters; rational passions, Kantian philosophy of education, stoicism, religious education

1. Introduction: is Peters a Kantian?

Like all other views on the nature and the education of the emotions, Peters' view is built upon a theory of human nature. John White identifies this underlying theory as *Kantian*. He singles out two main tenets. One tenet is the bifurcation in human nature:

Peters' attitude towards the emotions is irresistibly reminiscent of Kant. He shares the views that human beings ought to realise their rational natures and that they are often impeded in this task by non-rational influences, their passions and inclinations. Kant's rationale for his view depends on his 'two-world' view of man as consisting of a noumenal self and a phenomenal self. Peters does not use this distinction, but for him there is still something of a bifurcation in our nature: on the one hand the area of convention and reason, and on the other that of emotions and motives. Generally speaking, as with Kant, he holds that it is the job of the first part of our nature to keep the second part from sullyng it or diverting it from its proper tasks. (White, 1984, pp. 205-206)

The other tenet is the concept of rationality:

As with Kant, problems arise over the most central concept of Peters' philosophical psychology and ethics, the concept of rationality. Acting rationally is not to be understood in terms of satisfying one's wants: Peters' rich concept of wanting ... incorporates within it the idea of having reasons for acting. Detached from desire, the concept of reason in both Kant and Peters becomes obscure, the transcendental arguments of *Ethics and Education* leaving the reader as unenlightened as Kant's delineation of the noumenal self in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Groundwork*. (ibid., p. 208)

White offers an interesting description of what he takes to be Peters' background assumptions about human nature and rationality. At a closer look, however, it is debatable whether Peters really worked from these assumptions. With regard to White's interpretation, I want to ask the following critical questions. Does Peters really subscribe to these two tenets? Is Peters really a Kantian?

In this paper, I throw some doubt on the standard interpretation — and perhaps even on Peters' self-interpretation — of Peters as a Kantian philosopher. To that end, I begin with exploring his integrative view on rationality and its relation to the emotions. Next, I expand this view further into Peters' synthetic view on life and education, central to which is his Stoic attitude.¹

2. The integrative view: reason and passion

As to the relation between reason and passion, two opposite views can be discerned in the history of philosophy. According to the 'dominating reason' view, reason, as the essence of human nature, dominates and ought to dominate passion, whereas according to the 'ruling passions' view, conversely, the passions rule the waves of life, inclusively the life of reason. In modern philosophy, the first view is typically exemplified by the practical philosophy of Kant, while the second by that of Hume, who famously claims that "[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (Hume, 1739-40, p. 415). Peters does not side with either view and criticizes an assumption they both have in common: the *antithesis* between reason and passion. As against this common assumption, he defends the integrative view that reason and passion not only mutually influence each other but also intrinsically form a partnership.

2.1. Rational passions

Given the fact that in ordinary language the term 'passion' suggests some kind of turbulence or passivity, do the emotions necessarily exclude rationality? Although Peters admits, very plausibly, that some emotions tend to be irrational or unreasonable, he claims that in general they do not necessarily exclude rationality and that we can speak of (at least some of) them as reasonable and perhaps even rational:

... there is the obvious point that what we call emotions are good examples of passive states; but we can speak of them as being both unreasonable and irrational. This suggests that, on certain occasions, we can at least speak of them as reasonable, if not as rational. ... It does not seem, therefore, that the passive states, which we call emotions, are *necessarily* either irrational or unreasonable. Nevertheless there is a tendency for them to be. (Peters, 1971, pp. 160-61)

Some emotions, such as indignation and jealousy, might be perfectly reasonable in that they can be based on true beliefs about and appropriate appraisals of the pertinent situation. Yet the rationality of these emotions still depends upon standards of appropriateness that are upheld in a specific cultural context or against the backdrop of a particular world-view. Although it is not necessarily unreasonable or irrational to be overcome by emotion, the contingent fact remains that the emotions as passive and turbulent mental states contain the potential for unreasonableness and irrationality in them. Emotions possess this tendency to irrationality because they are based on hasty appraisals and they also warp or cloud other judgements:

For as the appraisals, which are intimately connected with them, are of situations which are very important to us, they are often made rather intuitively and urgently, with little careful analysis of the grounds for making them. They are also the most potent *source* of irrationality in that attention to features which are relevant to making *other* sorts of judgements is often deflected by irrelevant appraisals which are conceptually connected with our emotions. (ibid., p. 161)

However, even if the emotions are liable to unreasonableness and irrationality, they are not impervious to reason and will. As Peters' appraisal view makes clear, reason is not the slave of the passions but is capable of exercising a marked influence on them by the rationalization of emotion-appraisals and the rational control over emotional passivity.

Conversely, the passions also have a distinct influence on the use of reason. According to Kant, (pure) reason is independent from our emotional inclinations, while according to Hume, reason is merely the ability to make inductive and deductive inferences cut off from the discrete existence of the passions. As against both of these views, Peters argues for the *conceptual connection* between the operation of reason and a specific type of passions, which he calls 'the rational passions'.

Peters claims that reason cannot properly function unless it is supported by *rational passions*. The operation of reason as a transcending movement is unintelligible without these specific emotions in the service of reason:

There is a level of conduct connected with the use of reason which is only intelligible on the supposition that we postulate certain distinctive passions as well as the ability to infer, demonstrate, etc. The obvious overriding one is the concern about truth, without which reasoning in general would be unintelligible. ... anyone who is concerned about truth must be concerned about correctness — about getting his facts right; he must care about consistency and clarity; he must abhor irrelevance and other forms of arbitrariness; he must value sincerity. And so on. (Peters, 1971, pp. 169-70)

The love of truth is also connected with not only the love of order and system but also the hatred of contradictions and confusion. The use of reason requires suitable emotional dispositions, such as the determination to find out what really is the case in combination with the feeling of humility and the sense of givenness necessary for accepting the possibility that one may be in error. A person who is influenced by passions of this specific type is a reasonable man, whereas the unreasonable man "is a victim of prejudice and egocentricity ... biased and short-sighted ... obtuse, wilful, arbitrary and pigheaded" (Peters 1973, p. 79). The rational passions are, therefore, "of cardinal importance in high-grade experience. They act as monitors maintaining rational thought and action". (Peters, 1971, p. 166).²

The rational passions sustain not only the operation of theoretical reason but also that of *practical reason*:

These passions ... are internalisations of principles which give structure and point to theoretical enquiries; but they are also involved in practical activities and judgements in so far as these are conducted in a rational manner. (ibid., 1971, p. 170)

The concept of rational passions is primarily connected with that of different passions surrounding the concepts of truth and objectivity. Reason is universally

at work in theoretical enquiries as well as in practical activities and judgements. The universality of reason in the theoretical domain corresponds with its *impartiality* in the practical domain. So, the concept of rational passions is secondarily connected with that of different passions surrounding the concepts of truthfulness and fairness. As internalized rational principles, the rational passions in the service of practical reason function, therefore, as universalistic motives and self-transcending emotions. Rational passions, as stable moral sentiments, such as the sense of justice, respect for persons and benevolence, provide the moral motivation to apply the otherwise inert principles of justice and impartial consideration.

2.2. The levels of life

To briefly summarize the line of thought until this point, reason has a passionate dimension and passions have a reasonable dimension. The life of reason is not inconsistent with a life of passion. So, against the antithesis between reason and passion, Peters defends the integrative view that reason and passion mesh with each other. In the light of this view, he subsequently reinterprets Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. Peters supplements Kohlberg's cognitivism with an affective aspect.³ Against the backdrop of the integrative view, he develops this supplementation into a sketchy but suggestive theory of *the levels of life*. Given that the antithetic contrast between reason and passion is untenable, Peters proposes, as an alternative, the contrast between different levels of life, with at each level a specific interconnection of rationality and the emotions. Roughly parallel with Kohlberg's theory, he distinguishes between three levels (Peters, 1971, pp. 162-71; 1973, pp. 91-101):

- A. Arational or Irrational;
- B. Unreasonable; and
- C. Reasonable or Autonomous.

These levels of life should not only be interpreted diachronically, as the Kohlbergian sequence of stages, but also synchronically, in the sense that even reasonable and autonomous adults are still liable to irrational and unreasonable thinking and acting. Actually, Peters adds a novel, basic level to the Piagetian-Kohlbergian levels of moral development under the inspiration of Freud, namely the arational or irrational one (A). In addition, he compresses two of their levels — namely, the egocentric (pre-moral) and heteronomous (moral realistic)

ones — into a single level: the unreasonable one (B). The three different levels of life specify different levels of reasoning, each with its own type of passions. Accordingly, Peters distinguishes a high(er)-grade type of experience from a low(er)-grade type experience in his hierarchy of levels. I briefly describe each level.

First, there is a basic level of life below the absolute minimum level of rationality and conceptuality:

There is a level of thinking and affect which precedes the development of the conceptual apparatus necessary for life as a purposive, rule-following agent, and which persists after the development of this apparatus which we associate with 'reason'. The individual thus retains this capacity to react much more 'intuitively' to affectively significant stimuli that are fragmentary and may be well below the threshold of conscious discrimination. (Peters, 1971, pp. 164-65)

Very young children at this level are called 'arational' or 'non-rational' because there is not yet a rational background present, while adults relapsing to this level are called 'irrational' — that is, contrary to rationality — precisely because they relapse from such a background. Freud characterizes this level negatively in terms of the lack of the rational categories of non-contradiction and causality, as well as that of the reality principle, and positively in terms of the vicissitudes of (unconscious) wishes and aversions (Peters, 1965, pp. 376-79). In Peters' theory the basic level of life represents the *animality* of man.

Secondly, there is the unreasonable level of life, at which beliefs tend to be infected with particularity or arbitrariness and emotions tend to be of a 'gusty' type, such as lust and envy which are dominated by the pleasures and pains of the moment. Although, at this level, there is a rational background present and persons are responsive to reasons, the reasons they have are very weak and not objectified by the reasons of other people:

Being unreasonable ... is not connected, like being irrational, with a level on which reason gets no grip. Rather it is connected with a level of life when there are reasons, but the reasons are of a pretty low-grade sort. It is a level of life in which notions such as 'bias', 'prejudice', 'short-sighted', 'obtuse', 'wilful', 'bigoted' and 'pig-headed' have a natural home. (Peters, 1971, p. 168)

Since the reasons are largely self-referential in that they are considerations without giving due weight to the reasons of others, it is readily understandable that Peters includes the Piagetian-Kohlbergian egocentric (pre-moral) and heteronomous (moral realistic) levels in his unreasonable level. So, both the egoist and the conformist are, each in his own way, unreasonable and inauthentic.

Thirdly, and finally, there is the reasonable or autonomous level of life — the point of culmination of *the life of reason*. Also at this level, the specific cognitive and affective aspects are bound together. The person's capacity for rational reflection and critical thinking in the service of truth and objectivity takes front stage. Yet the exertion of this capacity is impossible without the motivating role of the rational passions, in particular the concern about truth. By exercising the capacity for reflection and criticism weak *prima facie* reasons are eliminated, whereas strong ones are transformed into all-things-considered reasons. By the same use of reason transient emotions are either canalized in innocuous directions or transformed into stable sentiments. The effective adoption, under the influence of the rational passions, of such a rational attitude towards life transforms it not only into a reasonable life but also into an autonomous or authentic life. The life of reason is, however, precarious as it is vulnerable to relapses from rationality into unreasonableness or irrationality.

Demonstrably, then, Peters' integrative view of reason intermeshing with passion develops into a theory of human nature and an attendant conception of rationality. In the light of his theory of the levels of life, it is arguable that Peters does *not* subscribe to the two main tenets White singles out: the bifurcation of human nature and the Kantian conception of rationality. Peters' theory of human nature is much more holistic than White suggests and there exists a striking cohabitation of reason and passion at each level of life that is orthogonal to the Kantian isolation of rationality from the emotions. In this important sense, Peters is not a Kantian philosopher. At the same time it can hardly be denied that his philosophical approach was deeply influenced by Kant – especially in his *Ethics and Education* (1966). Yet, whatever Peters' self-interpretation was, the Kantian influence mainly stayed at the *formal* level, particularly in his use of transcendental arguments. At the content level, it transpires that Peters is deep down a Stoic, as I will argue below.

What is more, Peters' integrative view widens still more into, what I call, his 'synthetic view' of the world and human life. While expounding this view, I also take a look at its consequences for Peters' conception of education and its aims.

3. The synthetic view: educating for life

Against the backdrop of Peters' later writings, answering the question 'How do we adequately conceive of moral development and moral education?' amounts

to answering the question ‘How do we adequately conceive of *education and its aims* as such?’ In his earlier writings, Peters starts off with an analytic view to answer this question about the nature of education. The concept of education is analysed in terms of the conditions of desirability, knowledge conjoined with understanding, and intrinsicness in relation to an initiation into a form of life. (Peters 1963; 1966, part one) This conception of education as an initiation into the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake has been criticized, among others by John White (1984), for being (too) narrowly *rationalistic* as it focuses one-dimensionally on the development of the child’s cognitive faculties.

However, in the light of his later writings, it transpires that Peters eventually does not hold such a narrow conception of education. In this later work, Peters’ thinking develops towards a far more broad conception that places education in the context of his overarching metaphysical world-view and philosophy of life, that is, his *synthetic* view.

Peters identifies education not only with *moral* education —“all education is ... moral education” (Peters, 1970, p. 73) — but also, by the transitivity of identity, with *liberal* education: “my conception of moral education is indistinguishable from the ideal of a liberal education” (*ibid.*, p. 81). At first sight, this might be surprising, but on a closer look, in the light of several of Peters’ assumptions, it is fully understandable. Given the more specific concept of education that Peters contrasts with the more generalized one and his broad ethical pluralism which includes worthwhile activities on the list of essential moral features, the identification of education as such with moral education is readily comprehensible. And in view of, once more, that specific concept of ‘the educated man’ and Peters’ conception of liberal education as an education for a ‘humane’ and ‘civilized’ life, the further identification of education with liberal education plausibly follows. Of course, one cannot deny that *reason* plays a pivotal role in moral as well as liberal education, and thus in education as such. Educating for life is, according to Peters, educating for *the life of reason*, in which the ideal of reasonableness and the concern about truth take central stage.

Some may find this rational view objectionable. But is it? Is this objectionable? Is this indefensible? I think not. Peters’ educational theory is evidently erected on the ancient ideas that mature human beings are rational animals and that the unexamined life is not worth living. Yet, although reason plays a leading part in this venerable tradition, theories in that tradition are not necessarily

rationalistic. Whatever the interpretation of these ancient ideas might have been in the history of philosophy, Peters does not identify reason as the highest good in his educational theory:

I do not wish ... to hold up reasonableness as the *summum bonum* or anything as pretentious as that. ... Reasonableness, rather, is to be understood as a way of going about life which is compatible with all sort of different emphases, with the pursuit of a variety of excellences. ... Reasonableness surely requires only a manner of travelling, not any particular destination. (Peters, 1973, pp. 101-102)

We can sum up this line of thought by putting forward the thesis that reasonableness or reason does not so much pertain to the content as to the *form* of conscious life. Education for the life of reason is, then, the sustained attempt to elicit and build up the rational form of the moral mode of experience in the broad sense. Educating children to become reasonable beings is educating them into a principled, rational morality in the broad sense. Reason is thus not a concrete aim, but only a formal one of moral and liberal education.⁴ The aim of education is the attainment of the reasonable or autonomous level of life. Arguably, this rational form of conscious life also includes an *affective* aspect, besides a cognitive one. The education of the *rational passions* is as central to the formation of the rational form of life as that of the rational principles: "... moral education is centrally concerned with the development of certain types of motives, especially with what I have called the rational passions" (Peters, 1970, p. 75). If there exists an intrinsic unity between reason and passion at all the different levels of life, then the education of the emotions is essential to education as such.

3.1. Religious rationality

Peters' conception of education is *not* narrowly *rationalistic* in the sense that education for life incorporates education for leading a passionate life in so far as this is compatible with leading a humane and civilized life. Yet, there is more to what Peters envisions as leading a life of reason. Surprisingly perhaps, being a truly reasonable man (or woman) also involves being aware of the *limits* of reason. Accordingly, educating for the life of reason is certainly not rationalistic because it implies educating for the appreciation of the *boundaries* of reason. Remarkably, Peters (1973, pp. 103-28) relates these limitations of reason to the *religious* dimension of a principled, rational morality. Religion, in a sense to be specified, is not opposed to the life of reason. Even for a reasonable man there is

a specific religious dimension to life precisely because it is his aspiration to lead a life a reason. Paradoxically perhaps, the appreciation of reason's boundaries engenders a transforming experience which constitutes, according to Peters, the possibility of religious experience for a reasonable man. The awareness of reason's limits has then further a positively transforming impact on the status of a rational morality and other aspects of the moral life.

This religious dimension of a rational morality has nothing to do with religious education understood as educating into one or other concrete religious denomination, such as a Christian or an Islamic one. What Peters calls 'religious experience' for a reasonable man — the transforming experience provoked by the awareness of reason's limits — has to be understood as an additional dimension of the *rational form* of consciousness against the background of Peters' synthetic view on world and life. I briefly sketch this ultimate dimension of his educational theory.

Although Peters has no worked-out philosophy of religion, he gives an answer to this key question: 'In virtue of what kinds of shared experiences do human beings come to agree about religious judgments?' (ibid., p. 106). According to Peters, religious judgements are neither based on revelation nor on religious facts, but on *emotional experiences of awe*:

Religion ... originates in experiences of awe, an emotion to which human beings are subject when they are confronted with events, objects, or people which are of overwhelming significance to them but which seem, in some important respect or other, inexplicable or shot through with contingency. (ibid., 1973, p. 106)

When significant events cannot be placed in the orderly system of ordinary events and explanations of them come to an end, these contingent events are prone to provoke feelings of awe in human beings. As an appropriate response to such impressive events, human beings engage in symbolic practices, such as worship and other rituals, to express these strong feelings, comparable with the method to canalize the passivity of emotions by expressing them in symbolic behaviour.

