

Stanisław Bieleń

TURBULENCE IN THE **POST-COLD** **WAR ERA**



**TURBULENCE
IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA**

Stanisław Bieleń

**TURBULENCE
IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA**

translated by Anthony Sloan



Reviewers

Jarosław Dobrzański

Bruno Drwęski

Commissioning Editor

Małgorzata Yamazaki

Content Editor, Proofreading

Daniel J. Sax

Production Editor

Maryla Broda

Index

Iwona Karpowicz-Dajczer

Cover Design

Elżbieta Chojna

Cover Illustration

Elżbieta Chojna

pixabay.com

Layout and Typesetting

Dariusz Górski

Published with the financial support of the Faculty of Political Science
and International Studies of the University of Warsaw

© Copyright by Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2021

Stanisław Bieleń ORCID 0000-0003-4031-3549

ISBN 978-83-235-5312-0 (druk)

ISBN 978-83-235-5320-5 (pdf online)

ISBN 978-83-235-5328-1 (epub)

ISBN 978-83-235-5336-6 (mobi)

Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

00-838 Warszawa, ul. Prosta 69

E-mail: wuw@uw.edu.pl

Online bookstore: www.wuw.pl

1st Edition, Warszawa 2021

Print and binding

POZKAL

Contents

Introduction	7
CHAPTER I. Geopolitical determinants of the international order .	17
1. Geopolitics and globalization	17
2. Characteristics of the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War order	24
3. How the international order is governed	29
CHAPTER II. The place of states in the international order	34
1. The relativization of the nation state	34
2. The threat of an imperialization of the world	40
3. The implications of the fall of states	43
4. The state from the global perspective	49
CHAPTER III. Status as an indicator of states' positions in the international hierarchy	59
1. Status as conceived sociologically	59
2. Status as conceived legally	61
3. The fight for status in international relations	63
4. Poland's historically and geopolitically encumbered status	69
CHAPTER IV. Manifestations of revisionism and the defence of the <i>status quo</i> in international relations	75
1. Antecedents of revisionism and the <i>status quo</i>	75
2. Russia and China as sources of anti-Western revisionism	77
3. The dialectics of revisionism and the defence of the <i>status quo</i>	80
CHAPTER V. From hegemony to 'polygony' in international relations	87
1. Hegemony as an indicator of the post-Cold War order	87
2. Under the mark of American power	88

3. US hegemony contested	96
4. Towards ‘polygony’ – a multicentric polygon of powers	99
CHAPTER VI. The identity crisis of the Western alliance	105
1. Reassessments in the Western world	105
2. The decline of the alliance	107
3. The need to restore common interests	113
CHAPTER VII. Redefining Russia as a superpower in international relations	119
1. Russia’s traditions as a great power	119
2. The search for a new identity	121
3. Determination to restore superpower status	125
4. Image-building	133
5. Pan-Russianism as a manifestation of imperial ideology	138
CHAPTER VIII. Perceptions of Russia in international relations	144
1. Perception and international images	144
2. Lasting tendencies in perceptions of Russia	147
3. The discourse over Russia	152
4. How Russia is perceived in Poland	159
CHAPTER IX. A return to <i>Realpolitik</i> in Russian-Western relations as a result of the conflict in Ukraine	165
1. The background of Russia’s new confrontation with the West	165
2. The foundations of Russian <i>Realpolitik</i>	167
3. The risk of an escalation in the conflict	174
4. Poland vs Russian <i>Realpolitik</i>	176
CHAPTER X. Central European energy security in the American geopolitical game	183
1. Energy interdependence in the modern world	183
2. The American energy game over Europe	186
3. The dialectics of American-Russian interdependence	190
Conclusion	198
Bibliography	208
Index	230

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, the West, convinced of its superiority as a civilization, assumed that the international order would now take on a 'liberal' character, that it would remain based on Western values, norms and institutions. The hegemonic superpower, which the United States proclaimed itself to be, took on a universal role – one full of megalomania and conceit – in defence of those values. Yet, because they had never been accepted globally, America's mission was bound to lead to many confrontations and conflicts, and Russia became one of the chief adversaries of the West. Much was expected of it, with no consideration given to the fact that, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia faced problems other than democracy – problems connected with its own survival. The more Moscow objected to Western models being imposed on it, the more the West grew irritated. A paradoxical situation arose in which, after the dramatic experiences of Cold War confrontation, rather than trying to create a community of states ready to build order through cooperation and consensus, the West chose a course of confrontation with a state that, for the first time in many decades, had given up the need for any ideological justification of hostility in international relations. Once again, an approach based on ideological motivations led to a division of the world into hostile groups and spheres of influence. It turns out that Cold War thinking is deeply rooted in the minds of politicians, whatever their geopolitical stripe.¹

In light of the existing atmosphere of confrontation between the West and Russia, there is a need to dispense for the foreseeable future with the hope of building a liberal order in international relations that would be uniform and universal. One should expect, rather, the rolling out of a diplomatic initiative towards a plural order, which draws on the experiences gained in the period of *détente* of the 1970s. The degree of tension then

¹ R. Legvold, *Return to Cold War*, Polity, Cambridge-Malden 2016.

was comparable to that of today, but back then political leaders on both sides of the impasse managed to rise above their divisions, respecting the rights of each side and agreeing to a peaceful co-existence.

For this to happen today, what is most needed is a realistic diagnosis of the situation that has lasted now for almost three decades, and which has brought about neither “the end of history” (Fukuyama) nor “a clash of civilizations” (Huntington). These propaganda slogans are clearly confrontational in nature, and have not helped anyone understand the complexities of the modern world or the logic of the changing international geometry. Similarly, a recognition of the real motivations of states is not helped by 19th-century analogies to Russia’s imperial identity and the *Realpolitik* it pursues. The fact is, both sides have begun engaging in a geopolitical revisionism, accusing each other of bad intentions. The policy of sanctions and counter sanctions has led to intractability and a standoff in mutual relations, while misperceptions are hampering any understanding of what the real source of the escalation in tensions is. Thus, we are faced with a spiralling conflict over which the parties involved are losing control. If each of them takes an offensive approach, it is not difficult to imagine that, at some place and time, things will come to a head, with incalculable consequences. A certain change in the behaviour of the West towards Russia is expected after the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States, but so far little has changed in how America and Russia see each other.

International diplomacy is thus faced with the problem of how to de-escalate the conflict. Neither the West’s accusations that Russia is solely to blame for the current state of relations nor Russia’s resistance and siege mentality will lead to the desired solutions. Professional diplomats must get back to making arrangements and seeking compromises. It is time to stop idealising one system of values and demonising the other. Different states have truly different paths of development, and are not giving in as easily as some expected to the internationalization of the values of the Western world. China, for example, and its political hybridization are showing that even the most ideological political systems can evolve into pragmatic regimes that defend their own national interests. Progress in international relations is not linear, as the ancients knew. There is no ideological determinism leaving no alternative in the choice of political systems. No one has a monopoly on managing either particular states or the international order as a whole. While many states – including Russia – agree on the basic rules of the game, there are plenty of divergences in how these are to be interpreted and applied in life. The Western states underline the role of shared democratic values and human rights, whereas Russia emphasises the principle of common security. Rather than integrating under

one big ‘umbrella’, the Russians believe that respect for sovereign equality is the basis of a stable international order, and this view is also shared by smaller states that do not want to subordinate themselves to a single political vision or a single interpretation of Western values. Such states include Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Poland, even though they are part of Western structures. Their examples show that the Western community is not uniform, and that the hope at the beginning of the 1990s for a quick transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (as expressed, for example, in the Paris Charter for a New Europe of 1990) was unfounded. In their naiveté, for a long time Western politicians were unable to grasp that the international order would have to be built on a new compromise, not at the dictate of the only victor. It seems that the time has come to understand the complexity of the identities of many states. It is no longer enough just to establish new institutions or sign new treaties: the consciousness of political elites and whole societies must also be changed – and this will take many generations.

Russia was the first state to openly oppose US hegemony. Instead of unipolarism, in Moscow multipolarism was launched, meaning the creation of a collective system for managing international relations reminiscent of the 19th-century Concert of Europe. In this Russia has received support from China, and the creation of the informal BRICS group was aimed at reinforcing this trend towards a ‘democratization’ of the transformation of the international order. Activities favouring a de-concentration of American hegemony were accompanied by Russian accusations that all the democratic changes in the form of ‘colour revolutions’ or ‘regional springs’ had been inspired by the United States and supported by other Western states. On this canvas, enormous mistrust arose, caused on the one hand by the West’s arbitrary subversion of the intra-state, and on the other by Russia’s undermining of the international *status quo*. Each side accuses the other of bad faith and inciting activities detrimental to its opponent. It has become an almost proverbial form of invective to accuse Russia of waging a ‘hybrid information war’, as if the United States and other Western states had no ‘constructive’ part of their own in that ‘war’. Laying all the blame for the ills of today’s world – including liberal politicians’ election losses – on Russia and Vladimir Putin bears the hallmarks of a certain state of paranoia. Misperceptions, that is, viewing the other side based on incorrect assumptions and negative attitudes results in evaluations that are faulty and conclusions that are wrong. Even part of the academic community – on both sides of the confrontation – has succumbed to a mental ‘asphyxiation’ that brings to mind the indoctrination of the social sciences of the Cold War era. In recent years, representatives of contemporary

American political realism such as John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen and Stephen Walt have tried to show the dangers of a Cold War recidivism. In their view, the growing confrontation is not determined by an objective force, but by bad decisions and a zero-sum game logic that has once again caught hold of the minds of politicians in both the West and Russia.² Ultimately, both sides are guilty of having created new spheres of influence and kindled hostilities.

This is especially visible in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. All the narrations on both sides cast blame on the other side, as if there could be no concept of shared blame for the existing situation.³ To top things off, Russia has shown a certain determinism in relation to the strategy of the West. Bent on ‘stopping’ Russia, American and European politicians treated the 2014 crisis in Ukraine not as a cause of – but a pretext for – confrontation. If there had been no Maidan revolt in Kyiv, any other situation would have sufficed as a cause. Certainly there is right on both sides, but Russia does not see how it has contributed to escalating the conflict, applying a perverse logic of Crimean reunification, not annexation – the latter, of course, being in violation of international law.⁴ In light of these discrepancies, complaints arise in the West that Russia is seeking to endow itself with separate status and special rights, and is demanding to be treated differently than other states.

Russia believes that the biggest ‘sin’ of the West has been to intervene in the internal affairs of many states, causing the outbreak of bloody conflicts and dramatic changes in legal regimes that have led to humanitarian catastrophes. Russia sees nothing wrong with its involvement in the Syrian conflict, defending what is widely recognized as a criminal regime. Again, there is a clash between the criteria used for evaluating the interests of the different sides, and without a willingness to compromise that could allow one side to acknowledge that the other might be at least partially right, normality will never be restored.

Each side in today’s confrontation blames the other for provoking the conflict. Neither wants to admit that its own actions are contributing to the escalation. The West, with the United States at the forefront, remains convinced of the superiority of its achievements as a civilization, which is an expression of a kind of *missiology*, not to speak of colonial, imperialistic

² B.R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2014.

³ R. Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*, L.B. Tauris, London 2015.

⁴ O. Zadorozhnii, *Russian Doctrine of International Law after the Annexation of Crimea*, K.I.S., Kyiv 2016.

arrogance. References to the ‘higher civilization’ of the West is a complete anachronism today, and is indicative of a return to a colonial mentality. Russia, in turn, along with many other states in the world, not only defends its own achievements, but insists on alternative political models and developmental paths. The result is a new kind of ideological war – though in fact there is no real alternative today to the liberal order; there is only a choice between order and chaos.

An awareness of this may urge the two sides to initiate changes in their existing strategy of taking an entrenched position. On more than one occasion in history, the logic of credible deterrence has led to an uncontrolled arms race and heightened tensions. In their own defence, then, the two sides must employ all their skill and efforts to ensure international security. For now, neither side seems ready for a ‘relaxed’ dialogue that could restore faith in shared values and interests. Perhaps it will take some kind of extreme ‘existential solstice’ like World War II or the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 for them to arrive at the conclusion that their own vital interests demand that they cooperate in order to survive.

A realistic view tells us that, in the long run, security and arms control should take precedence over the democratization of further states. Russia shares this view,⁵ as do many states of the western and central parts of the Old Continent. One can hope, therefore, that, with a bit of good will, the two sides will finally find common ground concerning what is most important for the world. Focusing on security strategy, and not on vilifying the Russian president, will create much more room to manoeuvre, and the conditions for mutual understanding. After all, this was the basis for the birth of *détente*. When demands that cannot be satisfied appear on either side, it is time for a dynamic re-evaluation of existing strategies. The road from digging in to acknowledging where the other side is right is a long one, but the history of the Cold War shows that the West was once willing to recognize the role of the Soviet Union in solving the world’s most serious problem, even though it stood at a remote distance from the West, ideologically and otherwise. The situation today is similar. Russia is demanding to be recognized as having an equal role in ‘managing’ global affairs. Punishing it by isolating it and excluding it from decision-making bodies only exacerbates the conflict.

If we look at the lessons history has to teach from the era of the thaw between East and West, we can clearly see that, while it paradoxically

⁵ A. Miller, F. Lukyanov, *Detachment Instead of Confrontation: Post-European Russia in Search of Self-Sufficiency*, http://www.kreisky-forum.org/dataall/Report_Post-European-Russia.pdf (11.03.2018).

favoured the post-war division of Europe, it led to a gradual dismantling of the Eastern bloc and, by means of “antagonistic cooperation”, to the disappearance of the Soviet sphere of influence. During the presidency of Richard Nixon, the United States understood (largely thanks to the efforts of Henry Kissinger) that no understanding with the USSR (or with Communist China) was possible without an understanding of the sources of their mistrust of the West. The ability to take a critical look at one’s own policy made it possible to resign from identifying enemies arbitrarily, and even more so from taking punitive measures against them. The dual strategy of deterrence and dialogue expressed in the Harmel Report of 1967 demonstrated that Western states could find a way out of the vicious circle of confrontation. Certainly, America’s position at that time was a result of the re-evaluations caused by the Vietnam War, but it was also due to growing contradictions within the Western bloc. Mainly because of Kissinger’s realism, the United States managed to read the intentions of the other side (sides) correctly. Today we are faced with a situation in which everything said by Russian politicians is construed contrary to their intentions. When the Russians warn of a “new Cold War”, this is understood in the West as an admission by the Russians that they are creating such a situation. When the Russians call for dialogue, this is attributed to their cynicism and Machiavellianism. When they demonstrate a will to fend off harassments and threats, this means they are ‘interfering’ in internal matters – including elections – in the old ‘established’ democracies of the West.

The lessons available from the Ukrainian conflict teach that a re-evaluation of the West’s relations with Russia is necessary today, in both the normative and practical spheres. In the first domain, it is clear that the values of democracy, the rule of law and self-determination are interpreted differently not only by opponents, but also within a single grouping. The current renaissance of populism and nationalism in many Western European countries shows that not all citizens of the states that promote liberal democracy are satisfied with the achievements of their states. The victory of Donald Trump in the American presidential election in 2016 might be only the tip of the iceberg, an indication of just how tired Western societies are of bearing the costs of “liberal internationalism”. Against the migrant crisis, there is a growing wave of prejudice towards immigrants from the eastern part of Europe. This undermines the existing openness of the political elites of the European Union and NATO to further eastward expansion.

In the sphere of implementation, there is an enormous dissonance between the declarations made and the will to carry out a real systematic transformation in those states looking for integration with the West. States such as Ukraine and Moldova prove that, despite the rhetorical assurances

made by their political elites, they are unable to eliminate their oligarchic structures or break free of kleptocracy. The reforms made are not bringing the desired effects; those states are just spinning their wheels. In the states of the 'younger' Europe, such as Hungary and Poland, there is a revival of the 'old' nationalism born in the 19th century, and a return of authoritarianism disguised as "non-liberal" democracy. Along with Brexit, the European Union is losing its legitimacy to represent the entire continent, which, after all, always was and is a false claim, since there have always been European countries outside the EU. The problem is to preserve the credibility of EU integration in the eyes of those states that are weaker and in need of help at a time when one of the most powerful European nations has turned its back on the organization.

Among Western analysts, voices are increasingly frequently suggesting – in accordance with the teachings of Max Weber – that the ethics of beliefs should be replaced by the ethics of responsibility. This is so, for example, among certain German experts (Matthias Dembinski and Hans-Joachim Spanger⁶). It requires no extraordinary shift in perspective. It is enough to begin with recognizing the *status quo*. Supporters of a thaw during the Cold War fought for similar goals. The idea is to separate ongoing policy from problems that are difficult to resolve in the current situation. Those problems should not disrupt the ongoing dialogue or affect cooperation in many areas of a pragmatic nature. Both sides in today's confrontation should resign themselves to tolerating each other without interfering in the other's affairs, especially through military means, and should respect fundamental human rights. No international institution, and even less so an individual country, can assign itself the role of 'censor of political correctness' with regard to other states. The era of 'police' in international relations disappeared forever once countries began basing their relations on the fundamental principles of international law – sovereign equality and territorial integrity.

The rub, however, is that the sides in the conflict – such as Russia and the West – must acknowledge previous violations of those principles as a 'closed chapter', since mutual accusations are unproductive. It may be that, if not for the intervention of Western countries in Iraq and Libya, and their activities supporting the self-determination of Kosovo, Russia might not have had a pretext for recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not to mention for annexing Crimea. *Faits accomplis* cannot be undone. Their normative power must be acknowledged. The incantations

⁶ M. Dembinski, H.-J. Spanger, "Plural Peace" – Principles of a New Russian Policy", *PRIF Report* 2017, No. 145.

and moralising of naive idealists is of no avail here. The *status quo ante* cannot be restored. Since the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, through the many regulations passed by the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN, up to the Responsibility to Protect resolution of 2005, states have agreed to respect both sovereignty and human rights. In practice, it has turned out that, under the guise of humanitarian intervention, states have engaged in common theft, getting rid of unbearable dictators but at the same time leading completely stable and thriving countries into ruin. The interventions of the Western states have caused unimaginable humanitarian catastrophes, of which the crowning example is the tragedy of the people of Syria. Laying all the blame at the feet of Vladimir Putin is not only contrary to historical truth, it also attests to the thick layer of hypocrisy that covers Western politicians, and shows how it is possible to build a favourable narrative about oneself by perpetually accusing the other side.

Russia, of course, is not blameless. By coming out in favour of the right to self-determination of the peoples of Abkhazia and Ossetia, and of the Russians in Crimea, it undermined its own credibility as a guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet space and as one of the main decision-makers in the UN Security Council (100 member states condemned the annexation of Crimea). But for every problem there is a solution, even if, in the short term, the impasse is having a paralysing effect. If the parties in dispute agree to the principles arising out of international law, with some good will from their leaders they may quickly find some kind of *modus vivendi*. After all, in the 20th century various ways were created of reconciling aspirations for independence with respect for the principle of territorial integrity and the right of nations to self-determination. Thus, apart from recognition of the total independence of the population of a given territory (e.g. South Sudan), conditional independence is also possible (e.g. Bosnia and Hercegovina or Kosovo), as is autonomy (South Tyrol), federalism (of which the best example is Belgium), confederalism (proposed as a means of resolving the conflict in Cyprus), and condominium status (Andorra). History also provides examples of solutions based on mandates, trusteeships and protectorates, remnants of which still exist. Not all solutions have proved their worth in practice, e.g., status as a 'free city' (Gdańsk, Rijeka). By employing useful solutions at diplomatic conferences and international organizations, it is possible to prepare proposals for resolving the impasse. However, the time must be ripe for effective diplomatic initiatives. The European Union can play a fundamental part in this. Less can be expected of the OSCE, which, due to a lack of determination and political will among its members, is no longer able to accomplish what it did during the period of *détente*.

Though in this context alarmist associations with a “new Yalta” arise, one should not underemphasise the opportunities that may exist for reconciling different positions on one fundamental matter: both the West and Russia have the right to protect their ‘vital’ interests. Acknowledging this as a starting point for negotiations on how to resolve the conflict in Ukraine may open the road towards a compromise that would involve Ukraine taking part in a number of initiatives aimed at transforming it, but not necessarily incorporating it into Western structures. After all, the European Union spoke on this issue some time ago (15 December 2016) when it refused to grant Ukraine the status of a candidate state. The examples of Georgia and Ukraine have taught NATO that there is a ‘red line’ that it cannot cross without provoking an aggressive reaction from Russia that may include the use of military force. It is worth, then, considering models from the Cold War era when, in response to the inter-bloc confrontation of the time, certain states benefited from having neutral status, or adopted a policy of remaining neutral (such as Austria and Finland). Perhaps in the current situation such solutions – which Henry Kissinger pointed to immediately after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine – could again prove useful, at least during a transition period.

There is no doubt that a basic condition for breaking the impasse in Russian-American relations is for both to take a critical look at their own strategies, which so far have led nowhere. The societies of the countries of Europe expect their leaders to come up with a new philosophy of joint security that will revise the dogma about the systemic infallibility of the West, while a ‘plural order’ will make it possible for states that have different identities and ideological preferences to coexist.

This collection of reflections on today’s international reality from the point of view of a Central European researcher is intended to draw attention to the rapid changes taking place in the international system, and the implications thereof. At the same time, employing a realistic approach, I would like to communicate just how lasting hierarchies of dependence and *Realpolitik* are in international relations.

The texts that follow arose out of my research work of the past few years. They were presented at various academic events and made available to readers in different forms – as presentations at conferences, articles in periodicals, and chapters in anthologies. In book form, I hope to share my viewpoint on a number of problems whose importance extends beyond the boundaries of Polish foreign policy.

I am grateful to everyone who contributed to the publication of this book in English. Above all, to Dr. habil. Daniel Przystek, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, for

financial support; also to Professor Andrzej Wierzbicki, Head of the Chair of Eastern Studies, who encouraged me to undertake the project, and to all my reviewers, whose comments helped put the book in its final, polished form.

CHAPTER I

Geopolitical determinants of the international order

1. Geopolitics and globalization

Two broad areas dominate the discussion on the contemporary international reality, like the two sides of a coin – geopolitics and globalization. The first means the traditional connection between powers in time and space, while the second refers to an intensification of contacts among people on the global scale through manifold forms of exchange.⁷

Geopolitics is enjoying a renaissance in the spheres of ontology and cognition. This concerns the relationships between geographic features of the international environment and political processes going on in the world. It is still a contentious issue whether geopolitical facts or geopolitical mental constructs count more. For a long time, it has been known that politicians of many states, and of great powers especially, build various geopolitical spaces, manipulating ‘geographic facts’ for the purposes of their own policies and strategies. This phenomenon has become particularly fashionable in recent years as old power arrangements have decayed and the international balance has begun to teeter.

In contrast, globalization is the greatest force driving change in the power arrangements of the world.⁸ Changes in how people communicate and interact with one another are causing radical technological and social transformations. They are also conducive to societies becoming more active politically, to changes in the subjective condition of humanity, which Zbigniew Brzeziński has called a “global political awakening”, and to the appearance of global problems of survival.⁹

⁷ P. Marber, “Globalization and Its Contents”, *World Policy Journal* 2004–2005, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 29–37.

⁸ J.A. Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005.

⁹ Z. Brzeziński, B. Scowcroft, *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, Basic Books, New York 2008.

Many researchers overestimate the significance of either globalization or geopolitics, since in reality they condition and supplement each other. Geopolitics reminds us of 'old' models of conduct in the international system, based on hegemony and subordination, and concerns the most important issues affecting the global distribution of power.¹⁰ In this sense, it is focused on processes relating to the global balance of power, in which the most important role is played by actual or potential great powers.¹¹ Globalization, on the other hand, anticipates growing interdependence, a ripening of processes of cooperation and integration. While this is not exactly new, it has certainly intensified in recent decades.¹²

The technological revolution has reduced the importance of physical space, including in international relations. Growing economic interdependence is having a calming effect on geopolitical tensions. The world's largest economies – those of the United States, the European Union and China – are so strongly interconnected that it does not pay to heat up conflict among them. A war between the great powers is unthinkable. The growth of one of them depends on the strength and prosperity of the others.¹³ Few are those today who think of their power in terms of territorial expansion. The idea of conquering foreign lands has lost any sense. It has been replaced by a whole arsenal of economic instruments for ensuring that the globalized economy rules out any return to a geopolitical rivalry according to past patterns.

A new phenomenon in the globalized world is the internationalization of all problems of social coexistence. Be it terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, contagious diseases, contamination of the natural environment, economic crises or water shortages, none of these issues can now be solved without cooperation and coordination among many states. And if we include the growing power of the non-state players in international life, we see just how difficult such coordination can be, and the prospects for mutual understanding on the global scale can seem to dwindle.

Against this background, questions arise: How can globalization help smooth over geopolitical divisions when they are still being maintained?

¹⁰ Given the complex conditions in the international environment, geopolitics must take account of many more factors than when natural dimensions prevailed, particularly geographic location and spatial distances and extents.

¹¹ B.R. Nayar, *The Geopolitics of Globalization: The Consequences for Development*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, p. 7 et seq.

¹² M.M. Weinstein (ed.), *Globalization. What's New?* Columbia University Press, New York 2005.

¹³ M. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs", *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1983, No. 34, pp. 205–235; 323–353; R.N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Poverty in the Coming Century*, Basic Books, New York 2000.

What new players and new processes of globalization are changing the power arrangement, breaking down old constellations, harmonising models and values, or creating a pluralism of ideologies and world views in the international environment? In other words: under the influence of globalization, how is the interpretation of geographic space as an 'object of desire' in the policies of states, and especially the great powers, changing?

Geopolitics was essentially a creation of the Northern hemisphere (the West). European empires dominated the South, from Latin America and Africa to Australia and Oceania. Over the past 500 years, Western know-how has literally fused the globe together,¹⁴ with the result that, by the end of the 19th century, external expansion came to be replaced by an internal consolidation of the international system. In the 20th century, the 'North' split into two opposing camps, while the 'South' the post-colonial 'Third World' emerged.¹⁵

With the end of the Cold War, the hope arose that states would move towards economic integration, which would put an end to geopolitical rivalry.¹⁶ It turned out, however, that states seek economic integration and adapt Western institutions or models of conduct not to withdraw from the geopolitical struggle, but to engage in it more effectively. The great powers, which are undoubtedly the engines of globalization, promote the values of peace and prosperity but at the same time are determined not to lose any opportunity to increase their influence at the expense of their international partners. This means that globalization has only modified, not eliminated, geopolitical rivalry.

The beginning of the 21st century has seen a revolutionary change in how world geopolitics (and its derivatives: geostrategy, geoeconomics and geoculture) are considered. The West once dominated the whole world, now the centre of gravity is shifting to the East and the South. Along with the rise of non-European powers and a relative decline in the importance of the United States, the initiative in shaping the international system is being taken by China, India, Brazil and Eurasian Russia.¹⁷ There is no doubt that these are the biggest beneficiaries of globalization and the transition to a market economy. At the same time, through what is known as

¹⁴ A. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, Oxford University Press, London 1948, p. 23.

¹⁵ P. Kownacki, *Trzeci Świat a polityczny aspekt globalizacji gospodarczej [The Third World and the Political Aspect of Economic Globalisation]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe ASKON, Warszawa 2006.

¹⁶ W. Zank (ed.), *Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations? Overlapping Integration and Identities*, Ashgate, Burlington 2009.

¹⁷ K. Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*, Public Affairs Press, New York 2008.

the demonstration effect, these countries have a positive impact on other countries in Asia and Africa, and offer new opportunities (financial, investment and commodity markets) for the world's most developed countries.¹⁸ Geopolitically speaking, this has been the most groundbreaking development in modern times, though economically one should probably take a cooler view of this psychological shock. A restrained view should be taken of today's rise of Asian powers, since in the past they also had a significant share in the global economy, but this did not mean they determined the fate of the world. In 1820, at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, China's economy comprised 30% of the world economy and India's about 15%, compared with 23% for Europe and less than 2% for the United States. By the middle of the 20th century, the two Asian giants had but an 8.7% share in the global economy, while the United States had reached 27.3%, and Europe 26.3%.¹⁹ Today, they owe their current growth to globalization – specifically, to the liberalization of world trade.

The essence of the psychological shock connected with geopolitical change is well expressed by the idea of “Chimerica”, coined by Moritz Schularick and Niall Ferguson to describe the complicated relations between China and America. If we accept that something like Chimerica exists, then it occupies about 13% of the surface of the Earth, it is inhabited by one quarter of the population of the world, it produces more or less one third of global GDP, and its combined economy generated more than half of global economic growth in recent years.²⁰ The economic crisis brought about an improvement in China's position to the detriment of America's,²¹ which meant far-reaching geopolitical changes involving a “great reconvergence” of East and West.²² China, still maintaining high economic growth, may not only overtake America in terms of GDP, but may also take the initiative in various areas of the world, from the Shanghai Cooperation

¹⁸ In this context, it is worth mentioning China's expansion into Africa, which must inevitably lead to friction between those powers that have traditionally had their own policies on Africa (Great Britain, France and the United States).

¹⁹ These data should be approached cautiously, for the absence of economic consolidation in China and India, and the quality of their potential, did not make them world powers in the 19th century. L. Cohen-Tanugi, *The Shape of the World to Come: Charting the Geopolitics of a New Century*, Columbia University Press, New York 2008, p. 6.

²⁰ N. Ferguson, M. Schularick, *Chimerica and global asset markets*, <https://www.jfki.fu-berlin.de/faculty/economics/persons/schularick/chimerica.pdf> (20.09.2019).

²¹ G.J. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?”, *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 1, pp. 23–37.

²² D. Scott, *The Chinese Century?: The Challenge to Global Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008.

Organization to Africa and Latin America. Yet these are largely products of the imagination of the West today. The fact is, China remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Its ambitions to be a superpower cannot eliminate what it lacks socially, technologically and militarily. The Middle Kingdom longs to emancipate itself, to achieve a position of equal weight to that of the United States, but this is highly unlikely to come about in the foreseeable future.²³ And so the Group of Two concept of creating a new international dual order led by the United States and China remains firmly within the realm of hypothesis. Along with such thinking goes the vision of Asia as an area of permanent rivalry fuelled by unresolved conflicts from the past. Compared with NATO, the regional security system in Asia is loose, with a low level of institutionalization and with many structures of various degrees of political and strategic importance. In Asia, there was no symbolic conclusion of World War II (between China and Japan, Japan and Russia), no Cold War (the division of Korea, the separate existence of Taiwan). Territorial disputes continue, and there are deep ideological differences and religious extremism and fundamentalism (Pakistan, India, Iran, Afghanistan). Growth in power by one country immediately evokes a reaction by others in the form of their seeking an external protector to offset the threat of domination²⁴. The relations of Japan, China, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia and Turkey with the United States should be seen in terms of a balance of power.²⁵ The United States will long remain the arbiter and guarantor of Asian regional stability, mollifying the ambitions of China, India and Japan.²⁶

The dynamic economic growth of the Asian powers has conjured up a “mirage of an Asian century”, although we are still a very long way from Asian political and economic hegemony. Above all, the colossus of Asia lacks geopolitical cohesion and geostrategic consolidation. In the coming decades, we can expect progress in these areas and in Asia’s importance as one of the pillars of the international order, but we should not take this too far, since the region does not have a high level of political unity and is

²³ J. Clegg, *China’s Global Strategy: Towards a Multipolar World*, Pluto Press, London-New York 2009.

²⁴ The history of Asia abounds in examples of rivalry for dominance and leadership among the biggest powers. China and Japan have fought many times over Korea; the USSR has allied itself with India and Vietnam to keep China in check, and China has supported Pakistan against India. China’s latest successes have already brought Japan and India against it.

²⁵ Y. Funabashi, “Keeping Up with Asia: America and the New Balance of Power”, *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 5, pp. 110–125.

²⁶ D.E. Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, Harmony Books, New York 2009.

unlikely to develop into something like the European Union. Asia's increasing importance *per saldo* should bring more opportunities than threats. The continent's economic growth is not only bringing hundreds of millions of people out of poverty – it is also increasing demand for Western goods. Internal cracks are allowing the United States to effectively control the geopolitical influence of potential rivals such as China and Russia. There is hope, then, that Asia's successes will create the competitive pressure the West needs to set its own house in order – without falling prey to false propaganda or hysteria.²⁷

Many observers of the international scene are inclined towards the traditional vision of an international order based on polycentrism and inter-polarity.²⁸ New models for a regional balance of power are being perceived that anticipate the creation of various constellations that counterbalance each other.²⁹ In the post-Cold War world, centrifugal and differentiating processes are overshadowing centripetal and unifying ones. Globalization is not on the wane, but is becoming increasingly mixed with traditional geopolitics; paradoxically, in this way the former is revitalising the latter. Thus, we see two spheres forming in parallel: the peaceful sphere of economic integration and multilateralism, which can be described as 'post-modern internationalism', and the sphere of confrontation between individual (national) and collective (integrative) centres of power against the background of the 'war on terror', civil wars, nuclear proliferation and other issues. Maintaining a balance between these spheres constitutes the biggest challenge for the West, which, even if it is unable to prevent a redistribution of power ("a new hand"), should do everything in order to consolidate the majority of states in defence of the achievements of Western civilization.³⁰

Differences in the amount of power states have puts their self-reliance and independence at risk, especially in an era of intensive interdependence. For this reason, the more independent states there are in the world, the greater the scope of action enjoyed by the strongest states of an imperialistic nature. Fortunately, no power has ever yet managed to conquer the

²⁷ Ali, S.M., *U.S.-China Relations on the "Asia-Pacific" Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008.

²⁸ G. Grevi, *The Interpolar World: A New Scenario*, "Occasional Paper", European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009, No. 79.

²⁹ T.V. Paul, J.J. Wirtz, M. Fortmann (eds), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-first Century*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA 2004.

³⁰ S. Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke-New York 2008.

whole world,³¹ and the British Empire was the last on which the sun never set.³² Despite its worldwide military presence, the United States is not able to dominate everywhere. In fact, the world is “uni-multipolar” (Samuel Huntington), with America at the head of a group of strong regional powers (many powers but one superpower).

John N. Gray, a political philosopher, maintains in turn that the world is neither unipolar nor bipolar nor multipolar. In his opinion, such categories are ill-suited to describing modern reality. Today, one cannot rule out even the most surprising alliances, for many of them are tactical in nature: the United States gave the example by creating a ‘coalition of the willing’; India become involved with the US against China, at the same time signing an agreement with Iran on energy policy. At the same time, according to Gray, the West has lost its supremacy. It is no longer leading. And after Iraq, the assertion that Western institutions maintain international stability can only evoke bursts of laughter.³³

This position is in line with that of Richard Haass on ‘non-polarity’. Haass believes that the international order that is emerging will not be dominated by one or several states, but by dozens of non-state players exerting various types of influence (regional and global organizations, large corporations, administrative regions and units within states, metropolises and megalopolises, information agencies, ‘militias’ or private armies, religious organizations, drug cartels and others).³⁴ This has been called a “new Middle Ages”, a depolarized world without great powers.³⁵ In such a highly diffuse international system, the United States will remain the greatest single centre of influence, but its global position will become relatively weaker.

Great powers have always sought to have their own vision of the international order and to foist it on others. If we accept that such an attitude is a criterion of independence, then Russia recovers its ability to create its own vision by countering American ideas. As much as the United States tries to launch a universal democratization, including through the use of force, Russia believes that every sovereign state has the right to choose its

³¹ Arnold Toynbee showed that every great empire has suffered from the mirage of immortality. R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981, p. 28.

³² N. Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, Basic Books, New York 2002.

³³ J.N. Gray, *Gray's Anatomy: Selected Writings*, Allen Lane, London 2009.

³⁴ R.N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance?”, *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 3, pp. 44–56.

³⁵ T. Akihiko, *The New Middle Ages: The World System in the 21st Century*, The International House of Japan, Tokyo 2002.

own model of government.³⁶ This means that the Russians are standing on the ground of the classic principles of international law, and appear, paradoxically, as defenders of the *status quo*, while the United States has become a revisionist power. According to public opinion, especially since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the opposite is true.³⁷

2. Characteristics of the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War order

The actual international order invokes a state of polyarchy in the international environment³⁸ and complex interactions between states involving both cooperation and rivalry. It encompasses institutions of power and control (states, international organizations), various types of management and administration (international regimes, global governance) and the system of political and legal norms (the rules of the game, international law). Apart from these, geography and technology (especially military technology) always have a key role to play, and enable us to understand the spatial and functional location of the various actors in international life.³⁹

20th-century models of the international order were based on a dialect of conflict and cooperation. During the Cold War, the international order was frequently associated with maintaining the *status quo*, as the maintenance of a power arrangement between opposing blocs that was stable, if unjust. Many smaller and weaker players had to respect the hegemony of the superpowers, since it guaranteed a balance in the international system as a whole.