Peters applies, then, this general idea about the origins of religion in the phenomena of inexplicability and contingency to the specific case of *the reasonable man*. Whereas for primitive people the powers of nature are the primary objects of awe, for enlightened people more universal objects for such feelings of awe are made available by the development of Western civilisation. Two specific

objects engender awe in the reasonable man, namely the *universe* and the *human condition*. This is, of course, reminiscent of Kant's selection: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me" (Kant, 1788, p. 169 [162]).

Why do 'the starry heavens above me' and 'the moral law within me' incite feelings of awe — 'religious feelings' in Peters' sense — in a reasonable man? First, in trying to explain rationally the creation and continuation of the universe human beings reach the limits of reason, because in this special case they try to explain the spatio-temporal framework that is presupposed in all other causal explanation. "And to grasp this is to open up the possibility of a new level of awe which is possible only for a rational being who appreciates the limits of reason" (Peters, 1973, p. 108). A reasonable man can realize the inexplicability of the explanatory framework itself and appreciate in awe the ultimate contingency of the universe. He might in so experiencing also express his feeling with the use of the word 'God'.

Secondly, in reflecting rationally on their unique position in the natural world human beings again stumble on the boundaries of reason. It is perplexing how they, as free persons worthy of respect and, as it were, destined for eternity, relate to their temporary predicament in this world. Human life, inclusive the life of reason, appears as a mystery impenetrable for rational explanation. This baffling predicament that "we have to make something of the brief span of years that is our lot, with the variable and partly alterable equipment with which we are blessed" (*ibid.*, p. 110) provokes feelings of awe in those reflecting on it. A reasonable man can recognize this finite predicament of any man trying to make something of his life and appreciate in awe the existential contingency of "the inescapable cycle of the human condition, birth, youth, reproduction, bringing up children and death, together with its contrasts such as joy and suffering, hope and despair, good and evil" (*ibid.*, p. 112).

These feelings of awe with regard to the universe and the human condition are emotions to which a *reasonable* man is prone when rationally thinking about these two more universal objects. These emotions are, therefore, supplementary 'rational passions' and as such they also belong to the affective aspect of the rational form of conscious life, much in the same way as benevolence and the concern about truth do. Yet, in contrast with the other rational passions, the

feelings of awe represent the *deeper* dimension of the affective aspect included in the rational form of the moral mode of experience. So, as ‘religious feelings’ in Peters’ sense, they form the religious dimension of the principled, rational morality of a reasonable person.

Since these feelings of awe are intimately connected to this rational morality, they can also profoundly influence it. The deeper, religious dimension has a positively *transforming* impact on the fundamental principles and ultimate values of a rational morality as well as on the other facets of the moral life. The religious awareness of a reasonable man is derived from his background awareness of the predicament of human beings in the universe that triggers his feelings of awe. Such a background awareness has transforming power in that it opens up ‘a different level of experience made possible by concepts which enable us to understand the facts of a more mundane level of experience in a new light’ (ibid., p. 111). Given that “all seeing is seeing *as*” (ibid., p. 111), religious seeing is seeing the world as a new place different from its ordinary or mundane contours.

3.2. Peters’ Stoic attitude

In what way does the deeper, religious dimension of the rational form of a reasonable man transform the principles of a rational morality and the other facets of the moral life? Apart from the moral principles, I limit myself to the religious transformation of the worthwhile activities in life.⁵

Before elucidating the transforming impact of the religious dimension on moral principles, Peters’ basic philosophical attitude towards life should be made clear. Ray Elliott (1986, p. 46) writes that Peters’ “philosophy of life is founded on the Stoic precept that one should remedy such ills as can be remedied and accept without complaint those which cannot. ... his work is pervaded by Stoic moods, attitudes and values”. I agree with Elliott that Peters is deep down not so much a Kantian as a Stoic on the content level, as remarked above. Peters’ *Stoic attitude* as the most reasonable and appropriate attitude towards life comprises two major tendencies which should keep each other in balance: the *alterability* as well as the *acceptance* of the human condition. The tendency to alter the human condition when it is bad is connected to the belief in perfectibility and progress, whereas the tendency to accept the human condition when it is irreparable to the belief in truth and reason. The former tendency is activated by compassion or love, while the latter by the concern for truth. On these two ultimate values

the principles of a rational morality are based. We articulate these values when we alter for the best in the name of justice and respect, and when we accept the givenness of the human condition in the name of truth and honesty.

According to Peters, the religious background awareness of a reasonable man transforms, then, a rational morality by making its underpinning values and operative principles *more objective* and *prominent*: “Religious experience, ... by widening the context in which human life is viewed, has the function of enhancing our conviction of their objectivity and of providing emphasis for some of these values [and moral principles]” (Peters, 1973, p. 114). By placing the operation of moral principles and values in a setting which awakens awe, these principles and values are endorsed and emphasized. By concentrating religious attention on certain features of the human predicament—specifically, on human pain, suffering and death—and thereby investing them with universal significance, the moral principles and values are more strongly and objectively related to the existential contingency of human beings. In this way the religious dimension also exhorts or invigorates our moral response to the human predicament, and especially to human suffering. It does so for Peters on the basis of a principled, rational morality.

As for our appropriate moral response to this predicament, Peters recommends the Stoic attitude as the attitude that keeps a balance between utopianism and fatalism. On the one hand, he warns both progressives and romantics against the perils of human pride and vanity in their attempt to realize heaven on earth:

There is, after all, the givenness of the human condition and of certain facts of human nature. In the light of this any form of human perfectibilism is a dangerous delusion. ... To dream of utopias on earth is vain; for they are not possible. And it is dangerous; for men will do dreadful things to other men in order to make their dreams come true. (ibid., pp. 117-18)

On the other hand, Peters, of course, shows like every other civilized man indignation at the plight of the poor and the oppressed, and acknowledges that many evils are alterable by human effort: “The elimination of misery is incumbent on anyone who cares about the human condition; the promotion of happiness is, in moderation, a harmless hope” (ibid., p. 118).

Also with regard to the culmination point of moral development and education, Peters takes the same Stoic attitude. The rational autonomous person acting on a principled morality is not an individual striving for perfection and self-sufficiency in isolation from the social context into which he is born. Peters holds

the view that “the autonomy of the individual ... can be endorsed in a way which is compatible both with a shared background of experience and with openness to love” (ibid., p. 122). Certainly, the religious dimension of a rational morality transforms the principle of respect for persons into that of the sacredness of personhood: “And respect passes into reverence and a belief in the sacredness of human personality when the perspective and purpose of a particular man are viewed in the broader context of human life on earth” (ibid., p. 122). Yet, although the belief in personal autonomy is thereby endorsed and emphasized, the belief in the social nature of persons should, precisely out of respect for the givenness of the human condition, equally be endorsed and emphasized. Mature human beings are in essence not only rational animals but also social animals. So, as to the Stoic aspect of alterability, autonomy involves the potentiality for determining one’s own destiny by individual choices, while, as to the aspect of acceptance, autonomy equally requires the potentiality for grasping a public predicament in terms of shared concepts.

The religious background awareness of a person capable of a reasonable level of life positively transforms not only the form of morality but also *its content*, specifically the ethical domain of the worthwhile activities. Engagement in these ‘desirable’ activities is the primary means by which individuals can make something of their temporary lives on earth. Worthwhile activities are thus of special importance to the existential contingency of human beings. At the reasonable level of life, these activities are already singled out by reason because they permit plenty of scope for understanding and sensitivity, as well as for enhancing the quality of life. If taking up a rational attitude towards human activities transforms them into something worthwhile, how then does taking up a religious attitude, in Peters’ sense, towards these worthwhile activities transform them further?

This question can, given the connection between worthwhile activities and the existential contingency of humans, be put otherwise: How does ‘religion’ in Peters’ sense affect a reasonable person’s view of what he is going to do with his one and only life? Both questions about the transforming power of religion come down to Peters’ version of the classical question of *the meaning of life*:

Religion affects the individual’s choice of activities and the manner in which he conducts them by enlarging the context in which these activities are placed, by pressing the question whether this is all that a man can do with the brief flicker of consciousness that is his life. (ibid., p. 128)

To this question, Peters offers the suggestive answer that taking up the religious attitude makes a rational person aware of the *immanence* of life's meaning and the *heteronomy* of value:

First, ... [a rational person] must grasp the ultimate pointlessness of life, that it cannot, as a whole, be given meaning in the way in which meaning is given to events and actions *within life*; but he must also strive to discern point within it. For life, like works of art, can exhibit values that are self-contained, that define a quality of life. Second, he will not feel that, in facing this issue, he is 'choosing' his values ... Rather, he will feel drawn towards them and, in so far as he lets them work through him, he will feel a sense of humility and of awe. (ibid., p. 125)

From the religious standpoint, the worthwhile activities which constitute the life of reason derive their worthwhileness not from a transcendent source, traditionally identified as 'God' in monotheistic religions. The meaning of life is immanent to life itself. Worthwhile activities contain their worthwhileness in themselves. Yet, although the values realized in these activities are internal, they are not autonomously chosen by the people who are engaged in them. Since values are not of our own making, we have to acknowledge their givenness. Furthermore, since values as such are exercising an appeal, we have to respond to their appeal. We should let them work through us.

Against the backdrop of his Stoic attitude, Peters especially draws our attention to *truth*, *love* and *the relief of suffering* as the central values to which we must respond in the context of the human predicament. In trying to make something of our lives, we can respond to the demands of truth, love and pain-relief directly or indirectly. We can straight away devote our lives, for instance, to the pursuit of truth or the cause of justice in taking up an academic job or becoming a social worker. Alternatively, and more commonly, activities and professional occupations can be transformed and enriched by the manner in which they are conceived and carried out in the light of these central values. Either way of responding to their call gives focus to the attempt to make something of one's own finite life. In so responding and realizing these values in worthwhile activities, a reasonable person who is also 'religious' in Peters' sense gives a definite direction to what he is going to do with his temporary life. Consequently, by taking up a religious attitude towards his life, he relates himself at the same time to his own mortality, to the fact that his life on earth covers only a brief span of time. In this perspective of the existential contingency of human beings, Peters aptly reminds us of

the Platonic wisdom that “to learn how to live [in philosophizing] is also to learn how to die” (ibid, p. 128).

3.3. ‘Religious’ education

What is the consequence of Peters’ synthetic view for his conception of education? Although demonstrably his integrative view on reason and passion widens into a metaphysical world-view and philosophy of life, he himself never makes explicitly the connection between this synthetic view and the concept(ion) of education. Nevertheless, it is possible to bring to light the way in which his ‘religious’ view *implicitly* determines how he conceives of education in his later writings. I already made the points that, for Peters, moral, liberal and education as such are, in the sense explained, identical to one another and that reason is the formal aim of education. This extended conception of education gets a new expression in the last paper Peters wrote on educational aims:

Education surely develops a person’s *awareness* by enlarging, deepening and extending it. Its impact is cognitive, but it also transforms and regulates a person’s attitudes, emotions, wants and actions because all of these presuppose awareness and are impregnated with beliefs. ... the purpose of education is ... to prepare people ... for life. ... a worthwhile life, not just keeping alive; ... Towards what situations, then, is the development of awareness [education] to be directed ...? The answer can only be ‘the human condition’. (Peters, 1979, pp. 33-34)

Here a still more broad conception of education, inspired by Peters’ synthetic view, is implicitly at work. Education is teaching children how to live by initiating them into not only a cognitive framework of knowledge and understanding but also into moral, emotional and existential perspectives on the human condition. Education for life is education for the life of reason in Peters’ highly complex sense of ‘reason’, including the reasonableness of appreciating the limits of reason. As for the form of reason’s life, educating involves developing a principled morality and a rational affective sensibility in children, while, as for the content of reason’s life, educating involves bringing them to engage with worthwhile activities. Since the deeper, religious awareness has a positively transforming impact on the form as well as the content of the life of reason, ‘religion’ in Peters’ sense has a distinct influence on education and its aims as well. In the best of all possible worlds, an education for leading a humane and civilized life implies, therefore, a religious education *of sorts*:

... they will be scarcely human if they have not reflected on the place of man in the natural and historical orders. In many the contingency, creation and continuance of the world, which are beyond the power of man to comprehend, give rise to awe and wonder. The human condition is viewed in a wider perspective, under 'a certain aspect of eternity', and ways of life are generated that transcend and transform what is demanded by morality and truth. (ibid, p. 41)

Correspondence

Stefaan Cuypers

e-mail: stefaan.cuypers@kuleuven.be

NOTES

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² For further reflections on the rational passions congenial to Peters view, see Scheffler 1977. See also Harvey Siegel's (1988, pp. 34-42) distinction between the 'reason assessment component' and the 'critical spirit' component of critical thinking.

³ For Peters' supplementation of Kohlberg, see Cuypers 2014.

⁴ Peters already defends the thought that education does not have a concrete aim, but only a formal one, i.e. *a principle of procedure*, in his *Must an educator have an aim?* (1959).

⁵ For the relation between the religious dimension and the three other moral facets – motives and emotions, qualities of the will and role-responsibilities – see Peters 1973, pp. 118-20.

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JOHN DEWEY: EDUCATION AS ETHICS, ETHICS AS EDUCATION¹

Kenneth W. Stickers

Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA

Abstract: John Dewey was arguably the most influential philosopher of education in the twentieth century. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the timeliness of Dewey's philosophy of education for us today with respect to the organic relationship between ethics and education that Dewey saw, by showing the centrality of education for Dewey's philosophy, that is, how for him, indeed, all philosophy is philosophy of education; further, how all education is moral philosophy; and hence how all philosophy pertains to moral education. Central to Dewey's understanding of both education and ethics is his notion of 'growth': education creates the conditions for students' ongoing growth, and the promotion of growth defines 'ethics.' Dewey's message is an important one for us today when there are such strong tendencies to reduce education to mere technical training: such training, for Dewey, is neither education nor ethical.

Keywords: John Dewey

Dewey on ethics of education

What is the relationship between ethics and education? It is appropriate to turn to the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey for an answer to this question for several reasons. Dewey is among the most influential philosophers of education internationally, but also 2015 marks the 100th anniversary of his most significant work on education, *Democracy and Education*. Indeed, Dewey is perhaps the most studied philosopher in the world today, and much of the interest in him focuses upon his philosophy of education. This should be no surprise since Dewey claimed that all philosophy is ultimately philosophy of education – the very idea of 'philosophy' is fundamentally tied to the very idea of 'education.' Indeed, according to Dewey, "Philosophy may be defined as the general theory of education; the theory of which education is the corresponding art or

practice" (MW7, p. 303).² The relationship between philosophy and education is thus an intimate one. One finds such a view in Plato, for whom, Dewey notes, "Philosophy and education were organically connected." However, Dewey laments, "The vital bond of union has long since been broken" (LW5, p. 292).

Dewey also claimed that all education is moral education, that is, the central aim of education is the improvement of human character and conduct. The term 'moral education' is thus, in one sense, a redundancy, since all education is ultimately moral, that is, has a moral end or purpose, and hence it is not to be contrasted with non-moral education, which for Dewey, does not exist. In another sense, though, the term simply underscores that point, that all education is moral. Hence, all philosophy is ultimately moral education: "Whenever philosophy has been taken seriously, ... it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life" (MW9, p. 334).

It is my aim here to demonstrate the timeliness of Dewey's philosophy of education for us today with respect to the organic relationship between ethics and education that Dewey saw, by showing the centrality of education for Dewey's philosophy, that is, how for him, indeed, all philosophy is philosophy of education; further, how all education is moral philosophy; and hence how all philosophy pertains to moral education.

Dewey would agree with Aristotle especially when Aristotle claimed that ethics "does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the [other sciences], for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use" (*Nicomachean Ethics* II, p. 2). Like those in the ancient and medieval traditions, Dewey held that the purpose of all learning is ultimately to make persons better, although he disagreed with them about the meaning of 'better.' Indeed, classical thinkers assumed that 'better' requires a 'best,' an assumption found, for example, in Thomas Aquinas's fifth argument for the existence of God. Dewey, by contrast, was a meliorist and contended that improvement was possible without some conception of a 'best' or ultimate 'Good,' identified in Christianity and other religions with 'God.' (We will see later how Dewey's claim is possible.)

Furthermore, Dewey agreed with Aristotle regarding the importance of habits: knowledge is to be used for the improvement of habits, whereby we do good as a matter of 'second nature' and take delight in doing so. Without good habits we would find ourselves paralyzed by the countless decisions that we constantly must make: good habits free us to devote our intelligence and

energies to solving problems that could not be anticipated and for making decisions regarding those matters outside of one's routine. Indeed, there is a substantial body of scholarship on Dewey that interprets him as part of the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, and in other respects (e.g., Sleeper, 1986). (He is also often interpreted as a sort of utilitarian or consequentialist, but certainly never as a deontologist, Kantian or otherwise.)

Traditionally, though, notions of 'good' and 'better' were understood teleologically, that is, by reference to what were imagined to be the true and proper ends for which we, both as humans and as individuals, were created. Dewey, too, was a teleological thinker, but he extensively criticized philosophers, like Aristotle, who dichotomized ends, the subject of *theoria*, or theoretical reason, and means, the subject of *phronesis*, or practical reason. For Dewey the effective positing of ends is always in light of available means, what he termed "ends in view," and ends posited as ideals independent of the means for achieving them are empty and serve no effective moral end: they do nothing to make us or our world better. As Dewey writes:

To profess to have an aim and then neglect the means of its execution is self-delusion of the most dangerous sort....When we take means for ends we indeed fall into moral materialism. But when we take ends without regard to means we degenerate into sentimentalism. In the name of the ideal we fall back upon mere luck and chance and magic or exhortation and preaching; or else upon a fanaticism that will force the realization of preconceived ends at any cost. (MW12, p. 121)

In other words, the separation of ends from means can easily lead to ideological oppression.

Dewey understands 'good' and 'better' in terms of 'growth.' Indeed, for him, "growth itself is the only moral 'end'" (MW12, p. 181). Growth is qualitative, not quantitative: it pertains not just to our biological bodies but to the quality of embodied experience. Growth is, for Dewey, increasing "richness of meaning, and its [experience's] revelation of new possibility" (LW17, p. 65) — i.e., the capacity to see within experience itself new possibilities for living more fully. It is the enhanced capacity "for later experiences of a deeper and more expansive quality" (LW13, p. 28), that is, the increased ability to experience one's world in an ever-increasing order of richness, intensity, and complexity. Growth is an expanding sense of wholeness, or integrity, of experience, a deepening feeling of meaningfulness in life. Thus, education is the cultivation of those habits that

foster a deeper and richer experience of meaning in life, and what fosters such cultivation is also what Dewey understands by the 'ethical.' Education is thus inseparable from ethics, and the ethical is also inseparable from the aesthetic: 'ethics,' 'education,' and 'aesthetics' all refer in different ways to the same process, namely, the promotion of human growth, understood as the enrichment of human experience, the deepening of feelings of meaningfulness in embodied living.

Furthermore, the imparting of information and the instruction in certain skills without consideration of the moral ends for which such knowledge and skills are to be used, is not education, for Dewey, no matter how sophisticated they might be, but merely technical training. He feared already in his own day that colleges and university were devolving from institutions of higher education into glorified trade schools, producing human resources for industry rather than educating people for growth and meaningful lives, as well as for responsible democratic citizenry, as we shall see later.

Dewey saw education as thoroughly continuous with life and vehemently opposed the notion that education is preparation for living, especially for earning a living: "the most needed of all reforms in the spirit of education" is, Dewey claimed, "Cease conceiving of education as mere preparation for later life, and make of it the full meaning of the present life" (EW4, p. 50): "education ... is a process of living and not a preparation for future living" (EW4, p. 87). Education is not preparation for life but is life itself in its deepest expression.

The fullest life, a life of growth, is one of ongoing education: it is living that continuously makes itself maximally open to future, richer, more intense, more complex, and better integrated experiences. To be fully alive is to be a life-long learner.

Because of his claim that all education is ultimately moral, it might seem odd that the word 'ethics' or 'ethical' never appears in the text of Dewey's *Democracy and Education* (MW, p. 9). (It appears only in the titles of several works cited in Dewey's references.) He did, however, write two entire books on 'ethics,' in which he takes 'ethics' and 'morality' synonymously (LW7, p. 9) and describes how both pertain to the process whereby we educate ourselves and others, in the manner just described, to live richer, more integrated lives. He explains that both 'ethics' and 'morality' can be taken in a two-fold sense: they refer on the one hand to the current rules governing a society, but on the other hand they refer to our critical reflection upon and improvement of those rules (LW7, p. 10).

Education, as fundamentally a moral enterprise, needs to take the two terms in both senses. In order to grow, students must understand and be able to contend with the restrictions that their societies places upon them, but for Dewey there is no intrinsic value in conforming to the rules of conventional morality for its own sake. Ethics is not to be found in mere conformity to moral principles and rules, whether they come from social convention or from philosophy. Moral principles and rules are important instruments, or conceptual, analytic tools, for facilitating growth, but like all tools, however, one needs to know their appropriate application. Moreover, conventional moral norms commonly conflict, and growth thus requires an intelligent ability to adjudicate such conflicts. Thus, ethics is not just about acting 'rightly,' that is, in conformity with certain principles or rules — in this respect Dewey distinguishes the (moral) 'right' from the 'good' (LW7, pp. 214-17). Rather, ethics involves the appropriate use of such principles and rules for the promotion of growth.

Experience, democracy, and science

Ethics, then, for Dewey, is in the service of growth, and growth pertains to the qualitative enhancement of experience. In his later book on philosophy of education, *Experience and Education*, Dewey thus argues that every sound educational theory must begin with a theory of experience (LW13, pp. 11-16). It is a mistake, though, to think that experiences are inherently educational, as when people cliché-ishly claim, "we learn from experience." Sometimes we do, but sometimes we do not. Some experiences, especially traumatic ones, can retard growth. As Dewey notes, "Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. An experience may be such as to engender callousness; it may produce lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness. Then the possibilities of having richer experience in the future are restricted" (LW13, p. 11). He goes on to say, "when and *only* when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing" (LW13, p. 20). Experiences need to be structured in order to be educative, and that is the function of the teacher: to help structure the students' experiences so as to open them to new experiences, with ever-increasing richness, complexity, and integrity.

Dewey thought that another common mistake in the educational theories of his day was to assume that experiences are strictly personal and even private,

and this (false) assumption is the basis for a false dichotomy between the personal growth of students and the demands of society. The war between so-called 'traditional' and 'progressive education' is based largely upon this false dichotomy, according to Dewey. Advocates of 'traditional education' claim that the main purpose of education is the transmission of culture and cultural norms (e.g., Hirsch, 1987; 1996), and they criticize advocates of 'progressive education,' such as Dewey, for feeding children's narcissism, that is, preoccupation with their own experiences, understood as private, and of ignoring the duties and requirements of social, civic life. Advocates of 'progressive education,' often following Rousseau, see cultural traditions and social demands as stifling children's creativity and growth and thus imagine that growth requires liberation from social norms.

Dewey did consider himself an advocate of progressive education but not in the sense that is rightly criticized. "All experience is ultimately social," Dewey claims (LW13, p. 21), both in its context and in its communication. Every experience occurs within a social context, even those of Robinson Crusoe, whose every effort aims to regain contact with others. Furthermore, we continuously choose which experiences we will share and not share with others: Crusoe longs for someone with whom to share his experiences. Dewey does not deny that we often feel a tension between our personal needs and social demands, but this does not mean that the two are fundamentally dichotomous. One of our deepest needs is to feel socially integrated and hence to overcome such a tension between self and others. Indeed, a major aspect of the sense of wholeness that is entailed in 'growth' is such a sense of social integration: a feeling that my needs and interests are continuous, or at least harmonious, with those of others. Discontinuity, in the form of fear, suspicion, and mistrust, on the other hand, is a major impediment to growth, needing to be overcome. There is no dichotomy or inherent conflict between the individual and the social, for Dewey, a point that he especially argues in *Individualism Old and New* (LW5). Humans are from the very beginning social creatures: socialization begins already in the womb. Healthy societies nurture healthy, creative individuals, and reciprocally healthy, growing individuals are necessary for healthy societies. Similarly, for Dewey, culture is continuous with nature, the central point of Dewey's *Experience and Nature* (LW1), which later Dewey claimed should have been entitled "Culture and Nature" (LW1, p. 361). Culture is life consciously modifying itself and the environment in order to bring about greater possibilities for growth and increased richness and integrity of experience: it emerges from nature, from human life itself, and is not some

supernatural force, or 'spirit,' imposing itself upon nature, in the dichotomous manner in which it is often imagined.

Moral education thus begins, for Dewey, with cultivating the student's attunement to social life, to others, that is, by fostering the student's senses of sympathy and compassion. One grows by realizing that initially felt conflicts between personal needs and social demands are ill-interpreted. What others want from and desire in life is not fundamentally different from what I want from and desire in life, and so much of growth entails transforming what we individually experience initially as 'mine' into 'ours.' Others, 'society,' cease to be experienced as barriers to personal growth but become increasingly understood as necessary for it and hence as ontologically continuous with oneself.

So, we have seen so far how moral education consists, for Dewey, not in learning 'correct' ethical principles or rules but in learning appropriate uses and experimentally reconstructing such principles and rules in the service of growth, understood as the increased capacity for richness and wholeness in future experiences, which are always both personal and social.

Another common criticism of Dewey's philosophy of education is that the notion of 'growth' is too vague to provide an effective basis for educational policy and planning or for any sort of integrated curriculum (e.g., Bloom 1987; Hirsch 1987, 1996). This criticism, I believe, stems from a failure to connect Dewey's understanding of education adequately with two other central notions in his philosophy: 'science' and 'democracy.' 'Education,' 'science,' and 'democracy' must all be understood in relation to one another. Once we understand these connections, then it becomes clear that Dewey provides extensive detail regarding what a curriculum aimed at promoting the growth of students looks like.

Science, for Dewey, is not a matter of knowing the world in a detached, disinterested, 'objective' manner. As Richard Rorty (1981) has famously shown, Dewey rejected the notion that knowing is a matter of representing or 'mirroring' the world. The activity of science is continuous with the efforts of living, human creatures to bring about more stable relationships with their environment, both natural and social. Discontinuity between an organism and its environment creates, as Charles Peirce had already described, the feeling of 'irritation,'³ a sign that the organism is in danger. The task of intelligent, scientific inquiry then is, first, to transform vague feelings of irritation into well-defined 'problems,' second, to bring existing knowledge to bear upon those problems so as enable one to formulate hypotheses regarding the causes of the irritations, and hence

the theoretical resolution of the problems, and third, to test the hypotheses experimentally and thus actually to solve the problem. The method of science, again as Peirce had already described, is thus the best method for relieving the irritations of life compared to three other methods tried by mankind, namely, the method of tenacity, whereby one simply clings to past beliefs in the stubborn hope that eventual they will prevail; the method of authority, whereby one dogmatically appeals to some authoritative text or personage; and the *a priori* method, whereby one acts merely in accord with what 'seems rights' or 'sounds good,' without looking for experimental verification of one's hypotheses. These other three methods all inevitably fail. The empirical testing of her hypotheses, by contrast, keeps the scientist open to experiences that will confirm or contradict her hypotheses and thus is more conducive to growth than the other methods, which arbitrarily close off future experiences.

Education, therefore, for Dewey, is to be scientific in the manner just described. It begins with students' felt irritations and the problems of life that they themselves — not the teacher — find most pressing. It then encourages students to bring to bear all relevant, available knowledge, regardless of discipline, in the formulation of hypotheses, which are then tested experimentally in the experienced world — the laboratory of life — keeping themselves open regarding the results.

Social life produces many irritations, which are to be addressed, according to Dewey, in the same scientific manner. Such irritations might stem from conflicts between persons' needs and wants, on the one hand, and social expectations, on the other, as I discussed previously, from disagreements between individuals, or even from contradictions produced by the efforts to apply different moral principles or rules to a problematic situation. Ethics pertains preeminently to such social conflicts, as we saw, as part of our effort to attune ourselves to social life, and thus involves the application of scientific, experimental method to their resolution. Such an application of scientific method to social life is what Dewey means by 'democracy.'

Democracy is thus not merely one political form alongside others but the application of scientific method to moral, social life, that is, to the effective resolution of the irritations — the disagreements and conflicts — that emerge from people living together. Democracy is not a matter of ideology but of practical, pragmatic, effective, but fallibilistic resolution of public problems, in accord with the experimental method of science. Indeed, in *Freedom and Culture* (1939),

Dewey lists several features that science and democracy share: “freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific method” (LW13, p. 135). Democracy is openness to the public testing of informed hypotheses in solving public problems. As Dewey wrote on the occasion of his eightieth birthday, in “Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us” (1939):

Democracy as compared with other ways of life is the sole way of living which believes wholeheartedly in the process of experience as end and as means; as that which is capable of generating the science which is the sole dependable authority for the direction of further experience and which releases emotions, needs and desires so as to call into being the things that have not existed in the past. For every way of life that fails in its democracy limits the contacts, the exchanges, the communications, the interactions by which experience is steadied while it is also enlarged and enriched. The task of this release and enrichment is one that has to be carried on day by day. Since it is one that can have no end till experience itself comes to an end, the task of democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute. (LW14, pp. 229-30)

So, moral education — and recall that, for Dewey, all education is fundamentally moral: it is about the improvement of character, conduct, and habits — is to be guided by the principles of science and democracy. Students are to be taught the methods of scientific, experimental inquiry and, as responsible democratic citizens, to apply those methods to public life. Much more, of course, can be said about what both ‘science’ and ‘democracy’ entail, but what I have said here only briefly is sufficient, I believe, to indicate that these notions provide more than what is required for effective educational planning and policy and the creation of coherent, effective curricula. Students are to be taught moral principles not as abstractions to be memorized but as ideas to be used and tested in the actual solving of social problems that they themselves feel and identify as problems.

Conclusion

John Dewey was one of the most prolific writers in the entire history of philosophy, in large part due to his long, healthy life. He wrote about every aspect of philosophy — metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, politics, logic, aesthetics — but his writings all revolve around and point toward one thing: moral educa-

tion, understood as learning how to grow as a person, how to open and refashion oneself so as to experience the world with ever-increasing richness, intensity, complexity, and wholeness, and hence how to experience living in an ever-more meaningful manner. Such then is the central issue to which all matters concerning educational curriculum and policy are to return constantly: what are the tools, both material and conceptual, that our students most need and are most useful to them in order to grow in the manner Dewey so describes?

Clearly one set of tools will not be equally appropriate for all students, and so the central challenge of the art and science of teaching – and Dewey did think that education is both an art and a science – is the proper matching of learning tools to students. Teaching is an art insofar as it requires an aesthetic sense for the wholeness of living and a feeling for what fits an individual student, but it is also a science insofar as it requires constant empirical testing of the teacher's best hypotheses regarding what will best work for each student – experimentation. Obsessive efforts to standardize curriculum thus, for Dewey, are unscientific, because they undermine the need for such experimental testing and readjustment of one's methods, and they poison the educational process: nothing kills education more than a priori efforts to determine in advance for each and every student what constitutes his or her growth, and whatever stands in the way of growth is what Dewey understood as 'unethical.'

So one of the most important ways in which Dewey's philosophy of education is so relevant today is that it provides powerful conceptual resources for resisting the move that we see in so many countries toward standardization of educational curricula, often in the name of a business-like notion of 'efficiency,' whereby students are conceived as uniform products, to be produced in assembly-line fashion. Such efforts, Dewey shows us, only effectively and efficiently poison students' vital love of learning and kill the spirit of education as growth. Such so-called 'education' is, for Dewey, immoral; indeed, as we have seen, it is not even education.

Correspondence:

Kenneth W. Stickkers

e-mail: kstikker@siu.edu

NOTES

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² I use here the standard format for citing Dewey’s writings in his collected works. EW = *Early Works*; MW = *Middle Works*; LW = *Later Works*. The first number pertains to the volume, and the second number, to the page(s).

³ “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry” (Peirce 1877, p. 5).

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ON SPEAKING TO VIOLENCE IN POST-APARTHEID SCHOOLS

Nuraan Davids & Yusef Waghid

Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Abstract. Post-apartheid South African schools are contending with unprecedented incidents and rates of violence that have not only brought untold humiliation to learners and teachers alike but have, in many instances, forced schools to redefine the way in which they function, and indeed, if they function. Repeated forms of condemnation, policy re-strategising and punitive measures have not only been inadequate, but have laid bare the sheer unpredictability of violence and its forms. In offering a dual-dialogue – one in addressing violence and the other directed at the inadequate response from education authorities to violence – we offer an interpretative analysis on the one hand, of how to think about violence, and on the other hand, about how a citizenship education of becoming can deal with the unpredictable consequences of violence in its own potentiality. We commence by looking at violence in South African schools, followed by an exploration of encounters, and summoning others to speech as a means through which to speak to violence.

Keywords: post-apartheid schools, violence, democratic citizenship education, co-belonging, community of becoming

Introduction

Apartheid has been held responsible for many of the social ills and pains of South African society. This blight has been particularly severe in schools that played a revolutionary role, sometimes a violent one, in combating apartheid itself. Township schools, in particular, have indelibly been branded by their violent forms of protest and destruction – so much so, that even in the absence of a worthy contestation, the violence continues to seep through the classrooms and playgrounds of these schools. The profound irony is, of course, that schools were used as both a weapon against social injustice, and a means towards social justice. A widespread assumption was that once the path to social justice was

embarked through the abolition of apartheid, these schools would be prominent agencies in the promotion of peace. Yet, two decades into democracy the violence continues to determine how, and indeed whether, schools function at all. According to Zulu, Urbani and Van der Merwe (2004), violence at schools has gained momentum, as generation upon generation have become socialised into violence.

Violence upon violence

Reports on violence in schools – such as, the South African Council for Educators (SACE) *School-based violence report: An overview of school-based violence in South Africa* (2011), and *The dynamics of violence in South African schools: Report* (2013) – are in agreement that the various types of violence are influenced by both social and gender dynamics. While there are more obvious forms of violence, such as corporal punishment or bullying, there are more subtle forms of violence, such as spreading malicious rumours, cyber-bullying, threats, and sexual harassment. Hazing and initiation, for instance, according to Burton (2008), are more prevalent in private and well-established schools than in poorer or township schools. Moreover, violence occurs from learner to learner (between or across genders); from teacher to learner; from learner to teacher; from teacher to principal; from principal to teacher; from principal to learner; from learner to principal; from parent to learner, to teacher, to principal. Leoschut and Bonora (2007) contend that the increased exposure and reinforcement of aggression and violence serve to normalise violence – contributing to an increasingly violent society. This means that for many children violence has become such a part of their daily lives that it is no longer considered abnormal or problematic. In this regard, the prevalence of violence in schools is not necessarily considered as an unusual occurrence.