The post-Cold War order is undergoing continuous transformation. No permanent models have yet emerged. Longings for a stabilized order are understandable, but unjustified, for the battle for leadership is still

³⁶ S. Bieleń, “Rosja we współczesnym świecie” [“Russia in the Modern World”], *Europejski Przegląd Prawa i Stosunków Międzynarodowych* 2009, No. 2, pp. 5–26.

³⁷ I. Oldberg, “Is Russia a Status Quo Power?” *Ulpaper* (Swedish Institute of International Affairs) 2016, No. 1.

³⁸ The term “polyarchy” was coined by Robert Dahl (*Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1971) to describe structures and processes in democratic systems. In reference to international relations, the first to use the term was Seyom Brown (*New Forces in World Politics*, Brookings Institute, Washington, DC 1974). In the Polish science of international relations, the word was first popularised by Józef Kukułka in his book *Problemy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych [Problems of the Theory of International Relations]*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1978.

³⁹ J.J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton, New York 2001, p. 20 et seq.

under way, constellations of powers are changing, while non-state players are causing more trouble than ever before. States themselves – the main players in international relations – are also changing. Processes that are internationalising society, and globalization especially, are altering the function of the state and increasing competition among non-state players. Globalization is modifying traditional geopolitics, but without any guarantee from states, it is difficult to imagine how the stability of the system can be preserved. A transition period always creates fears for the future. The greater those fears, the more difficult it is to diagnose existing dangers and uncertainties.⁴⁰

Regardless of all the obstacles and uncertainties in the modern world, there are growing hopes and expectations related to the new order. In the past, the order was largely associated with eliminating threats, whereas today there is talk of desirable positive functions of the international order, which is perceived as a source and guarantee of access to many desired benefits and social values. It can facilitate the flow of information and economic resources, ensure respect for human rights, give hope concerning external intervention, open up access to global social movements and international non-governmental organizations, and set cultural goods in powerful circulation. While many of those goods may turn out to be undesirable imports, the governments of states all around the world, as well as citizens, remain enthusiastically open to the idea of globalization.⁴¹

The actual international order always contains both unifying and differentiating elements, cooperation and conflict, war and peace, safety and threats, justice and oppression, symmetry and asymmetry. Observers see certain regularities and rules in that order, while at the same time many phenomena and processes are spontaneous, accidental and elemental, and it is difficult to find any logical connection between them or predictable patterns of behaviour. Nevertheless, that order is always associated with a certain harmony and stability, a desirable arrangement of various elements where rules of the game are in place.⁴² The international order, then, is the result of purposeful activities by many participants, with the great powers at the forefront.⁴³ The actual international order is always the

⁴⁰ J. Symonides (ed.), *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń [The World vs Contemporary Challenges and Threats]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2010.

⁴¹ J. Baylis, S. Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2001.

⁴² H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Macmillan Press, London 1977, p. 3.

⁴³ Georg Schwarzenberger called sovereign states the international aristocracy, and assigned the great powers the status of oligarchies (magnates) among that aristocracy.

result of their political strategy (or more broadly, ‘polystrategy’) – rivalry, cooperation, accommodation or avoidance.⁴⁴ Those strategies can take on the form of the dictatorship of the strongest, they may be the result of coalitions or a negotiated compromise, or they may be spontaneous, a chance conglomeration of various hidden forces and factors reminiscent of the laws of the marketplace (supply and demand, challenges and responses).⁴⁵ Political strategy always involves the use of power (authority) in order to impose, maintain or overthrow order, and analysts draw attention to the structure of the international system as a concentration of power. After the end of the Cold War, discussions on the subject of the polarized world and the division into blocs was overtaken by disputes over growing American hegemony, a result of that one power having achieved an advantage over others.⁴⁶

Taking account of these structural conditions, one can say without hesitation that every international order is a hierarchy, which does not rule out the absence of formal leadership or even a state of anarchy, in the meaning of a lack of government or central locus of control. The greatest threat to a stable order is when one of the great powers seeks to dominate the whole system. This is why coalitions with the participation of many states are important; they strive to maintain a certain constellation of powers that can prevent just one of them from setting out to conquer the world.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a return to a kind of idealism (a neo-Wilsonian policy of rebuilding international relations on the American model). Realism has found itself on the defensive, while exponents of neoliberalism and constructivism have begun to demonstrate a faith in transforming the international system, expanding democracy, increasing mutual dependence and strengthening peace through processes of integration.⁴⁷ Supporters of ‘soft power’ exaggerated the influence of the Western

G. Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics: A Study of International Society*, Frederick A. Praeger, London–New York 1951, pp. 6–7.

⁴⁴ Every international order leads to the problem of how to subject global space to political control. J.W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca–London 2005.

⁴⁵ I.W. Zartman, *The Quest for Order in World Politics*, in: I.W. Zartman (ed.), *Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder–London 2009, pp. 1–23.

⁴⁶ H. Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, Penguin, London 2014.

⁴⁷ P. Hassner, *La Violence et la Paix: De la bombe atomique au nettoyage ethnique*, Le Seuil, Paris 2000.

model of democracy (specifically, the American model), the free market and values associated with the world of material consumption and prosperity, all of which were meant to legitimize America's role as world leader.⁴⁸ Yet it turned out that the world has remained heterogenic and polyarchic, and states and nations have shown no sign of giving up their specific characteristics or their responsibility for themselves and for the system as a whole. One of the most serious changes in international relations was the disappearance of that colossus known as the USSR. Its demise, and then collapse in 1991 brought about a whole series of important consequences: the reunification of Germany, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the bloody war in the Balkans and the eastward expansion of NATO; the greatest consequence, though, was an enormous increase in the power of the United States, to such extent that it felt itself no longer accountable to any other power when taking decisions concerning the use of force in international relations.⁴⁹ It is curious that, in this situation, the US increased arms spending at a rate never seen during the era of inter-bloc confrontation. This hegemony led to the disappearance of many structural limitations that had resulted from the previous power arrangement, increased the now-sole superpower's scope of action, and made its internal matters the main motivating factor in how it conducted itself internationally. The mechanism of a balance of power ceased to operate in the system, and the method of 'management' became arbitrary and arrogant. It is true that no ideal system of sharing power has ever been created, but it had always been possible – especially after major wars – to regroup into a power arrangement that guaranteed systemic stability in the decades that followed. Flouting this historically proven logic, in the post-Cold War power arrangement a single power began to decide about the entirety of the international system.

During the presidencies of Barack Obama, however, the United States did re-evaluate its international strategy.⁵⁰ After the ideologization of foreign and security policy, there did come a time for pragmatism and restraint. It turned out that being a super- or even a hyperpower did not mean having full control over the majority of other states in the international system. A concentration of power does not translate into a polarization of international relations, contrary to what Charles Krauthammer has

⁴⁸ J.S. Nye, Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York 2004.

⁴⁹ F. Cameron, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff*, Routledge, London 2005.

⁵⁰ A.E. Poppe, *Whither to, Obama? U.S. Democracy Promotion after the Cold War*, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt am Main 2010.

claimed.⁵¹ Rather than unipolarization, tendencies towards depolarization and multipolarization arise.⁵² The bandwagoning effect has only partly supported a concentration of power under the aegis of the United States.⁵³ The majority of countries, and even allies of America, prefer to limit Washington's influence, not escalate it.⁵⁴

Another particularly important phenomenon has been a reduction in the strategy of containment and deterrence employed by the United States, a strategy that during the Cold War was effective towards such powers as the USSR or Communist China, but has proved less so towards much weaker states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran. The fact is, the deterrent force of even the greatest power in the world makes little impression on regimes that are weak, but ideologically determined.

Similarly, containment and deterrence is ineffective against international terrorism. Terror has become the weapon of the weak. Terrorists can acquire weapons, even very dangerous weapons, but are not able to create an army that can contend with the power wielded by states. In essence, they do not constitute an existential threat to states, though they can cause them spectacular harm, and the possibility that they could get their hands on weapons of mass destruction causes sleepless nights for many politicians and observers of the international scene. Yet this is not very likely if we consider that, firstly, states jealously guard access to such weapons, and secondly, states themselves fear that, if it ever came out that they were mixed up in supplying terrorists with such weapons, they themselves would be the targets of retaliation by the United States – the most important guarantor of non-proliferation.

Today, the threats to international peace and security lie not in the rivalry between great powers, but in the escalation of various catastrophes, from terrorism to ethnic and religious wars, arms and drug smuggling, to ecological and natural disasters. Such phenomena and events often involve the participation of a growing number of various non-state players that can undermine the stability of existing power arrangements, and it is for

⁵¹ Ch. Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs* 1990/1991, No. 1, pp. 23–33.

⁵² S. Bieleń, "Erozja monocentryzmu w stosunkach międzynarodowych" ["The Erosion of Monocentrism in International Relations"], in: P. Eberhardt (ed.), *Studia nad geopolityką XX wieku [Studies on the Geopolitics of the 20th Century]*, *Prace Geograficzne* 2013, IGiPZ PAN, No. 242, pp. 97–115.

⁵³ R. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit", *International Security* 1994, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 72–107.

⁵⁴ S.M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to American Primacy*, W.W. Norton, New York 2005.

these reasons that even the United States is increasingly limited in what it can do in this polyarchic international environment.⁵⁵

Many misunderstandings exist around support for democracy in the modern world.⁵⁶ The end of the Cold War did not change the ratio between the number of democratic or democratising states and the number of non-democratic states. Contrary to the pro-democratic rhetoric, most foreign aid from Western states ends up in the hands of authoritarian regimes, and in the name of the ‘war on terror’, in order to help carry out such operations as the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq. As William Easterly has stated, the history of foreign aid is largely the history of inventing reasons to support autocracies,⁵⁷ in which there is no lack of paternalism, arrogance or double standards of evaluation. The West tolerates dictatorships in the Arab oil countries, but is piqued by the dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus. It requires more from Russia than it does from Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, even though these Central Asian post-Soviet republics are way behind Russia in implementing models of democratic culture, for example, in the areas of election laws or terms of office in state positions. In numerous instances, Western aid only deepens the foreign dependence of African or Asian countries, and is conducive to corruption and dictatorial ruling methods. Thus, we can see that the rhetoric in support of democratic values does not go hand in hand with the actions taken by Western governments and a host of aid agencies.

3. How the international order is governed

Anarchy and hierarchy are not necessarily the most useful principles for a theoretical description of international relations – just as polarity is not a legible criterion for the distribution of power in the world.⁵⁸ We are faced with a paradox of ‘unipolarity’, which is, of course, physically absurd. Metaphors such as ‘unipolarity’, ‘bipolarity’ and ‘multipolarity’⁵⁹ can help

⁵⁵ M.S. Indyk, K.G. Lieberthal, M.E. O’Hanlon, *Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2013.

⁵⁶ R. Youngs (ed.), *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2010.

⁵⁷ W. Easterly, *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*, Penguin Press, New York 2006.

⁵⁸ J. Donnelly, “Rethinking Political Structures: From ‘Ordering Principles’ to ‘Vertical Differentiation’ – and Beyond”, *International Theory* 2009, No. 1, pp. 49–86.

⁵⁹ K.N. Waltz, *Intimations of Multipolarity*, in: B. Hansen, B. Heurlin (eds), *The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*, Macmillan, London 2000, pp. 1–17.

us imagine and depict the concentration and polarization of power in the international environment. The case of 'polyarchy' is similar; it helps describe the international reality, but is not a universal theoretical construction that can clarify all phenomena and processes taking place among the various participants in international life.

In international relations, we encounter a huge structural and functional differentiation that cannot be adequately reflected by single categories. First of all, there is a hierarchized differentiation of participants,⁶⁰ but at the same time there is a horizontal differentiation that leads to the segmentation of the international scene. The hierarchy is supplemented by a heterarchy, that is, in the vertical arrangement of power there appear various 'storeys' constituting networks of elements having the same or approximately the same horizontal position, forces and authorities having a common goal. Thus, at various levels of the international hierarchy there are different heterarchic arrangements (a multi-level hierarchy) that contain various forms of participation in modern international processes, different manifestations of power and authority, and relationships of dependence.⁶¹

The principles that govern the functioning of the international system are coordination and its derivatives – superordination and subordination.⁶² If anarchy is the absence of a centre of political power, it in no way serves to order the international system as a minimum of coordination and superordination. In turn, a hierarchy expresses relations of mutual dependence (from top to bottom) based on differences in what different states possess and the roles they play. In this sense, the concepts of superordination and subordination are vital to any international ranking as a kind of 'pecking order'.⁶³

Coordination is a *sine qua non* for maintaining the global arrangement of power. On the global scale, policies must be agreed in many fundamental

⁶⁰ It is worth recalling that many non-state players (non-governmental organisations, religious communities and religious movements, businesses, terrorist organisations) practically do not count in international rankings in terms of power. Only the propaganda connected with the buzzword of globalisation attributes to them a role that, in fact, they do not play. They occupy a place on the fringes of the international hierarchy.

⁶¹ D. Stark, "Heterarchy: Distributing Authority and Organizing Diversity", in: J.H. III Clippinger (ed.), *The Biology of Business: Decoding the Natural Laws in Enterprise*, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco 1999.

⁶² In the literature in Poland, one of the first to draw attention to this was Remigiusz Bierzanek ("Doświadczenie historyczne w badaniach nad stosunkami międzynarodowymi" ["Historical Experience in Research into International Relations"], *Studia Nauk Politycznych* 1980, No. 1). In this study the author mainly draws on the work of Kenneth Waltz.

⁶³ K.N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 1979.

areas, since otherwise humanity would be faced with catastrophe, if not complete annihilation. There is plenty of evidence of the successful coordination of policy globally – from financial and economic matters,⁶⁴ to the Copenhagen climate conference, the activities of the G20, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the struggle against world terrorism. In these processes, the most important players are the great and middle powers, which dispose not only of force (in the material and motivational senses) but also authority, having a reputation that results in their position and role being acknowledged internationally, one example being the track record of the Nordic States as mediators. What counts most of all is a power's status, its ability to lead others or impose its way, as well as its readiness to shoulder responsibility for the state of the international system as a whole. Small and weak states do not contribute much to the process of coordination, although it would be difficult to grasp the dependence of subordination and superordination without them. One can understand neither the essence of a society's state or class structure nor the international stratification and the processes taking place therein without taking account of all of the 'storeys' of participation. We must therefore accept that the international order constitutes an enormous complex where some players are independent and some dependent, and the whole is a network on co-dependence. At the same time, everything indicates that the international order, even when of a global nature, remains primarily state-centric, an inter-state order. Peace and stability among states provide the foundation of the world order in terms of the subjective rights, justice and prosperity of individual human beings.

Since the Peace of Westphalia, the basis of the international order has been the formal equality of sovereign states – though this does not mean their actual equality. Particular rights or privileges of the great powers result from their self-rule and self-sufficiency, where they need not reckon with the whole international environment, but only with other great powers (through a power arrangement). As a result of such tendencies, the international order could take on the nature of an unbridled 'war of everyone with everyone'. This is an overused metaphor reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes' "state of nature". In today's international reality, despite everything, war is not a natural state of human life. Similarly, there is no international order based on the hegemony of a single power (an empire) that dominates the entire world.⁶⁵ Such models are solely hypothetical. Even if the

⁶⁴ R.E.J. Penttilä, "The G8 as a Concert of Powers", *Adelphi Papers* 2003, No. 43, pp. 17–32.

⁶⁵ There are many examples of empires, from antiquity to the colonial era, in which relations between a metropolis and the empire's component parts were based on the primacy

United States of America currently considers itself a hegemon, it cannot rightly claim that it has conquered the whole international system.⁶⁶ The metaphor of unipolarity is indicative of a certain ideologisation, but also of a kind of cognitive helplessness, or a lack of invention in coming up with a better name for the phenomenon of an extreme, asymmetric concentration of power.

Today, we are indeed faced with an international order organized around one hegemonic power and a larger number of other powers that together create a plural power arrangement. This is the phenomenon of a heterarchy. Relations between the great powers, which are not equal to the American hyperpower, are based on coordination. A certain degree of coordination is also present at the regional and local levels between middle and small states. Whereas in the vertical arrangement, various manifestations of a hierarchical order appear between the great powers and other countries, where the principle of superordination is evident. The stronger states act as their status and abilities permit, while the weaker ones behave as they must, in accordance with the principle of subordination. Everything is decided by the relationship of power.⁶⁷ In summary, one can state that the existing power arrangements create a hybrid form of international order that is structurally varied and functionally complex. In practice, it is exceedingly difficult to describe it, take hold of it, or measure it empirically.⁶⁸

Regardless of the various disruptions in the functioning of the international order, there is a general conviction that, for several decades, there has been an unprecedented era of systemic peace and stability in the world. The greatest powers maintain friendly, cooperative relations with one another; democracy – despite resistance – is spreading; processes of economic integration are expanding and deepening on the global scale. This optimism

of the overlord and the subordination of the dominions. Yet these always encompassed some sector of the world's spatial reality, never the whole globe. No one has ever managed to bring the whole world within a single empire. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Empires", in: D.L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Macmillan, New York 1968, p. 41; M.W. Doyle, *Empires*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 1986, p. 12; A.J. Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires*, Columbia University Press, New York 2001.

⁶⁶ D.H. Nexon, T. Wright, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate", *American Political Science Review* 2007, No. 2, pp. 253–271.

⁶⁷ J. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 61.

⁶⁸ That order exists above all in the conceptual dimension and in our imaginations. There is even talk of an apparent or a nominal order appearing within an anarchised/polyarchised international environment. J.M. DiCicco, J.S. Levy, "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1999, No. 6, pp. 675–704.

may come to an end, though, if we look at the world through the prism of American power. It is true that supporters of globalization – like the idealists between the two world wars – argue that the network of complex international institutions and growing interdependence in many areas are eliminating major wars from international relations, but this does not mean there is no threat that the world may return to a dangerous rivalry that could wipe out all that has been achieved.

CHAPTER II

The place of states in the international order

1. The relativization of the nation state

In accordance with the assumptions of post-modernism, our view of the world largely depends on how we interpret it scientifically. Ideas and concepts are inseparably connected with the historical, social and intellectual context in which they arise, and so are not of a timeless nature. The idea of the nation state, then, according to which humanity is divided into a limited number of nations that organize themselves internally as states and separate themselves from other states externally while maintaining contacts with them and creating a system of international relations, may meet the same fate.

The nation state is the experience of but several generations in Europe,⁶⁹ while in other parts of the world it has existed for an even shorter time, if at all. Robert Cooper has demonstrated the existence of spheres of order, threats and chaos,⁷⁰ in accordance with which the world is divided into three zones: 1) the wealthy, modern, highly developed states of the North – Europe, the United States and Canada (to which can be added Japan, Australia and New Zealand); 2) modern states that are reasonably well organized that have entered the industrial age (mainly in Asia, Latin

⁶⁹ The nation state arose towards the end of the Middle Ages, when states and their rulers strove to liberate themselves from under the rule of an emperor or Pope. Nation states were a powerful engine of progress. Upon them was based the post-Westphalian system of international relations, whose basic distinguishing feature was the sovereign equality of states. As a result of decolonisation, that model was imposed on the inhabitants of Asia and Africa, even though it was contrary to their own history and culture. Despite many years of evolution, nation states continue to perform important functions, and remain the most important participants in international relations.

⁷⁰ R. Cooper, *Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*, Atlantic Books, London 2003.

America and parts of Africa, including the global powers of China, India, Russia and Brazil); and pre-modern states in which tribal leaders, clans and great families determine how power is to be wielded and where the common people live in conditions of poverty unimaginable to Europeans or Americans. This last is the sphere of chaos, conflict and unpredictable development.⁷¹

Given the enormous differences that exist between states, it is difficult to make any kind of categorical statement about their condition or drawn overarching conclusions. The pyramid of modern states includes both the giants, of which the United States is certainly one, and the traditional group of great powers (China, Germany, Great Britain, France, Japan, Russia), as well as a host of middle and small states – the ‘dwarves and Lilliputians’. If to this we add the quasi-states, that is, geopolitical entities that *de facto* control their territory, having a population and an effective government, but no international recognition (Taiwan, North Cyprus, Abkhazia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Somaliland), it turns out that the majority of the more than 200 states are not really suited at all to exist or function independently. The weakness of states, then, is an immanent feature of the international system, symptomatic of the changing nature, dynamics and continuous adaptation of various geopolitical entities to the standards of the international environment.

In his diagnosis of the modern international system, Francis Fukuyama perceives a growing dominance by states that are weak or failing. This is so because of the mobilization of new social players and new groups heretofore excluded from exercising power, and is also a consequence of globalization as the lifting of barriers against flows of various kinds, including of phenomena that are destruction for the state (organized crime, terrorism, narcotics, etc.).⁷²

⁷¹ Many hold the view that the degree of development of the dozens of states that belong to this sphere depends on the strategy taken by the European metropolises in colonial times. Depending on the climate and epidemiological conditions, their policy was either one of settlement and the creation of civilized political institutions like those in Europe (Australia, New Zealand), or one of repressive and predatory systems of management (Africa, Asia). D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, J. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, *American Economic Review* 2001, Vol. 91, pp. 1369-1401. In explaining these differences, it is also helpful to consider the unequal development of societies and states. In the that light, different social systems, and states as well, will always remain on different levels of development, meaning that it would be naive to think that in a short time they will come to resemble each other.

⁷² F. Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2004.

Some decades ago, based on his extensive experience, the British philosopher of history Arnold Toynbee predicted the fall of nation states. According to his interviewer, the Japanese scholar Daisaku Ikeda, “the idea of the state is not indispensable to human life, nor is it worthy of the highest respect”. Holding one’s country in reverence and being devoted to it may constitute a serious threat, especially when connected with the harmful effects of nationalism and chauvinism. In the opinion of both of the above thinkers, observations made since the end of World War II lead to the conclusion that local nation states are disappearing. This is being caused by an intensification of cultural and economic exchange, numerous international undertakings that leave little room for the authorities of nation states to slow down international contacts among people.⁷³ After Toynbee and Ikeda, many theoreticians of international relations began to express similar views about the approaching twilight of the nation state. In the mid-1980s, Kalevi Holsti described this current using the term ‘necrologism’.⁷⁴

Currently, those views are being revised. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche stated that from the fact that the god of a nation state is mortal it does not result that the state is dying, and compared such a situation to the myth in which the hero cuts off the dragon’s head only to see three new ones grow in its place.⁷⁵ This is an indication that nation state will not disappear, but will gradually cease to be the only structure of sovereign power; the state is no longer omnipresent internally or externally. Such a claim leads to a serious crisis in various ideologies that had assigned the state the role of omnipotent guarantor of economic growth, modernity and social justice. The state no longer meets all of the social expectations entailed by progress in civilization and the internationalization of various areas of social interaction. But it does remain the main player on the international scene.⁷⁶

Along with globalization, new areas of activity and new frameworks for such activity are arising. There are more players on the scene, with new resources and unknown rules leading to new conflicts. The idea has spread that globalization is leading to a global crisis of the state. The state as the political organization of society is being attacked from various quarters. It is under pressure from huge corporations and banks, which want to operate beyond borders, without having to consider either the existence or the

⁷³ A. Toynbee, D. Ikeda, *Choose Life: A Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008.

⁷⁴ K.J. Holsti, “The Necrologists of International Relations”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1985, No. 4.

⁷⁵ U. Beck, *Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2005.

⁷⁶ W.C. Opello Jr., S.J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder-London 2004.

interests of states. Such corporations are much stronger than many small states – and most states today are small. The state is also being weakened internally through ethnic nationalism, and tendencies towards decentralization and disintegration.

Public authority depends to a lesser and lesser extent on the enforcement of regulations through hierarchical structures of power, but is increasingly a matter of negotiations conducted by decentralized arrangements of fluid alliances” (network connections).⁷⁷ Within sovereign states, pluralistic social organizations are arising, and in external relations certain functions that previously belonged solely to the governments of nation states are being taken over by international, global or regional organizations. States are now being challenged by supranational trade zones, the culture of diasporas and global megapolises, in which loyalty towards the nation state is vanishing. In modern states going through processes of integration, the international system is penetrating their political system, at times even causing intervention by international regimes in the internal aspect of a state’s foreign affairs. In Robert Cooper’s view, borders are becoming less and less important for modern states. In most of the European Union, there are no border posts at all, while court rulings are now being enforced independently of state borders (up to and including parking tickets!). Security is now mainly based on openness and transparency.⁷⁸

The attention of researchers and commentators is drawn to questions concerning the future evolution of the nation state, the relationships emerging between what is local, supranational and universal, and the future form and role of the internal, autonomous bodies of the nation state. It is an interesting task to try to answer the question of the legitimacy of international law if it is not backed up by the full authority of a sovereign nation state.⁷⁹

Up to now, the national state provided stable, absolute sources for legitimising international standards and organizations, and the international order grew out of the same sources as the order of nation states. But today’s global order has autonomous sources of legitimacy at its disposal. New rules are appearing, for example, as a result of a connection being made between human rights and governance when those rights come into conflict with a national system of rules. The humanitarian intervention

⁷⁷ J. Sommer, “Przydatność kategorii ‘państwo’ w badaniach politologicznych” [“The Usefulness of the Category of ‘State’ in Political Research”], in: A. Lisowska, A.W. Jabłoński (eds), *Wizje dobrego państwa. Idee i teorie [Visions of a Good State: Ideas and Theories]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007, p. 25.

⁷⁸ R. Cooper, op. cit.

⁷⁹ D. Armstrong, T. Farrell, H. Lambert, *International Law and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, pp. 63-64.

during the war in Kosovo in 1999 showed how it is possible to abolish the legally sanctioned sovereignty of a nation state. At that time, the term ‘military humanism’⁸⁰ was coined to describe the new threats arising, since the global enforcement of human rights through the use of military force erases the boundary between war and peace.⁸¹

Nation states are, then, in the historical sense, a phenomenon determined by a particular epoch. Just as there were no nations or nation states in antiquity, we can imagine that they may disappear in the foreseeable future. For many theorists of various schools, an achievable ideal for the future is the complete disappearance of nation states and the unification of the world under one global government. Traditional states would be reduced to units of local administration. Such views grow out of the conviction that nation states are anachronistic in our globalising world.⁸²

The findings of Ulrich Beck lead in a similar direction, towards the degradation of the nation state. Yet, rather than some sort of utopian ‘global government’, Beck perceives a kind of meta-game for power⁸³ and this leads him to accept a cosmopolitan view where “national” political realism is replaced by a “cosmopolitan” political realism. The maxim: ‘national interests must be defended in a national way’ is replaced by the idea that the more cosmopolitan policy is, the more national and effective it is.⁸⁴ Beck points out that nation states currently exist only in people’s heads; they are phantoms, while traditional international relations as relations between sovereign states (the post-Westphalian order) are being replaced by some kind of “world internal policy”. The classic boundaries between internal and foreign policy are becoming blurred, washing away; in fact, the very distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is being undermined. Thus, a great challenge faces those who study political science and international relations: to free themselves of the dogma of viewing things through the prism of nations.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ N. Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME 1999.

⁸¹ J. Zajadło, *Dylematy humanitarnej interwencji [Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention]*, Arche, Gdańsk 2005, p. 12 et seq.

⁸² D. Markowski, “Naród i państwo w socjologicznej perspektywie wielu globalizacji. Zarys problematyki” [“The Nation and the State in a Sociological Perspective of Many Globalisations: An Outline of the Problem”], in: K. Gorlach, M. Niezgoda, Z. Seręga (eds), *Władza, naród, tożsamość [Power, Nation, Identity]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2004, pp. 59-64.

⁸³ U. Beck, op. cit.

⁸⁴ U. Beck, E. Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2007.

⁸⁵ J.N. Rosenau, “Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Towards a Postinternational Politics for the 1990s”, in: E.O. Czempiel, J.N. Rosenau (eds), *Global Changes and*

In the literature on the effects of globalization, there are indications that states are capable of self-transformation. Supporters of neoliberalism maintain that the state is not dying, but is demonstrating its ability to transform and adapt – to the world market, for example, through the privatization of the sphere of public services (health care, communications, telecommunications) and through deregulation (the removal of obstacles to flows of capital and financing, such as borders and other protective barriers).⁸⁶ According to such a view, not every transformation need be seen as a crisis or collapse. On the contrary, as experts on the problems of globalization point out, globalization affects the activities and autonomy of nation states in various ways. Even in the sphere of economic and financial policy there remains an area of decision-making that such states can use as of old to achieve priority goals, such as those related to social security or limiting unemployment.⁸⁷ Moreover, the state performs a dual role in relation to the players of the global economy – it is both homeland and householder – and in this way its importance as an implementer of that economy is growing.

Against this background, a certain paradox of the neoliberal conception of politics and the state appears. On the one hand, there is the *minimal state*, whose tasks and autonomy are to be trimmed to enable the implementation of global standards.⁸⁸ On the other hand, market deregulation and the privatization of public sectors is only possible with the participation of a *strong state* that sanctions the legal order and modernizes institutions of supervision and enforcement, for example, by tightening border controls and providing protection against terrorism.⁸⁹ State institutions still dispose of a significant portion of national revenue: the state budget, mineral resources (concessions), control of foreign trade (licenses, permits), and the influx of foreign investments (government contracts, making territory available, granting permits).⁹⁰

Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s., Lexington Books, New York 1989.

⁸⁶ S. Filipowicz, “Liberalizm i globalizacja” [“Liberalism and Globalisation”], in: J. Tymanowski (ed.), *Współczesne problemy globalne a bezpieczeństwo europejskie [Modern Global Problems and European Security]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2001, pp. 62-67.

⁸⁷ K. Gilarek, *Państwo narodowe a globalizacja [Nation States and Globalisation]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2003, pp. 187-188.

⁸⁸ R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990.

⁸⁹ H. Donnan, T.M. Wilson, *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State*, Routledge, London 1999.

⁹⁰ J.J. Milewski, “Debata o państwie w początku XXI wieku – refleksje historyka” [“The Debate on the State at the Beginning of the 21st Century – Reflections of a Historian”],

According to various sociological diagnoses, humanity is now at the stage of transforming from a mass society into a planetary society. Where the mass society fit within the borders of states, and states were somehow able to control their societies, the state is not able to prevail against a planetary society. For more and more people have international interests, work internationally, travel, fall in love internationally, get married internationally, live, consume and cook internationally; children are becoming international, multilingual, raised in the generalized 'nowhere' of television and the internet. What is more, the politics of loyalty and identity are no longer obedient to a monogamous, national loyalty.⁹¹ Thus, we are dealing with a powerful challenge from global civil society as a form of opposition to the power of the state (for example, consumer society as a genuinely existing 'global society' that can boycott certain products without the need to organize itself). This new situation forces a new approach not only to the problem of borders and of the differences between what is national and what is international, but also between the global economy and the state, or supranational organizations, nations, and societies.

2. The threat of an imperialization of the world

The evolution of the international environment is causing important changes in how states function as social institutions. People's needs are no longer satisfied by the old, traditional structures, and they are searching for something new. Where the beginning of the 20th century was characterized by the existence of powerful states and powerful institutions, the beginning of this century features a weakening of the state and a flowering of different types of small, non-state, non-governmental forms, both civil and religious. Sociologists point out that people are organising themselves according to their private needs and interests, and 'patriotism' is developing not on the scale of a nation or state, but among just such small communities.⁹² Alongside these and the nation states, empires are developing as a voluntary form of international coexistence; their existence does not interfere with the development of democracy, nor does it mean a new form of enslavement. According to one fashionable trend in the literature of the

in: K. Trzciński (ed.), *Państwo w świecie współczesnym [The State in the Modern World]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2006, p. 48.

⁹¹ U. Beck, op. cit.

⁹² R. Piekarski, M. Graban (eds), *Globalizacja i my. Tożsamość lokalna wobec trendów globalnych [Globalisation and Us: Local Identity and Global Trends]*, Universitas, Kraków 2003.

West, it seems that great empires and small nations will soon become the bastions of freedom, democracy and prosperity.⁹³

There are 'empirical' discussions under way in the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation; they concern the modelling of imperial policies. Various conceptions of democratic and liberal empires are cropping up. Niall Ferguson propagates the idea of empire as being useful in setting the anarchized international house in order, and praises the old British Empire for the civilizational role it played in history.⁹⁴ In France, opinions are expressed on the positive effects of colonization and the splendours of imperial France.⁹⁵

The 'theory of empires' is discussed in a book by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt entitled *Empire*, which caused something of a furore in the West. The authors claim that classic imperialism no longer exists, but a single, great empire has arisen that encompasses not only the most powerful countries, but also the media, corporations and the prevailing ideology. This being is as vast as it is nebulous. But it rules the world.⁹⁶ Similar views were advanced even before World War I by Karl Kautsky, who said that imperialism was becoming an ultraimperialism that was uniting the previously competing colonial powers.⁹⁷

The discussions on the current phase of imperialism tend to focus on the connections between imperial policy and the neoliberal economic project. Some say that globalization is conducive to the growth of imperialistic tendencies. The need to do away with state restrictions favours the creation of systems of imperial rule, with two examples provided by the United States and the EU.⁹⁸

The Polish sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis writes, for example, about the rise of an internet neo-empire. For her, the European Union is a 'spiderweb' based on radical proceduralization and the forced harmonization of institutions and laws. The basic difference between a state and an empire

⁹³ J.M. Colomer, *Great Empires, Small Nations: The Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State*, Routledge, London 2007, p. XI et seq.

⁹⁴ N. Ferguson, op. cit.

⁹⁵ R. Bertrand, *Mémoires d'empire. La controverse autour du »fait colonial«*, Editions Du Croquant, Paris 2006.

⁹⁶ M. Hardt, A. Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2000.

⁹⁷ In his article *Ultraimperialism* (1914), Kautsky predicted that imperialistic competition would lead to the creation of a cartel of great powers. That vision of a political unity of globalised capitalism may have seemed for a long time to be mere fantasy, but today it looks more like prophecy. P. Goode (ed.), *Karl Kautsky: Selected Political Writings*, McMillan, London 1983, pp. 74-96.

⁹⁸ C. Mooers (ed.), *The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire*, Oneworld, Oxford 2006.

is that a state is oriented inwardly, and seeks to maintain its own legitimacy, identity, decision-making autonomy and clear borders (territorial integrity). An empire, in contrast, has an external mission of absorption, which does not necessarily mean territorial expansion in the strict sense, but is about “projecting itself” (its philosophy of governance, institutional principles, the logic of its own market) onto new spaces. A distinguishing feature of imperial policy is structural violence, which is more characteristic of today’s empires than the geographic or political absorption of the past.⁹⁹

Empires still feed on expansion, but today this consists of attempts to legitimize the supranational order. The obligations that order entails – for example, fulfilling a civilizational mission, or in the case of the United States participating in the war against terrorism and promoting democracy – are connected with an interest in expanding spheres of influence in the name of geoeconomic and geopolitical stability. No Western country believes enough (though) in its civilizational mission to continuously impose its authority by force; all are incapable of doing so because the ideology of the West is democratic in character, and democracy cannot be achieved by coercion (although armies can create conditions for it by removing dictators).¹⁰⁰

All empires, then, have an expansionist imperative built into the structures and arguments that legitimize their power. The imperial logic of power does not tolerate neutral zones. The old empires spilled the blood of their own citizens and of other peoples in order to attain direct administrative control over initially foreign territories and populations. This always ended in the controlled entity being deprived of its sovereignty. The current object of rivalry is one’s position internationally in the race for technological and economic superiority, since these determine the status of states in the international arena. Political power and political intervention in the name of universal values need not be the same as imperial policy. Neither the policy of global or local domination nor the project for democratic hegemony postulate depriving members of the ‘international community’ of their independence. In this sense, one can speak of the end of the imperial age.¹⁰¹ The traditional imperial instinct is dead, at least among the Western powers. Yet imperialism may recur in various forms, as attested to by the policy of both the United States and Russia.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ J. Staniszkis, *O władzy i bezsilności [On Power and Powerlessness]*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2006, pp. 100-126.

¹⁰⁰ R. Cooper, op. cit.

¹⁰¹ J. Mathiex, *Civilisations impériales*, Éd. du Félin, Paris 2001.

¹⁰² R. Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2008.

Forcing others to acknowledge one's own expansionist logic and its internal rationality creates the basis for the complicated relationship between an empire and the states lying within its sphere of interest. Empires proclaim the moral mission they have, which cannot be changed. The Brezhnev Doctrine functioned according to the principle that the obligation to defend socialism in Central Europe remained in force even when legitimate governments (such as in Czechoslovakia in 1968) decided otherwise. And the same logic was used to justify the moral mission of the United States during the administrations of George W. Bush¹⁰³: ceasing to act upon it would undermine the identity of American democracy, because: "Freedom, which we value so highly, is not America's gift to the world. It is God's gift to humanity"¹⁰⁴ (President Bush during the State of the Union address, January 2003).

A source of the destruction of a state, therefore, need not be the weakness of its structures. On the contrary, it can be its overweening power. As Francis Fukuyama has put it, the crisis of a state also originates against the background of its strivings for "suicidal hegemony". The state that possesses the greatest military power in human history is not able to make rational use of it. Mistakes in assessing the situation and a lack of strategy and competence led to the calamity of the United States' engagement in Iraq. Fukuyama writes that the Bush administration, through incompetence, incorrectly evaluated the threat of weapons of mass destruction, planned the occupation badly, and failed to learn from its own mistakes when things went wrong.¹⁰⁵

3. The implications of the fall of states

Discussions on the fall of the state stem from the traditional assumption that the norm of every statehood is the existence of a political organization within a defined territory. This view gained particular favour during the period of decolonization, when the new state structures arising were compared to the Western model of nation states, even though they in fact had little in common with it.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Ch. Krauthammer, "Realizm demokratyczny. Amerykańska polityka zagraniczna w świecie jednobiegunowym" ["Democratic Realism: American Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World"], *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny* 2004, No. 3-4, pp. 29-45.

¹⁰⁴ *President Delivers "State of the Union"*, January 28, 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html> (25.09.2008).

¹⁰⁵ F. Fukuyama, *America's Self-Defeating Hegemony*, "Project Syndicate", Oct. 23, 2007, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-s-self-defeating-hegemony> (20.09.2008).

¹⁰⁶ A.D. Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1983.

It was assumed that statehood based on Western models was an important factor in modernising post-colonial societies, and so, up to the 1970s, no particular attention was paid to these new states' frailty, which was simply thought of as being a characteristic feature of their "youth". Approaches to social development, often inspired by Marxism, assumed that the state should be subservient to the processes of modernization. The state was to bring about socio-economic changes, institutionally guaranteeing developmental stability (e.g. Walt W. Rostow). Modernization, in turn, was to be the process in which the political system became capable of increasing integration, participation and loyalty on the part of citizens towards state institutions, as well as the effectiveness of the distributive and regulatory functions of the state.

The 1990s brought about an awareness in the international community that, along with the end of the Cold War, the number of states plunging into permanent chaos was growing. That chaos is no longer of a local nature only, but is becoming global. According to Francis Fukuyama, the dysfunctionality of this group of states is beginning to threaten the whole international order, and constitutes one of the most important political issues requiring urgent solutions.¹⁰⁷ This is confirmed by successive National Security Strategies of the United States.

In describing the effects of this crisis of state structures, the term 'failure' has come into use after the adjective used to describe 'failed' states or 'failing' states. The terms 'collapsed' states and 'fragile' states are also used (Fr. *d'état débile, d'état mou, d'état faillie*; Ger. *fragile Staaten, zerfallene Staaten, zerfallende Staaten*; Russ. *nesostoiavshiesiia gosudarstva*); all are negations of the 'normal' state. In the opinion of some observers, they are the 'black holes' of civilization, but for their neighbours they can constitute tempting morsels.¹⁰⁸

In many languages, there is no adequate or satisfying term for this phenomenon. Metaphors and borrowings are used, and these sometimes evoke unfortunate associations. Thus, we have 'mafia', 'rogue', 'criminal' and 'quasi-states'.¹⁰⁹ There is no need to show that many of these names

¹⁰⁷ R. Kłosowicz (ed.), *Państwa dysfunkcyjne i ich destabilizujący wpływ na stosunki międzynarodowe [Dysfunctional States and Their Destabilising Effect on International Relations]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2013.

¹⁰⁸ R. Cooper, op. cit.

¹⁰⁹ Apart from "quasi-states" there are also "artificial states", such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, which exists as a protectorate of the UN, secured by a NATO military contingent. Without external support, such a creature could never be kept alive, for it is certain that the removal of patronage and the departure of troops would cause the collapse of the Bosnian state and the secession of its Serbian and Croatian sectors to ethnic states. The situation is

first appeared in the rhetoric of the American administrations of the early 21st century, when the United States took on the role of global judge and global hegemon. Demonising opponents and looking for scapegoat states leads to them being stigmatized, and in turn being deprived of legitimacy and the privileges that flow from sovereign equality. Such states can be attacked, their governments overthrown, they can be subjected to occupation, etc. Who knows whether the conception of failed states does not serve the imperialistic ambitions of the United States?¹¹⁰

Gunnar Myrdal once used the term ‘soft states’ to describe those post-colonial entities who shared a lack of social discipline, legislative weakness, laxity, arbitrariness by officials and corruption.¹¹¹ Such ‘soft states’ found their legitimacy in the right to self-determination of the colonial peoples, but without taking account of their actual ability to survive and their own. Like many other ideas, self-determination has been subject to a certain mythologization and absolutization. It was propagated as the right of colonial peoples to obtain independence, regardless of their national interest or national consciousness. In many cases, shortcomings in these led to the creation of ineffective para-states which today are objects of concern to the international community. Lord Beaverbrook (William Maxwell Aitken) warned that granting independence to weakly developed countries was like “giving a child a razor”. The ruling elites in the post-colonial states were not able to provide internal cohesion or overcome the problems typically faced by multi-ethnic and multi-faith societies.¹¹²

The causes of political bankruptcy, and at times even the self-destruction of states, include: the legacy of the colonial system,¹¹³ weak internal structures, developmental pathologies, bad governance,¹¹⁴ the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of superpower spheres of influence and

similar in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: without Russian protection, neither could defend themselves against Georgia or preserve the “artificial” character of their statehood.

¹¹⁰ N. Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*, Metropolitan Books, New York 2006.

¹¹¹ G. Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline*, Pantheon Books, New York 1970.

¹¹² D.Z. Cass, “Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories”, *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 1992, Vol. 18, pp. 38-40.

¹¹³ Colonialism lasted long enough to destroy traditional social structures, but not long enough to create new ones based on Western constitutional models. The colonial powers did not show great interest in developing the identity of the areas they had conquered or in transforming them into modern nation states.

¹¹⁴ It is worth bearing in mind that the collapse of states is caused by the actions of specific people; they are not the result of some kind of misfortune or ominous conjunction of the stars.

the ‘patron-client’ relationship, the cessation of generous aid in exchange for political subservience, the loss of importance of many states in the strategic calculations of the superpowers; global processes of modernization – the desovereignization and disaggregation of the state.¹¹⁵

The fall of a state expresses itself as follows: the authorities lose their social mandate to rule; the citizens cease to identify with the authorities; referring to the categories of Max Weber, there is a loss of ‘monopoly’, that is, the state authorities’ exclusive hold on coercion; the functions of the state atrophy, meaning that administrative, organizational, economic, social and cultural functions disappear; the state bureaucracy loses responsibility for the state; there is anomie, that is, a lack of institutions capable of representing the state externally and dealing with external stimuli.¹¹⁶

These problems have the following consequences: internal order breaks down (power comes into the hands of bands, clans, warlords and gangs); society degenerates to the initial state described by Thomas Hobbes; social structures disintegrate, and the state and legal infrastructure becomes dismantled; there is a ‘privatization’ of the state and a ‘criminalization’ of politics; violence escalates in the form of civil war; the threat of military activities in neighbouring countries escalates; the state loses control over its borders; ethnic antagonisms heat up; there is economic catastrophe, corruption, poverty, famine; fundamental human rights and freedoms are violated; there are humanitarian disasters (mass migrations, expulsions, tribal slaughter); waves of migrants flow from the unstable states towards wealthy states where assimilation creates serious political and social problems; groups fight over resources (crude oil, diamonds, coltan, tropical wood). The above phenomena are fertile ground for the growth of international terrorism and organized crime, for dealing in arms and smuggling narcotics.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ M.A. Piotrowski, “Uwarunkowania oraz konsekwencje rozkładu i rozpadu struktur państwowych” [“Conditions and Consequences of the Breakdown and Collapse of State Structures”], in: M.W. Solarz (ed.), *Północ wobec Południa. Południe wobec Północy* [North Against South – South Against North], Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2005, pp. 259-268.

¹¹⁶ G. Gil, *Upadanie państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie* [The Fall of States in International Relations after the Cold War], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2015.

¹¹⁷ In the 1990s, at least several thousand people came through training camps in Afghanistan. Today’s international terrorist network rose from the ashes of failed states; thanks to the internet and satellite telephony, they were able to coordinate brutal campaigns in the form of bomb attacks and the kidnapping and execution of foreigners in various parts of the globe. The countries most threatened by terrorist attacks are: Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi

Failed states constitute a serious challenge for both the internal and the international legal order; they are a source of threats to civilization, even if they are limited to certain areas of the globe. The problem of failed states is related to the inadequacy of institutions and mechanisms and the standards of international law that refer to the regulation of international relations. At the same time, the main threats to international security are rooted in the internal situations of states.¹¹⁸

The very terminology concerning failed states raises a number of controversies because of its international legal consequences, for the 'failure' of a state may be taken to mean a breakdown of the conditions under which effective, responsible governance can occur; these can invalidate international recognition, and thereby justify, for example, intervention from the outside in order to protect people or take over property. International law calls for failed states to be rebuilt and restored to normal functioning. To this end, the position is maintained that their borders and territorial integrity cannot be questioned, nor can their legal personality, organizational affiliations, diplomatic relations or treaty obligations. Even when an 'old' state is challenged by competing entities pretending to statehood, recognition should not be withdrawn from the failed state.¹¹⁹

Most lawyers take the side of the theory of continuation. In that light, a failed state does not lose its subjectivity under international law, though it is deprived of the ability to act in international relations due to the dismantling of its political institutions and its *de facto* lack of representation; it still has legal capacity, but cannot exercise it to perform legal acts; its loss of effective control over its territory does not constitute an invitation for conquest by other states; a failed state qualifies for international protection.¹²⁰

It has been noted in light of previous experience that preventive measures to strengthen a state against collapse are much easier and cheaper to implement than the measures needed to resurrect a state after it has been

Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen, Algeria, Sudan and Colombia. M. Kassem, "Staaten am Rande des Abgrunds", *Politische Studien* 2004, No. 393, pp. 38-45.

¹¹⁸ R. Geiss, "Failed States – Legal Aspects and Security Implications", *German Yearbook of International Law* 2004, Vol. 47, pp. 457-501.

¹¹⁹ S. Bieliń, "Państwa upadłe" ["Failed States"], in: J. Symonides (ed.), *Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych. Bilans i perspektywy [The United Nations: Balance and Prospects]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2006, p. 629.

¹²⁰ J. Zajadło, "Prawo międzynarodowe wobec problemu «państwa upadłego»" ["International Law on the Problem of the 'Failed State'"], *Państwo i Prawo* 2005, No. 2, p. 16. A report by the UN Secretary General, *In Larger Freedom* of 21 March 2005, defines failed states as countries "emerging from conflict". Almost half of them fall back into conflict within five years.

completely destroyed. Restoring the self-sufficiency of states that have fallen into a state of collapse requires patience and perseverance. The example of Afghanistan has shown how long, laborious and costly reconstruction is.¹²¹ The creation of security forces and a feeling of security, cleansing traumatic experiences from the social memory, then rebuilding administrative structures through the creation of a bureaucracy and police force, and finding funds to pay them – all these constitute the most important challenges for the international community, and a fallen state is not capable of getting up again on its own.¹²²

In his book *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Francis Fukuyama postulates that the wealthy, stable countries of the West should employ methods of transferring efficient institutions and administration. But this is no easy process to implement. Some transfers are successful, some end up as fiascos. Certainly, it is relatively easy to organize a banking system or stock exchange, since these operate along similar lines everywhere. It is much more difficult to reconstruct a legal, education or health care system, because these are deeply rooted in local traditions. In many areas, a schematic transfer to models from one country to another is impossible. As a last resort, there is the use of force, which unfortunately remains essential to exercising law and order not only within states, but also throughout the world”. In a book from 2006 entitled *America at the Crossroads*, Fukuyama, with the experience of the United States’ intervention in Iraq under his belt, postulated the use of ‘soft force’; this would include educating local intellectual elites, and financing civil movements that favour the creation of democratic conditions. Fukuyama also postulated, rather than unilateral action, the use of multi-party structures and initiatives which, though slower, legitimize various campaigns and ensure them greater effectiveness in the long run.¹²³

To sum up the above reflections, it can be stated that the problem of failed states has shifted from the periphery of the international scene to centre stage. The collapse of states now constitutes a challenge for the entire international community; it is causing a mobilization of forces and resources that is both collective and individual – especially by the United

¹²¹ S. Skalski, “Afgańska dzirga. Quasi sądowy system rozwiązywania konfliktów i jego miejsce w kształtowaniu systemu prawa” [“The Afghani Jirga: A Quasi-Judicial System of Conflict Resolution and Its Place in Forming the Legal System”], in: K. Trzciński (ed.), op. cit., pp. 181-196.

¹²² T.D. Mason, J.D. Meernik (eds), *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, Routledge, London 2006.

¹²³ F. Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2007.

Nations, the European Union and the United States of America. The war on terror raised awareness of the close ties between governments “of low effectiveness” and the plague of threats to international peace, stability, the rule of law, freedom and democracy.¹²⁴ Rebuilding failed states comes up against great resistance. Long after the end of its civil war Bosnia is still a lame state, and in fact an international protectorate. Serious fears exist that, after the peacekeeping forces depart, the Bosnian state will again tumble into the turmoil of civil war. Similarly, Afghanistan, liberated from Taliban rule, remains a state only on the map, and the rule of its president ends at the gates of Kabul. The process of rebuilding this ethnically heterogeneous state is encountering dangerous reefs. And in the much more modern Iraq, the situation is even worse. More than a decade after the end of the war against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi state is in complete disarray. It neither provides security nor guarantees any improvement in the economic situation of its people. In the context of these examples, it is difficult to make a favourable assessment of any intervention campaigns whatsoever by Western states for the purpose of rebuilding failed states.¹²⁵ It is also worth noting that, in practice, all earlier American attempts to rebuild a state “by force” also ended up as fiascos (in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Nicaragua, Vietnam and Cuba). The strategy of waging preventive wars has proved to be a disaster. There is a need to return to multilateralism.

4. The state from the global perspective

Cognitive experience shows that the question of how to interpret processes of globalization evokes enormous emotions, is the subject of heated polemics among specialists, and becomes an argument in political discourse and a bone of contention for those who perceive globalization as a threat to their identity or sovereignty. The ambiguity of the concept of globalization, empirical liberties and a lack of precision are what lay behind these demonstrations and cognitive confusion.

As a reminder, one of the first definitions of globalization associated the phenomenon with both internationalization and growing interdependence;

¹²⁴ A. Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure”, in: C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, P. Aall (eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 2003, pp. 127-142.

¹²⁵ S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff, R. Thakur (eds), *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo 2005.

writers described processes in which there was an increasing density of impacts on the global scale, among states and non-state players. Globalization was treated as a result of liberalization, that is, the removal by states of official barriers and restrictions to the free movement of resources between states. An intensification of the processes of globalization is favoured by a reduction or liquidation of: trade barriers, currency exchange barriers, control over the flow of capital, and control over the flow of people thanks to open borders and modifications of visa regimes.

Globalization was also compared with universalization, understood as a planetary synthesis (synchronization, standardization and homogenization) of cultures and the propagation of various phenomena, models or experiences to all corners of the world. Those phenomena were to lead to a worldwide convergence or diffusion in culture, the economy, the law and politics. Of course, there was no lack of views to the contrary, that globalization could favour cultural diversity, rebirth and innovation.

Universalism tends to treat globalization as *Westernization*, or modernization according to the American model. Understood as a “hegemonic discourse”, globalization only serves to mask the rest of the world’s far-reaching subordination to the West – and above all to the United States (cultural imperialism).

Ultimately, one must agree that the term globalization is polysemantic (has multiple meanings) and will continue to be defined and redefined as long as the processes it involves dynamize societies both within states and internationally. Among globalization’s critics, it is worth recalling Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher, who showed that it is practically “wrapping up the activities of American imperialism in the privileges of cultural ecumenism or economic fatalism, and making sure that the supranational relations of the economic powers seem to arise as a natural consequence”.¹²⁶

A more neutral world view is expressed by Patrick Artus and Marie-Paule Virard, who believe that in reality, globalization is a gigantic machine taking income away from some to distribute it among others, setting its mark on economic models, the quality of life, inequalities, but also on the natural environment, the international currency system and, *in fine*, on democracy. Globalization is a machine that generates inequality, destroys the social fabric, sharpens protectionist tendencies, absorbs rare natural resources at an alarming rate, is conducive to a rapacious policy against the

¹²⁶ J. Osiński, *Państwo w warunkach globalnego kryzysu ekonomicznego. Przyczynek do teorii państwa [The State under Conditions of a Global Economic Crisis: Contribution to a Theory of the State]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2017, p. 100.

natural environment, accelerates the warming of the climate and generates all natural anomalies; it is also a laboratory for testing abuses of financial capitalism, an auto-ignition engine for the international currency system, and a rotor that may blow up Europe (and America) from the inside.¹²⁷

This opinion permits us to draw up a short balance sheet for globalization. For years, people have tried – in Poland as well, under the spell of neoliberalism – to show the positive effects of these processes. Enchanted by *polonoliberalism* (Rafał Woś) and the successes of a transformation supposedly unlike any seen in Poland since the days of Mieszko I¹²⁸, most researchers have tended to legitimize the existing social order rather than search for the causes of its failures. There has been a dominance of an “axiology of a liberal capitalism without alternative, wearing the corset of the rules made in Washington”. There has been an absence of questions as to how capitalism and democracy serve social and planetary rationality; how to reconcile the effectiveness of the economy, people’s social security, economic freedom, lasting development, freedom of choice as consumes and the functional demands of collective life with the finite biological parameters of our planet.¹²⁹ Many other questions can also be raised concerning the international order, the problems of war and peace, common security, disarmament, openness to dialogue, etc.

The global economic crisis (2007+) revealed the defects and weaknesses of the “free market”, and at the same time restored faith in state institutions and their corrective power over the economy. As stated by one Polish expert in this area, Tadeusz Klementewicz, after three decades of a neoliberal globalization carnival, the capitalist economic world has entered a period of stagnation. Klementewicz announces dramatically: “The balance sheet of neoliberal globalization is less than zero. At present, we are faced with a developmental regression. For how else should these data be interpreted: a decline in the share of real wages in GDP, a 40% increase in the difference between the 10% of the wealthiest and the 10% of the poorest people, 5% of people in central countries employed in agriculture, a mere 20% working in industry, a lasting precarization of employment (increasing uncertainty of having work), university diplomas no longer

¹²⁷ P. Artus, M.-P. Virard, *Globalisation, le pire est à venir: inégalités croissantes, gaspillage des ressources, spéculation financière, course absurde aux profits et implosion de l’Europe*, La Découverte, Paris 2008.

¹²⁸ The first historical ruler of the Polonians, considered the actual founder of Polish statehood; ruled from about 960 to 992.

¹²⁹ T. Klementewicz, *Stawka większa niż rynek. U źródeł stagnacji kapitalizmu bez granic [Stakes Higher than the Market: At the Sources of the Stagnation of Capitalism without Borders]*, Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, Warszawa 2015, p. 17.

guaranteeing a job. Moreover, globalization encompasses only 20-25% of the population of the world, while the rest continued to be marginalized. Only about 2 billion people can afford to buy goods or services on the global market, that is, are worthy of being called a citizen of the world... When he was within the circles of those cooperating with the World Bank, Branco Milanovic said that soon the income of the 1.75% of the richest people in the world would exceed the income of the 77% of the poorest. It is still the case that people income levels are 80% determined by the country they were born in, the social class of their family, and biological determinants of fate such as sex and skin colour. This is why the poorest Dane is richer than 82% of the population of the world, including, for example, the wealthiest inhabitant of Uganda or Tanzania”.¹³⁰

The internationalization of the economy has drawn with it an internationalization or globalization of financial crises. Their catastrophic consequences have been the result of a “crisis of neoliberal ideology”, whose supporters not only tried over several decades to infuse it with an absolute, universal character (as was done with the Marxist-Leninist version of communist ideology), but above all infected the minds of naive people around the world with the idea that we were at the dawn of an era of eternal happiness of all fields of human endeavour. It is true that global capitalism (turbocapitalism) crossed the borders of states, and even integrative groupings, but this does not mean that the infamous neoliberal geoeconomics eliminated the problems of structural unemployment or developmental disproportions between different regions of the world. It turns out that the neoliberal slogans of the primacy of the free market contained not only simplifications and ordinary greed, but also errors in understanding social phenomena and economic mechanisms. This led to misunderstandings of the dynamics, role and significance of the institution of the modern state. As Joachim Osiński has put it, a typical feature of neoliberal argumentation was “to generalize events or processes that were advantageous from the ideological point of view and to treat them as universal”.¹³¹ Many processes were said to be of an ‘objective’ character (which is reminiscent of old ideological axioms), pointing to a kind of globalistic determinism.¹³² To slogans about the free market the ideas of human rights and freedoms, solidarity and democracy were thrown in. Few considered that these values are gradable (relative), and unattainable in many places (more states in

¹³⁰ Ibidem, pp. 12-13.

¹³¹ J. Osiński, op. cit., p. 18.

¹³² G.W. Kołodko, *Dokąd zmierza świat. Ekonomia polityczna przyszłości [Where the World is Heading: The Political Economy of the Future]*, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2013.

the world have non-democratic systems than democratic ones). Moreover, those values are not conditioned solely by economics and money. The neoliberal description of reality was accompanied by neoliberal newspeak, for example: human capital, employer, employee, networks, labour market policy, exclusion, zero tolerance, multiculturalism, emerging markets, etc, while such categories as class, exploitation, pillage, domination and inequality disappeared. There has been an Orwellian reversal of the meaning of words, and a blurring or relativization of their meanings.

This apology for the dominance of the free market led to the concealment of two important phenomena: 1) a monopolization of the management of enormous resources (capital) by a decisive minority, and 2) a concentration and centralization of capital, causing most branches of the modern economy to be taken over by oligopolies. "In connection therewith, all defences of a free market based on competition, whether spoken by politicians, analysts or representatives of academe, may now be treated as resulting from either a lack of knowledge or conscious cynicism".¹³³

With the participation of politicians, journalists and academics, neoliberalism turned the institution of the state into the enemy of the "free market". Supporters of neoliberal views often attacked the state, foreseeing its twilight, or even its burial (the *statophobia* syndrome). As a consequence of the global economic crisis, however, people again began to perceive that the state has duties to perform in certain areas: reforming social benefits (social security), revitalising cities, penal policy and migration policy. The state has turned out to be the 'lifesaver' of corporations, banks and other private economic entities looking for help from budget resources (rescue programmes). Economic policy with the participation of the state has unmasked the powerlessness of market fundamentalists, but has also shown how a doctrine (or better, an ideology) can come to rule over the state and its bodies. For it turned out that all the various, infamous deregulations and privatizations were implemented with the participation and consent of specific states. This is one of the great paradoxes of globalization. States should be neither weakened nor restricted. They should simply be accepted, and used for one's own purposes – this is today's neoliberal *credo*. After all, how effectively – and with the participation of states – has public money been transferred to private financial institutions and corporations! States (whether the United States or the UK) have been used instrumentally to further the interests of big capital. The state is not nobody's, but then again, it is not the property of all of its citizens. Just as in times gone by, it is a tool in the hands of the class that rules economically. Due to

¹³³ J. Osiński, op. cit., p. 91.

the ineffectiveness of government controls, the neoliberal Leviathan again became the only “steering committee” for the particular interests of corporations, banks, their owners, managers, rentiers, investors, etc. The United States is an extreme example of this – the synergy of the American state and the world of business/finance has enabled it to continue to dominate the world economically, politically and culturally.¹³⁴

The experience of recent decades shows that the propagators of globalization (regulars at Davos) have recalled the usefulness of the state and its dynamics. After more than two decades of fighting against it, limiting it, marginalising it and running it down, they have reinstated it as an institution that protects property, assures monetary stability and eases social tensions against the background of societal delamination. Without doubt, the state remains the basic form in which societies are organized politically. It is the most important and the best organized entity in the international polyarchy, the guarantor of a certain order based on the norms of international law, the acknowledged rules of the game (e.g. the balance of power) and modes of behaviour (such as *comitas gentium* – international courtesy).

One can look at the significance of the state from several perspectives: political, economic, ethnic or anthropological. There is no need to glorify the state, nor to denigrate it. It should simply be viewed rationally and objectively.

The political perspective shows that the state is a dynamic organism, an institution capable of adapting to a changing environment that disposed of enormous creative and innovative potential. Of course, in accordance with the hypothesis of Mancur Olson,¹³⁵ there are specific cases of collapse and political myopia, when a state’s elites are not able to break out of their lethargy and regression, but these do not refute the overall historical truth. The political perspective forces us to look at the state in a holistic way concerning its genetic, structural and functional aspects, without reducing it to individual mechanisms (authorities) or duties (to govern). For, apart from its strictly political and economic functions, the state also fulfils needs related to culture, society (identity) and morality (values).

In refuting the accusations of the degradation of the state, we must view it in ontological terms, as a permanent, abstract being or an ideal type, and not only through the prism of specific types of cases which provide, under

¹³⁴ “Only the synergy between Wall Street, the State Department, the Pentagon, Silicon Valley and Hollywood can bring the United States the biggest, most comprehensive benefits and a lasting advantage in the world. Or if not, at least it allows America to effectively oppose other centres of politics and the global economy – Asia with the PRC, or Europe with the EU.” Ibidem, pp. 75-76.

¹³⁵ M. Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1982.

the principle of *pars pro toto*, grounds for generalizations. The wisdom of Fernand Braudel – a French historian of modern times and representative of the Annales School – asserts itself here: not to think in short-term categories, not to judge that the most authentic actors are those that make a lot of noise, for there are other actors prone to silence.¹³⁶ So we should not fall prey to the impression that particular modern states X, Y and Z and misadventures rules out the institution of the state as an “organization of a settled collective that fulfils certain developmental functions – ensuring security, material progress and the socialization of behaviour”.¹³⁷ Such an institution lasts, but also evolves, even though across the millennia hundreds of similar institutions have risen and fallen. It is worth distinguishing the state as conceived particularly and historically (as an organization that is territorial, sovereign and coercive power) from an ontological construction that bears certain imminent traits (attributes or qualities).

From the economic perspective, the state appears as guarantor and arbiter in the unequal confrontation between the market (markets) and the citizen (societies), regardless of whatever lines of conflict fundamentalistic enthusiasts of neoliberalization draw (for example, *jihad vs McWorld*).¹³⁸ No matter how much it is subordinate to economic considerations, a state must always consider the social aspects of management. Economic order is not a simple derivative of relationships of dependence resulting from capitalist production relations, whose purpose is the multiplication of capital. That order also includes the logic of choices aimed at optimising the allocation of goods and resources. All economic activities take place within specific social systems, and the political (normative) frameworks of the state are among the most important of these. The state is still the institution most capable of modifying the bargaining power of parties to market contracts (through tenders, concessions, taxes, supervision, planned development). Experience shows that no economic activity, now or in the foreseeable future, will be possible outside the state and without its participation (Walter Block, Jerzy Wilkin).

The perspective of the ethnic state, as in the previous cases, derives from doctrinal assumptions. The situation is different in the Scandinavian countries, and especially Norway – the best country in the world,¹³⁹ from that in the United States, where economic entities operating on the free

¹³⁶ F. Braudel, *Écrits sur l'histoire*, Champs-Flammarion, Paris 1984.

¹³⁷ J. Osiński, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 52.

¹³⁹ N. Witoszek, *Najlepszy kraj na świecie [The Best Country in the World]*, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec 2017.

market cannot act both effectively and ethically. The drive for quick profit, regardless of the moral and social costs – the cheating, lying and greed – revealed the true face of neoliberalism during the crisis, and the testimony by Alan Greenspan, former head of the FED (Federal Reserve Board), confirming this before the US Congressional House Committee on 23 October 2008 came as a shock to many.¹⁴⁰

Regardless of the doctrinal circumstances, the state remains the only institution that is able to establish a legal order and promote the principles of social justice (usually understood as distributive justice and compensatory-commutative or levelling justice).¹⁴¹ This mainly involves regulating relations between social groups against the background of the distribution of a society's wealth, implementing an active labour market policy, establishing laws against dishonest practices by businesses, banks and international corporations (once called simply exploitation). Combating exclusion or mitigating the adverse effects of social inequality, of course, remain important axiological postulates of the platforms of many political forces governing or seeking to govern in a state. A modern state cannot remain indifferent to its citizens, nor towards persons lacking that status but residing within it, whom it should provide assistance, support and even sympathy when they find themselves in a difficult situation through no fault of their own (e.g. humanitarian crises, natural disasters). The mechanism of the free market is soulless in such situations, devoid of sentiment or pity.

From the anthropological perspective, it should be noted that, due the intensification of flow globally in all areas of social interactions, humanity is being exposed to cultural influences stemming from the same source. The essence of 'universal capitalism' (primarily of Anglo-Saxon origin) is to promote and impose neoliberal models and values that are not necessarily suited to the local traditions of Latin America, Africa, or Central and Eastern Europe. In these areas, the post-colonial and neo-colonial strategies that accompany globalization are clearly evident. Caught up in the neoliberal experiment, in conditions of globalization states are not able to protect themselves against the ruinous effects that experiment has on their traditional structures and values. They can only mitigate or modify them. And the growing popularity of movements in defence of a people's own identity is an indication of a definite rebellion against global instruction and political correctness. The fundamental purpose of the state is still to optimize a society's civilizational development and to improve the quality

¹⁴⁰ A. Greenspan, *The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World*, Penguin Books, London 2008.

¹⁴¹ J. Osiński, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

of people's lives. It is for this reason that the anthropological perspective is so important – especially given the diffusion of values on the global scale. It points to the indispensable role of the state in defending people against the tyranny of big capital and global finance.

Defenders of neoliberal views on the need to restrict the economic activities of state economic, social and cultural institutions usually reach for the handy motto of respecting and protecting liberty. In Poland, this is the line taken by, for example, Leszek Balcerowicz.¹⁴² After some decades, we need not hesitate in stating that the 'discovery of freedom', whether in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe or the Middle East during the 'Arab spring', has benefited only those who promoted the slogan. Access was gained to new resources, markets and financial subordination, and waves of debt created, thanks to a combination of American political and military might and the financial clout of transnational corporations, banks and organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This promotion of freedom, that is, the myth of the weak state, served the interests of the United States. The US acts mainly by weakening its opponents and competitors, which today mainly include China and Russia, but interestingly, also its 'old partners' in the European Union. Many 'missionaries and priests of freedom' have justified this imperialist expansion by a supposedly 'objective process of globalization'.

Against all this, what are the prospects for globalization and the state? In the coming decades, many observers tell us,¹⁴³ there will be a rivalry between, on the one hand, the mechanism of the global market and its largest entities (banks, insurance companies, multinational corporations, knowledge and innovation centres), and on the other, states and their political, economic and military organizations. Oligarchic institutions of an integrative character (like the European Union) and the largest corporations (almost like the old empires) will fight for influence to create bodies and decision-making processes in states which, even if they seek democratic legitimacy, will become obedient puppets in the hands of the economic potentates. And here a question arises concerning the limits of a state's sovereignty and ability to take decisions autonomously.

The rise of these threats is already evoking reactions: the attempt to create a counter-hegemonic order (a financial and currency order led by

¹⁴² L. Balcerowicz (selection and introduction), *Odkrywając wolność. Przeciw zniewoleniu umysłów [Discovering Freedom: Against the Enslavement of Minds]*, Zysk i S-ka, Warszawa 2012.

¹⁴³ J. Oniszczyk (ed.), *Współczesne państwo w teorii i praktyce [Modern States in Theory and Practice]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2011.

China), the growth of left-wing and right-wing populism, a renaissance of the 'old nationalisms' and movements of discontent (various 'springs' and revolutions of 'dignity'). Globalization remains the strongest force driving the changes taking place in the international order, specifically, the breakdown of power arrangements and (existing) constellations of powers, and the pluralization of the international ideological system. Globalization is changing geopolitics, but has not finally determined that certain tendencies will triumph at the expense of others. All of the above processes are a function of the diminishing advantage of the United States in favour of new centres of power – particularly China. But will there actually be a classic multi-polarization of the international system? Might it undergo a 'bifurcation' into separate civilizations? Whether or not the depolarization and dehegemonization of the international system takes place in a peaceful, evolutionary manner remains a riddle that no modern-day Nostradamus can solve.

CHAPTER III

Status as an indicator of states' positions in the international hierarchy

1. Status as conceived sociologically

Status is a sociological category that described an individual's position in the structure of society. It is often connected with the concept of social roles,¹⁴⁴ and involves a specific form of stratification in which social groups are classified and organized according to legal, political and cultural criteria. Status can be treated objectively or subjectively. On the one hand, it means access to certain resources, attributes or traits, and on the other hand it refers to perceptions and evaluations of a given position within the social hierarchy. In other words, status means an objective limitation of the entitlements and privileges enjoyed by a given entity, which are at time guaranteed by the law or the will of other entities, or a subjective awareness of recognition, prestige and of being respected.¹⁴⁵ Status is a certain social label that does not result from one's own choice. It is also an important element with regard to participants in international relations, whose status is the result of their being recognized by others.

It seems that two American researchers – Theodore D. Kemper and Randall Collins – grasped the essence of status most completely, defining it as showing and receiving the signs of recognition and prestige.¹⁴⁶ In their

¹⁴⁴ Because individual people, like states, can play many roles, it is possible for one individual to have many statuses. In sociology, this is described by the term 'set of statuses'. R.K. Merton, "Zestawy ról, zestawy statusów społecznych i sekwencje statusów społecznych w czasie" ["Sets of Roles, Sets of Social Statuses and Sequences of Social Statuses in Time"], in: P. Sztompka, M. Kucia (eds), *Socjologia. Lektury [Sociology: Readings]*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Kraków 2006, pp. 142-153.

¹⁴⁵ B.S. Turner, *Status*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN 1988. In his work *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* Max Weber defined a position dependent on status as a striving for social respect.

¹⁴⁶ J.H. Turner, *The Structure of Sociological Theory: New Edition*, Dorsey Press, Homewood, IL 1978, p. 436 et seq.

theory, they connected changes in status with emotional changes taking place in individuals in social relationships.¹⁴⁷ Transferring that knowledge to international relations leads one to consider to what extent changes in the status of states generate positive emotions such as pride, satisfaction and belief in oneself, or negative emotions such as fear, anger or resentment, or even aggression. These emotions are evident in the conduct of political leaders, in media pronouncements and social moods.

In sociology, a distinction is made between formal status, attained status and attributed status.¹⁴⁸ Formal status, determined by way of certain regulations (statutes, agreements, decisions), established a whole set of rights, obligations, privileges and duties ascribed to a formally defined social position. Attained status is an indication of certain features and values a given entity possesses and which the social environment associates with that entity's achievements, whereas attributed status involves attributing certain traits and values to a given entity regardless of their effort or achievements.¹⁴⁹ This distinction may be useful in analysing status in international relations. After all, states are geopolitical individuals whose status is strictly conditioned by geography, economics and history, but there are also states that achieve a certain position and prestige thanks to what they achieve through rivalry, competition and cooperation. At times, status can also be the result of the determination of political leaders (e.g. Jawaharlal Nehru in India or Charles de Gaulle in the French 5th Republic), or can be attributed by others (e.g. China's and France's status as permanent members of the US Security Council largely depended on the will of the Big Three). In all these cases, what finally counts is a certain convergence of evaluations, a type of consensus – meaning collective acceptance and acknowledgment.

Sociology provides knowledge on the situational conditioning of the status of societal players. In the second half of the 20th century, under the influence of constructivism, particular weight began to be attached to various systems of reference which acquired significance only through the perception of those involved. What a given participant in the life of a society perceives, what he or she believes or expects is true of a given situation, may prove to be more important than the objective features of reality.

¹⁴⁷ T.D. Kemper, "How Many Emotions Are There? Wedding the Social and the Automatic Components", *American Journal of Sociology* 1987, No. 2, pp. 263-289.

¹⁴⁸ J. Scott, G. Marshall, *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, 3rd ed. rev, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp. 730-732.

¹⁴⁹ K. Olechnicki, P. Załęcki, *Słownik socjologiczny [Sociological Dictionary]*, Wydawnictwo Graffiti BC, Toruń 1997, p. 203.