The attempts by teachers to remedy these multiple forms of violence have been largely inadequate – even hopeless. Such attempts have sometimes contributed to further violence, often justified by teachers as the only language through which to counter violence. Although illegal, but institutionally sanctioned at many schools, corporal punishment has been described as the most common internal violence perpetrated against learners. Male teachers, in particular, have displayed disturbing forms of aggression, such as physical assault and rape (Mncube and Harber, 2013). Reports, according to Mncube and Harber (2013),

include the rape of a 13 year old primary school learner; physical assault of a learner, which involved being grabbed by the neck and pushed down the stairs; and a teacher attempting to drown a learner in a fish pond, requiring a police officer to rescue the learner. In another incident related by Raubenheimer (Mncube and Harber, 2013), a learner attempted to commit suicide after his physical assault by a teacher became public knowledge.

Inasmuch, however, as teachers inflict violence onto learners – whether through corporal punishment or derogatory language – learners inflict violence onto teachers. According to the SACE ‘School-based Violence Report’ (2011), an important finding was the increase in reports of learners violently attacking teachers – with schools reporting on verbal abuse, threats, physical violence, and sexual violence against teachers. Relating the findings of the *2012 National School Violence Study*, Burton and Leoschut (2013) report that school leaders generally felt that their schools were places of safety for both their teachers and learners. Teachers, however, were less likely to express this view with only 70% of teachers reporting that they felt safe when teaching and 73.4% thought learners felt safe while on school premises. Reports from the Western Cape Education Department confirm that seven learners in 2011 and five in 2012 were expelled for physical assault or threatening behaviour. One of the teacher unions, the National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa (NAPTOSA), acknowledges that abuse by teachers is as rife as abuse by learners. Nevertheless teachers are reluctant to report abusive attacks for fear of losing face in the classroom or further intimidation. *The School-based violence report: An overview of school-based violence in South Africa* (2011) states that while attacks on teachers are under-reported, they highlight the vulnerability of teachers in South African schools as well as the problem of reports of school-based violence which construct teachers as the sole perpetrators.

Responses from the education authorities have taken many forms. These include several policy documents, such as Department of Basic Education’s *Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy* (2002) or the recently produced *Building a Culture of Responsibility and Humanity in Our Schools: A Guide for Teachers* (2011). Other strategies by the DoBE have included the prohibition of corporal punishment (Republic of South Africa 1996b) as stipulated in the South African Schools Act (1996). With regard to discipline the SA Schools Act (Section 8) empowers School Governing Bodies (SGBs) to adopt a learners’ code of conduct

after consulting teachers, learners, and parents, which is intended to establish a disciplined and purposeful school environment. Related documents and guidelines have included *Alternatives to Corporal Punishment* (Department of Education, 2000a), *Signposts for Safe Schools* (South African Police Service and Department of Education, 2002). Other measures have included various safety programmes, such as 'adopt a cop', 'captain crime stop', and 'Bambanani' (Joubert, 2008). And in an attempt to regulate teacher conduct the South African Council for Educators (SACE) prescribe that teachers should be guided by the *Code of Professional Ethics* (SACE, 2002). However, with children more likely to encounter violence at their schools than within their homes or communities (Leoschut and Bonora (2007: 107) and with teachers resorting to more aggressive forms of so-called discipline (Mncube and Harber, 2013; Zulu *et al.*, 2004), it does not seem that schools are effectively dealing with violence.

Given this dire situation, perhaps the time has come to re-consider and imagine new forms of response to violence.

Dis-enframing violence

A political philosopher, Chantal Mouffe's (2000), has argued that violence is to be accepted as part of human nature and as part of something called the 'dimension of the political'. For Mouffe, the rationalist view of human nature, which denies negative traits within society, such as violence, is not the necessary basis for democracy, but is instead its weakest point. She argues that the political community should not be seen as an empirical referent but rather as a discursive surface. To this end the political community is constituted by a multiplicity of beings and expectations. This means that there will always be those on the inside and those on the outside; those who are violated and those who are not. It also means that one of the ideals of post-apartheid South Africa, namely violence-free schools, is unrealisable. As a discursive surface, schools are not only open to diverse ways of thinking and being but they are also perpetually susceptible and vulnerable to violence. In other words, the idea or ideal of a violence-free school can never be realised because the political community of a school is constructed along a 'social imaginary'. Violence as part of human nature – which is akin to making us humans and therefore open to practices and beliefs of exclusion and discrimination – means that the 'social imaginary' of a violence-free society is inherently unattainable.

If we accept, as Mouffe does, that violence is to be accepted as part of human nature, then we have to accept the fact that learners in our schools possess the capacity for violence. Schools are not 'enframed' – that is, they are neither fenced off from their respective communities, nor are they limited to orthodox practices. It is therefore impractical to expect that schools might function in a vacuum and be disconnected from the society in which they find themselves. School dynamics are in a state of flux. Similarly, the types of violence that confront the society are unpredictable and uncontainable. We cannot, therefore, assume that the antidote to violence is the teaching of a particular form of citizenship since this would assume that we can compartmentalise or 'enframe' both violence and citizenship. Following Mouffe's argument it would be important to resist any temptation to ascribe a common political identity to all South Africans. Instead, what might be contended is that post-apartheid South Africa, while accepting 'submission to certain authoritative rules of conduct' (Mouffe, 1992), also accepts that different communities might have differing conceptions of the good. This also suggests that post-apartheid South Africa, while connected by a common bond, is without a definite shape and is in a process of continuous re-enactment. This means that we cannot think of communities, schools and schooling as a collective – because this would imply being assimilated into a dominant culture which shares a common good and therefore always runs the risk of exclusion. If we accept that schools are not 'enframed' (limited to orthodox practices) and if we accept that schools are constituted through violence by virtue of it being an accepted part of human nature, then it does mean that we have to start looking at schools differently. Learners, together with the homes and communities that constitute them, co-belong to a common bond of being at school. And the violence that they bring through their violations co-belong to the communities through which they are constituted. The response from schools to counter the violence, therefore, cannot be 'enframed' (that is, limited to orthodox practices) by what ought to be taught at schools or by what disciplinary procedures ought to be implemented.

On encountering and summoning others to speech

To enact one's humanity requires that one recognises the frailties within oneself and others and actually acts upon someone else's vulnerability. Cavell (1979) posits that related to one's connection with the other is the view that one has

to acknowledge humanity in the other, of which the basis for such action lies in oneself: 'I have to acknowledge humanity in the other and the basis of it seems to lie in me' (Cavell, 1979, p. 433). To this end it is insufficient to have knowledge of another's vulnerability, such as a student being bullied, and not act against it. The conception of responsibility we are arguing for here is strongly connected to a moral action that is informed by a sense of fairness and justice. To Derrida (1994) justice comes in the form of responsibility to the other as difference – that every individual has a responsibility to live with the other and to treat the otherness of the other justly. In not acting responsibly one does not enact one's humanity in relation to the other and so doing fails to recognize that one's humanity is so because of a relational co-belonging. This means that the teacher would need to re-consider her response to the bully. Instead of humiliating or excluding her, she would need to enact her responsibility to the bully by recognizing her humanity and then her vulnerability. The propensity for violence, while conceived and perceived as acts and positions of strength, might not necessarily be so. Rather, it might be better understood as an enactment of a vulnerability which has found a misplaced expression.

Schools, as constitutive of and constituted by society, have to be spaces where the cultivation of responsibility and humanity are uppermost in pedagogical encounters. The notion of a pedagogical encounter *vis-à-vis* being a citizen is premised on the following three considerations: driving oneself to act freely to actively taking a stand; being answerable to others; experiencing others rather than knowing them with certainty on the basis of curbing one's rush to judgement about others. Put differently, acting democratically means to announce your position. And, when people announce themselves they demonstrate the capacity to actualise their equality – that is, their ability to think, speak, and act freely to take a stand, or what Rancière (2007) refers to as disrupting the chains of reasons. Secondly, acting as an intelligible citizen actually involves summoning other people to use their intelligence – that is, 'an intelligible citizen is one who obliges the other person 'to realise his [her] capacity' (Rancière, 1991, p.15). Summoning people to use their intelligence is in fact to remind them that they can see and think for themselves, to prompt them about their abilities and capacities, and not just always relying on others to see and think for them. Unlike traditional views of citizenship education that aim to educate people to speak, a reconsidered citizenship education starts from the assumption that a person is already

intelligible: that is to say, a 'speaking being' (Rancière, 1991, p.11). To be an amateur citizen is to deal with what is imperfectly put on the table by others – without authoritatively rushing to judgement about say imperfect formulations of the concept democracy. As such the amateur citizen allows for the evocation and enactment of yet-to-be lived and realised experiences.

This means that what teachers teach and what learners learn have to be conceptualised and enacted from, and within a basis of responsible action, which will be expressed through a humane connectedness. A teacher's relationship with learners ought therefore to be shaped by an acknowledgement that they be considered as fellow human beings, and therefore respected. This form of respect emanates from a democratic iteration which not only encourages dialogue but is informed by a 'talking back'. As such, learners participate in the acknowledged co-belonging, they recognise their own potentiality in shaping their own views, without fear of being disregarded or humiliated. By engaging with views different to what they have known and believed to be true teachers create new pedagogical encounters and cultivate for themselves new ways of becoming. By teachers not acknowledging their learners as fellow beings and by learners not acknowledging their teachers as fellow beings, their engagement becomes merely that of talking to the other - and at times, talking past the other. In not recognizing the vulnerabilities inherent in each other the potentialities for both teachers and learners are not only impaired but stunted in terms of becoming.

On the cultivation of a school community of becoming

Following Aristotle, Agamben (1999) distinguishes two kinds of potentiality: generic potentiality such as saying that a child has the potential to know; and potentiality as becoming, associated with someone having knowledge or an ability to do and become. It is potentiality as becoming that interests Agamben, such as a teacher having the potential to teach (to do). On the one hand, a child who has the potential to learn (to do) is obliged to experience an alteration through learning – that is becoming another (Agamben, 1999). If there is no alteration in thought or opinion, then perhaps learning has not taken place. On the other hand, the child who has the potential to know (generic potentiality), 'is instead [one with] potential ... on the basis of which he can also *not* bring his knowledge into actuality by *not* making work', that is, by not learning.

In other words, the potential of learners to learn does not always mean they will actually learn. Rather, the potential of learners to learn can also have the effect whereby they do not learn – that is, a matter of their potentiality not passing into actuality – either through an unwillingness or incapacity to learn. A student's true potential to learn is associated with bringing all her incapability or impotentiality (potential not to be) to the act of learning without being annulled in actuality. To have potentiality does not mean that such potentiality will inevitably be actualised. In fact there can be no mis-educational experiences, not least ones that are violent in character; that bring about an annulment of the very potentialities they should have actualised. Lewis (2014) explains that what makes us human, according to Agamben (1999), is precisely the capability to not be, to remain im-potential; the potential to act otherwise or to be otherwise.

A school community of becoming is one that is potentially in the making – it is not yet but potentially it can be. As such, there is more hope in it (the becoming school community) to deal with violence- for at least three reasons: Firstly, a school community of becoming is not yet actually such a community, that is, a community that can deal with violence. It is potentially so with all its possibilities for failure in being such a community. In such a school community, the affiliate individuals, neither share an ascribed identity nor do they define themselves mainly in reference to their differences. Learners as members of a school community are affiliated on the grounds of being persons. In other words, members of a school community contest one another's membership in relation to prioritising their humanity. And if being human implies honouring the sacredness of life, members of a school community become internally disconnected from using violent ways to cause bodily harm, even death to others. As members of a community of becoming that co-belong, individuals of whatever identity endeavour to disrupt incidences of violence for the sake of being human and living their humanity. Such a school community of becoming does not make the end of violence its aim, instead the struggle against violence becomes a continuous human experience.

Secondly, a school community of becoming comprises 'whatever being[s]' in its singularity (Agamben, 1993, p. 20). Lewis (2011, p. 589) clarifies that Agamben's 'whatever being[s]' implies not belonging to any set or class. Agamben's occupation with 'whatever being', clarifies Lewis, is a counterpoise to what he conceives as the learning society's instrumental theory of potentiality

– that is, one which reduces potentiality as a means to an end. Instead, to Agamben, potentiality is a means without end – which according to Lewis, ‘is a form of belonging that does not impose predetermined conditions of belonging (such as this or that identity, intelligence, or class)’ (Lewis, 2011, p. 589). In this sense, members of a school community are not members because they belong to a school community but rather, for ‘its being-*such*, for belonging itself’ (Agamben, 1993, p. 2). So to consider members of a school community in their singularities would be tantamount to seeing them as beings such as those that can prevent or disrupt violence. By virtue of co-belonging in ‘whatever singularity’, learners would find new and unimagined ways of connecting with one another in the face of opportunities to deliberate – that is, listening and talking back to one another.

Thirdly, a school community of becoming also emphasises ‘the suspension of the transition from potential to act, and the maintenance of impotentiality within potentiality’ (Mills, 2008, p. 109). To be considered as a community that can be able to thwart violence is also to recognise that the act towards eliminating violence might not be without its predicaments. This in itself would make the desire to eradicate violence a potentiality or a possibility. This means that a school community intent on countering violence has the potential to do so and simultaneously the impotentiality to do so – that is, they are not able to do so. But the potentiality members of a school community of becoming has, makes it possible for members of such a community to exercise their freedom in their own singularity – ‘a singularity that is *finite*, and nonetheless, indeterminable’ (Agamben, 1993, p. 67). What this implies is that a school community of becoming in the quest to quell violence, freely expresses itself in a determinate and simultaneously in an indeterminate way in relation to whatever is ‘within an outside’ of the event. For Agamben (1993) ‘outside’ is at the threshold – ‘a passage’ that gives access to the event. More specifically, a school community of becoming is at the threshold. In not belonging to any set or class - that is, in ‘whatever being’, a school community of becoming is open to any number of configurations and reconfigurations, thereby experiencing ‘being-*within an outside*’ (Agamben, 1993, p. 67, italics in original). Our understanding of ‘being-within an outside’ implies that a school community of becoming sees itself as a community that sees violence from ‘within an outside’. Although the violence to be dealt with is outside of a community’s reach, it (the community) grasps an understanding of the violence as if it is experienced by them (the community). And being in such

a singularity at once places the community of becoming in a position to think of possibilities and impossibilities as to how the violence can be combated.

Through a reconsidered view of citizenship education learners are taught to bring about change without privileging any dominant cultural community – meaning that change is neither facilitated nor cultivated through the dominance of the collective but through the co-belonging to multiple singularities. And through a reconsidered view of citizenship education learners are initiated into practices of speech whereby they exercise the ‘free use of the self’ to speak their minds, yet suspend judgement that would ensure that communication continues even in the face of sometimes troublesome and disruptive speech. What follows from such a reconsidered view of citizenship education is that a community of becoming – that is, a community that is yet to be – is one that can contend with whatever comes its way, including acts of violence, because they recognise that communities of becoming are shaped by fluidity, rather than by something which is fixed or fixated. If learners are to be taught what it means to co-belong as humans they are in fact initiated into pedagogical activities that value respect for the sacredness of human life. Similarly, through a reconsidered view of citizenship education, learners are initiated into practices to see things differently and understand that they do not privilege this or that community or the dominant community to which they loyally support. They are taught that their beliefs and actions ought not to be pre-determined by the community to which they belong, since this would mean that if all the teenagers in a community indulge in binge drinking then everyone ought to be doing it. Rather, as a community of co-belonging, they see things in their singularity in relation to whatever is good for all. This would mean that if they see or know of something, which violates who they are or violates others, they would not be afraid to speak out against it.

In sum, there seems to be a dyadic relationship between the idea of a pedagogical encounter and that of a reconsidered view of citizenship education. A pedagogical encounter guides citizenship education in particular ways and, in turn, a reconsidered view of citizenship education alters meanings that constitute a pedagogical encounter – thus offering the spaces necessary for new and unanticipated encounters and meanings. Unlike narrowly linking citizenship education to exercising rights and responsibilities and experiencing a sense of belonging, a reconsidered view of citizenship education views the citizen as someone who equally exercises thoughts and speech, intelligibly encourages others

to see things for themselves, and suspends a rush to judgement about imperfect others and their encounters. Moreover, citizenship education of becoming has in mind evoking the potentiality of learners to cultivate communities of becoming where they do not belong and share a common identity. Such a reconsidered view of citizenship education considers learners as humans who co-belong as they endeavour to be attentive to the issues of the day. Only when learners are taught to articulate speech that is open to deliberation and different ways of thinking and being would they remain part of a community of becoming – a community that does not expect of them to belong, share a common identity, and to negotiate difference.

A reconsidered view of citizenship education is also connected to the practice of seeing things differently. What seeing things in a different way also projects is the impossibility or impotentiality to see things in the same way. What a reconsidered view of citizenship education foregrounds seems to be connected to a potentiality of becoming. Consequently it would be appropriate to talk about a citizenship education of becoming vis-à-vis potentiality. In considering how such a view of citizenship education potentially guides the notion of community Agamben argues that the coming community is one whereby '[whatever] singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong, without any representable condition of belonging' (Agamben, 1993, p. 86). For Agamben the community of becoming exists now – that is, a community to which all belong without claiming to belong and which is engendered 'along a line of sparkling alternation on which common nature and singularity, potentiality, and act change roles and interpenetrate' (Agamben, 1993, p. 20). The fact that 'the coming community' is not constituted by belonging means that learners would be initiated into practices on the basis of a genuine commitment to bring about change without privileging any dominant cultural community. Bringing about change means enacting practices of engagement and deliberation which includes listening to views that might be either disagreeable or repugnant. It implies a willingness to engage from the perspective of the other – if only for a moment. Change for the better is distinguishable from a change for the worse when an individual recognises her responsibility in relation to the other and enacts that recognition in a just way.