It has been noted, therefore, that various subjective indicators of status – be they psychological, intellectual, moral, awareness-related, motivational, ideological, cultural or religious – determine potential impact and affect or even dictate others' behaviour.¹⁵⁰

The social status of a given entity constitutes its reflection 'in the mirror' of the community in which it functions. Thanks to that reflection, the entity creates 'an image of itself' that facilitates its understanding of its own condition.¹⁵¹ By analogy, this phenomenon can also refer to states within the international system, where self-identification against the backdrop of the community is a continuous, never-ending process. The task of each generation is to re-interpret itself against others and to redefine existing content and forms, that is, its position, status, prestige and authority. These values count for a lot, particularly at the symbolic level, though they also have concrete practical value. After all, they translate into a given entity's position and identity in the social hierarchy.¹⁵²

2. Status as conceived legally

Status can be viewed from the perspective of the law, and status in international relations in terms of international law. Legally speaking, status ordinarily refers to the legal state of a given person, institution or organization. This means a legal situation defined by all of the entitlements and obligations of a given entity.¹⁵³ In reference to international relations, such entities may be states, territories¹⁵⁴ (areas of land or sea, islands, canals, rivers, straits, border crossings, border zones) or international organizations (governmental or non-governmental),¹⁵⁵ but may also be natural persons

¹⁵⁰ P.A. Karber, "Constructivism' as a Method in International Law", *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting* (American Society of International Law) 2000, No. 5-8, pp. 189-192.

¹⁵¹ J. Sowa, *Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesną formą* [*The Phantom Body of the King: Peripheral Struggles with Modern Form*], UNIVERSITAS, Kraków 2011, p. 379.

¹⁵² Z. Bokszański, *Tożsamości zbiorowe* [*Collective Identity*], Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2005.

¹⁵³ A. Cassese, *International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 69 et seq.

¹⁵⁴ M. Sobczyński, *Państwa i terytoria zależne. Ujęcie geograficzno-polityczne* [*States and Dependent Territories: A Geographic and Political Understanding*], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2006.

¹⁵⁵ Within these, there are further categories of membership status (full member, associate member, observer, special guest). Such differences exist, for example, in the Council of Europe.

(foreigners, refugees, stateless persons, prisoners of war, criminals, women, children, etc.). In the literature, most attention is paid to the status of the state.¹⁵⁶ It is inseparably connected with subjectivity in international law, and a state's possession of legal capacity and capacity to perform legal acts is an "axiom beyond discussion".¹⁵⁷ A precise determination of the scope of rights and obligations is difficult to make, since every participant, states included, that scope varies, and depends on, for example, on what is being undertaken. Moreover, states often take up different positions concerning the content of particular standards and institutions of international law, but in principle there is no state that would make an overall rejection of the binding law in international relations.¹⁵⁸

In accordance with the traditions of international law, geopolitical entities that desire to be states must meet specific requirements (territory, population, effective exercise of authority), but no less important than these are sovereignty and international recognition.¹⁵⁹ From today's perspective, though, these elements should not be treated as the sole indicators of the legal or rightful character of a state. There has also been a devaluation of the cultural criteria that once made it possible to distinguish between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' states.¹⁶⁰

In the light of international law, states are obliged to conduct themselves peacefully, but this is no absolute, since in international military law a distinction is made between 'aggressor states', 'militant states' and 'neutral states'. According to the UN Charter, from the days of World War II and for a long time afterwards, a division existed between 'friendly states' ('peace-loving states') and 'hostile states' (Art. 107).¹⁶¹

The best-known, most significant differentiation in status is that within the UN Security Council. The Big Five – the United States, Russia, China,

¹⁵⁶ In practically all handbooks on international public law, this comprises the most important part.

¹⁵⁷ L. Antonowicz, *Rzecz o państwach i prawie międzynarodowym [On States and International Law]*, Innovatio Press, Lublin 2012, p. 69.

¹⁵⁸ A. Roberts, *Is International Law International?*, Oxford University Press, New York 2017.

¹⁵⁹ C. Berezowski, *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne [International Public Law]*, part I, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1966, p. 89.

¹⁶⁰ Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which sets of general principles recognized by civilized nations (in the sense of states), is a remnant from the times when such a division was acknowledged in international law.

¹⁶¹ "Hostile states" were considered every state that, during World War II, had been an enemy of any signatory of the Charter, meaning: Bulgaria, Finland, Japan, Germany, Romania, Hungary and Italy.

Great Britain and France – can veto resolutions on the merits, a result of their status as permanent members of the Council. This is a clear example of formal status not due to autonomous service or achievements. When the UN was established, only the United States and the USSR possessed the attributes of power that could entitle them to that position. Today, there are states as great or greater than Great Britain and France that do not have a seat on the Security Council. The argument in favour of the continued legal status of members of that body is their nuclear potential. Nor is it any accident that all of the Big Five have a history of imperialism behind them. In fact, some of them still conduct a policy of subordinating other states to themselves, part of the imperial legacy.¹⁶²

In the legal sense, status fulfils two important functions: one constitutive, one regulatory. The first grants a particular entity legality, legitimizes its right to stand up for itself and others in particular spheres of reality. The second function makes it possible to define the subjective scope of an entity's actions, what is permissible and possible in given circumstances. While there are many rules on subjectivity, which mainly result from customary and contractual law, there are far fewer constitutive norms, since the international polyarchy does not recognize anyone's authority as supreme in the international community. This is why intersubjective recognition and persuasion are so important, a consensus among all participants that is the source of the legitimacy of participation and rank. Attaining the status of a sovereign state, and especially that of a great power, means obtaining the right to co-manage the international system as a whole, using diplomacy and international law, and at times armed intervention.¹⁶³

3. The fight for status in international relations

In all international systems we know from the earliest times,¹⁶⁴ there has existed a hierarchy of participants according to status. Even if often conceived of very intuitively, it became a criterion of the 'pecking order' in the

¹⁶² A. Gałganek, *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój [History of International Relations. Uneven and Connected Development]*, Vol. 2: *Rzeczy i praktyki [Things and Practices]*, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa 2013, p. 996.

¹⁶³ A.L. Clunan, "Why Status Matters in World Politics", in: T.V. Paul, D.W. Larson, W.C. Wohlforth (eds), *Status in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2014, p. 282.

¹⁶⁴ B. Buzan, R. Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000.

polyarchized international environment.¹⁶⁵ In accordance with the realistic paradigm, the status of a state in international relations is inevitably connected with its rank, that is, where it places in the international hierarchy of power. It is this hierarchy, not the equality of states, that is characteristic of the structure of the international system.¹⁶⁶ States are equal only formally (legally), and the principle of sovereign equality is a reflection of this.¹⁶⁷

The status of states in international relations has been treated for centuries as a function of their objective attributes – power, resources, the size of their armies – in a spirit of political realism. Today, more attention is paid to the subjective aspect: recognition, acceptance, admission to certain groups, meeting specific criteria, or complying with established rules of affiliation,¹⁶⁸ all of which correspond with the assumptions of constructivism. Along with status or authority go other values, such as prestige¹⁶⁹ and reputation¹⁷⁰.

Status is a function of the collective recognition of a state's rank and position in the structure of the international system.¹⁷¹ Recognition, though, is not a one-time event, but a dynamic social process that goes on through relations among those playing the international game. Of course, recognition is a consequence of having certain attributes – wealth, defensive capability, an organized political system, leadership of a certain quality and diplomatic effectiveness – but also cultural attractiveness and demographic

¹⁶⁵ R. Skarżyński, *Anarchia i policentryzm. Elementy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych [Anarchy and Polycentrism: Elements of the Theory of International Relations]*, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomicznej w Białymstoku, Białystok 2006.

¹⁶⁶ D.A. Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature" Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics", *International Security* 2007, No. 1, pp. 47-79.

¹⁶⁷ J. Symonides, "Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych: geneza, podstawa, cele i zasady funkcjonowania, struktura, organy główne i pomocnicze, system Narodów Zjednoczonych" ["The United Nations: Origins, Foundation, Goal and Rules of Functioning, Structure, Main and Auxiliary Bodies, the UN System"], in: J. Symonides (ed.), *Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych... [The United Nations...]*, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁶⁸ M.G. Duque, "Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach", *International Studies Quarterly* 2018, Vol. 62, No 3, pp. 577-592.

¹⁶⁹ L. Gilady, *The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2017.

¹⁷⁰ J. Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2010.

¹⁷¹ "A synthetic indicator of the rank of states is their power, understood as the actual or potential ability of participants in international relations to use all means (assets and liabilities) in order to satisfy their needs and interests in the international community. That ability is not a natural attribute of all states, but in each case constitutes the result of their specific material, social and cultural resources". S. Bieleń, *Polityka w stosunkach międzynarodowych [Policy in International Relations]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2010, p. 36.

potential. Status manifests mainly through affiliation with a specific club of participants, and by the position held therein. Most attention is paid to states that are the leaders of groupings and the authors of group strategies. We usually call them 'powers'.¹⁷² Only they possess the attribute of authority, understood as a form of "causative action whose effectiveness is dependent on the position the entity occupies, the power resources it has at its disposal, and its ability to enforce subordination along with the acquiescence of the entities subordinated".¹⁷³ In seeking confirmation of its important, leading, at times hegemonic or dominating status, a power may opt – depending on its determination and the amount of resistance it meets – for strategic cooperation and conciliation, accommodation and co-optation, coercion and rivalry, or control and domination.¹⁷⁴

A state's place in the international hierarchy does not result solely from various attributes of power, but also from how skilled the state is at using them. Here national traditions and aspiration, the personalities and ambition of politicians, and the efficiency and effectiveness of diplomacy all count. In recent decades, Anglo-Saxon authors have popularized the concept of 'soft power', showing that, in the modern world, it is not only 'hard power' (commanding) in connection with material resources such as economic and military power that counts, but also skill at influencing people's minds, forming their style of life and patterns of behaviour – the ability to win over allies and supporters of the state's ideas because of its cultural and political attractiveness, as well as the dexterity of its leaders.¹⁷⁵ Also of importance are a state's motives, which relate to the determination, readiness and intensity of its decision-makers to acquire as much prestige as possible in international relations. The essence of having an impact on others to take command of the realm of symbols, thereby becoming able to impose on others a vision of the world that serves one's particular interests.

It is an old truth that money cannot buy dignity and prestige – derivatives of status.¹⁷⁶ It is worth noting that, at times, the efforts made to acquire

¹⁷² J. Wiśniewski, K. Żoź-Kuźnia, *Mocarstwa współczesnego świata – problem przywództwa światowego [Powers of the Modern World – the Problem of World Leadership]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2008; M. Tarnawski et al., *Rola mocarstw w stosunkach międzynarodowych [The Role of Powers in International Relations]*, Texter, Warszawa 2016.

¹⁷³ Cz. Maj, *Socjologia stosunków międzynarodowych [Sociology of International Relations]*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2013, p. 191.

¹⁷⁴ T.S. Szayna et al. (eds), *The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica 2001, pp. 45-72.

¹⁷⁵ J.S. Nye, Jr, op. cit.

¹⁷⁶ J. Renshon, *Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 2017, p. 2.

and maintain status can be very costly and risky.¹⁷⁷ Moral satisfaction and symbolic value are more important than financial expenditures, as is evident from many descriptions of the behaviour of political leaders who attached enormous weight to matters of prestige.¹⁷⁸ Today, China and Russia are striving to be seen as world powers like no other states in the post-Cold War international system.¹⁷⁹ They know very well that the higher their status the more they can achieve in terms of influence and effectiveness.

A state's status is difficult to take hold of, and in fact is subjective, fleeting, more dependent on feelings and beliefs than on values actually possessed.¹⁸⁰ Status is largely imaginative in nature, and therefore dependent on how a given state is perceived by other participants. How the conduct and statements of the leaders of a given state are received and interpreted are the key indicator of its ranking in the world.¹⁸¹ In international relations, reputation is not a simple derivative of measurable attributes of power, but of opinions and images that create a specific 'social construct' in the minds of participants. Status is therefore normative, not material. It is not enough to have a feeling of well-being and a high opinion about oneself. More important is what others think, and so status in the international hierarchy cannot be achieved unilaterally. It is always the result of recognition granted by others. A symbol of the respect shown to a given state is its being invited to join various decision-making and consultation bodies, the voices of its representatives being listened to, and its being allowed to organize various diplomatic, cultural or sporting events. Normally, the number of contacts a state has at the highest political level and its activities along certain geopolitical vectors show to what extent it counts internationally.¹⁸² Another form of 'ennoblement' is to attach special importance to having diplomatic contacts with great powers.

¹⁷⁷ R. Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York 1989, p. 8.

¹⁷⁸ H. Morgenthau, K.W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, Boston 1993.

¹⁷⁹ D.W. Larson, A. Shevchenko, *Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2019.

¹⁸⁰ D.W. Larson, T.V. Paul, W.C. Wohlforth, "Status and World Order", in: T.V. Paul, D.W. Larson, W.C. Wohlforth (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 3-29.

¹⁸¹ In reference to earlier sociological observations, political leaders often appeal to emotions rather than rational behaviour, exhibiting pride, arrogance or aggression in order to build up their image or respond to real or imagined slights. From antiquity to the present, political history provides many such examples.

¹⁸² D.H. Dunn (ed.), *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*, Macmillan, Basingstoke 1996.

In this, the United States of America has a unique role. Meetings at the White House are a gauge of the quality of its connection with other states, and an indicator of its approach to them. For those seeking an audience with the American president, a meeting is further proof of their being affirmed and initiated into a very special circle. Its importance is primarily symbolic, for in real terms the weaker state remains a supplicant and client of the stronger state, without access to high technology and unable to have its diplomatic initiatives given a serious hearing.

Only extremely determined states willing to risk everything on a single roll of the dice can manage to build up exceptional status and thereby gain access to atomic weapons. This is the extreme indicator of status, very difficult to achieve, but thereafter respected by everyone, even the strongest. An example that has caught the eye of the whole world is the process of trying to regulate relations on the Korean Peninsula undertaken with the participation of the United States and China. It can be clearly seen that, due to its possession of nuclear weapons, North Korea and its dictator have been raised up in the international hierarchy to the select group of the most powerful.¹⁸³

The status of states often goes hand in hand with their ability to lead, one could say their authority, that is, their ability to command other states, usually with the ability to enforce obedience. Weak states, even if granted international status as, for example, mediators or peacekeepers, are not able on their own to impose themselves on others or force anyone to obey them. They may, however, call upon their honour or take care to save face, which in some cultures is extremely important, whatever their place in the international hierarchy. At the same time, status is a value that is subject to internationalization, whereas honour and saving face remain issues that are individual, unilateral. Honour is not put up for tender; either you have it or you do not.¹⁸⁴ Status, on the other hand, can be licensed out, or be the effect of having obtained special privileges or rights.

Politicians responsible for foreign policy do not always realize how important and difficult it is to enhance their state's status over the long term. They often confuse or identify this with making spectacular achievements, when it is establishing their position in relation to the largest powers that requires governments to correctly identify main directions in their strategies and policies – not merely adapt to situations, but skilfully connect

¹⁸³ L. Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue*, Routledge, London 2013.

¹⁸⁴ A.P. Tsygankov, *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 13-27.

their own interests and goals with those of other states.¹⁸⁵ Consistent, wise policy makes it possible to build up a state's international status that can neutralize the weight of adverse geopolitical burdens. A model example of intelligent status-building is that of Finland, which, after World War II, specialized as an intermediary between the West and the USSR, and later Russia, promoting itself in the world as a skilful mediator and moderator in the difficult art of working out compromises.¹⁸⁶

A state's international status is not granted but once. It must constantly be pursued, maintained, and, when lost, be rebuilt. Once, under the sceptre of the Jagiellonians, the Kingdom of Poland was a state to be reckoned with in Europe, but after the demise of the last ruler of that dynasty it began to resemble the "phantom body of the king". Its status declined during the times of elective kings, until an event occurred that was unprecedented in the world at that time. One of the largest states disappeared from the map. It was not easy for Poland to return to the assembly of independent players of acknowledged status. For more than a century, all of the European powers, including those that had annexed parts of the Kingdom, became quite accustomed to treating Poles instrumentally in their geopolitical games.¹⁸⁷ The year 1918 saw Poland restored as a subjective entity, which meant that those powers, and Germany and Russia especially, had to re-evaluate their strategies, taking account of the Polish state in their calculations concerning their neighbours. A critical or expressly negative approach to Poland sometimes echoes in the foreign policy of those states to this very day.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ R. Rosecrance, A. Alexandroff, B. Healy, A. Stein, *Power, Balance of Power, and Status in Nineteenth Century International Relations*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills-London 1974.

¹⁸⁶ H. Haukkala, S. Saari (eds), *Russia Lost or Found? Patterns and Trajectories*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki 2009.

¹⁸⁷ Further examples of the loss of state status could be named. The case of Poland was of an extreme nature because it was wiped off the political map. But there are also many examples of states in which revolutions took place that resulted in new regimes that were totally isolated and boycotted by other players on the international scene. Since the revolution of the ayatollahs and the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran has been trying to attain the status of a player that counts. In spite of its position and its potential to take on the role of a regional power, it has not had its aspirations or ambitions recognized by the West, and by the United States in particular.

¹⁸⁸ S. Bieleń, "Geopolityczne uwarunkowania i implikacje polskiej niepodległości" ["The Geopolitical Conditions and Implications of Polish Independence"], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 2018, No. 1, pp. 47-61; W. Modzelewski, *Polska-Rosja. Myśli o Rosji i bolszewizmie w 100-lecie niepodległości [Poland-Russia: Thoughts on Russia and Bolshevism on the Centenary of Independence]*, Vol. 5: years 2017-2018, Instytut Studiów Podatkowych, Warszawa 2018.

4. Poland's historically and geopolitically encumbered status

Poland is a state that gained a lot by acceding to Western structures in the new geopolitical situation after 1989. After all, a state can lose a lot if it is unable to adapt to the expectations of its partners and allies, which often differ among themselves, as well as to its competitors and rivals, with which relations must be built on a peaceful *modus vivendi*, not a military crusade. The rule is that the higher one's status, the more respect one has concerning one's interests, ideas and institutions, even among one's enemies. A failure to understand this maxim often leads to the suspicion that states having higher status strive to make weaker states dependent on them. But history shows that states with the highest status have always had a broader scope of rights and privileges, including the possibility of calling wayward participants to order (as part of the right to inspect – *droit de regard*).¹⁸⁹

The asymmetry in the distribution of power and the ranking in international relations condemns smaller and weaker states to remain in a position of subordination, though none of them will admit to this. Depending on their strategy – of rivalry, accommodation or cooperation – the boundaries of a relatively secure, independent existence full of self-assurance vary. This issue is particularly striking in discussions on Poland's arms programme, when the country's individual military potential will never be able to counterbalance the military potential of Russia, known in political rhetoric as Poland's political enemy. No maximalization of arms spending (*nota bene* at the expense of other areas such as science and health care) will ever cause Poland's leaders to feel they have achieved full security comfort. There will always be a dose of fear and uncertainty, which is the lot of the state's low status in comparison with the great powers. Ultimately, being ready to engage in collective defence depends on some of these. This is why, in both the doctrine and practice of foreign policy, it is worth seeking other solutions based on cooperative strategies, not confrontation. There is a need to learn how to reach compromises and reconciliation with one's neighbours, to rid oneself of the satellite mentality and be open to international dialogue, not according to others' preferences, but one's own interest. As the experience of the Scandinavian countries shows, much more can be accomplished with the aid of diplomatic means and a strategy of accommodation than by rivalry or confrontation. Poland's continual references to geopolitics sets it on a collision course with its largest neighbour

¹⁸⁹ B. Simms, *Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present*, Allen Lane, London 2013.

to the east and makes it a vassal to the United States. A Poland that is in conflict with Russia, and not understood and without real partners in the European Union, is a dream partner of the United States.¹⁹⁰ Without any great intellectual effort, the Polish political elites agree to America's offer of protection, forgetting that limitless gratitude towards the patron beyond the ocean entails uncritical dependence and doing away with having one's own opinion.¹⁹¹

One of the causes of this phenomenon is that Poland remains enslaved to old geopolitical concepts.¹⁹² The domination of the great empires hindered Polish strategic thinking for many centuries. The burden of history and geopolitics has meant that Poland, and its governing elites in particular, are not able to break free of old habits and harm inflicted in the past. Through that prism they define their identity, friends and rivals, and their psychological distance and attitude towards Poland's neighbours. Yet the situation has changed, and it is clearly evident that the old geopolitical determinants of Poland's international status no longer have any rational justification. Poland does not have to be a buffer state, or a bulwark, or a frontier state. Those geopolitical functions were always assigned by cynical, external interactions. Having recovered its autonomy, Poland has a unique chance to take on a role that is the logic consequence of its situation in the middle of Europe – that of a 'prudent broker' in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian system. In the Euro-Atlantic system itself, Poland is now nothing more than an ardent, uncritical exponent of American interests in Europe, which brings no glory upon the country, to say the least. The sooner Poland's leaders correctly read the sense of the changes under way, the more they will gain in terms of strengthening Poland's status, distancing themselves from geopolitical fantasies created on the other side of the ocean in which Poland is assigned the role of barring the door to the West against Russia,¹⁹³ and in the long run against China. Essentially, that role means harnessing Poland to the chariot of the hegemonic policy of the United States, which does not intend to give up governing the world as it sees fit. The Anglo-Saxon countries gladly treat Poland as a 'salesman' of their interests, and even as a 'saboteur' in the East. It is hard to believe

¹⁹⁰ This is what animosity towards China and unnecessary conflict with Iran lead to.

¹⁹¹ R. Sikorski, *Polska może być lepsza. Kulisy polskiej dyplomacji [Poland Can Be Better: Behind the Scenes of Polish Diplomacy]*, Znak Horyzont, Kraków 2018, pp. 125-160.

¹⁹² R. Juchnowski, *Miejsce geopolityki w polskiej myśli politycznej XIX i XX wieku [The Place of Geopolitics in Polish Political Thought of the 19th and 20th Centuries]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2018.

¹⁹³ G. Friedman, *The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World*, Doubleday, New York 2010.

that such treatment does not find its way into the public debate, the sober reflections of decision-makers or independent intellectual analyses.¹⁹⁴

The experience of recent years clearly shows that Poland's manifestly pro-American policy is not bringing the desired results. It is an expression of weakness and political disorientation resulting from a lack of ability and a failure to understand the various mechanisms operating on the other side of the Atlantic. Poland's backtracking on its amendments to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance when pressured by Jewish circles in America and Israel, and by Washington directly, prove that, when put to the test – and even concerning something fairly banal – Polish-American relations can become very troublesome in a flash. We can see from this that one does not buy a protective umbrella once and for all, and that the price does not depend just on buying American planes and rockets or the combat readiness of American troops stationed on Polish soil. The essence of the guarantee is respect for the status and authority of the Polish state, without which Poland becomes a marginal state that can be trifled with, even in the most inelegant way.

Poland's foreign policy must serve its international position, and above all the legal and political continuity of the state. This is related to the state's identity as an entity under international law that endures regardless of political or territorial changes.¹⁹⁵ In light of the political declarations that

¹⁹⁴ Researchers who do attempt to clarify Poland's geopolitical reality become the target of vulgar attacks and paranoid evaluations. These are evidence of how low the culture of discourse and moral responsibility for one's opinions have fallen. Ideological doggedness and cognitive blindness now obscure any sense of decency. See the following text, whose author hides in cowardly fashion behind a pseudonym, in a supposedly serious periodical: J. Zagończyk, "Geopolityka w służbie imperium. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie w zwierciadle geopolitycznych koncepcji" ["Geopolitics in Service of the Empire: Polish-Russian Relations in the Mirror of Geopolitical Concepts"], *Arcana* 2018, No. 6, pp. 75-100.

¹⁹⁵ "A break in the legal and constitutional continuity of a state does not disrupt its continuity under international law. The state does not cease to be a subject under that law even if its political and social system, population and territory, name or international status change, provided that the change of status does not eradicate its sovereignty. The justifiable question arises as to whether the change in Poland's international status as a result of its being taken over by communist forces ideologically connected with the Soviet Union did not mean the destruction of its sovereignty. It seems that the People's Republic should be treated as a political formation of the Polish state, which maintained its sovereignty during that period, although the exercise of that sovereignty from 1944-1989 was more or less restricted by the Soviet Union by means of the way their mutual relations were actually arranged. The conception according to which a distinction should be made between sovereignty as an ideal legal concept and the exercise of sovereignty seems perfectly adequate to the sphere of facts and of the law". L. Antonowicz, op. cit., p. 167; M. Karwat, "Metodologiczne aspekty problemu ciągłości państwowej" ["Methodological Aspects of the Problem

the Polish People's Republic ('PRL') was a 'black hole' in history, there has been an escalation in destructive argumentation coming from the lips of the highest state dignitaries, who undermine modern Poland's right to exist by describing it as the successor to such an infamous predecessor. In order to prevent further harm resulting from such enunciations, some sort of compromise must be reached as soon as possible over how to conceive of the post-war Polish state, which had limited sovereignty, and in the name of the national interest the continuity of the Polish state must be protected as one of the important attributes of Poland's international status in the 20th century. These are rudimentary elements of Poland's geopolitical identity. If Poles themselves, led by their prime minister, undermine the continuity of statehood under the banner of the fight against "communist and Soviet usurpation", they create conditions ripe for today's Poland to be attacked from all sides, even by its allies and partners. Successive governments of the Third Republic have had and continue to have difficulty defining Poland's identity as a state, mainly due to opportunism and ideological obduracy. What is missing above all is a realistic understanding of the national interest. Such politicians have no knowledge of the role Poland played, for example, during the "thaw" in the period of de-Stalinization, during the era of *détente*, in normalising relations with West Germany and recognizing the border along the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers, or in creating the Conference/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and disseminating its standards. Less and less is said about these achievements in history coursebooks, which is to Poland's own detriment. This phenomenon attests to a kind of 'split personality' among modern Polish decision-makers, since on the one hand they acknowledge certain achievements in international politics (e.g. Poland's role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council), but on the other hand question the very existence of the People's Republic.

When analysing a state's international status, the degree to which its policy is ideologized is important. Revolutionary and revisionist states seek to subvert the existing order, missionary states seek to transform and improve it. Pragmatic states are mainly concerned with maintaining the *status quo* and working out useful compromises. Attitudes involving ideological engagement are not unknown in Poland. Its thoughtless support for everything anti-Russian, whereby Poland has fallen completely in line with American policy, has led in recent years to a resurgence and rehabilitation of Ukrainian nationalism. It has been recognized that Poland's

of State Continuity"], in: M. Pietraś, I. Hofman, S. Michałowski (eds), *Państwo w czasach zmiany [The State in Times of Change]*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2018, pp. 319-343.

approach can be influential in forming the new identity of an anti-Russian Ukraine.¹⁹⁶ Regardless of their ideological provenance, for more than a quarter century the Polish political elites have trivialized this phenomenon, blind to the fact that this form of nationalism is detrimental to their own interests. It undermines both the credibility of the Polish authorities in the eyes of Polish society and the arguments in favour of drawing Ukraine into European structures. The voice of Poland on this subject within the European Union is now becoming softer due to Poland's own image problems.

Despite the various objective burdens and subjective obstacles, there is no reason why Poland should not work out an image for itself that is not confrontational, or acquire a stature that commands respect and approval in the international arena. Yet to do so there must be a clear 'game plan'; a political doctrine must be formulated which consists of more than mere slogans and phrases about Poland belonging to the West, which demonstrates the functionality, stability and predictability of the Polish state in the international system.¹⁹⁷

The trouble with Poland, though, is that it not only lacks a mature international doctrine, but also lacks a clear identity based on deep reflections and evaluations, as well as a civilizational vision of development. Moreover, it objective finds itself somewhere between large and small states. After 1989, it was painted with the same brush as much smaller countries, or played an ambitious game to be counted among the 'exclusive' club of the few states that together form the 'decision-making centre of Europe'. Such a step requires enormous determination and self-denial, as well as sacrifices and patience. Even smaller states, let alone great powers, are not used to Polish aspirations to lead. All the more so in that those aspirations are accompanied by Poland's tragic inability to correctly diagnose community interests, the deterioration of its own state and its image, and a lack of awareness of the limits of its communicative competence. When information is being transferred among states, numerous disruptions always occur due to the complexity of the cultural context. Politicians should know that a correct understanding of their intended meaning often requires

¹⁹⁶ States and nations reaching for compromised nationalisms cannot necessarily be counted among modern states. J.M. Fiszer, T. Stępniewski, *Polska i Ukraina w procesie transformacji, integracji i wyzwań dla bezpieczeństwa Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* [Poland and Ukraine in the Process of Transformation, Integration and Challenges to Security in Central and Eastern Europe], ISP PAN, Warszawa 2017, p. 83.

¹⁹⁷ W. Lamentowicz, *Strategia państwa: teoria państwa aktywnego wobec sił spontanicznych* [State Strategy: A Theory of the State that is Active Against Spontaneous Forces], Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa 2015.

knowledge that goes beyond having a technical facility in a given language. A proper recognition of what a sender actually intends to communicate requires a recipient to be suitably prepared and to make a cognitive effort. Otherwise, communication can get bogged down in misinterpretations and denials.¹⁹⁸ Examples of this are provided by the numerous instances where the image of the Polish government has been tarnished.

All this brings on the reflection that Poland is unable to prove – neither rhetorically nor diplomatically nor symbolically – that it is a state to be reckoned with in the international arena. The self-satisfaction of its rulers and official propaganda are unable to undermine this observation, for it is as clear as daylight that what counts most here is not one's own beliefs, but how things are received on the outside. To be fair concerning this cognitive dissonance between self-perception and the reactions of the international community, it must be added that a state's status may at time be deliberately deformed or mistakenly defined. Certain aspirations of a state, or the moves it actually makes, may be presented in a false light or interpreted in a biased way. In this way, what those in power in Poland claim to be their intentions at reform appear to critically disposed external recipients as catastrophic moves that undermine Poland's constitutional order. Many discrepancies are evident between the government's intentions and how its actions are perceived externally. The intensity and scale of the contrast between the two sides determines the violence of the emotional reactions and practical counter-measures that ensue.

The case of Poland shows that it is much more difficult for weaker states to achieve various intentions that go against the interests of stronger players. This is why it is so important to wisely correlate one's own vision of the international order with the ideas and visions whose status provides them with the chance to implement them. In this context, a weaker state must make a place for itself in various contact, initiating, consulting, steering, management and decision-making groups. By being well prepared, and by specialising in defined areas or issues, Poland still has a chance to develop an interesting international offer. However, this will require it to get rid of the ethnocentrism and egocentrism of its leaders. In a democratic state, the politicians power change due to an alternation in political forces, while a state that is determined to become engaged and demonstrate a will to take part in solving difficult problems not only earns respect and prestige, but also builds sympathy towards itself within the international community. It is worth bearing this in mind when designing Poland's international status.

¹⁹⁸ J. Stewart (ed.), *Bridges Not Walls: A Book About Interpersonal Communication*, 11ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 2012, ch. 6.

CHAPTER IV

Manifestations of revisionism and the defence of the *status quo* in international relations

1. Antecedents of revisionism and the *status quo*

In political science, the term ‘revisionism’ can have different meanings. In reference to party programmes and political movements, it usually means a departure from the established rules, from what is legitimate, a questioning of main ideas or demands. For example, in the 19th century, the ideological current that rejected Marxist theory and the legitimacy of the proletarian revolution was called revisionism. It postulated instead a peaceful, democratic road towards reform (hence ‘reformism’), and this became the basis for the social democratic movement.¹⁹⁹

In the communist movement, revisionism became any divergence from the official doctrine of the ruling party.²⁰⁰ In international relations, revisionism is associated with the pursuit of changes in the current international situation. Most often, the subject of revisionism has been international agreements deemed to be unjust. Demands for revision concerned the conditions imposed by victorious states on conquered states, usually in respect of borders and territorial divisions.

In practice, revisionism appears interchangeably or along with revanchism, meaning the tendency of a conquered state to seek revenge against a conquering state. Revisionist and revanchist tendencies are associated with Germany after each of the World Wars in the past century. In reality, those tendencies emerged much earlier. Revisionism dates back to the French Revolution, and revanchism to the Franco-Prussian War, after which France sought to recover its position as a great power to demanded the return of the lands it had lost.

¹⁹⁹ J. Gyford, *Social Democracy: Beyond Revisionism*, Fabian Society, London 1971.

²⁰⁰ L. Kołakowski, *Główne nurty marksizmu [Main Currents of Marxism]*, part 3: *Rozkład [Decomposition]*, Krag, Warszawa 1989.

The term '*status quo*', meaning 'the state of things', was used in Roman law, and is used in international law in respect of an existing situation in a defined time. The expression has also been used to indicate that, during negotiations, the subject of the dispute remains unchanged. Most often, *status quo* refers to a specific state of political and territorial stability.

Historically, the term has had two variations: *status quo ante bellum*, where a power arrangement that had previously existed but changed as a result of a war is restored (for example, during the Congress of Vienna in 1815), or *status quo post bellum*,²⁰¹ which gives rise to a new 'state of things' after the end of a war (for example, changes in the territories of states in Europe after World War I). Today, this meaning has changed, mainly because of the prohibition of the right to wage war (*ius ad bellum*); now people usually speak of *status quo ante*, the idea is a 'return of the state of things preceding a certain event' or of the 'existing state of things', which is a reflection of the situation at a given moment or throughout a longer period of time.

In past clashes between Austria and France or France and England, the motive was always to revise what each possessed. This mainly concerned control over or the annexation of territories. The zenith of this phenomenon occurred at the end of the 18th century. History coursebooks around the world discuss the collusion of three powers – Austria, Prussia and Russia – against Poland. But extreme examples of revisionism also took place after the French Revolution.²⁰² Napoleon's conquests were a continuation of revolutionary revisionism in France.²⁰³ There was a return to a policy of *status quo* during the Congress of Vienna, when rules were established for a balance of power in international relations that lasted almost a hundred years.²⁰⁴ For part of this period, roughly up to the middle of the 19th century, the Concert of Europe was used by the great powers to protect the existing *status quo*. The Crimean War began a stage of various adjustments to the international order that results in further conflicts and the creation of new geopolitical entities. Revisionism flourished in the interwar period of 1918 to 1939, when the expansionist policies of Japan, Germany and Italy led to the outbreak of a catastrophic war waged on a scale never known before. In essence, the anti-fascist coalition was an alliance aimed at

²⁰¹ T. Srogosz, *Uti possidetis w prawie międzynarodowym publicznym [Uti Possidetis in Public International Law]*, Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2016, pp. 19-28.

²⁰² T.C.W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802*, Arnold, London 1996.

²⁰³ G.E. Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1978.

²⁰⁴ H.A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problem of Peace 1812-1822*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1957.

restoring order, but an order based on a new *status quo*. That order lasted half a century. In popular opinion, the United States was the guarantor of the division of influence established as a result of decisions taken by the victorious powers, while Stalin's Soviet Union, with its revolutionary ideology, undermined the rules of the game. Few people choose to remember that both hegemonic powers controlled their spheres of influence by means of intervention, and sought to hold on to their possessions.

2. Russia and China as sources of anti-Western revisionism

With the end of the Cold War, the ideological roles of the United States and Russia underwent a reversal. It was America that began to seek change, creating havoc in many parts of the globe and causing a transformation of the existing order. This occurred after the terrorist attacks against facilities in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The United States, with the support of the international community (and with the collaboration of France and Great Britain) began to deal with a number of regimes arbitrarily deemed by Washington to be allied with terrorism (Afghanistan, Iraq, then Syria and Libya). After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the rhetoric changed dramatically. No matter what the United States is up to in the Middle East, it is Russia that is charged with being aggressive and belligerent,²⁰⁵ primarily because it opposes there being a concentration of power in the hands of a single hegemon. Russia objects to a 'unipolar' and pro-American globalization, and favours multilateral mechanisms in which all states (meaning the main powers) have an equal and rightful say in resolving the most important issues facing the world.²⁰⁶

There has been a belief that, in order to achieve its aims, Russia has been using non-conventional means, and that the real purpose of its infamous 'hybrid war' is to disrupt the unity of NATO and the cohesion of the European Union.²⁰⁷ In all of its defeats and misfortunes, the West sees the hand of Moscow (from supporting the National Front in France to the referendum on the separation of Catalonia to the migration crisis to the US

²⁰⁵ A. Grigas, *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2016.

²⁰⁶ M. McFaul, *From Cold War to Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America*, Allen Lane, London 2018.