Citizenship education that educates learners about potentially coming into community also has in mind bringing learners 'into a communication without

the incommunicable' (Agamben, 1993, p. 65). This means that learners would be initiated into a form of communication where nothing deters the communication that unfolds. In other words the communication between learners and teachers will not be subjected to unjustifiable constraints. That is, learners are taught that nothing should remain unsaid in a community of becoming (Agamben, 1993) – speech should not be articulated without any form of imposition by another person. Learners are thus encouraged to speak their minds in an atmosphere of freedom and openness.

In conclusion, firstly, to be initiated into what it means to honour the sacredness of human life, learners should be taught what relations amongst humans involve – how they co-belong. And teaching learners that as individuals they co-belong they build relations of care and trust in the classroom as part of an ongoing critical lesson in human relations (Noddings, 2006). This implies that learners are taught not to stand by silently while their co-learners do things they believe are genuinely wrong, such as showing contempt for others, or when they witness the humiliation of someone who might be different in terms of sexual orientation, religion, or ability. Secondly, when learners are taught to recognise their responsibility in relation to others they are in fact initiated into discourses that emphasise whatever does not inflict harm, neither is it experienced as harmful by others. Thirdly, a reconsidered view of citizenship education teaches learners what it means to see things from 'within an outside' without rushing to judgement. In other words, a reconsidered view of citizenship education ought to teach learners what it means to be 'within an outside' – that is to be within violence and to explain it without rushing to judgement in their explications about violence. Likewise, learners should be taught that violence is not meaningless for some humans. Rather, learners should be taught that such understandings of violence work against being human as it leaves people vulnerable under attack of such inhumane actions. In a different way, learners should be taught the courage to resist violence and that a betrayal of violence is not admitting defeat but is actually inspiring in the quest to be human. In this way a reconsidered view of citizenship education can go a long way in teaching learners to co-belong. It will be a practice of potentially becoming.

Correspondence:

Nuraan Davids e-mail: nur@sun.ac.za

Yusef Waghid e-mail: yw@sun.ac.za

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THE SYSTEM OF TEACHERS' PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND POTENTIAL THREATS TO BUILDING THEIR IDENTITY WITHIN ITS FRAMEWORK

Anna Witkomirska & Anna Zielińska

University of Warsaw, Poland

Abstract. Professional identity combines some elements of personal and social identity in the area of goals, values, principles and measures. The paper focuses on the reflection of ambiguity of creating teachers' professional identity during educational reform. The new system of teachers' professional advancement has been in place in Poland for more than ten years. We have conducted complex empirical research aimed at comprehensive evaluation of that system (teachers, heads of schools and local authorities were surveyed). The theoretical framework is constructed on the concepts of the contemporary narrative theories of Ch. Taylor, A. Giddens, P. Ricoeur. There is a yawning gap between the path of improvement of quality imposed by the formal requirements of the system and the needs and educational aims formulated by teachers themselves, stemming from their everyday practice. The research provided important implication for educational policy, such as: a necessity for combining statutory requirements with particular school needs and teachers' individual development.

Keywords: teacher, identity, development, change, gap

There is no doubt that the necessity for professional development is crucial in the teaching profession. The driving forces for this development should come from teachers' self-evaluation of everyday practice as well as from the assessment of school work. The rapid rate of change in the world, especially social (for example, migration processes) and technological, as well as all changes relating to globalization processes, create a necessity to continually refresh professional knowledge. On the other hand, competition pressure, international comparison of school achievements, rankings of schools, and greater social expectancy from schools encourage governments to implement control procedures for teachers' professional development. This control is often established under the banner of work quality, and individual advancement with financial incentives. Such

a development occurred in Poland when in 2000 the Ministry of Education introduced a new system of professional advancement for teachers. The main purpose was to create rules and conditions for the professional development of teachers, leading to continuous improvement of their professional competencies. It was hoped that the result would be an improvement in work quality, both of individual teachers and whole schools. This is a significant combination of the social goal (better education) with actions favouring teachers as a professional group. The Polish system for evaluating and promoting teachers is set out in detail in the relevant provisions of the law (the Teacher's Charter Act and the related executive provisions) and comprises four degrees of promotion. At the beginning, a teacher starts as a trainee teacher. Next, upon fulfilment of specific requirements and a positive evaluation after an interview conducted by a school qualification committee, he/she can become a contract teacher. The next degrees are the appointed teacher and certified teacher. The committee bases the achievement of each subsequent stage upon the fulfilment of predefined requirements and positive evaluation.

It has become clear that the drafters and legislators of the new system did not give sufficient thought to the possible negative consequences of strict, external rules established to enforce professional development. Omitted, for instance, were considerations on such "soft" factors of successful work like professional identity.

Teacher's identity

In contemporary humanities and social sciences, identity is recognized as one of the important categories used to describe the condition and functioning of human beings. At the same time, as with many other terms in these research fields, identity is variously described. Various types of identity are cited, such as individual, social or professional. The term itself, which appeared as a consequence of the development of psychology and the Western ideology of individualism in the early 20th century, has also clearly evolved (Giddens, 1991).

This paper focuses primarily on those contemporary concepts of identity in which not only its situational conditioning is important (e.g. the interaction theory of G.H. Mead), or the variability of identity over time (e.g. narrativists such as P. Ricoeur), but also the category of social change. Among the approaches

to identity stemming from symbolic interactionism, it is worth mentioning the dynamic approach represented by R. H. Turner and H. Becker. According to these, the identity of an individual is formed in the process of performing various social roles, leading to a change in self-image (Piotrowski, 1985). Social changes condition the structure of the roles performed and the related system of expectations, which are the sources of identity changes.

When considering the identity of teachers, it is worth taking into account the approach of Charles Taylor, who stresses that we live in a specific time and within a specific society. A person creates his/her identity through his/her history, personal development, various events, successes and failures. Taylor traces how rising demands for social egalitarianism made it possible for an individual to create his/her own unique identity. He stresses the point that personal identity requires dialogue and social recognition. Shaping his/her identity, an individual "negotiates it with their surroundings" (Taylor, 1995, p. 13). This inevitably leads to conflicts between the standards of an individual and the standards of people or groups from which such recognition is expected or required, for instance while performing a given social or professional role (e.g. being a teacher). The givers of recognition, the 'significant others', may nowadays vary, from people one regards as authority figures, through supervisors, such as school headteachers (who personify both the law and the standards) to the media and the Internet. These latter are increasingly becoming the source of dominant models. During a period of significant and rapid social change and advancing globalization, both the givers of recognition and the standards change. The creation of identity becomes a dynamic and conflict-based process, leading to uncertainty with a shrinking number of relatively stable elements of identity that one needs; for instance moral values or ethnicity. Eliot Mischler (1999) considers professional identity as a complex structure which consists of many various subidentities that can be in a dynamic relationship with each other (in conflict or in harmony).

The concept of reflective identity, elucidated by Anthony Giddens, is also important for the contemporary understanding of the complexity of identity problems. According to authors of narrative approaches, the development of modernity has uprooted the individual from traditional social structures which had long been the basis for building one's identity. At the same time, the rationalism and scientific nature of modernity have weakened normative reflection in societies, leading to disorders in the creation of identity and depriving people of

ontological safety (a sense of trust and permanence). Here, individuals become dependent upon 'expert systems'. In late modernity, states Giddens, individuals build their identity on the basis of their own reflective life project. This identity can be relatively stable if a person finds justification and public acceptance for his/her reasons. The individual however faces the need to reconstruct his/her identity as a consequence of the various experiences of everyday life. Modern institutions also require the individual to fragment his/her identity, according to conflicts between various roles and the diverse expectations and values in areas where people function.

These various factors in identity, mentioned briefly above due to limited space, indicate issues which are important for contemporary considerations on identity:

1. Identity has a dynamic nature. It arises as a result of self-creation, but is entangled in and dependent on the social context.
2. Modern and post-modern processes of unsettling ontological safety lead to dependency upon external sources of standards.
3. The tension between individual and social identity grows due to a reduction in moral reflection and the conflict of one's own standards with those of groups or institutions.

These issues apply to all kinds of identity. Individual identity is usually defined as a set of self-definitions and self-identifications, built by a person, which enable differentiation from others. Social and professional identity is an extra-individual set of social identifications, based on group awareness and on differentiating one group from others. An important aspect here is the sense of being similar to, or different from, the rest of the group. It is also worth mentioning a certain variety of social identity, namely cultural identity, which can be described as the set of factors identifying individuals and social groups with the basic elements of culture, such as the normative symbolic systems, customs and rituals, history, and material products.

Professional identity can be defined as knowledge based on experience – one's own and that of other people - derived from the membership of a group which performs specific social tasks. One's position within the professional group influences the process of creating professional identity, as indeed does one's attitude to the group. Professional identity combines elements of personal and social identity in the areas of goals, values, rules and actions. The importance of

individual and social identity for the creation of professional identity probably depends on the nature of the given profession. Does the identity of the teaching profession have its own specific character? It is possible to indicate a few characteristic features:

1. a high level of cohesion within the professional practitioner's self-understanding, and especially with regard to such aspects as moral and intellectual self-assessment, positive attitude towards other people, the ability to cooperate, and a sense of social responsibility;
2. a heuristic model of action;
3. a high level of social expectations, securing recognition by others and embodying convincing models for self-presentation;
4. a narrative-reflexive character – the need for constant reflection on one's work, the readiness to question and modify knowledge, and continually develop oneself.

A person who commences work as teacher, when his/her identity is beginning to form, engages in experiences where each of the above four features comes into play, and influences the negotiation of identity in one way or another. How will those starting beliefs change? What set of knowledge about colleagues and about oneself, as member of that group, would be developed over the years at school? We shall answer these questions in the context of the changes wrought in Polish teaching by the introduction of the teachers' professional advancement system. Our research focuses on the social conditions in which teachers' professional identity is shaped, on the conflict between personal identity and the need for expert recognition, and on obstacles to the teachers' professional development.

Description of the research

The results come from the study *Evaluation of Polish Teachers' advancement system* which was conducted in the years 2010-2012 among school head teachers and teachers from a national sample survey of randomly chosen schools (600 people altogether from 100 schools). We examined a head and 6 teachers in different stages of professional advancement from every chosen school. We also identified 4 focus groups. These were formed from in-service training teachers, students of a Post-graduate course for future heads of school: *The Organization and Management in Education*. In addition 20 experts in teacher advancement from

the Ministry of Education, and 20 responsible employees from the local authorities running schools were interviewed, as were employees from randomly chosen Supervisory Offices. To complete the survey, 10 school case studies were carried out, including analysis of documents concerning the professional advancement of teachers.

Our investigation of issues of professional identity was carried out using the following categories of analysis:

- (1) leading one's own development, achieving mastery, achieving a sense of professional agency; the sense of agency
- (2) developing the need for creative action;
- (3) building the bond with the professional group and obtaining the approval of the group.

We shall try to answer these questions in the remainder of this essay. In doing so we shall bear in mind issues such as the following: whether the requirements associated with the advancement process and the school practice support teachers' sense of agency; whether the requirements encourage creativity, build group bonds, community spirit and the pride of belonging to a professional group.

1. Leading one's own development, achieving mastery, the sense of causality

We asked head teachers of schools covered by the research, who on a daily basis watch the teachers during the process of professional advancement, about the motives of teachers who engage in the process. Factors such as the need for professional development and achieving mastery in the profession were rarely cited by the head teachers. Only 6.5% of them said that the improvement of professional and educational qualifications was very important for the teachers engaging in the professional advancement process. Indeed one in three respondents believed this was rather or definitely unimportant. The most important motivation reported was the desire to obtain higher salary and achieve professional stability.

Thus, in the opinion of head teachers, a significant group of teachers did not consider the official advancement system as a chance to become a better teacher.

Teachers themselves, in their responses, rarely believed that the advancement system supports the building of their skills and professional development in ways that could become a source of professional satisfaction.

Table 1. Selected criteria for the assessment of the professional advancement process by the teachers (teacher responses - percentages)

Criteria of advancement system evaluation	Definitely yes	Rather yes	Rather not	Definitely not
to strengthen motivation professional development	9	44	38	3
to bring professional satisfaction	14	53	27	4
to encourage one to become better and better teacher	3	35	50	11

It is worth paying attention to the rather pessimistic evaluation of the advancement system as a chance to improve the quality of teachers' work. As many as 61% of teachers believed that the structure of the advancement process does not enable them to achieve mastery of their profession, to become better teachers.

Do the rules for advancement, and the route to achieve it, enable teachers to strengthen their sense of agency, their belief that they are the authors of change; their capacity to deal with problems and perform better quality work at their schools? Drawbacks of the system indicated by the teachers rather preclude such possibility (bureaucratic – 82% of responses, time-consuming – 59%, fictional – 35%).

The head teachers were asked whether the advancement process supports the development of skills tied to dealing with problems and issues faced by the teachers. They had a mostly positive opinion on the system's importance for improving cooperation among teachers. The head teachers also reported that the system enhanced teachers' ability to create teaching materials and to apply active methods in the teaching process, thus allowing students play an important role in teaching-learning process. But the head teachers also reported that many competencies which support a sense of professional ownership of professional development among teachers were developed either insufficiently or not or not at all by the official system. This view referred primarily to the educational and social competencies of teachers that would allow them to actively cope with problems in interpersonal relations and to deal with stress. According to the head teachers' opinion, the teachers did not improve their competencies in those areas.

Table 2. Assessment of the requirements of the advancement process as regards dealing with selected tasks and problems (Head teachers' responses - percentages)

Tasks and problems	to a large degree	to a rather large degree	to a rather small degree	to a very small degree	Not at all
Cooperating with other teachers	16.1	51.6	21.5	6.5	-
Preparing teaching materials by themselves	15.1	55.9	18.3	6.5	-
Using active methods	7.5	64.5	18.3	7.5	-
Overcoming stress at the work place	2.2	17.2	51.6	16.1	9.7
Students' arrogance towards teachers	2.2	10.8	43.0	28.0	10.8
Students' aversion to learning	1.1	18.3	53.8	14.0	8.6
Coping with emotional problems of students	-	17.2	50.5	20.4	6.5

In the context of the issues analyzed, the results of focus group interviews conducted among the most active teachers – participants in post-graduate studies – are very interesting. A prevalent view from these interviews was that the advancement system does not support the improvement of teachers' work quality, nor does it offer them a sense of ownership of their actions. This stems from the interviewees' view that the system's requirements are not matched to the day-to-day, core tasks of the school. The teachers regarded many of the requirements of the advancement system to be divorced from the daily priorities of teaching and learning in the schools, particularly the development of students' abilities. As one interviewee's comment put it: "Where is that development? And where is the student in all of that?"

Another important negative factor is, in the opinion of focus group interviewees, the extracurricular nature of tasks performed by the teacher in the course of the advancement process. The teachers are required to organize additional classes, which frequently are not related to the teaching or educational syllabus of the school, are not interesting for the students, and sometimes are, indeed, an additional, unwanted burden. Again, a representative comment from the interviews captures the point:

Of course, you can always force it. But those actions are not always necessary. We do plenty of things for which there is no demand. But we need to do them, in order to have something to account for.

The teachers also believe that there is pressure to organize particularly attractive classes, often fancy ones, while the educational or didactic potential is accorded less importance in the official scheme of things. For instance reference was made to demands for plentiful competitions, recordings, films, various festivals and so on. The pressures of the advancement process and its procedures, the teachers maintain, mean that the *content* of the performed actions becomes less valuable than the fulfilment and documentation of formal requirements. The following serious criticism also emerged from the focus group interviews. If teachers are rewarded by a system of advancement mainly for fulfilling bureaucratic requirements, regardless of the educational purpose and the quality-promoting nature of their actions, they lose the sense of meaning. They may even feel ethically compromised when they do something only for 'paper need' without a visible advantage for the students. In such a situation, it is difficult to speak of leading one's own development or of a sense of professional agency. This curtails the cultivation of the teacher's professional identity and aggravates the conflict between individual and professional identity.

2. Developing the need for creative action

The advancement system was expected to support the development of teachers' creativity. In order to respond to the challenges posed by modern, continually changing society, it was necessary to train teachers who would get out of their ruts, be able to act creatively, combine teaching competencies tied to their subject with the educational ones, be capable of providing care and education for students with varied needs, organize the social life of the classes, and skilfully react in various difficult situations. Did the system live up to these expectations? Certain of its features (already mentioned), such as bureaucracy and excessive formalism, were criticized widely, not only by the teachers and head teachers, but also by experts and representatives of the authorities participating in the process. The most common criticism was that such features do not support creativity. On the contrary, it was widely felt that they support routine and conformist behaviours. This could lead to a strong inner conflict for a teacher who is aware of the need for creativity, but who feels that strict observance of conformist requirements is called for if promotion prospects are to be realized.

Opportunities for creativity on the part of teachers are rightly associated with the developments and implementation of a teacher's professional development plan. Under the advancement system such an individual plan has to be constructed by the teacher in question (in the case of junior teachers, with the support of their coordinator). It is submitted together with the application to commence the procedure for the next degree of advancement, and the teacher is required to include tasks regarding various aspects of the school's work. The plan is next approved by the head teacher, who sometimes recommends certain changes to adapt the various tasks better to the needs of the given school. Case studies conducted at schools have shown that reality does not normally correspond to such idealistic assumptions. The case studies we examined show that teachers, preparing their professional development plans, closely followed the requirements set forth in the executive order to the Teacher's Charter, and also what had become the established practice. Frequently they were afraid of even the slightest deviations from the customs observed at their school and focused primarily on the fulfilment of formal requirements. They created their professional development plans on the basis of plans of their colleagues who had already been promoted, and they used dedicated websites and commercially-produced guidebooks which are available in the market. The development plan is expected to take into account the specific features of the school in question, and to transpose the general requirements to the needs of the local environment in a creative manner. In the teachers' opinion, the requirements were frequently ill-adjusted to the specific positions; moreover, the teachers often did not know and were thus unable to include the school's development plan in their own plans.

This element of the system was supposed to offer the teachers support for individualizing the nature of their advancement, and to develop their creativity. Unfortunately, due to errors in its structure and to conformist practices that had become established in schools, it did not often fulfill these expectations. It did not contribute to the building of the teachers' positive professional identity as an independent creator of their own skills and capabilities.

3. Building a bond with the professional group and obtaining the approval of the group

The rules and the tasks contained in the advancement system had the purpose of establishing bonds and co-operation among teachers, and of supporting

their sense of group pride and professional identity. Our research shows that the goals tied to bond-building have been achieved in part. The responses of head-teachers suggest that the rules of advancement do support cooperation among teachers (to a very large extent – 16% of responses, to a large extent – 52%). The teachers in group interviews also stressed that the advancement rules in fact enforce better cooperation among their teams. On the other hand, they do not have a sense of being supported by their colleagues and co-workers during the advancement process (only 39% of teachers stated that they can “definitely” count on such support). In their opinion, they can rely more upon support from their mentors (“definitely yes” – 62%) and from the headmaster (“definitely yes” responses – 56%).

During the group interviews, the teachers stressed that they frequently compete for tasks related to their practice. The above-mentioned requirement for organization of extracurricular classes means that the teachers have to “fight” for students who would be interested in them. As one teacher put it:

Sometimes you come after 5:00 pm and there is no-one to work with. The kids are gone because another teacher wore them out an hour earlier with some sports activities.

The analysis of interviews conducted with the various external entities – experts of the qualification committee, representatives of authorities which supervise the schools – shows that the professional advancement system offers the teachers stability of employment and gives them an opportunity for higher salaries; but it does not increase the prestige of the profession. These managerial bodies believe that achieving advancement is too easy and too fast, and does not necessarily verify and improve the practical competencies. The managerial bodies point out the superficial and excessively formal nature of advancement, and also the various associated breaches and abuses (for example, getting materials from the Internet or from colleagues). The teachers and other parties tied to this process sense that it does not improve the acceptance of their social group among teachers themselves as well as within the whole society. In that respect it appears that this is a wasted opportunity for building the professional identity of teachers (Wilkomirska and Zielińska, 2013).

The shaping of both individual and professional identity has been known for many years to be key to the concept of a person's professional development (Super, 1957; Holland, 1993). Holland even formulates the term of the “modal

personal orientation style”, whose essence is based on the compatibility of one’s self image with professional preferences. The choice of career and its course is a transfer of one’s own personality into the work environment. According to R. Harre (1999), professional development cannot be separated from personal development – this is a process of acquiring the ability to act and to be, both in the individual and the social spheres.

Researchers of professional development usually isolate its different stages. For the analysis conducted in this paper, three of them are important: assuming the professional role (dominated by following existing models), adaptation of the role and identifying with it (competence) and the stage of creative modification of the role, saturating it increasingly with one’s own identity (approaching mastery).

The teacher who commences work full of ideals, enthusiasm and knowledge acquired during studies – aside from his/her own predispositions – needs the appropriate conditions for professional development, supporting the ambition to achieve mastery. Does the Polish system of professional advancement ensure such conditions? It appears dubious. In the beginning of the 21st century, many authors pointed out that the professional development of a teacher cannot be excessively ‘cornered’ by a network of regulations and requirements (Fullan, 2001; Gewirtz, 2002; Hoyle and Wallace 2007; Evans, 2008). This would lead to results contrary from the intended ones. Authors mentioned above even wrote of the corrosion of the teachers’ professional development. Christopher Day (2005) points out that development-supporting learning is possible only when teachers themselves want to develop. He is critical of the attempts to evaluate all teachers in a formal, unified manner. Adaptation to clerical requirements is in conflict with the subjective steering of one’s own development; it reduces creativity and the sense of purpose, and triggers adaptive actions which are far removed from the core values of teachers’ work.

In light of the quoted research results, can teachers whose work is subordinated to formal requirements for their professional advancement develop their professional identity in ways that would display the characteristics mentioned at the beginning? As a reminder, these features include strong cohesion with one’s individual identity – especially as regards moral and intellectual self-assessment, a positive attitude towards others, application of a heuristic model for action, narrative nature – the need for constant reflection on one’s work and professional improvement. Numerous doubts arise here. The discrepancies between personal knowledge and standards on the one hand, and external expectations

stemming from political and administrative decisions on the other, lead to moral and identity conflicts. They cause a certain ethical dimorphism and dissociation of personal and professional identities. In such a situation, the teachers usually employ such strategies as:

- giving up being the central persona of their professional activity – teachers themselves reduce their professional duties to the tasks imposed by external entities; they become, at best, effective executors of their role.
- escaping from ethical reflections on their own work, and subordinating themselves to institutional standards.

As shown by one of the key researchers of human identity issues – Erikson (1968) – when a person fails to notice himself/herself as the creator of his/her own actions, when he/she does not observe his/her own identity, he/she will act in the same manner as other people in his/her environment, with which he/she has melted permanently. There can be no self-creation, no personal identity, and no self in the professional role.

Correspondence:

Anna Wiłkomirska

e-mail: awilkomirska@uw.edu.pl

Anna Zielińska

e-mail: azielinska@uw.edu.pl

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OPEN ACCESS PUBLICATION: SOME NOTES ON VISIBILITY AND MAKING PUBLIC

Naomi Hodgson

KU Leuven — University of Leuven, Belgium

Abstract: The paper analyses the recent policy relating to open access publication as a requirement of funding councils and future research excellence assessments. This is considered in the context of the way in which the university and the researcher have been reconfigured by and for the knowledge economy. Open access is explored in relation to both the opening up of the university and its constituent functions and the way in which new technologies and social media are constitutive of the researcher to explore how practices of visibility and transparency operate in modes of governing and self-governing. The principle of making research accessible to the public through open access publication opens the question of how the public is understood in this relationship. Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour a distinction is drawn between publication as making visible and publication as making public.

Keywords: open access publication, the public, publication

Introduction

Concern over university reform, both within academia and the general public, tends to focus on privatisation, marketization, and the positioning of students as consumers. There is at the same time, however, an ongoing concern with the elitism of universities and their need to widen participation, and to be more student-centred, and more transparent and accountable for the public funds they receive.

In recent years, open access publication has moved from a marginal but growing mode of publishing, more commonly found in the sciences, to a focus of governmental policy at national and international levels. The OECD, the European Commission, and many national governments now promote the use of open access publication and have made it a requirement of publicly funded research.

In light of concerns over privatisation and of elitism, open access has many supporters. The debate in the UK, however, where the national research councils require academics they fund to publish their work in open access, thus making it available to the 'general tax-paying public' (RCUK, 2013, p. 1), has been largely influenced by the findings of the UK's National Working Group on Expanding Access to Published Research Findings (the 'Finch Group') report¹, which stated a preference for gold open access. Subsequently, academics concerned about the move to open access publication have often focussed on the cost of publication. While the politics and economics of paid-for open access publication is an important focus, the concern here is slightly different. This paper does not seek to weigh up the pros and cons of the gold and green routes to open access publishing. Nor does it seek to propose a third option. The aim, in part, is to take the academic discussion of open access beyond the dichotomies of gold and green, open and closed, public and private, and the concern with the practical requirements of the UK research councils' and European Commission's publication policies. The approach taken here focuses not particularly on the normative language of policy and what is expected of the researcher and the university, but on the particular notion of the public that is used, and effected, by such policy, and by related practices and material devices.

The analysis of open access publication here forms part of a larger project on the changing role of and notion of 'the university' and the figure of the researcher constituted in current policy and practice. Changing practices of reading, writing, and publication form important foci for this project. The university is undergoing a period of considerable reform, perhaps to the extent that it might be possible to argue that 'the university' no longer exists. That is, the university in its modern, institutional, progress-oriented form, no longer exists. What now exists has been described in various ways in policy and in academic analysis: 'entrepreneurial', 'virtual', 'networked', 'the multiversity', 'in ruins'. The project thus far has sought to understand these changes, the form the university currently takes, to provide some form of critique, broadly speaking, that effects a form of resistance to certain aspects of these changes, but to do so in such a way that scores well against the various measures of performance measurement and management according to which the research and the university are understood today.

The approach taken here does not offer a normative account of what the university or the researcher should be. Nor does it provide a critique from

a particular perspective that reveals a truth about the current configuration. The approach here instead draws on recent social-material approaches developed in the social sciences and humanities. This permits material things into the account so that, for example, the technological devices that we use every day are not given merely an incidental role in the account, in which they contribute to a particular narrative, but neither are they given so central a role that a technological determinist account is produced. As Matthias Decuyper puts it, as this approach 'rejects a dualist bifurcation in which subjects are endowed with activity and creativity on the one hand and objects with passivity and rigidity on the other, the possibility of considering objects as non-humans that are also able to act emerges (Latour, 1991/1993; Law, 2004)' (Decuyper et al., 2012, p. 7).

In educational studies, socio-material approaches are probably most closely associated with Actor-Network Theory, deriving from the work of Bruno Latour (see e.g. Fenwick and Edwards, 2010). I will not provide a literature review of the ways in which this approach has been adopted in education. The approach taken here does not take a 'theory' and apply it to an educational setting or policy. Rather, a socio-material approach is set out here - in relation to issues raised regarding open access publication – on the basis of its potential to itself be educational. The particular issue that is taken up regarding open access publication here is that of 'making public'. This notion has a particular tenor in the work of Latour and others developing this approach that enables a rethinking of what we do today when we publish and what we are asked to do when we are asked to make work available to the public in open access.

Making public as an educational approach to things

Given the changes in the relation between the individual and the state in recent decades and the privatisations that are changing institutions and spaces previously assumed to be public, it seems necessary today to rethink what we mean by these terms. Material approaches can challenge the distinction according to which politics exists only in the public domain and not in the private spheres of home and work by enabling an analysis not only of the role of devices in constituting the public or the political but how the devices themselves become political. The further need to explore the notion of the public lies in the governmental concern with the public in the form of, for example, public engagement, participation, citizens-as-researchers, and of course open access publication:

When governments and powerful non-governmental organizations adopt an explicitly participatory agenda, a generic commitment to the principle of 'public engagement' no longer suffices. 'Ready-made' concepts of public engagement need probing... (Marres and Lezaun, 2011, p. 497)

The approach taken here adopts a notion of the public not as pre-existing theoretical construct but as an assemblage to be permanently re-configured. The term assemblage here refers to something like a gathering but is also used specifically as an alternative to the network notion of Actor Network Theory, as suggested by Decuyper et al. (2012). The term network complicates the picture by often being used as or assumed to be both form and metaphor (ibid., p. 9). In ANT it refers rather to 'a method for being aware that each agent taken into account has to be re-presented as an agent, not as something or someone that makes no difference at all' (ibid., p. 9). So, the public here refers not to a sense of community settling down in agreement and consensus, but to a gathering based on shared concern, constituted in associations. On Latour's account, making public refers to gathering a public around matters of concern. This is distinct from addressing a public already assumed to exist with our expertise on matters of fact. To gather around a matter of concern, for Latour, is to gather around what divides us. He draws on Heidegger's use of *Ding* to suggest *Dingpolitik* as a more realistic politics today than *Realpolitik*. *Ding*, he writes, refers to an archaic assembly, 'the issue that brings people together because it divides them' (Latour, 2005, p. 22-23). Thus, in this approach, it is not only the notion of the public, of *what* is being studied, that is displaced, but also *how*, and *in the name of what*, it is studied.

A concern with matters of fact implies the application of existing knowledge, of expertise, to a problem. The study of universities tends towards this: we know what universities *should* look like, so we can critique them on that basis; or we have a set of theories that explain what is happening now, which we can apply. The university - its public and its practices, the materials and actions that constitute it - seems quite undisturbed by these accounts, however, though they do contribute to the measurable performance of those institutions and individuals. We write that the university is undergoing dramatic shifts, but we also assume to already know how and why. Matters of concern are distinct as they are not yet rendered knowable by expertise. Approaches deriving from ANT put the 'academic expert' out of position by not wanting to claim any expert position...

not wanting to be the highly competent scholar who can browbeat the layman with bare matters of fact(Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, 1999/2009; Latour, 1999/2004)' (Decuyper et al., 2012, p. 7). The approach taken here seeks not to apply a theory or particular critique to explain the university, to conceptualise it, but rather to explore it in a way that is, in itself, educational. That is, it is our thinking that is put to the test. Distinguishing a philosophy of education deriving from the ascetic tradition, Jan Masschelein writes:

In this tradition, the work of philosophy is in the first place a work on the self – that is, *putting oneself to 'the test of contemporary reality'*, implying an enlightenment not of others but of oneself – however, of oneself not as subject of knowledge but as subject of action. Putting oneself to the test is, therefore, an exercise in the context of self-education... [T] his exercise...has to be conceived not as a private matter but as a *public gesture* or a way to make things public and as a condition for a truth-telling that is in the first place illuminating, inviting, cutting, inspiring. (Masschelein, 2011, p. 356)

But in this concern with the self, the self is displaced. It is not central to the enquiry. It is not about me, not directly; it is not a narrative or autobiographical account. In order for it to be educative – for me, for a public – requires that I am exposed to the matter at hand, that my thinking is put to the test of the reality I am faced with. The question then is not what should the university look like, but what is distinct about the university? What practices make a university a distinct kind of institution? Student (or customer) satisfaction, for example, is a central concern for universities, but it is also central to most businesses and thus is not particular to the university. (see Masschelein and Simons (2012) on the lecture as distinct practice of the university). And how do current practices constitute the university and the researcher in a particular way? What university is produced?

In this discussion of open access as a way of considering the university and the researcher today I will touch on three main areas:

The Shape of the University – institution > research environment

Technologies of Performance – devices such as Vitae, profiles, competition and comparability

Publication as Visibility

So, the move to open access publication here is not understood in traditional political public/private terms, where this opening up is seen as testament to the rightful place of the university as a public institution. Instead, this tension

between the privatising, individualising, economising tendencies of the knowledge society and the practices constitutive of the university and the researcher today and the making public, or publicising, of their outputs are explored. A distinction will be drawn between making public, drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, and making visible, seen in terms of a mode of governmentality in which visibility and transparency are important aspects.

The shape of the university

The university has undergone a shift in recent years from being an institution to being a learning environment or, part of, a research environment (cf. Simons and Masschelein, 2008). The change in the configuration of the university from its modern form has of course brought about changes in the working practices within the university but also requires a shift in how we make sense of it.

Reference to education has been replaced by ubiquitous reference to learning, and political and social problems have been translated into personal learning problems (ibid.). The governmentalisation of learning in the name of the knowledge economy has re-shaped the university and its practices.

In recent years, the position of the university as an institution with the combined functions of public service, teaching, and research has shifted. Each of these aspects is now subject to its own measures of performance, and the university's services are now provided in a variety of learning environments, with physical locations in more than one country, virtual provision, and private consultancy. The market has expanded and each aspect of the work of the university is subject to competition. Its value must be proven in the face of other organisations that can fulfil the same function(s) more cost effectively, more quickly, with a greater degree of innovation, e.g. commercial research laboratories, for-profit providers. The mission of the university today is to be excellent and world-class in all its outputs, which means achieving high levels of student satisfaction, high levels of graduate employability, and producing research and innovation that can be put to use through commercial application or the improvement of policy and practice (Hodgson, 2012a). It operates in the marketplace of the knowledge society (in Europe, 'the Innovation Union'), in which common languages and practices of performance measurement and management seek to ensure optimal transparency, compatibility, comparability, and competition (Hodgson, 2012b).

The move not only to promote open access publication but also to require it, as a measurable aspect of the researcher's and the university's performance,² can be seen as consistent with the mode of late neoliberalism to which the governance of the university is subject. The university works not in the name of the progress of the nation state but of excellence, productivity, and value (cf. Readings, 1996). It is subject to the concerns of policy makers and businesses who require the knowledge it produces to be put to particular purposes, to solve particular problems, here and now. The university must also be proactive in identifying these problems and recasting them in productive terms for which responsibility can be taken.

The focus on changing the model of publication from the payment of subscriptions by libraries or individuals to the payment of Author Processing Charges (APCs) by authors or their funders, has led some to suggest that one way forward is for universities, or learned societies, to take publishing in-house, to do away with the large publishing company altogether, and to become a publisher oneself. This move, which can be seen already, is illustrative of a further aspect of the changed research environment. Like the university and the 'disassembling' (Barber et al., 2013) of its research-teaching-consultancy service aspects, the publisher is now positioned as a service provider rather than as an essential aspect of a hierarchical, or gatekeeper-governed, system. The publisher too, it seems, must restate its purpose and the value of the services it provides and rationalise these.³ And universities will now need to decide which compliant publishing model offers the best value for money.