²⁰⁷ L. Freedman, *Ukraine and the Art of Strategy*, Oxford University Press, New York 2019.

presidential election).²⁰⁸ On the one hand, this attests to a loss of internal control in the political and media circles of the Western states, and on the other hand, has led to an exaggerated view of Russia's might. Furthermore, in light of the engagement of Western states in various 'colour revolutions' and 'Arab springs', all those accusations against Russia served to distract attention away from the West's own activities on many fronts – from Africa and the Middle East to Eastern Europe and Central Asia.²⁰⁹ Blaming Russia, and Vladimir Putin personally, for all the ills of the Western world and the destruction of the international order – in which, after all, the dominant player has been the West – is indicative of a growing crisis and the West's inability to meet the new challenges and threats arising in international relations.²¹⁰

The West has failed to make a realistic determination of Russia's strengths and intentions, and has reacted hysterically to threats which it has largely caused.²¹¹ The spiralling tensions that have resulted on both sides have led not just to a replay of the old 'security dilemma', but also to a dramatic reminder of the importance of misperceptions in international relations, which deform reality and cause conflicts to escalate.²¹² A kind of 'security paradox' has formed between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, for the problem is not to find an adequate response to a growing threat, as was the case in the old 'security dilemma', but to correctly understand the conduct and intentions of the other side when mutual trust is diminishing and fear and tensions are on the rise.²¹³ In the political and military circles of the West, an anti-Russian narrative has gained prominence, of which the best example is Great Britain, which has been accusing Russia of every evil in relation to the West.²¹⁴ A real challenge now is the lasting division between opponents of Russia, who accuse it all revisionism and expansionism, and those who support a return to dialogue and a de-escalation of tensions, who are now on the defensive.²¹⁵ How long this polarization

²⁰⁸ A.P. Tsygankov, *Russia and America: The Asymmetric Rivalry*, Polity Press, Medford, MA 2019.

²⁰⁹ E. Inbar (ed.), *The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramifications*, Routledge, London-New York 2013.

²¹⁰ J.J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT – London 2018.

²¹¹ R. Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine...*, op. cit.

²¹² R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1976.

²¹³ K. Booth, N. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2008.

²¹⁴ A. Monaghan, *Dealing with the Russians*, Polity, Medford, MA 2019, p. 3 et seq.

²¹⁵ R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century: From Cooperation to Crisis*, Springer, Cham 2018.

continues depends less on Russian policy than it does on the readiness of the states of the West to critically re-evaluate their own policies.²¹⁶

At present, there are increasing suspicions about the revisionist policy of the People's Republic of China. As China grows in strength, it has no intention of fencing itself off from the world as the old Chinese emperors did. At the beginning of the 20th century, the German Kaiser warned the last Russian Tsar of the 'yellow threat', and today's apocalyptic visions of China dominating the world are no longer mere futuristic phantasmagoria. Many reasons exist for acknowledging China as a hegemonic power in the 21st century.²¹⁷ The world's most populous country is strongly centralized and almost mono-ethnic, with a dynamically growing economy and a growing military might based on modern technology, with an extremely effectively diplomatic service and support from the most numerous diaspora on the planet. It is capable of causing changes having incalculable consequences. Yet, in this train of thought lies a trap, that of making a primitive extrapolation from the philosophy of the West. China does not intend to take a drastic leap reminiscent of the expansion of the Western empires. Its expansion is an expansion of influence, with pragmatic respect for the interests of other powers.²¹⁸ Thus, for example, even though an enormous power vacuum arose in Central Asia after the collapse of the USSR, China did not enter there (as the classic Western empires would certainly have done), but respected the interests of Russia in the region.²¹⁹ Chinese influence seeks to maintain a balance between Russia, the Western states and the world of Islam in this part of the globe. Taking on a counterbalancing, or even decisive, role is of more benefit to the authorities in Beijing than direct expansion.²²⁰

In Northeast Asia, China's goals are to weaken the Japanese-American partnership and use both Korean states in a game with the United States and Russia. The unification of Korea on Chinese terms would give China additional leverage against Japan. Even today it is evident that China's

²¹⁶ K. Giles, *Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 2019; R. Sakwa, *Russia's Futures*, Polity, Medford, MA 2019.

²¹⁷ G. Rachman, *Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century*, Bodley Head, London 2016.

²¹⁸ G. Allison, *Destined for War? Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* Houghton Mifflin, London 2017.

²¹⁹ D.V. Trenin, *True Partners: How Russia and China See Each Other*, Centre for European Reform, London 2012.

²²⁰ M. Kaczmarek, *Russia-China Relations in the Post-Crisis International Order*, Routledge, London-New York 2015.

leaders have managed to convince North Korea to slowly change its course towards reunification, and the United States is taking account of this in its nuclear dialogue with the North Korean dictator.

The area that most threatens the *status quo* is the sphere of China's vital interests in Southeast Asia. In this region, where powerful capital and the latest technologies converge, China is seeking to answer the question: *Quo vadis, Sina?* There, the most important process is 'the unification of the motherland' through the annexation of Taiwan. Many observers lose sleep over this possibility, since it would mean that China had moved from diplomatic persuasion in defence of the current state of possession to a revisionist leap into the unknown. A lot will depend on which interest groups – centred around international business and the conquest of world markets, or the industrial-military complex – prevail in the foreseeable future.²²¹ As for now, however, there are no political forces in China that would resort to all available means to enforce unification. The Chinese elites are focused on the great work of becoming the "unquestioned and independent" greatest power in the world.²²²

3. The dialectics of revisionism and the defence of the *status quo*

The issue of revisionism and the defence of the *status quo* in international relations always recurs when the international system finds itself in a phase of violent and unpredictable transformation. Some states tend to preserve the current state of possession and take a peaceful approach, while others lean towards change and hawklike behaviour.²²³ The classic political realists, led by Hans Morgenthau, have noted that the states that defend the *status quo* are those who count most on security, while the revisionists are those seeking to maximize their own power; the latter are most often described as imperialistic.²²⁴ The snag is that, in practice, it is difficult to tell one from the other. Security and power condition each other, and one

²²¹ X. Yan, *Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford 2019.

²²² B. Góralczyk, *Wielki renesans. Chińska transformacja i jej konsekwencje [The Great Renaissance: The Chinese Transformation and Its Consequences]*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2018.

²²³ J.W. Davidson, *The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006.

²²⁴ H.J. Morgenthau, K.W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations...*, op. cit., p. 56 et seq.

can never be sure whether it is possible to be truly safe without increasing the attributes of power.

To be precise, this dichotomy of revisionists and defenders of the *status quo* does not exhaust all of the possibilities of the international reality. Most states cannot afford to take an active part in the game of international power. They are 'backward' or 'alienated' states, indifferent to the most important global trends taking place, for they are simply incapable of investing in the means of disseminating various values around the world. The most they can manage is to defend themselves, and even here their achievements often leave much to be desired.

States also rival each other over territory, resources, status, economic markets, ideologies and influence on legal regulations international institutions. If, for example, a state accepts the existing ideological and political division, it is defending the *status quo*. If, however, it attempts to 'convert' others to its own ideology or topple someone's political system, it is certainly a source of revisionism. A certain problem arises in the context of the discrepancies between the goals states declare and what they actually do. There have been many states in history that were revolutionary only in their manifestos and declarations, but had no means of putting these into effect. In other words, idle talk. In China, the expression 'paper tiger' was coined long ago; in the rhetoric of Mao Zedong, it ironically exposed the powerlessness of the American imperialists to thwart the revolutionary changes taking place on the Asian continent. And for a more recent example we need not stray far from China. For years, successive governments of India have declared their support for the religious and secular leader of Tibet, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, but have not followed up their demands for Tibetan independence with any steps that could upset the rather stable balance between India and China.

In practice, revisionist and conservative tendencies can be interwoven. What is more, states can simultaneously conduct a policy of defending the *status quo* and demand a revision of the order in one particular sector. For example, Japan today, unlike imperial Nippon, is not seeking any changes in the territorial order of Asia, but is demanding the restoration of its sovereignty over the Northern Territories, that is, the Kuril Islands.²²⁵ Russia, in turn, considers that, by annexing Crimea, it was not acting as a revisionist state at all in relation to the whole of the international order. The American 'offensive realist' John J. Mearsheimer has shown that, in fact, all states display revisionist tendencies, for they all seek to increase their own strength

²²⁵ B. Glosserman, *Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2019.

in order to increase their security. When they resort to revisionist policies depends on the given specific power arrangement and circumstances.²²⁶

The most interesting case is that of the United States of America, whose power is weakening relatively as China's power increases. For this reason, the United States is not conducting a policy solely aimed at maintaining the *status quo*. On the contrary, successive administrations have involved "warriors of the new Cold War", that is, those who support confrontations with other states based on ideology. Even if the current resident of the White House is behaving with restraint in respect of engaging in new wars, his advisors make no attempt to conceal that they dream of changing many regimes around the world, not only in Iran. Defending its status as hegemon, the United States has shown its willingness to initiate a multitude of conflicts, which hardly attests to its unambiguous defence of the *status quo*.²²⁷

A state's attitude towards the international order results from internal and external factors. The character of its government, and especially the degree to which the government is ideologically motivated, makes a state more radical in pursuing its demands for change. Expansionism, having a perceived historical mission, considering itself exceptional, or simply striving to enhance its position and prestige – these are the symptoms of such an attitude, which can be strengthened when there is an awakening of nationalist sentiment accompanied by dissatisfaction with existing achievements or by unfulfilled aspirations.²²⁸ To the above we might add yet another motivation resulting from unjust solutions imposed upon defeated states by the victors of a war. Thus, the humiliation experienced by the Germans under the harsh conditions of the Versailles Treaty proved to be a cause for the revisionism that gave rise to the revisionism of the Nazi Third Reich. Attempts to appease Hitler led to the outbreak of the greatest of all wars. This example brings to mind the extraordinarily important problem of the legitimacy of an international order established by great powers. Is what they dictate legally binding only because they are more powerful, or is it grounded in international law? When a 'power vacuum' forms, that is, when there is a lack of key players, can stability in the international order be maintained? After all, it is widely known that, when great players are missing, the circumstances tempt the others to change things for their own

²²⁶ J.J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, op. cit., passim.

²²⁷ R.J. Lieber, *Retreat and Its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016.

²²⁸ The most common source of revisionist tendencies is nationalist ideology, which evokes, on the one hand, a feeling of pride and superiority over others, and on the other hand a burning desire to make up for wrongs and losses experienced in the past.

benefit. This tendency has been known since the days of Thucydides, who identified the motives of rival *poleis* in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

External motivators are always connected with such values as co-existence, increasing a state's scope of decision-making autonomy, and its feeling of security. So it is obvious that, as states grow in power, their desire to maximize those values evokes anxiety in other states, causing weakening states to focus on preserving the current state of possession. Here we should pay attention to a kind of coincidence between, on the one hand, the various internal and external factors, and on the other, the circumstances that give rise to these. An increase in international tensions, a growing feeling of danger, or pressure from a stronger ally all add fuel to the fire of demanding and revisionist attitudes.

It seems a good idea to analyse today's Poland from just this perspective. On the one hand, its leaders continually emphasize their unease at the current condition of state security and the growth in tensions and threats coming from Russia, yet on the other hand they seek to increase their level of participation in decision-making processes in the integrative and defensive communities of the European Union and NATO. By pursuing a strategy of bandwagoning with regard to the United States, that is, by making defence strategy dependent on the protective umbrella of America, Poland gains a certain amount of room to manoeuvre (or even a certain distance) with regard to the traditional European powers – Germany and France, and can increase its assertiveness towards Russia. Raising Poland's rank in American strategy is the result of its particular geopolitical location. As George Friedman wrote in *The Next Decade*, the United States urgently needs Poland, because there is no alternative strategy for balancing an alliance between Russia and Germany. From America's perspective, Poland should be a threat to both of its neighbouring powers so that neither of them can feel safe: maintaining a powerful wedge between Germany and Russia is of overwhelming interest to the United States.²²⁹ Thus, we have a simple interpretation of how to make Poland the key to a new power arrangement. In this case, the revisionism of Polish policy is an expression not only of the political determination of the rulers of the country, but of the strong pressure put on by the hegemonic superpower. By reinforcing the myth of Poland's status as a power, American propagandists openly admit that the idea is to use the Polish state to block Russian expansion. Because the German and Russian economies are so deeply connected, Poland must be made into a buffer, and at the same time a base for American operations in this part of the globe. The zealous pro-American manifestations made

²²⁹ G. Friedman, *The Next Decade...*, op. cit., pp. 134-137.

by members of the Polish government are the result of various complexes and weaknesses, and even more of a lack of political orientation resulting from their inexperience in international politics. Also significant is their irrational dogmatization of political choices and their treating these as having no alternative. All criticisms on the subject of the policies of the government are understood as threats, attacks or unauthorized meddling in the business of others. This propagandistic doggedness makes them dig in their heels, become alienated and lose touch with reality.

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 underscored the naivety of the constructivists' faith that in the post-Cold War era there would be a strong internalization by states of the norms against making sudden changes in the territorial status of various geopolitical entities.²³⁰ It turns out that the provisions of international law against violating territorial integrity, intervening in another state's internal affairs, or using or threatening to use force are inadequate to curtail revisionist tendencies.²³¹ Besides, today revisionism need not involve armed territorial expansion. No standards can stop states, and especially great powers, from redistributing various values, from economic goods and arms to cultural and ideological content. Experience shows that acting upon human consciousness in a refined way, forming lifestyle and cultural models, and manipulating people, including by means of the technological and financial components of state power, lead to control over the sphere of symbolism, thanks to which it is possible for someone to impose a vision of the world that is in line with their particular interests. It is on this that modern global imperialism is largely based, and against which only the strongest can protect themselves, their identity and their sovereignty.

The example of Crimea shows one more thing: that Russia, as a nuclear power, dares to revise the territorial *status quo* without fear of anyone taking nuclear retaliation.²³² This proves that the deterrent effect of nuclear arms, according to which nuclear powers will not dare to enter into a direct military conflict, is not enough to prevent even members of the 'nuclear club' from acting on their revisionist temptations.

The challenge presented by Russia is just one symptom of the profound recomposition of the international order that is taking place. The main

²³⁰ B. Grenda, *Środowisko bezpieczeństwa europejskiego w świetle zagrożeń militarnych ze strony Rosji [The European Security Environment in Light of Military Threats from Russia]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2019.

²³¹ D. Armstrong, T. Farrell, H. Lambert, op. cit.

²³² V.A. Kivelson, R.G. Suny, *Russia's Empires*, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford 2017, pp. 385-392.

causes lie in the crisis in the liberal democracies of the West, led by the United States, which were convinced after the Cold War that they would be able to impose their values on the whole world as in Francis Fukuyama's primitive vision of "the end of history". Yet, under the impact of its own internal crises and the exhaustion of its ability to influence others effectively, the West suddenly found itself on the defensive.²³³ One reason for this proved to be its failure to anticipate the transformations about to take place in various parts of the world and its loss of control over the course of events and processes. In the case of the United States, its authority was eroded and its position as leader of the Western world undermined.²³⁴ To make matters worse, despite tremendous spending on arms, the US is unable to meet the challenges and threats resulting from the technological revolutions taking place in the fields of military communications, transport, pandemic and weaponry.²³⁵ The cracks that have appeared in the Euro-Atlantic community's relations with Russia are seen as one of the biggest dangers to the post-Cold War international order,²³⁶ and yet the West has no clear understanding of Russia's actual interests and intentions. The West blames Russia for the world's problematic historical legacy, but cannot find a way to effectively stop Russia, or even deter it. On this subject there has been no shortage of criticism and disappointments.²³⁷ In fact, both sides in the conflict are responsible for the escalation in tensions, though a number of serious researchers and observers are of the opinion that the blame for the current state of affairs lies mainly with the West, and the United States in particular.²³⁸

The dialectic friction between conservative and revisionist tendencies is an immanent feature of the international system. As long as states, as the most important geopolitical entities, continue to seek to maximize

²³³ R.N. Haass, *World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order*, Penguin, London 2017, pp. 10-12.

²³⁴ I.H. Daalder, J.M. Lindsay, *The Empty Throne: America's Abdication of Global Leadership*, Public Affairs, New York 2018.

²³⁵ M. Urban, *The Edge: Is the Military Dominance of the West Coming to an End?* Abacus, London 2015.

²³⁶ R. Sakwa, *Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, p. 326.

²³⁷ D. Schoen, *Putin's Master Plan to Destroy Europe, Divide NATO, and Restore Russian Power and Global Influence*, Encounter Books, London 2016.

²³⁸ J.J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin", *Foreign Affairs* 2014, Vol. 93, No. 5; S. Cohen, "Cold War Again: Who's Responsible?", *The Nation*, 01.04.2014, <https://www.thenation.com/article/cold-war-again-whos-responsible/> (20.09.2019).

their power, security and autonomy, they will take advantage of favourable internal and external circumstances in order to redistribute various goods and hold up values as being extremely beneficial. The changes now taking place in space and time are so radical that they affect the most vital issues concerning the role of the state, and state sovereignty and identity, as well as the harmonization of patterns of behaviour. In view of the technological revolution that is under way in communications and transport, the world is becoming de-territorialized, geographic distances are shrinking, the speed at which ideas, images and values flow is increasing, and the importance of borders is diminishing, or rather, their permeability and transparency are increasing. All of this commands us to pay close attention to the new organization of relations among states that is arising, to the new division of roles and of how power is exercised. Revisionism is expressed in attempts to change the global hierarchy of influence and unequal development. That hierarchy reveals a huge asymmetry in the creation, management of and access to goods and values, where some states come out as beneficiaries while others incur losses. The process of the political programming of new imperial relationships of dependence continues. Unfortunately – and this is nothing new – such relationships mean that the ability of the largest powers to control, limit and coerce weaker states is on the rise.

CHAPTER V

From hegemony to ‘polygony’ in international relations

1. Hegemony as an indicator of the post-Cold War order

The concept of a hegemonic order in international relations is connected with a state-centric understanding of the international system, and with a questioning of the hypothesis of their being a polyarchy.²³⁹ Since antiquity (Herodotus, Xenophon, Aristotle, Isocrates), hegemony has been understood as a certain political and military arrangement based on a hierarchical relationship between an entity that disposes of a certain amount of power – and has a vision of how to employ it – and those geopolitical entities that find themselves in a lower position in terms of their potential and motivation.²⁴⁰ In most cases, hegemony referred to a negative phenomenon where models of behaviour were dictated to the weak by the strong. It constituted a certain superiority of one entity over others. It was observed in historical systems of international relations, such as in ancient Greece, or among the German states up to the 19th century. Hegemony is associated with attempts by one power to impose its will on other states through an expansionist foreign policy. Such was the policy conducted by Spain in the 17th century, by France in the 18th century, and by Germany in the 20th century.

In international relations, hegemony is one of the symptoms of domination, alongside such forms as imperialism and leadership (primacy). Where imperialism assumes the conquest and subjugation of a certain territory (as a protectorate or colony), leadership (or primacy) involves

²³⁹ A. Gałganek, *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój [A History of International Relations: Uneven and Connected Development]*, Vol. 1: *Idee [Ideas]*, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa 2013, p. 474.

²⁴⁰ D. Wilkinson, “Hégemonia: Hegemony, Classical and Modern”, *Journal of World-Systems Research* 2008, Vol. XIV, No. 2, p. 119.

a more altruistic form of domination. In imperialistic relations, what counts is control and coercion, whereas leadership is based on consensus and the leader's acceptance of responsibility for the group. All these forms of domination mean regulating the international order through the use of power or force. They can be separated only theoretically, for in reality they are all interwoven.²⁴¹

Hegemonic states normally exercise their leadership through various alliances (political, military and economic groupings), thus seeking to legitimize their power in the eyes of smaller and weaker participants. In this way, the international system preserves its constitutive 'inter-state' nature and is not transformed into a single global empire. Even in the presence of hegemony in international relations, the phenomenon of coordination among powers remains, though its derivatives are the superordination, or supremacy, of the most powerful states and the subordination of all the rest. Hegemony does not take the problem of hierarchy or heterarchy off the agenda of the international order; on the contrary, it strengthens these characteristics by showing how dependent the weak are on the strongest.²⁴²

2. Under the mark of American power

In the course of its history, the United States of America has practiced all forms of domination. It was imperialistic in its territorial conquests of the 19th century; it practiced leadership in Europe after World War II through the Marshall Plan and by maintaining the North-Atlantic Treaty; and after the end of the Cold War it became the world's only hegemonic power, capable of taking on responsibility for the preservation of the global order.²⁴³ Yet its proneness and ability to incur the costs of maintaining a stable international system changed due to its growing egoism in satisfying its own ideological, political, military and economic interests.²⁴⁴

In the 1970s and 1980s, many voices were raised that warned the United States against its unbridled ambitions and unlimited opportunities to increase

²⁴¹ H.H. Lentner, *Hegemony and Power in International Politics*, in: M. Haugaard, H.H. Lentner (eds), *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, Lexington Books, Lanham 2006, pp. 89-108; S. Sur, *Relations internationales*, Montchrestien, Paris 1995.

²⁴² J. Donnelly, "Rethinking Political Structures...", pp. 49-86.

²⁴³ S. Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2014.

²⁴⁴ S. Bieleń, "Erozja monocentryzmu..." ["The Erosion of Monocentrism..."], op. cit., pp. 97-115.

its power. One fashionable current was declinism, mainly popularized by Paul Kennedy.²⁴⁵ While such prognoses have not diminished in importance from a strategic perspective, they did have to be re-evaluated at the end of the 1990s, to America's benefit.²⁴⁶ The United States became the only superpower after the end of the Cold War, while the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the USSR, along with its victory in the First Gulf War in 1991, meant that an American unipolarism and monocentrism in the international order had arrived.²⁴⁷ Among the intellectual elites in most countries of the world, the idea prevailed of absolute US dominance in contemporary international relations. Differences in opinions mainly concerned how America should exercise its leadership, and how its role in the world would be accepted.²⁴⁸

The 11th of September 2001 became a symbolic date not only because of the spectacular terrorist attacks carried out against the United States, but also because of the intensity of America's re-evaluation of its political and military doctrine. The political elites in Washington stood before the daunting task of redefining the US's mission and interests in the international arena. Gone were the isolationist fantasies that had influenced American policy for decades. Gone was the feeling of security that had been afforded by the great distances between the US and its potential enemies and traditional sources of danger. Gone was America's 'splendid isolation'.²⁴⁹ Political forces were now heard calling for unilateral involvement by the United States in setting the most volatile and critical spots on the globe in order.²⁵⁰ Initiating military intervention on an unprecedented scale, the US took on the role of empire in the old meaning of the

²⁴⁵ P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, Random House, New York 1987.

²⁴⁶ J. Joffe, "The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America's Decline", *Foreign Affairs* 2009, Vol. 88, No. 5, pp. 21-35.

²⁴⁷ Ch. Krauthammer, "Unipolar Moment...", op. cit.; M. Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War", *International Security* 1997, No. 4.

²⁴⁸ M. Kowalczyk, *Lśniące miasto na wzgórzu. Ideowe podstawy amerykańskiego unilateryzmu w okresie rządów George'a Busha [A Shining City on the Hill: The Ideological Foundations of American Unilateralism under the Administrations of George Bush]*, Wydawnictwo von borowiecky, Warszawa 2008.

²⁴⁹ In American foreign policy since the days of George Washington, three basic have tendencies appeared: isolationism, internationalism (also known as multilateralism), and unilateralism (with shades of imperialism), the last of which had its predecessors at the beginning of the 20th century (Alfred Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt). W. Russell Mead, "The American Foreign Policy Legacy", *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 1, pp. 163-176.

²⁵⁰ M. Hirsh, "Bush and the World", *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 5, pp. 18-43.

word.²⁵¹ It justified its bellicosity by the need to retaliate for the damage it had suffered and its determination to stop further terrorist attacks, and by the failure of existing mechanisms – above all the United Nations – to prevent the escalation of violence. In this way, the United States moved from being a state that took part in establishing the laws and institutional guarantees of a polycentric international order to one that made demands and enforced its will on others, which meant using war as a tool of politics. It became the sole global superpower, enjoying a decisive advantage over its actual and potential rivals.²⁵² Aware of its power, it began acting as the world's 'sheriff', meting out justice and keeping watch over the global order.²⁵³ As part of that 'philosophy', America rejected the Kyoto Protocol on limiting greenhouse gas emissions, refused to sign an understanding regulating the arms trade, withdrew from the ABM and INF treaties,²⁵⁴ and opposed the ban on nuclear testing the convention on biological weapons. World opinion considered the United States' refusal to ratify the status of the International Criminal Court a scandal.²⁵⁵

America's hegemony, then, is no mere derivative of its material (economic, military, technological, etc.) power, as was its previous position as a superpower.²⁵⁶ It is the result of the active use of that power, that is, of

²⁵¹ G. J. Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition", *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 5, pp. 44-60.

²⁵² T. Sporek, I. Pawlas (eds), *Atrybuty mocarstwowości Stanów Zjednoczonych [Attributes of Power of the United States]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach, Katowice 2018.

²⁵³ This situation was foreseen by Richard Haass in a book published in 1997. He claimed that the end of the Cold War would bring about the end of rigid, lasting alliances. They would be replaced by an ad hoc initiative to mobilise in defence of certain defined values or principles under the leadership of the American 'sheriff'. This prediction came true for the first time in Afghanistan, where NATO and the US's traditional allies were completely marginalised. R.N. Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War*, Council of Foreign Relations, New York 2005.

²⁵⁴ Treaties on arms control had provided a much needed limitation on the United States' freedom to act. The US realised that it was the only superpower having global reach and interests. Moreover, the treaties from the 1970s and 1980s had become largely outdated due to technological progress. Russia also understood the need to change the treaty bases of the strategic balance, and agreed to the United States' termination of the ABM treaty and its bypassing the restriction resulting from the INF treaty.

²⁵⁵ In response to the initiation of the International Criminal Court, the United States passed the American Service Members Protection Act, which permitted the use of military force in order to free any American soldier kept in custody pursuant to a ruling by that court.

²⁵⁶ Superpower status came into being during the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the USSR. These two rivals were considered superpowers, mainly due to

strong motivation resulting in dynamic measures being taken. As long as the United States used its potential to maintain the existing international order, its hegemony was assessed favourably overall. There is no doubt that it was because of America's might that no large-scale armed conflict involving other great powers erupted in the era following World War II. The idea of an 'armed peace' was based on a strategy of deterrence and retaliation, which prevented both the United States and the USSR from launching a nuclear strike against the other side. When, however, America began to impose its model of the international order on the world, its hegemony began to be perceived as a grave danger; it seemed America aspired to have an unlimited mandate to use force in international relations. The United States' logic of preventing further unexpected attacks against it stood in conflict with the accepted principles of international co-existence. Though only a relatively small number of states expressly question Washington's moral right and strategic purposes, doubts were raised both without and within the US by America's tactics, which discouraged its traditional allies, put off potential new allies, and in the end undermined international support for the United States.²⁵⁷

Historically, no hegemon has ever gained a complete monopoly on world affairs; the United States, however, certainly has achieved a clear advantage over other great powers, for a number of reasons. The dynamics and scale of growth in its economy has made America unbeatable as an economic power. The collapse of the bipolar system and the demise of the communist Soviet superpower also contributed a lot. The multidimensionality of America's power means that no other country is able to take on the United States military, economically, technologically, politically, culturally or ideologically.²⁵⁸ In the 1980s, George Modelski showed that America also has a geostrategic advantage over other powerful states (it enjoys a comfortable location far away from potential rivals, whereas other states are compelled to be 'mutually vigilant' due to their proximity to each other).²⁵⁹ Successive American administrations have had strong

their military potential, whereas hegemony largely derives also from economic power. It is expressed in the exercise of control over access to sources of raw materials, control over the largest sources of capital, control over markets, and an advantage in the production of highly processed goods.

²⁵⁷ R.D. Kaplan, *The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in Twenty-first Century*, Random House, New York 2018.

²⁵⁸ Z. Brzeziński, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, Basic Books, New York 2012.

²⁵⁹ G. Modelski, "Qualifications for World Leadership", *Voice*, October 1983, pp. 210-229.

support from their society, one that is cohesive and open, but at the same time ready and willing to make sacrifices.²⁶⁰ Finally, the ease with which the United States can create an image of the global order and take an active part in bringing it to fruition is also an important factor.

Economically, the United States continues to lead the modern world. Comprising a mere 4.3% of the world's population, the inhabitants of the US created about 24% of global GDP (about 19 trillion dollars, one and a half times that of the People's Republic of China) (World Bank 2017). They also consume one third of all the crude oil extracted to almost the same degree and are responsible for emissions of greenhouse gases. The United States is both a promoter and the best example of globalization – of a free market capitalism that pays little attention to borders, special interests, restrictive or protectionist practices or state interventionism. At the same time, the same America denies foreign agricultural producers access to its internal market, puts up trade barriers, and subsidizes its own products.²⁶¹

In the military sphere, the United States spends 10 billion dollars per year on defence,²⁶² a figure that exceeds the total military budgets of the next seven states combined. Even this is not a particularly high amount in relation to GDP – about 3.1% annually (2017), when during the Cold War it reached values of 7-9% of GDP. The United States maintains bases, ships, planes and troops in various regions of the globe. It has a crushing superiority in nuclear weapons. It dominates the world in the military application of advanced communications and information technologies.²⁶³ No other country in the world can match the United States in terms of the scale of development of its intelligence services, air transport, air defence disruption systems, air tankers for in-flight refuelling, maritime transport, medical services or search and rescue units. The US is way ahead in coordinating and processing information received from the battlefield and extraordinarily precise in destroying targets remotely. For these reasons, America is able to intervene militarily with virtually no temporal or spatial

²⁶⁰ This relates to the disappearance of the Vietnam War syndrome. Along with the activation of a generation that no longer remembers that war, fears of further armed interventions by America in various corners of the world diminished. But that situation is changing, as was seen in the protests against the intervention in Syria.

²⁶¹ K.W. Dam, *The Rules of the Global Game: A New Look at the U.S. International Economic Policymaking*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001.

²⁶² Estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2018.

²⁶³ G. Nowacki, *Rozpoznanie satelitarne USA i Federacji Rosyjskiej [Satellite Intelligence of the USA and the Russian Federation]*, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2002, pp. 65-120.

limitations, including by conducting military operations in several places around the globe simultaneously.²⁶⁴

America's soft power cultural offer has proved to be unrivalled and extremely attractive all over the world. Unfortunately, however, regardless of the results of 'cultural imperialism' understood in terms of the 'Americanization' of national cultures, in the realm of ideological leadership and the attractiveness of its model of society the United States is losing ground. Its traditional missionary nature and 'didactic approach to the world' have been undermined by the evident contradiction between America's interests and those of the rest of the world. Especially in the area of the economy, when America proclaims the idea of free trade while protecting its own interests contrary to free trade principles, this serves to compromise the idea of free trade and to justify the charge that the United States supports free trade only as long as it is in line with US interests.

A combination of economic, military and cultural attributes gave the United States global means of exerting political pressure,²⁶⁵ but its efforts to strengthen its monopolistic position led to a number of pathological phenomena inevitable to any monopoly. Comparisons made between the American empire and the glory and fall of the Roman empire may represent attempts to alert people to the catastrophe looming on the horizon.²⁶⁶

America's self-assurance or, as some would say, arrogance, largely results from its indispensability. It has become the only great power capable of effectively stabilising or destabilising the existing global order. Regardless of whatever criticism or doubts are raised, it is the only power that can meet the international challenges and threats of the post-Cold War era. The procrastination and opportunism of many governing elites in the states of Western Europe have mercilessly exposed the powerlessness of existing mechanisms against the slaughter in the Balkans and humanitarian tragedies in the Near East and Africa. If not for a decisive response by America, the ethnic cleansing would likely have gone on much longer, and peace would have proved unachievable. The world, therefore, needs America very much, and for a number of reasons. Regardless of the lively anti-American feeling currently present in various parts of the world, the United States is still in the ideological forefront, promoting the ideas of liberty, respect for the rights of others, and tolerance,²⁶⁷ and therefore remains a magnet

²⁶⁴ S.G. Brooks, W.C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective", *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 4, pp. 20-33.

²⁶⁵ Z. Brzeziński, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York 1997.

²⁶⁶ P. Bender, *Weltmacht Amerika. Das neue Rom*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2003.

²⁶⁷ P. Buhler, *La puissance au XXIe siècle*, CNRS Editions, Paris 2011.

for thousands of immigrants from different corners of the world, and not only from countries having undemocratic political regimes.

Politically, the United States has the determination and political will to carry out its leadership role, especially in the area of preventing the escalation of conflicts in the world. There is a certain social consensus in the United States concerning the engagement of force and resources to resolve international problems, and this is an ace up the sleeve of politicians and diplomats. The United States is also the only power in the modern world that can effectively and decisively enforce the compliance of wayward dictators that have not yet been eliminated with universal standards of human rights. It is the only power that can oppose the expansion of modern terrorism by building coalitions and respecting or negating the sovereign rights of other countries. It is only by doing so that the United States can maintain its position as a hegemon whose roles internationally are looked on favourably rather than with dismay. A hegemony that is viewed positively may, therefore, constitute a benign form of the exercise of power, where generally accepted standards and values are defended and the rules of the game respected – the rules that form the warp in the fabric of the international order.²⁶⁸

Finally, America is the only 'locomotive' of the global economy, as is evident from its share of world imports (USD 2.352 trillion – about 14% in 2017) and exports (USD 1.576 trillion – about 10%). Given the tremendous appetite of the United States' internal market, the economies of all other highly-developed countries can still count on growth driven by American consumers and investors. The American investment market absorbs more than 1/3 of global foreign direct investments. This potential allows the United States to stabilize the international monetary system and to be the guarantor of the liberal principles of foreign trade. It can improve the system for redistributing social wealth at the global scale. It disposes of the most resources for donations and other forms of aid to the poorest countries. America is capable of reforming the existing fund administration system to prevent the occurrence of monstrous corruption and misuse of funds in target countries.

The great powers contribute to the international order in two ways: by regulating their mutual relations, and by using their advantage to impose their will on broader groupings of states, or even on the whole international community.²⁶⁹ This kind of regulation was previously based on

²⁶⁸ A.F. Krepinevich Jr., "Strategy in a Time of Austerity", *Foreign Affairs* 2012, No. 6, pp. 58-69.

²⁶⁹ Hedley Bull attributed negative characteristics to a hegemony, but indicated that, depending on the moral qualifications of the power involved, it could maintain order in

guaranteeing an overall balance of power, understood after World War II as a strategic balance between the blocs of the East and the West. The idea was to control and 'steer' crises, as well as to search for ways of avoiding war on a large scale. After the Cold War, the function of ensuring a balance of power has continued to legitimize mutual deterrence, except that the superpowers of the old East and West are now faced with a need to create a common front against extremist powers that show complete contempt for the 'rules of the game'.²⁷⁰

In international relations today, there is little application of the traditional principle of a balance of power, in accordance with which every power (individually or as an alliance) gives rise in time to an opposing power, which prevents world domination by a single power or bloc of powers.²⁷¹ What has changed primarily is the motives for the pursuit of power in international relations. Today's systemic hegemony does not require the United States to engage in territorial expansionism, which was an imminent feature of the traditional models for building an advantage in international relations. Moreover, the United States is not an enemy, but an ally, of most other powers in the world, which reap substantial benefits from their connections with America. Even China and Russia, which might seem to be the least engaged with the United States, cannot imagine building up their own power without cooperating with or competing against the American economy.²⁷²

A characteristic feature of the modern international balance is a clear asymmetry in the potential of individual powers or alliances of states (such as the European Union). Most powers are one-dimensional or sectoral only, whereas the United States is multidimensional and global.²⁷³ This unipolar hegemony of the United States, combined with its democratic

international relations. Whether we speak of the USSR or the United States, during the Cold War both powers contributed to a decline in the tendency to use force against states whose sovereignty their hegemonies restricted (Eastern Europe and Latin America). H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society...*, p. 219 et seq.

²⁷⁰ Ch. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, Alfred Knopf, New York 2003.

²⁷¹ S. Bieliń, "O pojmowaniu równowagi sił w stosunkach międzynarodowych" ["On Understanding the Balance of Power in international Relations"], in: S. Sulowski (ed.), *Polska-Niemcy. Nadzieja i zaufanie [Poland-Germany: Hope and Trust]*, Fundacja Politeja, Warszawa 2002, pp. 109-126.

²⁷² R.J. Lieber, *Eagle Rules: Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-first Century*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 2002.