Technologies of performance

The current mode of governance entails an individualisation of the academic in the figure of 'the researcher', whose work is economised, as seen in the exchange value assumed in the rendering of academic publications as outputs and in the ways in which she is responsible for her professional sustainability, e.g. building a research profile, generating research income, publishing in high-ranking journals to generate maximum impact, forming productive collaborations. Giving free and open access to these outputs occurs, then, in the context of a privatizing or domesticating of the academic as a 'researcher' (cf. Hodgson and Standish, 2007). For example, she is subject to standardising measures of performance and required to produce research outputs that have impact - not

only academic but also social, cultural or economic benefit - and are perhaps commercialisable.

In the opening up of the academy according to the rationality of the learning society or knowledge economy, and the economisation of its constituent functions, the university is concerned with its transparency and the visibility of its outputs. The performance of the university and of the researcher has been concerned with research impact, knowledge transfer, developing collaboration, the wider economic, social, and cultural value of their outputs, and the promotion of these markers of excellence. Sharing, of a sort, then has been an increasing feature of the way in which we talk about the value of research and what research excellence is. Open access publishing adds a further dimension to this. New technologies have not only enabled these practices to be implemented as part of the everyday practices of the administration of the university, but also add further dimensions of performance measurement and management: in addition to transparency and visibility, we are now also concerned with discoverability.

As part of the optimisation of the assets of the university as a research environment and of herself as an individual, the academic is responsible for herself as a 'researcher': with establishing a research profile, seeking external funds to cover the cost of her research and ideally her salary too, producing outputs that (until now at least) are published in high-ranking journals, seeking collaborative, interdisciplinary partnerships, and teaching in a way that optimises student satisfaction and learning outcomes. And often, she is to achieve these things without a tenured position (The researcher, as with any role today, is not a rung on a career ladder that one reaches following a particular academic qualification and before promotion to a higher rung, but a particular accumulation of skills and competencies that are needed now and that she wishes to put to use now in this way).

Publication as visibility

The concern with the public role of the university here is not based on the assumption that it has an inherently public role but rather with what 'public' means when the university's outputs (as publications are called) are made open and accessible to the public.

The rationale for policies that require those in receipt of public funds to make their outputs freely accessible reflects the idea that learning is vital to the sustainability and growth of the knowledge economy. For example, the UK Research Council's (RCUK) policy refers to the 'significant social and economic benefits' that free and open access to research brings (RCUK, 2013, p. 1). This belief has been central to the discourse of the learning society, or knowledge economy, globally (see for example the OECD or European Commission policies) and its shaping of current modes of governing and self-governing has been termed the 'governmentalisation of learning' (Simons and Masschelein, 2008).

The placing of research into a university research repository (the green route), which most universities provide or are developing, is required by research councils (now) and HEFCE (in the future). It not only makes research freely available to the public, it also makes research visible and is a form of making the university transparent or accountable. It enacts a level of visibility and discoverability for the university, the researcher, and their outputs, and thus contributes to measurable performance indicators. For example, alongside, 'public good' and 'Compliance with funder and REF requirements', The University of Leeds' publication policy lists 'increased visibility of publications' and 'raised profile for authors, funders, and university' as benefits of open access.^{4 5} The visibility and resulting measurable discoverability and citation rates are one illustration of the way in which the move towards open access contributes to a particular mode of governance and self-governance of the university and the researcher.

Discoverability of the researcher and the research, and its re-useability, are now means of achieving visibility, transparency, and impact. The possibilities of this technology, and in particular the measures or metrics it can supply, are changing the ways in which information is accessed and valued. Impact and visibility measured for example in downloads and citations are now also determined by discoverability and shareability (measured in downloads, citations, hits, likes, shares and comments). At a recent roundtable on implementing the Finch report, a number of contributors referred to the preference for post-publication review in the open access publishing market, citing e.g. PLOSOne.⁶ That is, the traditional model of experts peer reviewing prior to publication is shifting to a model whereby quality and value are measured by the post-publication response to it, measured in terms of downloads, citation, positive comments (on the article itself online), sharing, and re-use. Some also noted the need to move

away from the judgment of quality in terms of where the article is published. The hallmark of expertise assumed from publishing one's work in a particular place is no longer assumed, at least not outside academia (A survey was quoted at the same roundtable that showed that the prestige of the journal, and not whether it was open access, was more likely to determine where academics published).

These shifts and new practices are made possible by new technologies and thus in order to understand the constitution of the university and the researcher these must be present as agents in the account. The individual researcher's public profile(s), or her network, and the way in which technology operates in the production and sharing of this is illustrative of, and instrumental in, impact and sharing as two particular aspects of the discourse of research. Each researcher will, usually, be visible on their institution's website, on the pages of their department or perhaps their research group. It will give information on their teaching, their research interests, and often provide a list of publications, perhaps with links. There might be links to the websites of specific projects they are working on. It may also carry a link to their personal website or blog, or to their personal profile hosted on another website, such as academia.edu or LinkedIn. You might also find their twitter handle. Each of these aspects ensures that the researcher is discoverable, and defines her in terms of a network of sites, institutions, topics, others (cf. Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour et al., 2012). Today, when looking for knowledge or expertise the first point of contact may be more likely to be Google than the university library catalogue, even if that is the link the searcher clicks on in the end. It becomes essential then, that one is visible, easily discoverable, by this means.

The account of the researcher here does not seek to treat these online profiles and the network(s) that these represent as an additional level of reality to be studied separately but rather, following Latour et al., constitutive of one level of reality and, as they write, 'quickly modifying the very definition of what individuals are' (p. 3). The ways in which technology and the data it produces operate in our everyday lives and the rendering of all aspects of our lives and work as subject to the same indicators of success and quality places things on one level.

Conclusion

To publish in open access is to make research freely available to the public. This mode of publication is referred to as 'compliant' publishing, as it is that which complies with funder's current and anticipated open access policy. The move to this mode of publication is driven by modes of governance and self-governance to which visibility is a vital component, as discussed in the previous sections. Research is rendered measurable as outputs and in terms of economic and social benefit. The public is served, then, not only through these economic and social benefits but also by the transparency this provides. The public to whom the research is accessible is conceived as an audience and also as an additional benefit, a measure of added value of the work of the university and the researcher. The public, then, are already assumed to exist. Compliant open access publishing, then, is understood here as publishing as making visible. As discussed earlier, however, such a notion of the public frames matters in a particular way that perhaps closes them off from inquiry.

Publication as making visible is distinguished here, then, from publication as making public, in the sense elaborated above. It could be argued, in the context of the output-oriented research environment, that collaborations of individual researchers are often formed on the basis of agreement, for the production of output on matters of fact (e.g. policy-oriented research). But, of course, often they are not. And the purpose here is not to suggest that all research is driven blindly by the demands of the mode of governance in which it operates. The distinction between publication as making visible and publication and making public is not intended to mark a choice. What we do might be and can be both.

The context of this recasting also shifts what is meant by public and private. Arguably, to analyse the changes in these terms is to keep in place a mode of thinking about the state, the university, and the individual that does not reflect how they operate and that in itself maintains these conceptual distinctions. Today, we are governed and govern ourselves not in terms of public and private, but, I suggest, in terms of privacy and transparency or visibility.⁷ Performance measurement and management as a mode of accountability requires that the university is accountable, that is transparent, in its practices and its outputs. The same rationality applies to traditionally 'public' institutions such as government, schools, the health service: transparency is the way in which agents/organisations are accountable to stakeholders (the public, shareholders, other interested par-

ties e.g. other agents/organisations seeking best practice). Privacy refers to that which we choose not to show (or which perhaps we do not acknowledge as it has not yet been operationalised and quantified) or for which legal protections exist.

In seeking to analyse the 'research environment' and the researcher here, the analysis started from the position that the very language in which we talk about what we do describes and inscribes practices that are different from the university as institution populated by students and academics. The terms according to which we analyse the new configuration of agents - people, policy, technology, places, spaces, things – is also necessarily shifted. What the university, the academic, and the public are now has no clear, inherent definition: the things we look at 'no longer have the clarity, transparency, obviousness of matters of fact; they are not made of clearly delineated discrete objects' with clear boundaries, such as the university as institution, or clear status and responsibilities, e.g. to the state or to human progress (Latour, 2005, p. 23). Seeing the university and the publisher as representing the public and the private respectively, for example, is not an accurate view. The binary positions of open access vs publisher profits, fair vs unfair, overlooks the fact that both sides are seeking to provide outputs in the name of the same measures: institutional and researcher profile, impact, citations, discoverability, and justification of purpose and value.

There is perhaps an ambiguity to the account. Open access is seemingly subject to critique here in ways that might seem to undermine what is, generally, in principle, a good thing. The rationality of governing and self-governing in which academic publication exists, and which constitutes the research environment and the researcher are, however, undergoing shifts that require us to respond philosophically and theoretically to the realities they present. This paper is an attempt to understand the policy shift towards open access publication in terms of a particular mode of governmentality, in which research and the researcher are cast in particular roles. The analysis here intends to indicate that the research environment is a particular configuration of practices and technologies, and the researcher a particular mode of subjectivation, that do not map straightforwardly on to the institution of the university and the figure of the academic or scholar. There are further aspects distinctive of the work of the researcher that mark a further shift from these more archaic figures: how, for example, does the shift to the electronic, public sharing of research change the way in which we understand academic writing? How does it change how we read? And how does the shift away from peer review to electronic forms of post-publication feedback shift

the status or understanding of expertise? The notion of publication as making public itself challenges the assumption of expertise, of the academic as addressing a public of those who do not know on matters of fact. The academic, or researcher, is repositioned by the concern that she can no longer assume that she knows the answer, or even the terms in which to phrase the question.

Correspondence:

Naomi Hodgson

e-mail: naomi.hodgson@kuleuven.be

NOTES

¹ <http://www.researchinfonet.org/publish/finch/>

² HEFCE are currently consulting on plans to make open access publication part of the evaluation of research excellence in future.

³ This repositioning is evident in the investment in and development of new technologies and related service providers by existing publishers, e.g. in June 2014 John Wiley & Sons acquired the scientific software company SimBioSys. In the press release Wiley is not described as a publisher but as ‘a provider of knowledge and knowledge-enabled solutions that improve outcomes in research, professional practice, and education’ (<http://njbmagazine.com/njb-news-now/john-wiley-sons-inc-acquires-simbiosys/>; last accessed 5th August 2014).

⁴ <http://library.leeds.ac.uk/open-access>

⁵ In debates on open access, the traditional publisher is often seen as the barrier to such moves. They represent the high costs to university libraries, the paywall that prevents access, the profiting from work undertaken and outputs produced from public funds (see e.g. Shieber, 2013; Wickham and Vincent, 2013). The move towards open access has turned attention on to the publishers as central to an outmoded, unjust, and unsustainable publishing model in which academics provide content and product for which publishers earn large profits. The UK’s National Working Group on Expanding Access to Published Research Findings (the ‘Finch Group’) report sought a way forward that did not damage publishers, and most now offer open access publishing options, for a fee. Some open access advocates argue, though, that this is a mis-step: making traditional journals into hybrid journals slows the pace of progress to a fully open access world and cements the place of publishers as profiting from academics’ work (see Shieber, 2013, pp. 35-36).

⁶ <http://www.plosone.org/>

⁷ This distinction is not, however, satisfactory since what is private – not shared, redacted – is visible as being such.

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**REFLECTIVE BOOK REVIEW OF
*EDUCATION, DIALOGUE AND HERMENEUTICS,***

ed. by Paul Fairfield, Continuum International Pub Inc, 2011. Pages 152.

Daniel J. Shuster

Paul Fairfield selected seven guest essays (by Jean Grondin, Shaun Gallagher, Nicholas Davey, Graeme Nicholson, Ramsey Eric Ramsey, Andrzej Wiercinski, and Babette Babich) and one of his own for this 152 page volume. These chapters take a Continental view of education through a hermeneutic lens, and together form a balanced argument for education renewal with Wilhelm von Humboldt's *Bildung*. A common theme is concern for the underlying postmodern aversion to *paideia* and resistance to hermeneutic dialogue in schools. This book is strongly recommended as a foundational footing for deep study of the contemporary condition of education and its critical relation to dialogue and hermeneutics as it relates to any field. Each author is broadly published and thereby accessible.

Jean Grondin's essay "Gadamer's Experience and Theory of Education: Learning that the Other May Be Right" provides a solid anchor for this collection. After discussing the social and historical traditions that formed Gadamer's life, Grondin shares his essential views on the constructivist nature of learning and education as revealed through *Truth and Method*. We are reminded of the importance of receptivity to other's points of view, and of Socrates' *elenchus* in the cultivation of *Bildung* – "to elevate oneself above one's own particularity and learn to view it with some perspective." Conversely, we are dissuaded from clinging to the certainties of positivism and the need to be right and conclusive in our ever-changing, white-water circumstances.

Grondin invites the reader to Gadamer's perspective of reality as continuous acquisition of an ever-expanding horizon. Our *sensus communis* within our culture draws and binds us to a humanist education that allows scientificity and empirical reasoning their proper place and proportion of influence, while also allowing us to create our own place and identity in the world. Through never-ending dialogue and suspension of finality we can continuously re-interpret our horizons across time, through language, and to apply that learning to emergent social situations for a more humane culture.

Shaun Gallagher's essay "Narrative Competence and the Massive Hermeneutical Background" draws on childhood development stages to locate the roots of intersubjective understanding. After discussing the theories that constitute a *massive hermeneutical background* accumulated through interactions since childhood, Gallagher describes a development toward narrative framing which together with primary and secondary intersubjective processes leads to contextual understanding of other's actions. Narratives accumulate into a *folk psychology* within particular cultures and communities, and it is only new narratives that can change the folk psychology, and the culture itself, as they increase the stock of massive hermeneutical background from which new narratives emerge. This is strikingly similar to Alfred Korzybski's *time binding*. The two stages of early childhood interaction that lead to intersubjective understanding may draw to mind the work with mirror neurons and empathy since the link was discovered in the 1980s and 1990s by Giuseppe Di Pellegrino, Luciano Fadiga, Leonardo Fogassi, and Vittorio Gallese at the University of Parma.

Nicholas Davey's essay "Philosophical Hermeneutics: An Education for all Seasons?" builds on three "mutually interwoven concepts:" education, the formative process of *Bildung*, and philosophical hermeneutics. Davey speaks to Gianni Vattimo's dialogical utopianism and "defense of every individual's entitlement to a meaningful existence" through *Bildung* as an intensification of process not outcomes – means not ends, quality not quantity, solidarity not competition, reduction of violence not scientific models. From this perspective, "unending individual qualitative transformation" comes about as a "consequence of continuous adaptation and negotiation" through "exchange with others, [and] challenging and extending horizons of individual and collective possibility." Davey draws on Martin Heidegger, Francisco Varela, John Shotter, and Mikhail Bakhtin to show how living systems are autonomous, complex systems of potentiality – dialogical, hermeneutical, and self-organizing through their own recursive history.

Davey articulates Gadamer's synthesis of Herder and Hegel's understanding of *Bildung* into six theses: *Bildung* as ontologically congruent with non-essentialism; *Bildung* as associated with culture; *Bildung* as effect; *Bildung* as thoughtful disposition towards experience; *Bildung* as capacity to act; and *Bildung* as tactfulness. From these perspectives Davey summarizes *Bildung* as "a philosophical attempt to articulate a process of self-formation which neither depends on the self alone nor culminates in a final self-image." Again drawing from Gadamer, Davey offers a phenomenological conception of *movement* with respect to *Bildung* that involves three separate but overlapping levels of meaning: the historical, the linguistic, and the tribal. Holding one's self in mindfulness "to the movement in things" is an essential part of *Bildung*. The author goes into detail into the idea of formative movement. Davey also includes more recent perspectives on *Bildung* from Michael Oakshott, Lars Løvlie and Paul Standish, Sven Nordenbo, Klaus Mortensen, Gert Biesta, Ilan Gur-ze'ev, Helmut Peukert, and Ronald Reichenback (*Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 2002) to build a strong case for *Bildung* and its transformative, non-instrumental approach to education. The essay concludes with a strong critical argument against instrumental methods of education and the neglect of the whole student.

Graeme Nicholson's essay "The Education of the Teacher" speaks to the notion of *Bildung* as life-long, self-reflexive, mutual education of students and teachers alike. Nicholson makes it clear that the formative nature of *Bildung* falls in opposition to professional education or development of any particular technical expertise; however the *thinking teacher* of any such instrumental coursework may also bring the student along on their own research journey into more humanistic topics or unanswered questions in the teacher's own life narrative. Nicholson offers a picture of the thinking teacher – one who shares her internal thought processes of the formative experience in her own life leading up to the curriculum at hand. Such a teacher may also invite the students to reflect on their own lives and circumstances that bring them to that moment. One outcome is a continuously evolving approach to any given curriculum and its historical and situational relevance to the multitude of lives passing through a school. "The student is invited to think because the teacher does not merely think but fosters thinking through *acting out* thinking in the course of a class." The thinking teacher is described as one who fearlessly works along the edges of what they themselves don't know; and is not one to hide in the safety of certainty and a fixed canon

of knowledge to be doled out in one direction. Acknowledging one's errors and their corrections by one's students, and asking students for insight and answers are hallmarks of a thinking teacher. In his reflection on *Bildung* Nicholson cites the ambition held for its purpose by Herder, Fichte, Humboldt, Schleiermacher and Hegel, and its displacement by pedantry in 19th century German universities by way of bourgeois deviation and nationalism. The author leaves the revival of *Bildung* squarely on the shoulders of thinking teachers.