²⁷³ J. Wiśniewski, K. Żodź-Kuźnia, *Mocarstwa współczesnego świata...*, [Powers of the Modern World...], op. cit., pp. 41-86.

system, prevents the occurrence of large-scale conflicts between powers. Furthermore, due to the decisive advantage that America enjoys, there is little if any chance in the foreseeable future of any other existing power being able to meet the United States head-on or threaten its clear superiority.²⁷⁴

3. US hegemony contested

In international relations, a time of crisis reveals the importance of the risks that exist in various dimensions of international life, including its geopolitical and geostrategic dimensions. Questions are raised increasingly frequently as to how stable the international order is, and where the threats to its functionality and capacity lie. Are the most important state and non-state players in international relations able to create reasonable guarantees that the existing international order will last? Will supporters of maintaining the *status quo* win, or will revisionists and radicals win the day? Perhaps the fate of the international order no longer depends at all on the conscious efforts of its authors and guarantors? Perhaps today's globalized world is slipping out of any form of control, and the risk of destruction is growing as never before?²⁷⁵

Many reflections concern the global power arrangement and the changes it will undergo in the future in the polyarchical international community. The attention of geopoliticians is drawn above all to the evolution of power across time and space.²⁷⁶ While it is true that the behaviour of states and other entities internationally is conditioned by many factors, it seems that geopoliticians point to the most important of these, which determines how the system will evolve. One feature of geopolitics is a belief in the correctness of certain timeless truths or laws that have been formulated on the basis of observations of power arrangements.²⁷⁷

Today's system of international relations is going through a stormy transformation. Given the dynamic rate of change and the number of unknowns, no one is able to foresee what the result of the transformation

²⁷⁴ P.A. Świtalski, "Powracające widmo Tiamat – chaos i porządek w stosunkach międzynarodowych" ["The Returning Spectre of Tiamat – Chaos and Order in International Relations"], *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny* 2007, No. 6, p. 53.

²⁷⁵ I. Bremmer, P. Keat, *The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge in an Uncertain World*, Oxford University Press, New York 2010; N.N. Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Random House, New York 2010.

²⁷⁶ Y. Lacoste, *Géopolitique de Méditerranée*, Armand Colin, Paris 2006.

²⁷⁷ G. Cimek, *Podstawowe problemy geopolityki i globalizacji [Basic Problems of Geopolitics and Globalisation]*, Wydawnictwo Athenae Gedanenses, Gdańsk 2017.

will be. However, all seem to agree that what is taking place involves a profound decomposition of existing structures and constellations of powers.²⁷⁸ It is enough to look at the crises facing such organizations as NATO or the European Union to understand that the world is going through a period of profound changes.

Those transformations are the result of at least several processes.

There is a pluralism of visions concerning the international order.²⁷⁹ Previously, the Western view was dominant, and Western values were used to diagnose the various challenges and threats to that order. Today, other perspectives are becoming increasingly evident; these are being created by 'emerging' powers such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Their positions are on the rise during this lasting crisis that is troubling Western economies.²⁸⁰

Europe's position, both politically and economically, is on the wane. The contribution of European states to finding solutions to international problems is diminishing, and in place of the US-Europe 'axis', new decision-making 'axes' are arising, such as US-China and China-Russia. Europe is losing out as a civilizational authority.²⁸¹

A re-nationalization of many states is under way; they are increasingly driven by egotistical motives and are resigning or withdrawing from collective forms of coordination and co-responsibility. This is clearly evident in the case of the European Union, and this situation is restoring importance to bilateral alliances and security based on a balance of power.²⁸²

Alongside geopolitics, which creates the background for conflicts of interests and rivalry among states, the importance of geoeconomics is growing: through the economic processes of various entities, geoeconomics shows there is a concentration of power and the influence of big capital.²⁸³ It is not geographic location that counts most, but economic potential; it determines the ranking of powers – not necessarily state powers – in space. Every economic power tries to translate its economic muscle into political

²⁷⁸ L. Cohen-Tanugi, *The Shape of the World to Come...*, op. cit.

²⁷⁹ M. Dembinski, H.-J. Spanger, "Plural Peace" – Principles of a New Russia Policy...", op. cit.

²⁸⁰ J.J. Grygiel, A.W. Mitchell, *The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2016.

²⁸¹ W. Laqueur, *After the Fall: The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent*, Thomas Dunne Books, New York 2012.

²⁸² S. Clark, S. Hogue (eds), *Debating a Post-American World: What Lies Ahead?* Routledge, Abingdon-New York 2012.

²⁸³ E. Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce", *The National Interest* 1990, No. 20, pp. 17-23.

power, and so the international system is becoming an international economic system, and this approach is leading to the disappearance of traditional geographic and civilizational divisions, especially of the division between East and West. The old political divisions, such as those that existed during the Cold War, are no longer significant. Both authoritarian China and the only partially democratic Russia participate in the exercise of political influence on an equal footing with the democratic powers of the West.²⁸⁴

Yet the biggest sources of anxiety are the challenges to America's hegemony in the world, and the actual weakening of the United States.²⁸⁵ Every global power is exposed to asymmetrical threats. In order for a state to achieve strategic goals today, it is not enough to possess a military advantage. Rather than defending its borders, it must face threats that are mobile or invisible, or must wage war over remote distances with an enemy that has no clear identity. True hegemonic power requires the responsible exercise of leadership.²⁸⁶ At the same time, a state that aspires to lead others must be resistant to the threat of internal deregulation and disruptions. The United States' European allies insist – and not only in their own interest – that any international campaign involving the use of force must be legitimized democratically. Harmonious cooperation among many states can serve to reinforce decisions by making them decisions taken jointly in a transparent process. This makes it possible to avoid suspicion and partiality. It is also a guarantee that states will learn to be responsible, and will share responsibility. After the tragic lessons of America's engagement in Iraq, Libya and Syria, it is generally recognized that decisions on international interventions involving the use of force must be the result of consultations, not simply dictated. Signals are also being sent that only a collective effort by the greatest powers will be able to preserve the stability of the international order.²⁸⁷ In the *geocracy* that is forming, that is, in global political integration, there must be a place for pluralism and respect for the civilizational achievements of all regions and nations. If a single civilization continues to impose itself upon the whole world, the future looks bleak indeed.

²⁸⁴ R.S. Ross, "The Problem with the Pivot", *Foreign Affairs* 2012, No. 6, pp. 70-82.

²⁸⁵ F. Zakaria, "Can America Be Fixed?", *Foreign Affairs* 2013, No. 1; R.D. Kaplan, "The Post-Imperial Moment", *The National Interest* 2016, No. 143, pp. 73-76.

²⁸⁶ V. Bulmer-Thomas, *Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 2018, pp. 304-331.

²⁸⁷ H. Kissinger, *World Order...*, op. cit., "Conclusion: World Order in Our Time?"

4. Towards 'polygony' – a multicentric polygon of powers

From colonial times until after the Cold War, various models of the normative, axiological and institutional orders were imposed by the West on the rest of the world (as a result of pressure, imitation and absorption), which meant they became 'universal'. The euphoria over the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a kind of triumphalism in America that found expression in such absurd slogans (from today's perspective) as "the unipolar moment" and "the end of history". There was no lack of visionaries predicting that the liberal values of the West (democracy, the free market and human rights) would dominate the international system permanently. But this was belied by how things actually developed; the old geopolitical rules made a speedy return to the game.

The Western models of civilization were not received enthusiastically everywhere. The dynamics of the international system showed that many activities of the Western states, including the United States, were unacceptable to other states, for example, Russia or China, both of which quickly began to display revisionist tendencies. This was especially so of China. Due to its clearly growth in power, it began to be perceived as a challenger to Western domination, and to America's hegemony in particular. Russia, because of its determination to defend its state of possession and status as a great power, continued to be viewed as playing an aggressive, destructive role. It did not matter that many of the moves Russia made were in response to American provocations.

In the post-Cold War era, a number of dramatic events have caused the West, and the United States in particular, to lose credibility in respect of its defence of existing standards of the international order. In 1998-1999 in Kosovo, and in 2003 in Iraq, first NATO, and then the United States and the UK used military force without the authorization of the UN Security Council. This raised a debate over whether, under international law, it was possible to carry out unilateral humanitarian interventions which, under the guise of protecting human rights, led – as in Iraq – to even greater humanitarian catastrophes. According to Russia and China, "double standards" were being applied to how international law should be understood and to whether decisions taken by international bodies should be respected, even when they went against a given state's interests. This argumentation came up frequently in Russia after its annexation of Crimea, and in China in the context of the disputes over the South China Sea.

No Western state has made an in-depth analysis at the government level leading to the admission that many humanitarian disasters, especially those in Iraq, Libya and Syria, were caused by erroneous political decisions.

Nor has the escalation of Islamic terrorism met with deep reflection on the subject of the West's, and especially the United States', co-responsibility for its genesis and consequences. It is true that many books and hundreds of articles have been written that courageously reveal the real causes of the above humanitarian disasters, but have not had enough clout to affect governments or public opinion. As a result, there has been no proper re-evaluation of the existing strategies of interventionism, behind which stand various corporate and military lobbies that push their own egotistical agendas rather than seeking to maintain a stable international order.²⁸⁸ For these reasons, anti-Western and anti-American sentiment is growing in various parts of the globe.

At the same time, there has been a decline in the economic power of the West, with the crisis of 2008 exposing the weakness of the capitalist system and undermining trust in the US dollar. The 'emerging' states threw down the gauntlet to the petrodollar system dominated by the United States.²⁸⁹ In 2009, the BRICS states – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa – attempted to build up a common front against the United States and Western Europe imposing their will on most of the world despite their declining demographic and economic potential. China stepped forward as America's strongest competitor, its economic growth being a big asset in the geopolitical game.²⁹⁰ The 'emerging powers' seek greater representation in international institutions, which has inclined the West to engage in a certain 'power shuffle' in coordinating bodies (for example, by shifting the accent from the G7 to the G20). China's creation of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, in which Australia and the United Kingdom participate, attests to divisions within the West itself and a weakening in Washington's diplomatic influence.²⁹¹

The impossibility of negotiating multilateral trade agreements in the forum of the World Trade Organization directed the attention of the United States towards a partnership with Europe (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – TTIP) and with states in the Asia and the Pacific region (the Transpacific Partnership). Each of these circumvented the BRICS states, which tried to negotiate their own competing partnership with states

²⁸⁸ R. Foot, S.N. MacFarlane, M. Mastanduno (eds), *US Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003.

²⁸⁹ A.S. Alexandroff, A.F. Cooper (eds), *Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2010.

²⁹⁰ T.J. Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*, W.W. Norton, New York 2015.

²⁹¹ D. Flemes (ed.), *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*, Ashgate, Farnham-Burlington 2010.

in Southeast Asia (the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – RCEP).²⁹² Finally, in accordance with Donald Trump's pre-election promises and vision for America's trade relationships, the fate of both of those partnerships was sealed because of the adverse effects they would have had on America's interests.

Against this background, it is worth noting America's growing determination to maintain its hegemonic position, even at the price of destroying all the existing standards that have benefited the entire Western world, and above all America itself. The Trump presidency was a period of transition in which existing values, norms and institutions were undermined, with little offered in exchange.²⁹³ This lack of ideological orientation is leading to disturbances of the criteria by which one's own and others' interests are assessed. Building a strategy based on victories in trade wars, and evaluating every transaction in terms of profit, is causing America's existing allies and partners to turn away from it. Complaining of the "brutality" of the European Union and the "ingratitude" of its allies in NATO for the protection provided by the umbrella of America attests to a radical change in priorities. A disturbed perception of reality makes it possible to call the biggest satraps "great personalities" (as in the case of Kim Jong-un). Nationalist and xenophobic attitudes hold sway, scapegoats are sought, and arbitrarily appointed enemies demonised.²⁹⁴

The worst consequence of these changes is not so much a decline in the standards of the civilization of America as a leader and model, but the growing threat from various primitive atavisms and revisionisms. There is a growing climate of confrontation, accompanied by tensions that give rise to conflicts. Most interestingly, these phenomena threaten not just America and Russia, or America and China, with a new "Cold War", but are also appearing within the system of the West itself.

In recent years, observers have pointed to an end of the post-Cold War era that formed as a result of the depolarization that occurred after the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the demise of the USSR.²⁹⁵ Apart from

²⁹² J. Szczudlik-Tatar, *Negocjacje umowy o regionalnym partnerstwie gospodarczym jako kolejna próba azjatyckiej integracji [Negotiations of an Agreement on a Regional Economic Partnership as Another Attempt at Asian Integration]*, PISM, Warszawa 2014.

²⁹³ D.Q. Mills, S. Rosenfelde, *The Trump Phenomenon and the Future of US Foreign Policy*, World Scientific, Singapore 2016; B. Woodward, *Fear: Trump in the White House*, Simon & Schuster, London 2018.

²⁹⁴ D. Kovalik, *The Plot to Scapegoat Russia: How the CIA and the Deep State Have Conspired to Vilify Putin*, Skyhorse, New York 2017.

²⁹⁵ The issue of the redistribution of power in the post-hegemonic system of international relations gives rise to many problems as to how to conceptualise or model where power is

the objective factors involved in the growth of new powers, 'geopolitical fear' has arisen in the West, which believes that China and Russia, in particular, are hungry for new spheres of influence and regional hegemony, challenging the global domination of the West, and especially the position of the United States.²⁹⁶ Russia is said to be employing 'salami tactics' to regain its influence over the post-Soviet space. At the same time, in the opinion of the former resident of the White House, America was unduly submissive towards Russia's military inclinations. Yet Donald Trump proved unable to deal effectively with the series of incidents that have taken place along the Russian-Ukrainian border.²⁹⁷

Under today's conditions of an 'inter-era', when ideological and moral standards and the normative and institutional international order that has existed for decades are crumbling, what is most needed is a proper diagnosis of the existing threats and a global awareness that will allow appropriate measures of improving the situation to crystallize. There is much to indicate that, in the coming decades, the world will be neither happier nor safer than it is today. The greatest challenge now is the growing group of states and non-state entities that will try, by various means, to undermine the current international order that is so beneficial for the West, replacing it with their own order, or attempting to change existing systems and the rules of the game. Efforts in this direction have already appeared in recent years.

The world of the future will be increasingly multipolar, polycentric, pluralistic and ideologically polyphonic. Rivalries will be played out both regionally and globally. The United States of America will not be able to maintain its dominance, and so must engage in multilateral solutions. On its own, it will not be able to maintain order in the world.

The biggest challenge and threat to the stability of the international system is a result of the growing number of failed states and weak states. These will not be able to maintain order within their own territory, and

concentrated. J. Świeca, "Niepolarne, interpolarne i multipolarne – struktury oraz mechanizmy we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych. Globalna scena międzynarodowa w pierwszej dekadzie XXI w." ["Non-polar, Interpolar and Multipolar – Structures and Mechanisms in Modern International Relations. The Global International Scene in the First Decade of the 21st Century"], in: I. Kraś, B. Matsili, M. Soja (eds), *Mechanika sceny międzynarodowej. Nowe wyzwania w nowej epoce [Mechanics of the International Scene: New Challenges in a New Era]*, Akademia im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie, Częstochowa 2013, pp. 27-61.

²⁹⁶ G. Rozman, *The Sino-Russian Challenge in the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East Versus West in the 2010s*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC 2014.

²⁹⁷ M. Isikoff, D. Corn, *Russian Roulette: The Inside Story of Putin's War on America and the Election of Donald Trump*, Twelve, New York 2018.

so may become hotbeds of instability and disturbances in their vicinity. Current examples of this include countries such as Somalia, Libya and South Sudan, but much closer to home there is no lack of states on the verge of collapse, and in the near future others may join this unfortunate group, especially in Africa and the Middle East. What is worse, that chaos will be conducive to various forms of pathology that will be difficult to control as state structures disintegrate.

War is not about to disappear from the international scene. We can expect further 'substitute wars' like those currently raging in Yemen, Syria and Ukraine. It is highly likely that new states will try to gain possession of nuclear weapons and means of launching them, and the arms race in space and cyberspace will intensify. Experts warn against the threat of hybrid non-state players such as the Islamic State and international organized crime. No doubt, these will be aided by the development of new technologies; terrorists and criminals will come into possession of relatively inexpensive, but potentially very destructive means of destruction.

In the coming decades, controlling the migration threat will be a challenge. The problem of an uncontrolled inflow of refugees, fugitives, exiles and *misérables* deprived of their homeland will increase along with the increase in areas of poverty and exclusion in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This will be accompanied by crises over the availability of food and water.

Aggressive ideologies of a fundamentalist, global 'holy war', the rise of nationalisms and the revival of racism only exacerbate the scale of the dangers the world faces, including in the areas of the old European civilization. Against the backdrop of this pessimistic diagnosis, all who are guided by reason in their analyses of the international scene see the need for a joint effort to 'manage' global problems, and especially security problems. The essence of such management are international negotiations. We would do well to return to various forms of bilateral and multilateral discussions whose primary role is to allow governments and political leaders to communicate with each other directly. But for now, it is clear that few are inclined to trade in confrontation for negotiation. Overall, the Western mass media are not very much inclined to promote critical thinking on the subject of the threat of war in the modern world. Few have shown the courage to propose a withdrawal from America's current policy of building a military hegemony for itself.

Today's world is disoriented: the war of information prevents people from really knowing who is right and who is wrong. The US President himself surprised people on almost a daily basis, making incomprehensible personal decisions within his administration. Yet, at times, it seems that,

beyond his chaotic shuffles and disturbing statements, there was beginning to emerge a bold, consistent effort to dismantle America's global military empire based on endless wars and armed interventions. Many observers cannot imagine the United States as anything other than a fire brigade putting out the blazes that erupt in various parts of the globe. And while America often in fact starts those fires, the majority of the international community – often under the influence of the US propaganda machine – consider America's role as firefighter more important than its role as arsonist. But then, such is the function of all militarisms, that they themselves create perilous conditions in order to justify their reason for being *urbi et orbi*, to step up arms spending, and so forth. Nevertheless, if Trump's calculations were correct, it was possible for America to withdraw from many of its current military obligations, at least within a certain scope. Perhaps such actions were solely rooted in Trump's mercantile world view, but even if he lacked any deeper philosophy for the transformation of the world order, a serious break in how the United States thinks about its global engagement was already made. And this brings hope that new ideas and conceptions can be found for disarmament among the most powerful states, for a turning away from political revisionism and the escalation of tensions in regional conflicts, and a withdrawal from the expansionist ideology of the West in favour of pluralism and polycentrism in international relations. In this way, the pendulum of the concentration of power globally would begin to move towards the opposite end, from hegemony to 'polygony' (a polygon of powers), from monocentrism to polycentrism. Such a doctrinal revision would reflect the real degradation of US power that is taking place, and could also constitute a means of insuring that degradation and, with time, a means of legitimising the 'relativization' of America's status among the other great powers. At present, few people are considering these issues, though many prophecy that, given the growth of China, the American era is coming to an end.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁸ Ø. Tunsjø, *The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism*, Columbia University Press, New York 2018.

CHAPTER VI

The identity crisis of the Western alliance

1. Reassessments in the Western world

The geopolitical community and Western civilization²⁹⁹ find themselves in a difficult phase of having to reassess their role in the international system. The West still has the strength to live well, but it no longer has the strength to tell others how to live. This opinion contains the assessment that the West has lost its capacity to expand its civilization. It now concentrates more on preserving its state of possession than on shaping the geopolitical map of the world. Faced with this crisis of Western values, it is worth considering whether the Western community will survive its confrontation with reality. After all, it was within NATO that Western Europe gave up its sovereignty in favour of American protection, with the US's European allies losing their geopolitical subjectivity. Their role in international relations was degraded to that of "pawns and other pieces" on the international chessboard. Their moves were decided by the true player from across the ocean.³⁰⁰

Despite these limitations, the Western European allies enjoy a comfortable level of security. This is not only because of their close ties with the United States and the presence of American troops on their soil, but also because they are quite far removed from hot spots and potential aggressors. However, those states situated along NATO's eastern fringes feel more threatened, and have a significantly smaller security guarantee.

²⁹⁹ Treated synonymously as the Atlantic or Euroatlantic community.

³⁰⁰ P. Mickiewicz, "Rozkład, obumieranie czy trwanie? Przyszłość NATO a zapisy nowej koncepcji strategicznej" ["Decay, Demise or Duration? The Future of NATO and Records of a New Conceptual Strategy"] in: M. Pietraś, J. Olchowski (eds), *NATO w pozimnowojennym środowisku (nie)bezpieczeństwa [NATO in the post-Cold War Environment of (Non-)Security]*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2011, pp. 25-35.

This difference should be recognized for what it is: illogical, and not conducive to stability.³⁰¹

Those countries of Central and Eastern Europe that granted America unlimited support in all of its interventions (in Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq) may feel particularly humiliated that their help did not bring about the desired result, since it turns out that, at least during the George W. Bush administrations, the United States was not guided by the interests of the international community. Its desire to turn its position as world leader into a global hegemony not only brought disaster to countries such as Iraq and Libya, but also caused the credibility of the West and its institutions to be undermined. Instead of humanitarian intervention, the world witnessed acts of the arrogant use of force to ‘put out fires’ that the West itself had had a hand in starting.³⁰²

The post-Cold War order has proved to be fragile and unpredictable. Since the end of that ‘war’, no method has been found of bridging the gaps that provided the two opposed political and military blocs with their reason for being. Little has been done to make international security indivisible.³⁰³ After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the West began to extend its geopolitical domain, encroaching into areas of the former Eastern bloc. This, of course, irritated Russia, which has returned to the game of power and constitutes a serious obstacle to the further expansion of NATO, this time into post-Soviet territory. Russia’s determination to protect its own security interests has been made quite clear in the form of armed interventions, the most drastic of which have taken place in Georgia and Ukraine.³⁰⁴

Today, there are voices in the West as well that Russia is entitled to consider itself the injured party. The Russians claim that the United States and its European allies broke the promise made to Mikhail Gorbachev during the negotiations over the reunification of Germany that the NATO would not expand into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. For these reasons, Russia was practically forced to oppose NATO’s ‘march’

³⁰¹ J. Zajęc, “NATO w polityce bezpieczeństwa Polski” [“NATO in Poland’s Security Policy”], in: K. Czornik, M. Łakomy (eds), *Dylematy bezpieczeństwa Polski na początku drugiej dekady XXI wieku [Security Dilemmas in Poland at the Beginning of the Second Decade of the 21st Century]*, Wydawnictwo Regionalnego Ośrodka Debaty Międzynarodowej w Katowicach, Katowice 2014, pp. 191-205.

³⁰² R. Allison, *Russia, the West, and Military Intervention*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013.

³⁰³ S. Mayer (ed.), *NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2014.

³⁰⁴ R.E. Kanet, M. Sussex (eds), *Power, Politics and Confrontation in Eurasia. Foreign Policy in a Contested Region*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2015.

eastward in order to protect its own vital security interests. Many Western politicians deny this, but documents disclosed from American diplomatic archives confirm the Russian version of events.³⁰⁵

The NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 gave cause for deeper reflections on the function of the alliance in today's world. Faced with the negative experience of American hegemony, and growing internal divisions over the absence of decision-making power, in many NATO member states there is growing discouragement, or even a tendency to restrict existing obligations. Furthermore, in times of terrorist threats and a shift of the accent from military security to migration security, isolationist tendencies naturally arise that cannot be hindered by any pressure from a leader that is losing its position and authority. All the more so since the former leader of the United States was evidently undermining the sense of America's participation in the very costly alliance.³⁰⁶ It is not known whether such tendencies are a natural result of the disintegration and demise of an 'old alliance', or merely a result of the ordinary myopia and populism of political leaders who have lost their instinct for self-preservation and are no longer able to distinguish strategic threats from those posed by terrorist attacks in everyday life. It may turn out that the fear and panic caused by terrorist attacks have more profound consequences for the defence strategies of wavering states than the threat of a nuclear attack by an enemy power.

2. The decline of the alliance

Since the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has successively departed from its basic role as a defensive alliance. It is primarily a regional collective security organization based on the principle of 'one for all and all for one', but at the same time has succumbed

³⁰⁵ J.R.I. Shiffrin, "Russia's got a point: The U.S. broke a NATO promise", <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shiffrin-russia-us-nato-deal--20160530-snap-story.html> (31.05.2016).

³⁰⁶ It is worth noting that every new conflict in which the United States has become involved since the Cold War has provided an opportunity for building new military bases. It is thought that those American bases, which provide cover for various functions (from transit ports to the stationing of forces to electronic surveillance stations) comprise about 800 units, though many of them are no doubt secret. American bases are found in more than 100 countries, and about 300,000 soldiers serve in them, not counting those contingents taking part in operations within Iraq and Afghanistan. *Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area*, <http://www.uvm.edu/~fmagdoff/employment%20Jan.12.11/http-:siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil:personnel:M05:m05sep05.pdf> (20.05.2016).

to the global interests of the American hegemon. It has become a tool for maintaining the United States' world supremacy – at the expense of its European members. While it is true that not all NATO member states are responsible for the alliance's interventions out of area, that is, beyond the area where *casus foederis* applies as set out in Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty (for example, France was against the attack against Serbia in 1999 and, along with Germany and Belgium, opposed support for the American intervention in Iraq in 2003), the conflict among NATO's most important members has led to a decision-making paralysis that has weakened the whole coalition.³⁰⁷

One reason NATO has declined is because its joint strategic goals have been shattered by the United States' unilateral security policy, which gives short shrift to the alliance's existing coordination and consultations mechanisms (including by creating 'coalitions of the willing'). But there is another reason as well. Increasing the number of NATO members has had an adverse effect on cohesion and effectiveness. Obviously, as the numbers increased, so did the intensity of bilateral and multilateral relations. But too many members also meant that problems arose in connection with coordination, disagreements and tensions. In the end, the larger the alliance, the less vital the contribution of individual states, especially the smallest. The importance of individual obligations diminishes. All this results from the well-known law that an alliance's potential and defensive capacity are more than the sum of its participating states' contributions. A high degree of integration, especially military integration (shared strategic doctrine, mechanisms of command and communication, unified equipment, similar military organization, agreed proportions of firepower among combat units, comparable training, joint manoeuvres, war games, etc.) has led to significant qualitative growth in the power and potential of the alliance. Given the large disproportion and asymmetry of power between the leader of the alliance and its new states, which are relatively powerless, it was only natural that NATO would come to be dominated by its hegemonic superpower.³⁰⁸ The United States considered itself to be not only

³⁰⁷ R. Menon, *The End of Alliances*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, pp. 53-99.

³⁰⁸ One can disagree with Russia's arguments against NATO expansion to the Baltic States (that they "fled from one dependence to another"), but it is difficult to deny that the Russians are correct in asserting that those states play only a marginal, passive role in the great alliance. They can exist only as pickets, frontier states and 'new warriors' in the West's confrontation with Russia. In this way they are becoming completely dependent on the will and strategy of the leader. A. Fenenko, "Khuzhe, chem v kholodnuiu voïnu. Konfliktnyi potentsial rossiïsko-amerikanskikh otnosheniï", *Rossiia v global'noi politike* 2016, No. 2, <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Khuzhe-chem-v-kholodnuyu-voïnu-18028>

solely responsible for the effectiveness of the alliance (the bandwagoning effect, i.e. a concentration of power under the ‘American umbrella’), but also to be the unquestioned leader of the West, promoting its ideological values in the new geopolitical space.³⁰⁹ This became the cause for external resistance to the alliance (mainly by Russia) and internal dissonance against enforced obedience and subordination (criticism from France, Germany and some Central European states). It seems that, under conditions of inequality and asymmetry among members, even a common ideology – which certainly favours internal communication and shared assessments based on identical criteria – may give rise not to the cohesion desired, but to tensions and misunderstandings.

From the example of NATO it is clear – contrary to popular opinion – that there is nothing automatic about allies rushing to each other’s aid. The debate over the justifiability of triggering the mechanism based on Art. 5 after the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States in 2001 demonstrated that the circumstances in which allied assistance is to be provided need not be unambiguous.³¹⁰ In practice, such help is always conditioned by the readiness of the individual states participating in the alliance. The fact that there is such an article written into a treaty is not enough. The states involved must be willing to meet their obligations. Glaring examples of NATO’s decision-making impotence are the disputes it went through over ensuring Turkey’s security in the event of an intervention by Iraq and its lack of response to the actual energy security threat during the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict at the turn of 2008-2009. It has to be admitted, though, that it may have been due to that inertia that NATO – in spite of itself – avoided reacting hastily to the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of separatism in eastern Ukraine in 2014. The differences in how different members perceive the risks the Ukrainian conflict poses for the alliance as a whole show once again that NATO has difficulty distinguishing between the idea of a real enemy and the sources of various threats (separatism, irredentism, terrorism, rebellion).³¹¹

Until recently, it seemed that after the Cold War, disputes between states

(12.06.2016).

³⁰⁹ R. Lieber, “American Power in a Post-Unipolar World”, in: A.-S. Dahl, P. Järvenpää (eds), *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-Unipolar World*, Routledge, London-New York 2014, pp. 3-14.

³¹⁰ M. Petersson, *The US-NATO Debate: From Libya to Ukraine*, Bloomsbury Academic, New York 2015.

³¹¹ T. Stępniewski, “Unia Europejska, Ukraina i Rosja: kryzysy i bezpieczeństwo” [“The European Union, Ukraine and Russia: Crises and Security”], *Studia Europejskie* 2015, No. 4, pp. 11-25.

and coalitions would shift to another societal level (to a “war of civilizations”, according to Samuel Huntington). But it turns out that this only deflected attention away from real phenomena connected with redefining the enemy. The old expansionist, totalitarian powers were replaced by hybrid geopolitical creatures, ‘pseudo-states’, ‘failed states’ and ‘militant states’ having different faces than those of traditional aggressors and employing atypical combat strategies. Against such enemies, which hide, for example, behind the banner of *jihadism* and act from within and without, in an undefined and unidentifiable space, the West’s strongest alliance needs a new diagnosis of the threats it actually faces, and a new action plan.

The NATO states must consider whether their alliance is to constitute an instrument of intervention in a global ideological struggle (in the name of ‘total democracy’) or is to fulfil the regional (transatlantic) defensive role for which it was originally established. Spreading democracy is not a fundamental goal of NATO, since this not only destabilizes international relations but also increases arms costs, often to the detriment of the quality of life of society. Such a missionary approach by the alliance only serves to fuel the need for more arms, which mainly benefits global arms producers and dealers. The naive belief of American neo-conservatives and interventionists that the delegitimization of existing authoritarian systems will result in the natural fulfilment of human happiness by means of the universal acceptance of democratic political models only leads, unfortunately, to chaos and conflict.³¹² This was evident in the ‘Arab spring’ and the various ‘colour revolutions’. Even when they lose their mandate to rule, the authoritarian regimes in Moscow or Beijing need not be replaced by regimes that are democratic. There is no such determinism. Democracy is neither a universal value in the modern world, nor the only viable political model, nor is it geopolitically conditioned. The political transformations that have taken place in many Asian states show that gradual transitions are possible that need not lead to the reproduction of Western models but may favour an evolutionary reconstruction of political relations and bring about new forms of social legitimacy (compare Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, etc.). In some regions, for example Latin America, successive ‘waves’ of attempts to install democracy have often

³¹² America committed the sin of pride by accepting that only the Western (US-centred) system of values is universal. This monistic vision of a systemic unity of states necessitates doing away with all alternative developmental models – which is contrary to the principles of liberalism, the dominant philosophy of the West. Such erroneous thinking lay behind the universalist project for the axiological and normative harmonisation of the entire world. Yet recent decades have shown how dangerous such ideological assumptions can be for the international order.

been met with growing resistance, not universal approval. The economic crises and political tensions that accompany systemic transformations show that, for a long time to come, the people of many countries will continue to view democracy through the prism of their fear that their conditions of existence will become destabilized and of the adverse experiences of the democratic states of the West themselves, which are embroiled in economic, demographic and immigration crises.³¹³

Running away from the task of properly defining its civilizational enemy (terrorism is only a tool), the West is committing a cardinal error by directing its strategy against Russia, when in fact there is nothing to indicate that Russia intends to engage in a war with the West.³¹⁴ It is certain, however, that Russia will not give up its geopolitical state of possession and will vigorously defend its own security interests without showing any willingness to give way in matters of systemic reform.³¹⁵ Whoever refuses to accept this puts himself into a reckless confrontation with that state. Burdened with old prejudices, under Washington's influence NATO decided on expansion to the east, thereby engaging in a rivalry over the shape of the post-Soviet space. This has unnecessarily antagonized Russia towards Europe, and what is worse, is destabilising and weakening the latter's ability to effectively combat the growing threats it faces of a civilizational nature.

Yet, in spite of it all, the hope remains that the weakening West will one day come to accept the world in its pluralistic complexity. Crisis situations are bringing an end to the era of ideological crusades in the name of democracy and human rights. The neoliberal doctrine is on the retreat; capitalism has entered a phase of recurring crises and the absence of future prospects, particularly in the eyes of those rejected and excluded. This means, among other things, that democracy cannot be exported or forcibly imposed on other states. Understanding and accepting axiological and political diversity is the first step towards NATO countries building up a *modus vivendi* with states such as Russia or China. And it is on the peaceful establishment of relations between the great powers that the stability of the international order depends. This means that the West must resign from its offensive strategy in the post-Soviet space, and must build

³¹³ F. Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*, Profile Book, London 2015.

³¹⁴ Among military experts, there is a prevailing conviction that Russia is certainly preparing itself for a defensive war, but will not start a war because it has no guarantee of winning it.

³¹⁵ W. Laqueur, *Russia and Its Future in the West*, St. Martin's Press, New York 2015, pp. 158-161.

a new ‘friendly neighbourhood’ between the states of NATO’s eastern flank and Russia.³¹⁶ At the same time, it is obvious that the parties involved must manage their deterrent potential rationally so that neither is tempted to attack the other by surprise, but this does not mean they should refrain from looking for solutions to their many shared problems through dialogue and compromise.³¹⁷

Such an approach will require penetrating and bold re-evaluations within NATO, especially in order to halt further eastward expansion. For countries such as Poland or the Baltic States, which have decided on an uncompromising confrontation with Russia, there is a psychological barrier that is difficult to overcome, especially since they categorically sided with Ukraine in its conflict with Russia, leaving themselves no room at all to manoeuvre – which could become problematic if their priorities change.³¹⁸ When perceptions of threats change in Europe, which seems inevitable, and when, as a result of a new diagnosis of the situation the main states of the West redefine their strategic goals, it may turn out that they are able to adapt to the changing conditions without becoming particularly hysterical (as was the case during the period of *détente*). It may be that, for emotional and personal reasons, current conditions are not ripe for such a change, but if the migration crisis and the energy crisis deepen, the appearance of an appropriate reaction will only be a matter of time. But for now, the clock is running against NATO, for it is not able to revise its erroneous diagnosis the real sources of threats. When decision-making bodies accept – to the applause of obedient experts and *claqueurs* – the propagandistic view that “Putin is flexing his muscles” and “Russian aggression is growing”, this does nothing but fuel emotions and escalate tensions. It does not contribute to security. This mainly serves the interests of the United States, which seeks to maintain its global hegemony based on the dogma (inherited from the Cold War) of the need to defend the ‘free world’ of the West from the machinations of arbitrarily identified enemies. It draws attention away from America’s defeats in various parts of the world. The United States wants to stop China and Russia from becoming superpowers, and wants

³¹⁶ A.T. Wolff, “The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis”, *International Affairs* 2015, Vol. 91, No. 5, pp. 1103-1121.

³¹⁷ D.M. Jones, M.L.R. Smith, “Return to Reason: Reviving Political Realism in Western Foreign Policy”, *International Affairs* 2015, Vol. 91, No. 5, pp. 933-952.

³¹⁸ Reading Polish studies on the subject of Poland’s NATO affiliation, one cannot help noticing the absence of criticism of Poland’s growing dependence on NATO’s military strategy – e.g. M. Kleinowski, “Polska polityka zagraniczna względem NATO” [“Polish Foreign Policy towards NATO”], in: J. Knopek, R. Willa (eds), *Polska polityka zagraniczna 1989-2014* [*Polish Foreign Policy 1989-2014*], Difin, Warszawa 2016, pp. 122-126.

to gain control over the global trade in energy resources. But this course is bringing the entire West into conflict with many other states that could be its allies in fighting the threats posed by extremist forces.³¹⁹

After its unhappy experiences with the US's violations of international law, NATO needs to restore the basic standards upon which the international order is based. Above all, there must be a restoration of faith in the rule of international law, from which derives the duty of every state to comply with customary and statutory norms, and especially with, *ius cogens*, the principles of the UN Charter. International law must not be spoiled by the application of double standards. An effort must be made to restore its status, not by making hypocritical declarations, but by enforcing compliance on an equal footing for all. It is also worth demasking the true face of humanitarian interventions, which have not always been humanitarian.³²⁰

Among the most important principles of international law is the principle of non-intervention in internal matters. This involves respect for the internal competence and decision-making authority of states, especially regarding their jurisdiction. Yet it is not clear how to separate the national political interests of members of an alliance from solidarity and control among them. How and when can instructions be issued to other states concerning their internal political choices and reforms? Traditionally, it has been acknowledged that intervention, of whatever form, violates the principle of the sovereign equality of states. Allies, therefore, have no right to exert pressure on each other in order to subordinate others' sovereign rights to their own interests. Nor can they grant direct or indirect help (involving terrorism, sedition, defamation, etc.) in order to overthrow the political system of another state. The 'colour revolutions' had little to do with defending NATO, and geopolitical expansion has its limits, which are set by the security interests of the other participants in international relations.

3. The need to restore common interests

When states join an alliance, they increase their opportunities for achieving their foreign policy and defence goals. Their level of security goes up, as does their certainty that, in the case of a direct threat, they will not be left standing alone on the battlefield. However, in order to be effective, secu-

³¹⁹ F.W. Engdahl, *Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order*, Third Millennium Press, Boxboro, MA 2009.

³²⁰ A. Domagała, *Interwencjonizm humanitarny NATO [NATO's Humanitarian Interventionism]*, EM Oficyna Wydawnicza Edward Mitek, Bydgoszcz 2014.

rity within an alliance requires the creation of common interests among its member states. This mainly concerns having a shared perception of the sources of threats, and the conviction that the vital interests of every member must be defended by a joint effort.³²¹ This desirable alignment of interests within an alliance, however, serves to weaken the heterogeneity of its membership and diversity in their expectations. This issue has been aptly described by Adam Bromke, who wrote that, when states of various ranks form an alliance, “they seek to gain as many benefits as possible while paying the lowest possible price. A weaker partner strives to obtain the maximum guarantee of security with the fewest restrictions on its freedom to conduct its own policy. And conversely, a stronger country strives to take on the minimum number of obligations towards the weaker partner while at the same time exercising as much control as possible over what the weaker partner does”.³²² The specific compromise made between these two contrary tendencies determines the character of the alliance – whether it is close and lasting, or loose and uncertain.

It is worth bearing in mind that the security of smaller states always depends on guarantees made by larger states, and that dependence is not reciprocal. Ultimately, great powers can get along without allies, whereas small states see an alliance as their own chance to protect their existential interests: certainty, integrity and identity. They openly seek the military presence of their protectors, for the status of their own armies and politicians is raised when they are allowed to take part in joint exercises or consultations concerning them.³²³

States that make a real contribution to the effectiveness and functionality of an alliance are referred to as its pillars. Others, those that benefit from the protection of their stronger patrons, are simply clients, whereas states that are supported by stronger states but interfere with the proper functioning of an alliance are called encumbrances.³²⁴ The stronger the bonds that form between patrons and clients in response to common threats, the more effective the alliance. If, however, their perceptions about threats differ, two possibilities arise. A client that feels increasingly threatened may seek to liberate itself from its relatively secure patron. Or, an increasingly uneasy patron may lose control over its client, even though it continues

³²¹ S.M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 1990.

³²² A. Bromke, “Trwale nurty w polityce polskiej” [“Lasting Currents in Polish Politics”], *Tematy* 1969, No. 31-32, p. 356.

³²³ H. Baldersheim, M. Keating (eds), *Small States in the Modern World: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham-Northampton 2015.

³²⁴ A.N. Sabrosky, “Allies, Clients and Encumbrances”, *International Security Review* 1980, No. 2, p. 127.

to support it. Such a situation may even lead to a reversal of the alliance (in this case, a bilateral alliance), as took place, for example, in Egypt at the beginning of the 1970s. The example of Romania in the old Eastern bloc shows that, though Romania was very much dependent on the USSR, it managed to enjoy a certain scope of freedom and to conduct its own policy on many issues – towards Israel, the Arab states and the non-alignment movement – in time becoming the *enfant terrible* of the whole grouping. The behaviour of Israel, in turn, shows that the aid it receives from Washington (on the basis of bilateral commitments) does not completely deprive it of initiative. It is worth recalling that, in many suggestions coming from the United States, Poland is compared with Israel: Poland is to play the same role on the front towards Russia that Israel does towards the Arab states and Iran.³²⁵ It is generally true that, in exchange for their help and protection, the leaders of alliances demand loyalty and sacrifices from their smaller allies. The long history of European alliances, where the favour of partners could be purchased, and the gratitude of weaker states cynically evoked, shows just how effective economic interdependence is in leveraging an alliance's effectiveness. One can fairly say that, in order to maintain its high standard of living and dynamic growth, Western Europe has willingly given up its status as a geopolitical agent. The hierarchy of its alliance with America – with the United States at the top – relieves European leaders who have no greater ambitions of responsibility for international security.³²⁶

The quality of an alliance's leader always depends on its potential and determination to defend common values. A prosperous power helps its allies and takes on the responsibility of being always ready to fulfil the coalition's demands without its own growth suffering, whereas a power that is declining will tend to shift the financial responsibility for maintaining the alliance onto the shoulder of its weaker members. As stated previously, the downturn in the prestige of the United States and its power have begun to have an adverse effect on some NATO members, and on the coalition as a whole. This is why the US so often speaks of the need to recover its will to act and faith in its own abilities. Yet as its position slides, it also feels a need to consolidate the alliance around a clearly defined enemy. And so, Vladimir Putin has become the most important propaganda target,³²⁷ even though the greatest threats to the West actually come from

³²⁵ G. Friedman, *The Next Decade...*, op. cit., p. 24.

³²⁶ R. Alcaro (ed.), *Re-launching the Transatlantic Security Partnership*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma 2008.

³²⁷ E. Lucas, *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*, Palgrave

completely different directions. Extraordinary intellectual courage and analytical insight are needed today to fend off the ubiquitous ‘Putinophobia’ and assert that the most serious threats do not come from stable autocracies, but from failed states, within which dangerous phenomena are growing that threaten the entire civilized world (systemic pathologies, terrorist armies, mass exoduses of people).

Interventions in the name of expanding democracy and protecting human rights are less important than taking charge of rebuilding ruined states in order to eliminate the radical moods that exist among their economically disadvantaged populations, and to reduce the pressure of migration, which undermines the stability of the Euroatlantic security zone. The NATO treaty area is not threatened with aggression. Russia is perceived as a threat because of a misperception and an obsession about Putin as a “bandit”. The greatest fears are that it will prove impossible to protect the achievements of Western culture and civilization, or to ensure that the strategic goals of NATO member states can be achieved.³²⁸

The conflict in Ukraine in 2013-2014 and the lasting damage wrought to Ukrainian statehood shows that NATO is not prepared, either conceptually or logistically, to prevent crisis situations in its close vicinity, to deal with conflicts that threaten to escalate into all-out war, or to stabilize post-conflict conditions. Forgotten are the slogans sounded out for many years about the need to coordinate military action with political action (through diplomatic efforts and various forms of pressure), while the idea of cooperative security involving organizations and states – even those having very different points of view – lies in ruins. In the autumn of 2013, preventive diplomacy failed when it was decided in the West to take advantage of the existing situation to accelerate Ukraine’s affiliation with the European Union. It was quite predictable that Russia would oppose this, and yet the United States insisted on its own scenario of events. The result: the creation of an enemy to consolidate and activate the alliance.

Every alliance contains two traps – a weaker ally, and a stronger ally. The trap of the weaker ally is the risk faced by a stronger power, and especially the leader of the alliance, that its smaller allies will conduct an irresponsible policy that get them entangled in an unnecessary conflict. In NATO, such a troublesome member today is Turkey, whose ambitions in the Middle East (skirmishes with its regional rivals or Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and especially Russia) could result in an escalation of tensions within the whole grouping. Similarly, the anti-Russian phobia of Poland and the Baltic States,

Macmillan, New York-Basingstoke 2008.

³²⁸ R. Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine...*, op. cit., passim.

and their obsession about having permanent NATO bases located on their soil, could lead to a conflict between Russia and the larger states of the alliance, particularly Germany³²⁹ and France.

The trap of the stronger ally awaits client states dependent on the patronage and protection of the leader of an alliance. Smaller states often delude themselves that they enjoy a 'special' relationship with the leading power, which treats them as an equal. Yet the evident asymmetry of their interests and the glaring difference in their potential means that the stronger partner will always be able to force its way upon those that are weaker. These can always demand greater concession from the leader, if they have enough courage and determination, but they risk being accused of having lost loyalty and credibility. The fear of such a judgment can paralyse political decision-makers, who may consider such a 'fall from grace' as an enormous danger – for themselves, especially. This applies to Polish-American relations since 1989. No Polish government during that period has been able to determine the price being paid for America's unconditional support. Polish politicians, regardless of their ideological provenance, have become hostages to the belief that any opposition to the United States would mean a return to a pro-Russian affiliation. A mental climate has been created (both in the salons and in the media) in which Poland is thought to have no room at all to manoeuvre in its relations with America. This is mainly because Polish politicians have not rid themselves of their inferiority complex towards the United States, and do not understand that they should be using arguments that are pragmatic, not ideological.³³⁰

The West and its largest alliance need a leadership renewal. America's leadership has become a source of many disappointments. The United States is not able to offer the world a cohesive vision of a new international order based on the search for rational cooperation among all of the greatest powers in order to preserve the planet, eliminate divisions, moderate conflicts, and build peace and stability. NATO must redefine its strategy in light of the current situation and the future of the international (in)security environment; it must stop making maximalist demands of an ideological nature and focus on operations that create stability. NATO will not be able to rebuild its defensive capacity unless it gives up on its vision of global engagement on behalf of the interests of a hegemonic power. Those

³²⁹ T. Forsberg, "From Ostpolitik to "Frostpolitik"? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia", *International Affairs* 2016, Vol. 92, No. 1, pp. 21-42.

³³⁰ S. Bieleń, "Deficyt realizmu w polskiej polityce zagranicznej" ["The Deficit of Realism in Polish Foreign Policy"], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 2008, No. 3-4, pp. 9-30.

interests are not in line with those of the rest of the world, and therefore create dangerous collisions that could even lead to a global war. There is no way to square the purpose of a defensive alliance of limited territorial scope with the tasks of a global security institution having expansive and hegemonic ambitions.

In the face of the current crisis in the values of the Western world, it is worth considering whether the Euroatlantic community will survive its attempt to confront the rapidly changing international reality. As long as NATO members continue to play the role of client in relation to their hegemonic leader, they will not be able to stand up to its arrogant ideas for ruling the world, and NATO will be nothing more than a tool of the United States' expansionist and military policy backed by big capital and the arms lobbies on the other side of the pond. For now, NATO is doomed to continue staving off Russia, since at the moment it has no pretext strong enough to make it reconsider its doctrine. It is increasing its military presence in Eastern Europe on a scale unseen since the end of the Cold War, and in this seeks to be legitimized by international opinion. It therefore portrays Russia as an aggressor, and at the same time postulate a return to dialogue with Moscow (e.g. in the forum of the NATO-Russia Council) in order to provide an alibi for its actions.

Whatever political changes occur in the United States or Europe (due to, for example, Brexit or the migration crisis), NATO must once again respect the historical sovereignty and geopolitical identity of those states that are adjacent to its territory. It must not put pressure on those states that have not yet matured enough to make a conscious choice about their own political affiliations. The example of Ukraine is particularly instructive. The declarations made by its political elites do not constitute sufficient grounds for its accession to Western institutions. Ukraine's numerous political and economic pathologies (clientelism, feudal clan connections, political patronage, graft, the alienation of public institutions, kleptocracy) undermine the values of the West, they do not bring Ukraine closer to the West. This means that the idea of drawing Ukraine towards the West is a purely ideological demand based on wishful thinking, not actual conditions. The sooner the West, and especially the United States and its NATO allies, realize that they have to revise their existing strategy, the sooner the world can free itself from the spectre of global catastrophe.

CHAPTER VII

Redefining Russia as a superpower in international relations

1. Russia's traditions as a great power

Russia's traditions as a great power date from the reign of Peter the Great and the Northern War that culminated in Russia's victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. Russia came to be known as a 'great power' around the middle of the 18th century, though the expression came into official use only at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. At that time, Russia found itself among the titans of the day – Great Britain, Austria and Prussia – as part of a European *tetrarchy* – and after France's return, a *pentarchy*. *Les grandes puissances* possessed the specific attributes of power, including an effective army to defend the state, a well-developed bureaucracy in control of the population and territory, and respect for the people on the part of the authorities, which had lost their absolute power in favour of the nation. Russia met the first two criteria thanks to the consistent policy of Catherine the Great, but had developed an autocratic tsarist system that was contrary to the ideals of the Enlightenment pertaining to the social contract and civil rights. But this did not stop Russia from taking part in the European Concert and acting as one of the stabilizers (*gendarmes*) of the international order at that time. The empires of Europe reconciled themselves to the fact that Russia, invoking its own traditions and the specific nature of its political system, defended ideas and a social order that were anachronistic in relation to the Enlightenment. This attitude on the part of Russia was supported by Russian Orthodoxy, which provided an ideological justification for Russia's imperial mission. Certainly, the impulses towards reform in Russia during the 19th century were due to influences from the West. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 confirmed the depth of the crisis in values, a crisis that tsarist Russia had not been able to cope

with.³³¹ The result was that the most heavily militarized empire in Europe fell under the weight of its own revolution.

The identity crisis of imperial Russia began as early as the middle of the 19th century, when the order established in Vienna broke down as a result of the Crimean War, in which the two Western empires of France and Great Britain fought against tsarist forces. It was also at that time that a Russia began to be treated, on the one hand, as one of the key players on the European scene, and on the other, as a backward civilization. In Western liberal circles, the threat posed by what was perceived as the despotic empire to the east began to attain mythic proportions, and Russia began to be 'pushed out' of Europe. It was then that the myth of the antinomy between Russia and Europe arose,³³² which negated the obvious truth that Russia represents a specific variant of civilization, deriving from Byzantium, that is certainly part of the European heritage.³³³ That antinomy also deepened Russian doctrine into Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism. Militarily and economically, Russia began to slide in relation to the Western powers; it lost prestige and its position as a playmaker in European politics. Along with the growth of Bismarck's *Realpolitik* in the 1860s and 1870s, Russia found itself on the periphery of the rivalry among the great powers. It did take part in creating a coalition with France and Great Britain in order to counterbalance the central continental powers, but lost credibility as a state capable of carrying out great military campaigns. Its defeat in its war with Japan confirmed that assessment. Only the great battles of World War II restored the Russian army's reputation as a winner.³³⁴

When assessing the accomplishments of Russia as an empire, it is essential to take note of its territorial expansion in Asia and the Caucasus. In a certain sense, this was reminiscent of the westward expansion of the United States across America. Russia's growth had its beginnings in the campaigns of Ivan the Terrible against the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates. The conquest of the Caucasus was achieved only through much bloodshed, and the consequences of the war with the followers of Islam were still being felt 150 years later, during the Chechen Wars of the 1990s.

³³¹ S. Bieleń (ed.), *Rewolucja w myśli i praktyce politycznej [Revolution in Thought and Political Practice]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2018.

³³² M. Malia, *Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horsemen to the Lenin Mausoleum*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1999.

³³³ J. Kieniewicz, *Wprowadzenie do historii cywilizacji Wschodu i Zachodu [Introduction to the History of the Civilizations of the West and the East]*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2003, pp. 147-152.

³³⁴ N.V. Riasanovsky, M.D. Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 9th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018.

Of course, the justification for the brutal subjection of the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia was Russia's *mission civilisatrice* towards the whole of the Orient.³³⁵

The Soviet era was a mixture of imperialism and power strategy. Stalin's cynicism led the country into an alliance with Hitler and another partition of Poland in 1939. At the end of World War II, the USSR became a global superpower, a rival of the West, and of the United States in particular, for control over certain spheres of influence. While not matching the powers of the West in terms of economic potential, the USSR employed ideological instruments in its strategy. It is irrefutable that it imposed an imperialistic domination over many states (politically and ideologically), meaning essentially that it enslaved them. It also supported various revolutionary movements in post-colonial states economically and militarily, but its deepening economic atrophy and stagnation, its increasing technological backwardness, and the costly arms race brought it to a state of 'imperial overstretch'³³⁶ that led to its downfall. Under the governments of Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR gave up on its hegemony in Eastern Europe and permitted the 'velvet' disassembly of communism. In relation to Western powers, signals were given that Moscow was ready to abandon rivalry in favour of team play. But those plans never came to fruition. The USSR collapsed, and the issues of what the new Russia's identity would be, and how to redefine it as a world power, were now at the top of the country's agenda.

2. The search for a new identity

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia became more or less synonymous with the previous embodiment of the Soviet empire, even though it had lost many of the attributes of the former superpower. This was due to a kind of entanglement of 'Russian-ness' and 'Soviet-ness'.³³⁷ What is more, Russia inherited the formal attributes of the USSR's status as a great power, particularly its permanent membership on the UN Security Council and its treaty-regulated responsibility for the post-Soviet nuclear arsenal. In fact, though, Russia was considerably weaker demographically, territorially and

³³⁵ D.R. Brower, E.J. Lazzerini, *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1997.

³³⁶ A term coined by the British historian Paul Kennedy in reference to the United States.

³³⁷ A. Kocho-Williams, *Russia's International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, London-New York 2013, p. 153 et seq.

economically. It was not the leader of a large grouping of Eastern European states. Its former allies turned towards the West, and the attitudes of some states in its immediate vicinity were unfriendly, if not openly hostile. Along its borders, Russia came up against various hotbeds of conflict, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. As a transcontinental state, it found itself confronted with antagonistic currents of civilization from Europe and Asia, North and South. One of the biggest threats came to be terrorism of different stripes (most often connected with ethnicity and national liberation, as in the case of Chechnya).³³⁸

Post-Soviet Russia found itself in a dramatic situation that required it to redefine its identity. In the first few years of the capitalist revolution, it was difficult for Russia to answer the question of 'who it was' (a definition of itself), 'what is important for it' (self-definition by means of a system of values) or 'where it was heading' (self-definition by means of interests and goals). What was missing most of all was certainty as to the country's future and internal stability, and there was good reason for calling why this period was called the 'second Time of Troubles' (*Smutnoe vremya* or *Smuta*).³³⁹ The many existential problems were further complicated by an axiological disorientation (anomie) and a feeling of isolations (alienation complex). As existing institutions broke down and recognized values became outdated without being replaced, as the image of the state fell apart in the eyes of its citizens and outside observers, and as these challenges and threats proved difficult to overcome, it also became increasingly difficult for Russia to make a conscious determination how it conceived of itself.

In the 1990s, parallel processes of identification were under way in Russia at the national, state and international levels.³⁴⁰ The national and state identities were built upon the co-existence of the "old and the new", a combination of features from the previous political system and elements of the new order and the search for a new image. The reaffirmation of traditional state symbols played an important part in building up Russia's image internationally. References were made to its imperial glory, historical achievements and contributions to civilization. At the same time, it was realized that this new international identity could only be formed by joining the community of nations and states, not in opposition to the rest

³³⁸ A. Włodkowska-Bagan, *Rywalizacja mocarstw na obszarze poradzieckim [Rivalry among Powers in the Post-Soviet Space]*, Difin, Warszawa 2013, p. 87 et seq.

³³⁹ A. Skrzypek, *Druga smuta. Zarys dziejów Rosji 1985-2004 [The Second Time of Troubles: An Outline of Russian History 1985-2004]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2004.

³⁴⁰ S. Bieleń, *Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej [The International Identity of the Russian Federation]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2006.

of the world. Russia's ideological and historical mission was abandoned, but at the same time the Russian state became a forum for dramatic ideological and programmatic confrontations, especially between Eurasianists and Atlanticists, supporters of the idea of empire and pragmatists, whose visions drew on Russia's imperial tradition, its status as a great power, and nationalism. Two tendencies clashed – an openness to the ideas and values of the West, and a flight towards the preservation of the “uniqueness of Russian civilization”.³⁴¹ Strong differences in views are a characteristic reaction to the Soviet period in which just one ideology and just one theoretical vision of society prevailed.

The Russian Federation is unique in terms of its surface area, its geopolitical situation in both Europe and Asia, its centuries-long history of as a great power and an empire, its long tradition of authoritarian government, its natural wealth, and its nuclear weapons, which determine the important place it holds in international relations. Above all, Russia is a great global exporter of energy resources, and is one of the world's biggest nuclear powers. The nuclear factor has an adverse effect by maintaining or deepening other countries' suspicions about Russia. The oil factor has the opposite effect, encouraging other states to take a constructive interest in Russia.

Russia's European identity in terms of civilization, and its Eurasian identity in terms of geopolitics, are two inseparable components of how the country defines itself. Russia is at one and the same time 'Europe in Asia' and 'Asia in Europe'. The problem is how to manage the specifics of this immanent 'dualistic' identity. The priorities of the Russian political elite are economic growth and civilizational development, with democracy and the institutions of civil society in second place. Modern Russia combines formal democratic institutions with strong political leadership that ensures the unimpeded power of the state. This gives rise to fears over the consolidation of authoritarian tendencies.³⁴²

Destabilization in the post-Soviet space, nostalgia for the lost empire, and a strong correlation between security and the economy caused Russia to appoint itself the sole arbiter and guarantor of stability in its 'near abroad'. Also of importance to how Russia viewed the post-Soviet space was the change in US strategy after the terrorist attacks of 2001. From that

³⁴¹ Idem, “Orientacje ideowo-programowe w rosyjskiej polityce zagranicznej” [“Ideological and Program Orientations in Russian Foreign Policy”], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 2000, Vol. 22, No. 3-4, pp. 51-69.

³⁴² R. Bäcker, *Rosyjskie myślenie polityczne za czasów prezydenta Putina [Russian Political Thought under President Putin]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007.

moment, Russia treated its regional policy as a counterweight to American hegemonial aspirations.

It is in Russia's long-term interest to develop normally, to engage in constructive cooperation with the West. But the Russians are mistrustful of the West – this being a remnant of ideological confrontation and historical prejudice. Among Russia's political elites there exists a syndrome of an 'encirclement' that has been confirmed by successive losses in the 'near abroad'. The accession of the Baltic States to NATO and the EU, followed by a westward shift by countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, have all been traumatic for Russia, increasing its feeling that its existential interests are threatened.

While the most attractive partner for Russia is the United States, it still sees the 'old' European powers – France and Germany – as serious political and economic partners. The Russian Federation remains a difficult partner for Western states, with its lasting prejudices, negative attitudes, conflicts of interest and dysfunctional institutional culture. Despite these problems, though, it is more of a partner than a rival. In strategic matters, Russia declares its desire for peace, stability and mutual beneficial cooperation, but at the same time continues to engender mistrust and fear within the international community, both in the West and among its closest neighbours, especially those in Central Europe. Russia uses the multifaceted bodies of Europe to legitimize its cause. It treats the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as a forum for pushing its 'special' and 'equal' position in relation to the West.

The new Russia remains a Eurasian state having important interests in Asia. It treats its Asian foreign policy as a counterweight to its potential marginalization in European affairs, and to American global influence. Its partnership with China is especially important, since it allows the two states to coordinate their efforts in the international arena in order to build up a common front in a multipolar world. The Russians recognize the growing importance of the Asia and the Pacific region in economic relations, and to security as well. Russia seeks to work together with Asian states in a spirit of compromise and partnership. It is an attractive partner for Asia because of its natural resources and its military technology. Russia's imperialistic and colonial past, however, remains a drawback, since to the present day there are a number of disputes, especially with Japan, that it has not managed to regulate by treaty.

Russia is in the process of re-evaluating its involvement in international affairs. The drama of the situation is that it has no clear vision of what the new Russia's place is in the global power arrangement, and the most important issue is how to overcome the country's deeply rooted

complex about being one of the world's leading decision-makers. This can only come about if Russia abandons the idea that being 'omnipresent' in the world is one of its vital interests. Russia needs to limit itself. The paradox is that today Russia sees itself as a regional power, declares itself active continentally, and continues to engage in activities that would put it among those powers having global ambitions. With such a 'multi-vectoral' diplomacy, in the foreseeable future Russia will only be able to afford a 'limited globalism', that is, to contribute to the shape of the international order along with other powers, and to accept the rules and values that are common throughout the international community.³⁴³

3. Determination to restore superpower status

Vladimir Putin not only restored stability to Russia's foreign policy, but has also begun to outline a doctrinal foundation for the new state.³⁴⁴ Over the last decade, voices have been heard that Russia has sufficient potential to maintain its advantage and dominance in Eurasia, after the pattern of the United States in the western hemisphere. Its very real ambitions and growing opportunities have provided a basis for creating a vision of the world that is in line with its national interests.³⁴⁵ Russia has begun to show the world its determination and readiness to do what is necessary to increase its prestige and attain the highest possible status in international relations.³⁴⁶

By attacking Georgia in August 2008, Russia demonstrated its determination to recover its status as a great power, and its opposition to the 'unipolar' order being established by the United States.³⁴⁷ While in such situations there can be divisions over who was in the right, ultimately Russia proved that it is capable of decisively protecting its own interests and is a force to be reckoned with on the map of great powers, since it is

³⁴³ S. Bieleń (ed.), *Rosja w procesach globalizacji [Russia in the Processes of Globalisation]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2013.

³⁴⁴ A. Monaghan, "Putin's Russia: Shaping a 'Grand Strategy'?" *International Affairs* 2013, No. 5, pp. 1221-1236.

³⁴⁵ M. Stuermer, *Putin and the Rise of Russia*, Pegasus Books, New York 2007.

³⁴⁶ S. Bieleń, "Siła motywacyjna w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej" ["The Power of Motivation in the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation"], in: A. Bryc, A. Legucka, A. Włodkowska-Bagan (eds), *Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego, [The Post-Soviet Security Area]*, Difin, Warszawa 2011, pp. 64-76.

³⁴⁷ J. Mancoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD 2009.

difficult to imagine an armed confrontation between the Western powers and a state the size of Russia when the latter is determined to protect its traditional spheres of influence through the use of force.³⁴⁸ By recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia took an active part in forming the international order, following the lead of the United States in this respect.³⁴⁹

The Russians are aware of the changes that are conditioning their position internationally. They are no longer counting on expensive arms, which have become a burden, but on such factors as their intellectual potential, economic innovation and competitiveness, computerization, and their ability to adapt and respond to the needs of the global market. Hence the slogans and the debate about modernization. By means of systemic reform, Russia seeks to adapt to and become integrated with the global economic system on conditions similar to those of other powers.³⁵⁰ When Russian reforms are discussed, it is no accident that references are made to Alexander II and the so-called Post-Sevastopol Thaw, as well as to Sergey Witte or Pyotr Stolypin. The symbol of the reconstruction of the empire's foreign policy remains Prince Aleksander Gorchakov who, after the Crimean War, called for the country to 'concentrate' on regenerating itself as a power.³⁵¹

The essence of the efforts made by Russia's political elites in recent decades has been to restore and maintain the country's status as a great power the world must reckon with,³⁵² referring directly back to Gorchakov, and symbolized by Putin. The idea is to restore the balance in international interactions, based on multiple vectors, and to become independent of the two greatest powers, the United States and China. These do not pose a military threat to Russia, but a geopolitical and economic threat that is causing Russia to focus on a multi-polar conception of the international order. The co-dependence between Russia and the West is mainly of an economic nature, with Russian natural resources and its gaining access to new technologies, know-how and investments conditioning the two sides' mutual success. Without cooperating with Russia, Europe has no chance

³⁴⁸ P.B. Rich (ed.), *Crisis in the Caucasus: Russia, Georgia and the West*, Routledge, London 2010.

³⁴⁹ R. Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010.

³⁵⁰ S. Bieleń, A. Skrzypek (eds), *Bariery modernizacji Rosji [Barriers to Russian Modernisation]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2014.

³⁵¹ F. Splidsboel-Hansen, "Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies* 2002, No. 3, pp. 377-396.

³⁵² I. Ivanov, "The New Russian Identity: Innovation and Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy", *Washington Quarterly* 2001, No. 3, pp. 8-9.

of maintaining its position as a rival to other centres of power. And Russia without Europe will not be able to bring about the modernization it needs to be able to integrate with the international system. Yet the Russian political elites, who are often of a post-Soviet provenance, flout this diagnosis and, instead of moving towards integration, play a game of tough politics which looks like a battle for power and influence in the style of the 19th or 20th centuries. In their view, Russia and its allies should offset the advantage of the United States and the West in a kind of return to the traditional balance of power from the days of the bipolar order.³⁵³

Today's Russia has abandoned the ideologization of its foreign policy, putting its money on pragmatism and economization, on those interests that determine all international priorities³⁵⁴. It has also given up on promoting some kind of alternative model of civilization, although in fact it could still be a mainstay and point of reference for various authoritarian regimes, both in its 'near abroad' and as far away as Venezuela. Contrary to appearances, and despite not having a democratic political culture, Russia's political system is quite attractive, and many states – post-Soviet states especially – are not put off at all by its patrimonial authoritarianism. On the contrary. For states such as Belarus, Azerbaijan or the Central Asian republics, Russia is a model worthy of being followed, and a guarantee that they can preserve their own authoritarian regimes.³⁵⁵

Russian political thought is based on realism in the sense of protecting its own interests understood in terms of power. This is why it typically engages in zero-sum games and concentrates on bilateral relations with other powers.³⁵⁶ From this realist perspective, Russia takes special care over its security interests through a rivalry with the other great powers of our times, such as the United States. Its strategy results from its own subjective calculations and from its objective geostrategic location. Its asymmetry

³⁵³ B. Lo, *Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics*, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2008, pp. 33-34.

³⁵⁴ D. Trenin, "Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West", *Washington Quarterly* 2007, No. 2, p. 95.

³⁵⁵ S. Bieleń, "Unia Europejska i Rosja w przestrzeni poradzieckiej – rywalizacja i współpraca" ["The European Union and Russia in the Post-Soviet Space – Rivalry and Cooperation"], in: J. Diec (ed.), *Rozpad ZSRR i jego konsekwencje dla Europy i świata. Kontekst międzynarodowy [The Collapse of the USSR and the Consequences for Europe and the World]*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2011, p. 226.

³⁵⁶ J. Peters, "Rosja w oczach niemieckich ekspertów" ["Russia in the Eyes of the Experts"], in: A. Łada, E. Kaca, K.-O. Lang, J. Peters, *Rosja dziś i jutro. Opinie polskich i niemieckich ekspertów [Russia Today and Tomorrow. Opinions of Polish and German Experts]*, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 76.

with the United States is a source of constant dissatisfaction and frustration on the part of the Russian elites, but there is nothing to show that the country will be able to level that particular playing field in the foreseeable future. The only option for Russia is to look for shared interests that can provide a basis for developing cooperation in important strategic areas.³⁵⁷

An awareness of the serious disproportion between Russia and the strongest grouping of Western states has driven the Russian elites to focus on internal transformation and modernization, but these take time.³⁵⁸ The unequal multipolarity in which Russia has no chance of making up the enormous distance that separates it from the United States means that Russia is not looking for any ad hoc allies to counter actions taken by the US in various parts of the world. This was the case during the US and NATO interventions in Kosovo and the invasion of Iraq. In principle, Russia reconciled itself to the existence of an unequal multipolarity with the United States as hegemon. Based on certain declarations made by Vladimir Putin, Russia will need several decades of modernization, which will power its development. It is trying to fit into the existing arrangement of regional, continental and global powers in order to gain some influence over the most important processes conducive to its interests.³⁵⁹

From a constructivist perspective, Russia considers itself ready to cooperate with powers and worthy of recognition by the West. This legitimization of its status as a great power is of particular importance subjectively and motivationally.³⁶⁰ The Russians are especially sensitive about being treated seriously and as ‘equals with others’. This is expressed in the psychological atmosphere in which contacts with partners, and states not friendly to Russia, take place. Interestingly, within the international community there is a belief that Russia’s position is considerably higher than that which would result from its actual strength. There is a gap between its real capability to act and its ambitions, the latter being based on ideas it has about power and empire. It is thought that Russian foreign policy is geared towards demonstrations of power, and that this gets in the

³⁵⁷ J. Stachura, “Znaczenie Rosji w polityce zagranicznej USA za prezydentury Baracka Obamy” [“The Importance of Russia in US Foreign Policy during the Obama Presidency”], in: K.A. Kłosiński (ed.), *Rosja. Ambicje i możliwości w XXI wieku [Russia. Ambitions and Opportunities in the 21st Century]*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, pp. 345-365.

³⁵⁸ L. Jonson, S. White (eds), *Waiting for Reform under Putin and Medvedev*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012.

³⁵⁹ T. Ambrosio, *Challenging America’s Global Preeminence: Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005.

³⁶⁰ A. Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD 2010.

way of other countries cooperating pragmatically with Russia based on shared interests.³⁶¹

From the liberal perspective, Russia is perceived as an important regional economy that is becoming increasingly interwoven with the global economy. Russia's entry to the WTO gave this process an institutional character. Foreign investments and its share in international trade make Russia an important partner of the European Union, the post-Soviet states and China. The Russians are becoming increasingly convinced of the need to regulate relations with other states by treaty, and of the valuable role played by international institutions in building the global order.³⁶² The liberal perspective also asks us to look at Russia's internal problems – protecting the integrity of the state and its territory; developing the economy and raising the quality of life for its people; building modern infrastructure; health care; developing science, education and culture; and environmental protection. The Russian elites understood long ago that the standard of living in the country will not depend on whether Russia is or is not considered a great power in international relations. Of course, the Russians are still far behind the West in terms of having a mature democracy or building civil society, but they treat these values as signposts in their long-term strategy for development and modernization; what is of key importance to them is that their society become prosperous and become a highly developed capitalist economy.

Russia's systemic hybridity, relatively close affiliations with the West, and its position as a transcontinental and transcultural bridge all mean that Russian diplomacy can be employed to build up a new 'non-Western' order in international relations.³⁶³ Rather than trying to create a separate *Pax Russica* upon the ruins of the Soviet empire, Moscow now has an opportunity to become a power that initiates and guarantees transformation on the global scale. This, however, will require it to revise its current strategy, and to take an autonomous and virtually self-sufficient approach

³⁶¹ E.N. Sahle, *World Orders Development and Transformation*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010, p. 109 et seq.

³⁶² A. Głąb, "Integracja Federacji Rosyjskiej ze strukturami instytucjonalnymi gospodarki światowej w świetle prowadzonej polityki zagranicznej" ["Integration of the Russian Federation with Institutional Structures of the World Economy in Light of Its Foreign Policy"], in: L. Zyblikiewicz, M. Czajkowski, P. Bajor (eds), *Polityka zagraniczna Federacji Rosyjskiej. Wybrane aspekty stosunków z Polską, Ukrainą i Białorusią [Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: Selected Aspects of Relations with Poland, Ukraine and Belarus]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2010, pp. 66-78.

³⁶³ Ch.A. Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*, Oxford University Press, New York 2012, p. 111.

to many international problems, without entering into close cooperation with other states, although the fact that Russia does not belong to any of the big political and military groupings causes it to be mistrusted by the world for displaying an unwillingness to play along with the rules of the collective game.

Russia's transient accession to the G8, the world's most influential states, was an ennoblement, but as the events in Crimea and Donbas proved, it did not alter the essence of Russia's relations with the other members of that body. Russia is considered an exotic member of the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), but BRICS is more of a loose 'club of interests' than a compact alliance of states that could stand shoulder to shoulder on important matters in the international arena. In this context, Russia is counted as an 'emerging power', although its recurring economic troubles (in 1998, 2009) give little reason to be optimistic about its economic growth.³⁶⁴

Russia is relatively close to those states that, for one reason or another, are stigmatized, subjected to international pressure and control. These include Iran, Syria, Venezuela and, closer to home, Belarus. It is hard to say whether having such close relations does Russia more harm or good. By defending such countries in its relations with other states, Russia invoked the Soviet tradition of solidarity with the countries of the old 'Third World' in their confrontations with the West. Today, in order to resolve the problems of Iran or Syria, what Russia needs is not a separate policy, but consolidation and coordinated action with the West.

Russia's international orientation remains conditioned by its complex Eurasian character, its cultural traditions, its ethnic and religious circumstances, and its geostrategic location. All these mean that Russia is faced with a difficult choice: between a Euroatlantic strategy, a Eurasian strategy, or drifting in place – that is, protecting its state of possession in its current form and remaining on the sidelines of the global international game.³⁶⁵

Russia's Western affiliations seem to be irrefutable when judged from what it has declared in its internal and foreign policies. Its determination to modernize its system, albeit in a meandering way, shows that it is ready to go ahead with transformations that will eventually strengthen democracy and the free market. This means that Russia is striving to become part of the

³⁶⁴ For these reasons, Russia is called a 'declining' power. R. Kuźniar, *Porządek międzynarodowy. Perspektywa ontologiczna [The International Order: An Ontological Perspective]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2019, p. 191.