Paul Fairfield's essay "Dialogue in the Classroom" begins with recognition of a form of dialogue used in the pedagogy of Paulo Freire for critical consciousness. Fairfield finds elements of objectivist epistemology embedded in Freirean dialogue associated with Marxism. He suggests that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provides a form of dialogue for the classroom that is less ideologically, and more hermeneutically driven. This preference toward an emergent and generative style conversation reminds this reviewer of David Bohm's conception of dialogue through mutuality; which albeit powerful and intriguing, may risk dulling the critical edge of the pedagogy and detracting from Freire's *conscientization*. Stepping completely away from the *political* aspects of hermeneutics in this case may have unforeseen consequences and need deeper reflection given the present circumstances of education that have become ideologically skewed by neoliberalism, whether we like it or not. Exclusive use of Gadamerian or Bohmian dialogue, it seems to this reviewer, is a pivotal, strategic choice to be further considered and cautiously made; and if chosen as such, may just the same lead to expressions of a critical and political nature that will challenge the teacher for political solutions.

Fairfield cogently reviews Gadamer's contributions to the art of dialogical conversation: the receptivity and passivity of quality dialogue, "falling into conversation," "that a conversation has a spirit of its own...that it allows something to 'emerge' which henceforth exists," that it "is like an event that happens *to* us," that "goodwill...is a disposition that applies equally to the text and to the participants in the conversation," that "it requires a good deal of background knowledge," and that "dialogue presupposes both informed participants and a common orientation toward a productive line of questioning." The author is firm in his opposition to Freirean dialogue stating, "educators are not revolutionists in the cause of emancipation," and invoking Dewey in the idea that students ought to be exposed to a form of inquiry that leads them to "habits of mind that

incline them toward further inquiry and to a love of ideas for their own sake.” This idea has long been a hallmark of good education and now challenges critical pedagogy to find its place within the teacher-student relationship. Fairfield is clear on the value of Socratic questioning and its value in motivating the student to research answers through reflection and reading sources they might not otherwise look for. He furthermore details the difficulties of engaging dialogue in uncondusive spaces, or with dogmatic or highly structured teachers who may be uncomfortable with the informality of good dialogue. Some teachers may feel insecure being confronted with new information presented by students doing their research to examine or validate their ideas. Notwithstanding Dewey’s “ethos of experimental inquiry” being threatened on many fronts in the contemporary university, the author concludes with Gadamer, “The path of all knowledge leads through the question.”

Ramsey Eric Ramsey’s essay “On the Dire Necessity of the Useless: Philosophical and Rhetorical Thoughts on Hermeneutics and Education in the Humanities” stems from his work in the philosophy of communication and rhetoric. He draws on Pierre Hadot, “Not the memorization of doctrines, philosophy...understands [that] ‘real wisdom does not cause us to know: it makes us *be* in a different way.’” Ramsey points to philosophy as both “diagnostic and therapeutic for troubled times.” On the diagnostic side he points to problems arising from Platonism, Cartesianism, Christianity, scientism, capitalism, and instrumentalization as revealed by modern western philosophers. On the therapeutic side he points to eclecticism, transdisciplinary dialogue, “transformative power of our own pleasures,” socialism, and art. The author sees hermeneutics and rhetoric as the fabric of social interconnectedness—“interpretation and communication as part of the inescapable structure of the human condition and not merely techniques.”

Ramsey quotes Calvin Schrag, richly describing the epistemological space beyond subjects and objects as a “vibrant hermeneutical space of affect-imbued and praxis-oriented engagements.” His idea of the hermeneutic circle consisting of *phronesis*, *ethos*, and *pathos* as “constitutive of our being-together” follows from that understanding of the entwinement of hermeneutics and rhetoric. It is against this backdrop that Ramsey generously illuminates two moments within Plato’s cave allegory that illustrate “what the task and challenge of our education shall entail.” From his rendition of the cave allegory, he extracts that “we share and confirm our place in the world” and are thereby returned to a grounding of

phronesis, ethos, and pathos. Thus we now stand “in dire need of inventing ways of thinking, talking, and being-together to confront rhetorical situations” to try “from as many disciplinary perspectives as possible to disclose the structures that make up our shared being-in-the-world.” In closing, Ramsey tells us his reading of the allegory can allow us to welcome Socratic dialogue, “welcome our inexactitude and remain answerable to it by thinking about it with care, spontaneity, and rigor,...[and] welcome the idea of and be thankful for an education that makes us...Useless.” This reviewer invites the reader to study this interdisciplinary interpretation of the cave allegory.

Andrzej Wiercinski’s essay “Hermeneutic Education to Understanding: Self-Education and the Willingness to Risk Failure” is a lucid testimony on the understanding of what education is and is not. A powerful statement sets the stage: “To educate a human being is not to teach someone a trade or an art, but to cultivate a sensitivity toward exercising one’s freedom... Primarily it is about the will to learn about oneself.” The role of hermeneutics in education is described as to help us “realize what is happening to us in the process learning” and to help us “to identify serious misconceptions and to address unspoken premises that we often take for granted.” In hermeneutic education the teacher’s role is to sensitize the student, not necessarily to inform them. “The teacher has a profound responsibility of creating a learning relationship with students and encouraging them to build such relationships with others.” Encouraging “openness to risk, misunderstanding, and the unexpected...situates the relationship in the horizon between familiarity and strangeness.” In such a relationship we have a mutual commitment to each other’s freedom. Withholding one’s prejudices and personal interests protects the visibility of the other in such a dialogical relationship. Without resorting to totalizing power, the teacher encourages ethical decisions. In this way, “education can be understood as a kind of assistance in the transformation of the self in the better living of life.”

Wiercinski draws heavily from Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Gadamer to find *Bildung* to be not just formation, but self-cultivation with an emphasis on the student self as the active agent. One can say that the self learns and transforms through conversation with others. The quality of the conversation and the sensitivity of the ‘others’ surely have effect on the self-cultivation. To each participant in a dialogue there is likely some proportional measure of mutual transformation; thus to the teacher even the student is an ‘other’ through whom she is also

transformed. This line of thinking leads this reviewer to suspect that if there was to be a “measure” to this true form of education, it might be a teacher’s written narrative of how *trans*-formed they themselves are through the dialogical mutuality with each particular student—whereas the student’s autobiographical writing might describe their mutuality among all those with whom they converse and learn with and through. The final pages of this memorable essay are so rich with description of the vital importance of education and the hermeneutic life they must speak for themselves.

Babette Babich’s essay “Education and Exemplars: On Learning to Doubt” details how Ivan Illich and Friedrich Nietzsche each in their own way challenged educational institutions. Drawing on Illich’s 1971 *Deschooling Society* and Nietzsche’s 1910 *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions* the author appears to recognize the valid need to de-school society and replace mass education with self-education.

On balance, this volume is an important and timely addition to the philosophical canon on education. Each contribution is a different facet to a crystal clear image of the vital importance of hermeneutics and dialogue to everyone’s formation through mutuality. I recommend this book to anyone who cares deeply about a hopeful future for the coming generations of humanity.

Correspondence:

Daniel J. Shuster

e-mail: shuster@scc.net

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THE RELUCTANT POSTMODERNISM OF BARBARA WEBER

REVIEW OF BARBARA WEBER, *PHILOSOPHIEREN MIT KINDERN ZUM THEMA MENSCHENRECHTE: VERNUNFT UND MITGEFÜHL ALS GRUNDVORAUSSSETZUNGEN EINER DEMOKRATISCHEN DIALOGKULTUR*

(Philosophizing with children about human rights: Reason and empathy as preconditions for a democratic dialogue culture)

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Mareike Gebhardt

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany

Barbara Weber's book belongs to a series of three books that deals with rationality and empathy in the context of human rights and bodily perspectives on political thought.¹ In general, the analysis follows a path of reconciliation combining Jürgen Habermas' modern and Richard Rorty's postmodern democratic theory. After two philosophical volumes, Weber concentrates her attention in *Philosophieren mit Kindern zum Thema Menschenrechte* on the relationship between the philosophical notions of rationality and empathy and an educational concept that emphasizes the cultivation of human rights under transcultural conditions. Weber sketches the connection lines between a reciprocal understanding of rationality and empathy, a well-established reflection upon methodological aspects and a pedagogical operationalization of philosophical questions in the context of *Philosophy for Children* (P4C). This review follows those three lines of argument. It focuses firstly on a philosophical analysis of whether reason and empathy are antagonistic or reciprocal concepts; secondly, on Weber's highly skilled methodological pluralism, and thirdly, on the possibilities of philosophical inquiry within the classroom.

Weber's analysis oscillates between modern and postmodern thought: between a deep faith in communicative processes of reasoning and the importance of transcultural recognition of otherness (*Andersheit*). In this regard the book is a successful reconciliation of *modern* thinking – in terms of universal human rights and communicative action – and *postmodern* approaches – in terms of critical

thinking towards reason and universalism. On this account reason and empathy cannot be seen as antagonists between which philosophy and democratic education have to choose, but rather as complements to each other. When teachers talk to children about human rights and democracy, both capacities are of utmost importance: without reason, understanding the Other is based on contingent and unreflected acts of “judging” and must remain prejudice; without empathy, the recognition of the Other stays on a merely abstract level. Thus, children need both: an education towards reason as the capacity to judge thoughtfully and the sensitivity for the Other suffering as much as I do. Only communicative reason combined with sensitive judgment fosters the consciousness that the Other is unique in her Otherness but also very much like myself: A person that I sometimes cannot fully comprehend but that I always need to respect in her capacity to feel and fear cruelty. This is the lesson Weber wants us to learn.

Accordingly the book emphasizes the claim to universal validity of human rights – following ideals philosophy knows and appreciates since Enlightenment – and the importance of meeting the Other under fair and equal conditions in a transcultural and postnational lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*). Weber seeks to reinforce the importance of dialogue and mutual understanding in those situations of diversity and difference children are confronted with in their lives as human beings and later as citizens. She introduces a way of thinking that acknowledges the intersubjective truth-seeking procedures of deliberation and discursive dialogue (Habermas) and the need for a sensitivity that allows the emotional capacity for the recognition of the Other’s suffering to flourish (Rorty). For the latter, a body-based experience is very important. At that point, Weber criticizes Rorty’s approach for its mere concentration on linguistic arguments for a cultivation of empathy. She therefore adds a phenomenological interpretation of bodily experiences to Rorty’s language philosophy of empathy.

Drawing on a well-elaborated argument that reveals a deep knowledge of contemporary political philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy, Weber provides us with an enriching analysis of modern and postmodern ways of thinking about human rights. The study’s multiperspectivity sheds light on advantages and disadvantages of a mere modern, or a mere postmodern thinking. Her argument successfully manages to sketch modern and postmodern thought as complementary. In convincingly establishing a fruitful dialogue between modern and postmodern thought Weber does not vote one-sidedly for one or the other.

In accordance with her own thesis that dialogue can never be hierarchical, Weber does not decide in favor of one particular philosophical way of thinking. She leaves it open to the reader to decide which concept she finds more convincing or if she should follow Weber's path of not-choosing. Nevertheless, by not-choosing Weber "secretly" votes in favor of postmodern approaches: To deny the existence of an (absolute) truth is unambiguously postmodern. In that way, even Weber's reading of Habermas becomes postmodern when she emphasizes the contingency and temporality of the intersubjective "truth". Weber's subtle postmodernism discloses itself in her interpretation of Habermasian and Rortian philosophy: On Weber's argument Habermas' discourse theory works as a contemporary methodological supplement for the Platonic concept of (absolute) truth-finding. To him, truth can be *found* in intersubjective confrontations with others. Regarding the class room situation—as a very specific form of dialogue—the teacher leads the child to the "right" answer by using Habermasian techniques of discursive deliberation. On the contrary, Weber favors the Rortian concept: In *Philosophy and Social Hope* (1999) Rorty distinguishes between "finding truth" as in metaphysics and in the philosophy of Enlightenment on the one hand, and "making truth" in terms of constructivistic thinking on the other. He starkly votes for an intersubjective dialogue that is structured by asking questions more than by giving answers. The statements we make must be asked and constantly altered in disruptive waves. To Rorty, moreover, the notion of "truth" must be modified according to the normative standards of postmodernism: the only "truth" we can rely on is the "truth" we *made* by and for ourselves. In accordance with Rorty, Weber declares, nobody will give us "truth", nobody can find *the* truth, and it will never be everlasting. Instead, we *make* our socio-cultural situated and highly contextualized "truths". Unlike Rorty Weber emphasizes that the cultivation of sensitivity and empathy cannot only rely on linguistic terms but must be supplemented by bodily aspects. The importance of the body in encounters with the Other is being introduced through a phenomenology of the body (*Leibphänomenologie*).² Only a theoretical recourse that follows arguments from phenomenology of the body can thwart the formalistic and procedural character of the Habermasian model: not only reason, but also bodily experiences must be emphasized when talking about the cultivation of human rights. Children are confronted with the Other not only in situations of speech and talk but also by their bodily appearance: By seeing, hearing, smelling, and feeling the others'

presences the abstract notion of otherness turns into a concrete experience. To Weber, only what is tangible (*greifbar*), can be comprehensible (*begreifbar*). For this reason, Weber's educative model towards the recognition of the inclusiveness of human rights cannot solely rely on modern, rationalistic, "enlightened" arguments (e.g. those of Kohlberg/ Habermas), but must be complemented by a postmodern view that draws attention towards empathy, emotion, the body, and the contingency of being.

Since bodily experience plays a major role in a child's development of empathy, an educational concept of P4C must consider not only rationality but has to support the child's ability to feel the other's suffering. Only then, Weber maintains, can the child's emotional and cognitive development be guaranteed. P4C is therefore adequately established only when communicative rationality *and* empathy are developed. To connect both, Weber suggests phenomenological, hermeneutical, dialectical, and speculative thinking to serve as a junction between philosophical methods that can be didactically transformed in the classroom and bodily experiences which constitute children's lifeworlds. In order to do so, Weber follows Ekkehard Mertens's plurality of methods: different methods are didactically applied according to the children's ways of asking and understanding. Such different methods serve as amplifiers for specific modes of approaching problems. *Phenomenological methods* refer to bodily experiences and are therefore bound to sensitive experiences. They foster and support the development of empathy. *Hermeneutics* is seen as a social practice: it is the art of understanding the other in her otherness. It helps to identify similarities between different individuals and groups for establishing certain forms of solidarity. In contrast, *dialectics* aims at the identification of differences and diverse interpretations of norms and values (thesis and antithesis). In the end, dialectical thinking synthesizes these differences. Thus, it clarifies the necessity for compromise and cooperation in contemporary lifeworlds where political and social unities have been demolished. *Logical thinking* seeks for insight and the intellectual recognition of intersubjectivity as the best way of solving problems—similar to Habermas' argument of the non-coercive force of the better argument (*der zwanglose Zwang des besseren Arguments*). Finally, *speculation* is not so much a coherent method but a mode of changing perspective: it bursts the chains of traditional thinking and dissolves the security of an all too obvious set of all too outdated rules and regulations. Thus, by speculative thinking new structures of thought are to be explored.

With her methodological diversity Weber withdraws from P4C-approaches that focus on the Socratic dialogue, since it relies on the existence of objective answers and solutions, and therefore “right” and “wrong”. For Weber, the binary code of ancient Greek and Enlightenment philosophy is inadequate in contemporary classroom-situations. Neither should the teacher be viewed as a classical leader of the child (*paid-agogós*) on the “right” path nor should the teacher be seen as an authority. Rather, teacher and children come together under the equal and fair conditions of the ideal discourse community (*Diskursgemeinschaft*). Children do not automatically seek for right answers and final solutions but are far more interested in asking questions playfully. Weber, of course, refers to the danger of too high expectations of children’s ability of philosophical reflection; but she emphasizes that children should not be underestimated in their capacity to deal with difficult and complex questions and situations. The teacher therefore does not impose her normative values on the *Community of Inquiry* but guarantees a free and fair atmosphere in which children should start thinking for themselves. They should learn to think freely and critically first, and then learn about the consequences that arise from their decisions and actions. This aims at helping them understand what their decisions mean to themselves and to the other. For that, they not only need a certain kind of rationality but also the capacity to feel (for) the other.

In general Weber’s research ranges between modern and postmodern thought. It can be considered a very convincing interplay of the two most influential lines of thought of contemporary philosophy. Nevertheless, her deep faith in communicative reason seems too optimistic in the face of irrationalities and particularisms that have been arising all over the world. Very often multiculturalism has failed in dealing with the challenges it meets. In a postnational and transcultural world we witness tendencies of regional and cultural withdrawal. These irrationalities Weber’s approach cannot mitigate. However, what makes Weber’s approach so enriching is firstly, her astonishing playfulness when it comes to her knowledge of and her competent dealing with philosophical concepts. Secondly, she maintains her argument a lightheartedness of thought that allows both a complex philosophical analysis – or may I say a dialogue with her readers about philosophical questions – and the development of a didactical model that takes the otherness of children seriously.

Correspondence:

Mareike Gebhardt

e-mail: mareike.gebhardt@fau.de

NOTES

¹ *Zwischen Vernunft und Mitgefühl. Jürgen Habermas und Richard Rorty im Dialog über Wahrheit, politische Kultur und Menschenrechte* and *Vernunft, Mitgefühl und Körperlichkeit. Eine phänomenologische Rekonstruktion des politischen Raumes*; both published by Karl Alber-publishers (Freiburg i.B.) in 2013.

² The Husserlian tradition of phenomenology differentiates between *Körper* ("body") and *Leib* ("limb"). While the notion of *Körper* refers only to the senses and therefore to the objectification of the human body, the notion of *Leib* refers to a transcendental concept that entails more than just the concrete human body ("soul"). The details of this difference are of subordinate importance to this review; for further information cf. Husserl, Edmund: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1950ff.) and Merleau-Ponty, Maurice: *La phénoménologie de la perception* (1945).