³⁶⁵ V. Kremeniuk, "Shansy i resursy rossijskoj derzhavnosti", *Mezhdunarodnye processy* 2012, No. 1, pp. 40-53.

structures of the Western world. From the Russian perspective, its mutual relations with the West are competitive, but not antagonistic. Russia neither desires to dominate the world nor intends to rebuild its former empire. Its leaders dream of the country regaining its status as a superpower so that it can take part on an equal footing in the game of interests – above all in the energy sector.³⁶⁶ Naturally, this causes unrest in the areas of policy and strategy, but this does not mean that Russia has any intention of toning down its activities, since other powers also use economic leverage in politics. Moreover, Russia no longer treats the United States or Western Europe as its only points of reference – because of the crises that the West is going through. Today's Russia is more pragmatic than ideological, which distinguishes it from its Soviet predecessor. From its perspective today, there is no ideal system in terms of freedom or democracy; the most one can say is that some are stronger, some weaker, and that's what counts most. Paradoxically, in many ways Russia is more similar to the United States than to European states. Firstly, it is geared towards defending the state sovereignty, not dismantling it, and manifests a tendency to use force to resolve international disputes – part of the legacy of its hegemonic mentality. The state's approach towards religion, the role of money and increasing individualism in public life are leading Russia towards Westernization, but in an American, not a European, way.³⁶⁷

Russia often treats its own Eurasian affiliations as a counterweight to its connections with the West. It considers its ties with China, India, Iran and Korea to be beneficial, provided they do not entail a dependence that is too far-reaching. With most of those states, Russia is engaged in lucrative arms contracts, a not particularly noble leftover from Soviet times. The Russian industrial and military complex lost its markets in Central and Eastern Europe, and set out to compensate for this in the Near and Middle East (Iran and Libya), Central and Eastern Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia), and Latin America (Venezuela). A particular hallmark of Moscow's peaceful intentions is the assistance it has provided to Iran to build the foundations of a nuclear energy programme; many Western states suspect that this could lead to the production of nuclear weapons. Russia's involvement in Asia does serve, though, to underline its uniqueness and its capacity to work with different cultures or, where necessary, to mediate between them and the West. Russia treats these strengths as an advantage it has in dealing,

³⁶⁶ D. Trenin, "Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West", in: A.T.J. Lennon, A. Kozłowski (eds), *Global Powers in the 21st Century: Strategies and Relations*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008, p. 236-248.

³⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 238-239.

for example, with the Muslim world, which is generally hostile towards the West.³⁶⁸

For Russia today, it is not Europe, but the United States and China, that are its points of reference. Russia sees the United States as a model worth following because of its international role, and China as an object of admiration and envy because of its rapid economic growth and its evolutionary approach from communism to capitalism. For Russia, the European Union is an important economic partner, but with the accent on bilateral relations with its individual Member States, especially Germany and France. By maintaining good relations with the states of 'Old Europe', Russia seeks to neutralize the sceptical attitudes of new Member States such as Poland and the Baltic states. One could say that, in keeping with tradition, Russia tries to form coalitions with the strongest, often at the expense of the weakest.

Both Russia and the EU are affecting the future development of states in the post-Soviet space; however, Russia is convinced that any eastward expansion of the EU or NATO should end at the border of the Commonwealth of Independent States. For its part, the EU does not want to offer those states member status, but is interested in expanding the 'security community' within Europe as broadly understood, and in creating a 'ring' of well-governed and prosperous states in the East.³⁶⁹

Russia's international position in recent decades has become stronger, to the extent that it should now be ranked as an important partner of the Western powers and China. Russia is a state that is highly centralized, but stable, and that stability is not correlated with democratization. Russia has become sure of itself and its policies more assertive, even to the point of using military force to defend what it sees as right. In spite of all the shortcomings of Russian foreign policy and the many reservations other states have about it, Russia is a state that is stable and predictable. It can even be called 'normal' in that it has clearly defined goals and an international strategy for attaining them.³⁷⁰ No one in the West is particularly surprised that the Russians are stepping up the pace of their pursuit of great power status, especially since the geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions are currently in Russia's favour. What it can achieve internally, though, is limited

³⁶⁸ D.R. Herspring, "Russian-Asian Relations", in: S.K. Wegren (ed.), *Russia's Policy Challenges: Security Stability, and Development*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2003, pp. 19-37.

³⁶⁹ N. Popescu, A. Wilson, *The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood*, The European Council on Foreign Relations, London 2009.

³⁷⁰ M. Omelicheva, "Russian Foreign Policy: A Quest for Great Power Status in a Multipolar World", in: R.K. Beasley, J. Kaarbo, J.S. Lantis, M.T. Snarr (eds), *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, 2nd ed., SAGE, Los Angeles 2013, pp. 94-117.

by its complex historical identity, the dramatic systemic transformations it has gone through, and the growing aspirations of its society.

There is no doubt that a ‘big game’ between the West and China is being played out on the Eurasian ‘chessboard’, and that Russia is also taking part in it. In that game, Russia must take an unequivocal position. If it sides with the West, it will have to pay the price of sharing its interests within its traditional sphere of influence, but will be better able to defend its borderlands against radical Islam from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and against pressure from China in Central Asia, Central Siberia and the Far East. Together with the European Union and NATO, Russia can change Europe radically. A North America – Russia – EU ‘axis’ (with Japan joining in along the way) may become the geopolitical challenge of the coming era.³⁷¹ Russia is not able to take on the growing power of China on its own, and nothing in this new ‘axis’ suggests an alliance with China against Russia. The game, then, is over forming a counterweight to Chinese power in the coming decades – globally, not only in Eurasia.³⁷²

Using its transcontinental position, Russia wants to play an important role in promoting dialogue between different cultures and civilizations. As a great Eurasian power in which different ethnic groups and religions co-exist, including Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam, it may be able to fill in the huge gulf between the West and the Islamic states. These arguments give Russia an advantage over the United States and the EU, and allow it to build bridges between the West and the rest of the world.

4. Image-building

Vladimir Putin not only restored stability to Russia’s foreign policy; he also began to outline a doctrinal basis for the country as a great power. In the past decade, Russia has shown that it has enough potential to maintain its advantage and dominance in Eurasia, as the United States does in the western hemisphere. Russia’s real ambitions and growing opportunities have provided a basis for the creation of a world vision in line with its national interests. It has begun to exercise soft power in the world, based

³⁷¹ A. Kazantsev, “*Bol’shaia igra*” z neizvestnymi pravilami. *Mirovaia politika i Tsentral’naia Aziia*, Izdatel’stvo MGIMO-Universitet, Moscow 2008; G.P. Herd (ed.), *Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century. Competing Visions of World Order*, Routledge, London 2010; E. Lagadec, *Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century. Europe, America and the Rise of the Rest*, Routledge, New York 2012.

³⁷² Z. Magen, O. Bagno-Moldavsky, “The Big Game: The Great Powers in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, *Strategic Assessment* 2010, No. 4, pp. 115-126.

on a readiness to put in the effort to acquire as much prestige and the highest status possible in international relations.

At the same time, voices are now being heard that Russia has abandoned its “eternal model of territorial growth”, that it has lost its *libido dominandi* and societal motivation, since the Russians no longer want to pay the high price of maintaining an empire. Dmitri Trenin has called this syndrome “imperial fatigue”.³⁷³

Regardless of all the doctrinal formulas and renouncements by the Russians of imperialistic ideas, it seems that today’s Russia is attempting to rebuild its empire under the guise of various slogans and plans for reintegration in the post-Soviet space. The ideas for creating the Eurasian Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Community and the Eurasian Union are universally seen as new manifestations of old imperialistic urges. Russia launches the slogans of ‘privileged interests’ and ‘strategic responsibility’ in the post-Soviet space, evoking ‘geopolitical laws’. These tendencies can be named in various ways, with reference to imperialism or the phenomenon of Eurasianism in Russian ideology. But this does not change the essence of the matter, that it has been one of the most important components of Russia’s motivation in the past two decades.³⁷⁴

A particular challenge for Russian influence over the states of its ‘near abroad’ was the ‘colour revolutions’, especially the ‘orange revolution’ and the ‘revolution of dignity’ in Ukraine. The Russian elites realized that the West was more effective in propagating its political models, and was capable of providing more effective assistance in the process of political and economic transformation. Russia found itself sitting in an ‘ideological vacuum’, with nothing to impress or attract the post-Soviet republics, and especially Ukraine and Georgia. The answer to that ‘vacuum’ was the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ as a variant of the Russian ‘national idea’ during Putin’s presidencies. Kremlin strategists negated the liberal democracy practised in the West. In their opinion, the whole world cannot be governed according to a single model. Whereas the priority of democracy in America is freedom, and in Europe equality, for Russia at its present stage, what is most important is security. The main goal of ‘sovereign democracy’ is – as the name suggests – the defence not so much of

³⁷³ D. Trenin, *Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC 2011, p. 142.

³⁷⁴ S. Bieleń, “Oblicza imperializmu rosyjskiego” [“The Face of Russian Imperialism”], in: A. Dudek, R. Mazur (eds), *Rosja między imperium a mocarstwem nowoczesnym [Russia: Between an Empire and a Modern Power]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010, pp. 25-38.

individual rights as of the sovereignty of the state. Essentially, this means preventing ‘bottom-up’ pressures from within society and ‘top-down’ pressures from the international community, such as those which led to the ‘colour revolutions’ in Ukraine and Georgia. According to Kremlin specialists, “attempts at so-called democratization” are nothing more than an attempt by the West to “limit the sovereignty” of the post-Soviet states. Russia is also such a target. Within Russia, this purpose is supported by agents of foreign influence – native liberals, defenders of human rights and national minorities.³⁷⁵ From the perspective of Kremlin ideologists, sovereignty cannot be provided to a state or nation by law; it can only result from a state’s potential, its economic independence, military might and cultural identity. Another basic element of state sovereignty is to have an elite that holds nationalist views. The national character of that elite is the most important factor that determines the strength of a sovereign state. Thus, the slogan of ‘sovereign democracy’ is applied as required by the current needs of the authorities, for a sovereign democracy is presented in terms of a fight against chaos and disorder. It is a type of state ideology seasoned with imperialistic and nationalistic sentiments, and constitutes a symptom of the Kremlin’s deliberate strategy of trying to convince the West that Russian democracy has its own specific character.³⁷⁶

Acting against Western non-governmental organizations in its ‘near abroad’, Russia began to intensively support and finance its own organizations, as well as various analytical centres and foundations, in which ‘political technologists’ of the Kremlin began to make their presence felt (in Ukraine, the Transcaucasus, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, and even in the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).³⁷⁷ The Russians also decided to activate their compatriots – the Russian-speaking populations living in the post-Soviet republics, by promoting the concept of a *russkiy mir* [Russian world] involving “a differently conceived Russian spiritual space, Russian cultural space and Russian linguistic space”.³⁷⁸ *Russkiy*

³⁷⁵ A. Chadaev, *Putin. Ego ideologija*, Izdatel’stvo Evropa, Moscow 2006.

³⁷⁶ S. Bieleń, “Powrót Rosji do gry wielkomocarstwowej” [“Russia’s Return to the Great Power Game”], in: A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, S. Bieleń (eds), *Rosja w okresie prezydentury Władimira Putina [Russia during the Presidencies of Vladimir Putin]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Łódź-Warszawa-Toruń 2008, pp. 237-238.

³⁷⁷ A. Włodkowska, “Problemy rosyjskiej dominacji na obszarze WNP” [“The Problem of Russian Domination in the CIS Area”], *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, Year 6, Lublin 2008, pp. 65-83.

³⁷⁸ A. Curanović, *The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London-New York 2012.

mir began to be presented as a Russian project for civilization,³⁷⁹ whose characteristic features are: ‘bridge-building’ between civilizations, multiple religions, multiple ethnic groups, tolerance and interfaith dialogue.³⁸⁰

The Russian authorities control the mass media, which allows them to maintain a somewhat cohesive interpretation of events that is communicated both internally and abroad. It is worth noting that the Russian media, and television in particular, are very popular in several states of the ‘near abroad’, as well as among the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic states. The Russian information space, therefore, is an important determiner in other fields of activity. The media favour the cultivation of a certain nostalgia for the Soviet empire, and create the impression that Moscow remains the only caretaker of the post-imperial heritage, at least in the psychological and intellectual dimensions.

Another aspect of the impact of Russian political culture is the use of Russian as the *lingua franca* of the whole post-Soviet space. About 100 million non-Russians use Russian, and not only in official contacts. Knowledge of the language helps millions of workers from the ‘near abroad’ find work in Russia, carry on business, study at university and communicate at various levels of society. Russia promotes its language by supporting Slavonic universities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and elsewhere. In several of the post-Soviet states Russian is an official language after the national language, while the others have taken deliberate steps to diminish its stature and to reduce its presence in education as part of their efforts to build up a new national and state identity.

Russia is aware of the greatness of its unique culture, without which it would be difficult to imagine European culture. It possesses an unusually attractive and rich cultural heritage that draws tourists from various corners of the globe. It organizes many important cultural events, and takes part in festivals, exhibitions and other events around the world. Its film industry, literature and contemporary music make Russia attractive throughout the post-Soviet space.

Russia’s polyethnism and multiculturalism are undeniable riches, though they are also a source of disputes and conflicts. Looking at Russia from the outside, no one particularly highlights or demonizes the national, racial, religious and cultural mosaic of the citizens of the Russian Federation (*Rossiyane*). Russia considers itself to be a state that is relatively cohesive

³⁷⁹ The Russkiy Mir Foundation acts with government support, and has about 50 centres in 29 states, including in the United States, Germany and China.

³⁸⁰ A. Kudors, “‘Russian World’ – Russia’s Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy”, *Russian Analytical Digest* No. 81, 16 June 2010.

internally that conducts a decisive, assertive policy. It is against this background that the religious renaissance and the restoration of unity to the Russian Orthodox Church within the country and beyond is perceived. If we accept that the religious element is now playing an increasingly important role in Russian foreign policy, then religion becomes an important component of Russia's driving force.³⁸¹ Here, though, we should be thinking not only of Russian Orthodoxy, but also of Sunni Islam. Russia wants to play an important role in promoting dialogue among various cultures and civilizations.

Russia is becoming increasingly fond of public diplomacy. Not long ago, it was very mistrustful of using non-governmental organizations, which it saw more as competitors than allies of the political authorities. Its propaganda often lost out to modern technologies for creating a state's brand and image in international relations. Yet for a number of years now, Russia has been using public relations in order to build up a positive image for itself for the needs of its foreign policy. During its G8 leadership in 2006, the Russians drew on specialist Western companies for help in lobbying for Western investments in the energy sector and finding support for Russia's attempt to become accepted to the World Trade Organization. The Russian authorities are now making broad use of the RT (*Russia Today*) internet television network, an English-language satellite broadcast designed to offset the interpretations of events imposed by the BBC or CNN. Since 2005, RT has shown the world from the Russian perspective, and has been confronting stereotypes about Russia. It broadcasts in English and Spanish, and in over 100 countries. Furthermore, the Russian authorities also use the press to bring their arguments to an international audience.³⁸²

This increase in the effectiveness of soft power in foreign policy has led to a better understanding of the Russian state in other states; it has created informational, situational and partnership connections which in turn permit normal, stable relations to be built. Making use of its cultural attractiveness is helping develop mutual attraction, more effective persuasion and a dialogue conducted on equal footing. To this end, Russia is taking concrete organizational steps such as establishing institutions that specialize in using information to create impact. This is what was behind the Russian President's decision in September 2008 to reorganize the Federal Agency

³⁸¹ A. Curanović, "The Guardians of Traditional Values. Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Quest for Status", *Transatlantic Academy Paper Series*, February 2015, No. 1.

³⁸² R. Orttung, "Russia's Use of PR as a Foreign Policy Tool", *Russian Analytical Digest* No. 81, 16 June 2010, pp. 8-9.

for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (*Rossotrudnichestvo*). That institution is active outside Russia in the form of representative or diplomatic outlets, and took over the competences of several structures, including the Russian Centre for Scientific and Cultural International Cooperation. Its activities now include providing assistance to foreign partners, coordinating the activities of the Russian diaspora, helping non-governmental organization in their international activities, etc. The government Commission for Compatriots Abroad and the Institute for the Diaspora and Integration have similar goals.³⁸³ The Russians are now aware that building up a positive image of their state in international relations is mainly a consequence of an improvement in their economic condition and of a guarantee of real leadership that can offer other states not only 'hard' security guarantees, but also attractive cultural and civilizational models. Russia will be respected when it shows that it is innovative, technologically advanced, and highly developed.

5. Pan-Russianism as a manifestation of imperial ideology

Russia's political leaders are prone to expressing their far-reaching goals and strategic plans in doctrines that are wrapped up in ideology. The current version of Russian political doctrine contains a whole series of lofty slogans and principles that are in accordance with both international law and international morality.³⁸⁴ Yet beneath these, one can detect the hard-headed assumptions of *Realpolitik*. Russia has expressed not only its readiness to protect Russians living abroad, but also its determination to do so by means of actual intervention. The episode of the five-day war in Georgia in August 2008, and the Crimean campaign and the war in Ukraine have confirmed these are not empty words.³⁸⁵

Before our very eyes, a new variant of imperial ideology is being born, known as pan-Russianism. This means solidarity with the 'great homeland', that people living in what used to be the Russian empire will identify with Russia politically – not just a culturally, ethnically or linguistically, and is reminiscent of the historical appeals of Tsar Aleksander or Stalin for

³⁸³ G. Filimonov, *Russia's Soft Power Potential*, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/number/Russians-Soft-Power-Potential-15086> (27.03.2011).

³⁸⁴ M. Leichtova, *Misunderstanding Russia: Russian Foreign Policy and the West*, Ashgate, Farnham 2014, pp. 39-66.

³⁸⁵ J. Sherr, *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*, Chatham House, London 2013.

national concord in times of great military peril – namely the invasions of Napoleon and Hitler, respectively.³⁸⁶

Pan-Russianism is connected with the ideology of Pan-Slavism, which was to bind all Eastern Slavs together during the Russian Empire. Its supporters did not acknowledge the division of Eastern Slavs into “three fraternal nations”, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Pan-Slavism opposed the creation of state borders between Slavs, and appealed to such values as “the land of Rus”, “the peace of Rus”, “the faith of Rus” and “the only Russia”. This was related to the concept of the canonical territory of the Orthodox Church.³⁸⁷

All those values take on new meanings in the context of today’s glorification of the imperial past. Pan-Russianism does not solely refer to – though it does not omit – the ethnic identity of ‘Russian-ness’ dating back to the old Rus’ of the Middle Ages. It puts more emphasis on sentiment and respect for a strong Russian state that extended its patronage over many subject peoples.³⁸⁸ Pan-Russianism does not constitute an original, well-considered project that could justify the restoration of imperial Russia. It is yet another embodiment of the idea of extending influence over other nations, and another way of legitimising Russia’s claim to rule in the post-Soviet space. Russia is looking for arguments conducive to reinforcing people’s ties with the Orthodox faith, the Russian nation, and the ‘great homeland’.

Pan-Russianism is also an answer to the tendency towards emancipation in Russia’s ‘near abroad’, especially to Ukraine’s break with traditional Pan-Slavism. Ukraine’s irredentism and Ukrainians’ search for the sources of its own historical and geopolitical identity incline Russia to compensate by trumpeting the “imperial glory of our own homeland”. Pan-Russianism, as an imperial ideology, is becoming a “substitute source of satisfaction”. By restoring responsibility for the vast post-imperial space to Russia, the

³⁸⁶ H. Carrère d’Encausse, *L’Empire d’Eurasie, une histoire de l’Empire russe de 1552 à nos jours*, Fayard, Paris 2005.

³⁸⁷ O. Nemenskiĭ, “Panrusizm”, *Voprosy Natsionalizma* 2011, No. 3, pp. 34-43.

³⁸⁸ Ivan III (1440-1505) was the first to articulate the aspiration for a single, great Russian state. During his reign in the second half of the 15th century, this involved claims to the full legacy of the Rurik dynasty. The “gathering of the lands of Rus” became an important element of Moscow ideology, while the state, which took on the majestic name of Russia, became a symbol of the success of that process. The ideology of the Russian state was influenced by its confrontation with the Roman Catholic Kingdom of Poland, which caused a consolidation of spiritual and secular power in the sceptre of the Tsar. The idea of a ‘Third Rome’ provided a basis for the state being the focal point not just for Russians, but for other Orthodox nations as well.

Russians can reconcile themselves to various inconveniences and historical humiliations. They desire national greatness and seek to restore the Russia's former glory. In this sense, within Pan-Russianism there are echoes of revanchism and geopolitical revisionism.³⁸⁹

Russia does not seek to rebuild the old empire as a form of rule over other nations. Putin's project aims rather to consolidate the Russian state as the state of the multi-ethnic Russian nation, whose imperial form concerns how the enormous territory of the state functions and is managed.³⁹⁰ It is defending the territorial extent of its possessions while keeping its distance from the West. Thus understood, Russia is seeking to maintain a buffer zone around itself, not to draw such countries directly into the Federation. The case of Belarus is particularly instructive in this respect.

By defending its possessions and nurturing *Russophony* (the primacy of the interests of Russian-speaking people over a territory), Russia is certainly not admitting that it is a revisionist state. Objectively, however, a series of *faits accomplis* led to the 're-unification' of Crimea with the matrix. For the Russians, this nomenclature is not just about a 'terminological error', but about the essence of the changes that have taken place in Ukraine. In their diagnosis, the Russians emphasize the lack of constitutional legitimacy for the events that led to the Ukrainian crisis and its escalation into the conflict in Donbas. For them, the 'forcible change in power' in Ukraine marked a turning point in how the West treats international law. Taking control over Crimea was only a consequence of the events in Kyiv, where there had been an unconstitutional coup. Furthermore, the return of Crimea to Russia was effected with respect for the right of the inhabitants of the peninsula to self-determination. Their will was expressed in a plebiscite, in which 96.77% of participants voted for Russia taking control over Crimea.³⁹¹

When considering what is and is not revisionism, it should be emphasized that every such phenomenon is a consequence of specific geopolitical changes that are not accepted by the people of the area under dispute. It is well known that, following the collapse of the USSR, borders were created that did not necessarily correspond with the aspirations of Russian-speaking people now administratively incorporated into the new states that had arisen. At the time, no one paid much attention to this, just as there

³⁸⁹ M.H. Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD 2014.

³⁹⁰ A. Wierzbicki, "Rosja dla Rosjan". *Nacjonalizm rosyjski i etnopolityka* ["Russia for the Russians": *Russian Nationalism and Ethnopolitics*], Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2018.

³⁹¹ T. Gomar, "Posledstviia raskola mezhdou Rossieĭ i Zapadom", *Rossiiia v global'noi politike* 2015, No. 3, <http://www.globalaffairs.ru>

was no discussion about exactly who has the right to self-determination. On the basis of *uti possidetis iuris*,³⁹² the Russian-speaking people scattered throughout the empire were denied the right to freely choose what state they wanted to belong to. The arbitrary division of the USSR into new geopolitical entities caused a postponement of dealing with a problem that had to be faced in the case of Crimea. When the delegitimization of the current political authorities in Kyiv led to a revival of a separatist mood in Crimea, it was hard to expect Russia to behave otherwise than it did. Any other state would have done the same in its position. Examples from the past of the various interventions by the United States, including to protect its own citizens, need not justify Russia's use of force in Crimea, but in any objective analysis they cannot be overlooked. The fate of Crimea was sealed. It is difficult take issue with the fact that the majority of the people living on the peninsula preferred to return to Russia – which, in turn, could hardly ignore its compatriots crying out for protection. Faced with the threat of discriminatory practices on the part of the new Ukrainian authorities, Russia's behaviour was understandable and justifiable.

Having control over Crimea is one of the basic tenets of Russian strategy. It permits Russia to block Ukraine's and Georgia's maritime access to the Bosphorus and the Kerch Strait. The situation of the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov are similar to the Polish city of Elbląg, which is connected to the open sea through the Strait of Baltiysk, controlled by Russia. By taking over Crimea, Russia also made it easier for itself to communicate with and supply the separatist Transnistria. For these reasons, it is difficult to imagine a return to the *status quo ante*. Russia's rule over the Crimean Peninsula, and its military base in Sevastopol in particular, permit it to avoid a strategic encirclement. As Dariusz Bugajski of the Maritime Academy in Gdynia has noted, "the existing lease of the military base and installations in Crimea did not give the Russian Federation freedom to use the forces stationed there, due to restrictions under international law... The Black Sea has no other bays as convenient and deep as those at Sevastopol. Their advantages are obvious from every perspective: geopolitical, geostrategic, operational and tactical. In Sevastopol, there are 10 km of quays, there are systems of homing, command, defence, operational support and logistical security. The Black Sea Fleet and its air power can control all

³⁹² *Uti possidetis, ita possidetis* – 'may you continue to possess such as you do possess'; in Roman law, this was a means of protecting real property. In international law it is a basis for regulating territorial issues in some parts of the world (Latin America, Africa), and for regulating territories when concluding peace treaties. It means a definitive settlement of a given territorial issue, the recognition of legal title to a given territory.

directions of the movements of enemy forces – and above all, the exits out of the Bosphorus Strait and the western and central parts of the Black Sea”.³⁹³

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for the separatists in Donbas show its readiness to confront the West, which must shoulder the responsibility not only for how the conflict proceeds, but also for keeping Ukraine ‘alive’. Many people assert that Russia’s goal is to create quasi-state structures in Donbas along the lines of those in Transnistria and South Ossetia, and this is being helped by the lasting crisis in Ukraine as a whole. Some analysts also emphasize that – despite Western sanctions – Russian can continue to bear the costs of running the war in Donbas, which means that it is set for a long, drawn-out conflict, which could result in a return by the West to normalization and the defeat of the ‘Ukrainian issue’. Russian support for the aspirations of the separatist regions has therefore taken on a character that is independent of all other circumstances. Russia’s idea is to show its determination to defend ‘compatriots’, and to use its leverage to have a continual impact on how the situation develops. Giving up Novorossiya would be a blow to its prestige and a loss of face; moreover, Russia would lose an important political and strategic instrument for influencing the situation.³⁹⁴

The Ukrainian crisis is forcing a re-evaluation of the assumptions underlying the existing order in international relations. Against the background of Russia’s confrontation with the West, and its international isolation, the risk of a large-scale armed conflict breaking out has grown, meaning that there is a rational need for work out a new compromise between the participants in the conflict, and above all between Russia and the West. The West must revise its policy based on an “understandable sacralization of its own culture” (the words of Pope Francis), since this breeds fanaticism and the threat of new ideological crusades.³⁹⁵

³⁹³ D. Bugajski, “Krym na zimno” [“Cold Crimea”], *Para Bellum. Niezależny Magazyn Strategiczny* 2015, No. 1, p. 40.

³⁹⁴ Responsibility for putting out the Ukrainian conflict lies on both sides. One can expect restraint from both Putin and Western politicians. The withdrawal of Russian forces must go hand in hand with the cessation of the active support for Ukraine provided by the United States and the EU. It is not in the interests of the West to escalate the conflict, since it now faces a dramatic migration crisis. Nor is there much sense in Russia remaining isolated within the Euroatlantic world for a long time, since Western sanctions have proved ineffectual. Distancing Russia gives Western strategists hope not that it will become weakened, but that they can gain time to make up for their losses and become stronger themselves. No one can say today how all this will finally affect the existing international order.

³⁹⁵ P.C. Phan, “Papież, który nie przyszedł nawracać” [“The Pope Who Didn’t Come to Convert”], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27-28 September 2014.

Russia demands to be recognized as an important power having the right to articulate and freely conduct its interests. If this is interpreted by the West, and especially by the United States, as an aggressive challenge and source of danger, then we are dealing with either ill will or an aberration in mutual perceptions. In his first term of office, President Barack Obama formulated the image of Vladimir Putin as a 19th-century advocate of *Realpolitik*, who viewed relations with the West in terms of a 'zero-sum game', and who was striving to rebuild the Russian Empire through Eurasian integration. Thus, all acts of Russian intervention, called aggression in the cases of Georgia and Crimea, are received in a negative light, when the problem should be viewed from both sides, when it should be acknowledged that each side has reasons for acting as it does. The West perceives Russia's behaviour through the lens of an aggressive strategy aimed at further territorial expansion. Russia views its own acts of armed intervention as defensive responses to threats and sources of destabilization arising on its doorstep. Without each side defining its real interests and establishing uniform criteria for assessing these, no peaceful co-existence between them will be possible in the long term.

Russia clearly declares that it has no intention of revising the existing international order, but does expect that all powers will apply the jointly established rules of the game in a uniform manner; this concerns respecting both the sovereignty of states and their international affiliations. President Putin often asks the question of why the West is able to integrate in various forms, but Russia is denied the same right. Russian demands respect for its vital interests and recognition of its position as a great power, invoking its grand historical traditions and its achievements as a culture and a civilization. In this regard, the Russians are very determined to show that they are unyielding and ready to bear heavy costs. The West must reckon with this position.

On the other hand, Russia negates the advantage the West has achieved since the end of the Cold War. In this sense, its demands are reversionistic. What Russia seeks is not so much a return to the *status quo ante* as recognition of its role as a counterweight (if not of equal weight) to the United States, which motivates the US to return to a strategy of confrontation and rivalry rather than accommodation and cooperation, since this would force it to give up on its expansionism and hegemony. In this way, the United States rescues its reputation as the leader of the West and the only power capable of acting on the global scale. Russia clearly stands in the way of this.

CHAPTER VIII

Perceptions of Russia in international relations

1. Perception and international images

It was observed long ago that people do not react directly to historical events or facts, but operate on the basis of what they imagine (stereotypes, myths, prejudices or attitudes).³⁹⁶ Psychology provides many models that can be useful in decision-making processes, and which allow us to understand the influence of the complexity of the human mind on cognitive and practical processes in international relations.³⁹⁷ Of particular interest here is the issue of the images that are provided by such sources of cognition but are not provided by events themselves,³⁹⁸ where a distinction is made between images of a certain entity that are the effect of either the entity's own imagination, or the reception and perceptions of others, or what are known as 'desirable images' created by the entity for propaganda purposes, to promote its values in the international community.³⁹⁹

How states are perceived by other players in international life is extremely important to their identity.⁴⁰⁰ Stated briefly, identity means defining and interpreting oneself. Most definitions of the identity of social entities refer to their self-awareness, which is a result of interactions involving assessment of their capabilities in relation to other entities and the situations

³⁹⁶ K. Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI 1956; J.H. de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*, Merrill, Columbus, OH 1968.

³⁹⁷ R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception...*, op. cit.

³⁹⁸ G. Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Intercultural Press, Inc., Yarmouth, ME 1988, p. 81.

³⁹⁹ Ibidem, p. 112.

⁴⁰⁰ I. Zevelev, "Russian and American National Identity, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations", *International Politics* 2002, Vol. 39, p. 450.

in which a given entity finds itself.⁴⁰¹ “Identity is the art of perceiving the world and locating yourself within it”.⁴⁰² From a constructivist perspective, states have a need for collective identification. Their identity is an expression of feedback from other participants in international life.⁴⁰³ In interactions between states and the international community, states come to define themselves in relation to “others” and “foreigners”,⁴⁰⁴ they engage culturally or distance themselves, and they perceive each other, creating new meanings and values.⁴⁰⁵

Taking account of cognitive achievements on the subject of how international perceptions are conditioned, one can postulate that Russia’s image in the world is the effect of a confrontation between various imaginings about it and real experience. People do not perceive the country as it is, but as they expect it to be. They look at it through the lens of their convictions, opinions and pre-conceived attitudes.⁴⁰⁶ Often, an image involves the application of evaluations and value judgment – including stereotypes and prejudices – to the circumstances and needs of the moment.⁴⁰⁷ This has been the case since at least the first half of the 19th century when, as a young Russian diplomat in Munich, Fyodor Tyutchev made efforts as a journalist to change Germans’ negative attitude towards Russia – which was the effect of conscious, intentional activities on the part of state services.⁴⁰⁸ Perhaps it was at that time that the brand of the Russian state began to be built. Various techniques of persuasion were used to create and maintain a positive image of Russia and Russians in the minds of European observers –

⁴⁰¹ R.F. Baumeister, *Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986, p. 4.

⁴⁰² W. Żelazny, *Etniczność. Ład – konflikt – sprawiedliwość [Ethnicity: Order – Conflict – Justice]*, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań 2004, p. 51.

⁴⁰³ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.

⁴⁰⁴ E. Nowicka, “Swojskość i obcość jako kategorie socjologicznej analizy” [“Ownness and Foreignness as Categories of Sociological Analysis”], in: E. Nowicka (ed.), *Swoi i obcy [One’s Own and Strangers]*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1990, p. 45; S.P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity*, Simon & Schuster, New York 2004, pp. 24–27.

⁴⁰⁵ S. Bieleń, *Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej... [The International Identity of the Russian Federation...]*, pp. 21–33.

⁴⁰⁶ V. Gel’man, “Studying Russian Politics through Western Lenses: Changes and Challenges”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, No. 94, 28 March 2011, pp. 2–4.

⁴⁰⁷ T. Szarota, *Niemcy i Polacy. Wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy [Germans and Poles: Mutual Perceptions and Stereotypes]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1996, p. 122.

⁴⁰⁸ I. Rozhkov, V. Kismereshkin, *Imidzh Rossii. Resursy, opyt, priority*, RIPOL’ klassik, Moscow 2008, p. 6.

contrary, it must be said, to the famous line from a verse by Tyutchev that Russia can be “by faith alone appreciated”, since in fact it was possible to organize a cognitive process whereby Russia could be grasped “with the mind” and measured with an ordinary “yardstick”.⁴⁰⁹

Russia is one of those states whose image in the world does not result from an absence of information, but from manipulations and falsehoods perpetrated by external circles hostile to it,⁴¹⁰ or at the instruction of Russia’s own internal authorities. One important feature of Russia’s message abroad is the marginalization of its own public opinion. All matters are decided within the narrow circles of the political authorities at the highest level. The ‘Potemkin village syndrome’ lives on, that is, presenting for public consumption a version of events that serves to idealize reality, not transmit the truth. The marginalization of public opinion and the creation of virtual images of the state are convergent with the bureaucratic mentality of those in government, who consider a lack of transparency to be an asset and a means of consolidating their power. Exclusivism and secrecy in decision-making processes is one of the immanent features of Russian politics.⁴¹¹ This also applies to the manipulation of history, whose politicization is nothing extraordinary in Russia,⁴¹² whose tradition of falsifying the past is stronger than that of most countries in the world.⁴¹³

One can gather plenty of evidence to show that Russia has a bad image abroad; it is associated either with various despotic figures from history or with communism and the influence of the old KGB, and today with oligarchs, ubiquitous corruption and the mafia.⁴¹⁴ It is not associated with

⁴⁰⁹ Z. Żakiewicz, *Rosja, Rosja... [Russia, Russia...]*, Wydawnictwo Oskar Polnord, Gdańsk 2006.

⁴¹⁰ For an extreme example of the treatment of Russia and the Russians in the propaganda of the Third Reich, see: E. Dmitrów, *Obraz Rosji i Rosjan w propagandzie narodowych socjalistów 1933-1945. Stare i nowe stereotypy [The Image of Russia and Russians in the Propaganda of the National Socialists 1933-1945: Old and New Stereotypes]*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 1997.

⁴¹¹ S. White, *Understanding Russian Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011.

⁴¹² V.A. Tishkov, “History, Historians, and State Power”, *Russian Politics and Law* 2010, No. 4, pp. 70-79.

⁴¹³ “At its peak, the KGB retouched photographs to remove compromised comrades, reworked history coursebooks to add other comrades who had not been there before, interrogated and persecuted professional historians. The Russian authorities today are their descendants, sometimes literally”. A. Applebaum, “Groźne zmartwychwstanie Stalina” [“Stalin’s Dangerous Resurrection”], *Dziennik*, 7 January 2009.

⁴¹⁴ From the depeches of American diplomats published by the website *WikiLeaks* a picture emerges of a ‘wild’ Russia, a state in which the system of actual power functions apart from public institutions, while informal structures are large based on dependence

refined culture and art, but with the invention of the Kalashnikov rifle and the Molotov cocktail.⁴¹⁵ Events in Russia catch the attention of the whole world;⁴¹⁶ they are normally given a sensational twist, regardless of whether they concern critical, dramatic situations or everyday life. This is the result of people's attitudes and expectations, according to which Russia is a source of threats and uncertainty in the world. At present, however, its reputation is clearly changing as civilization changes. Trust in Russia as a place to invest to visit is growing.⁴¹⁷ This has its advantages and drawbacks, but certainly much has changed since the Soviet period. Western political science has also had a hand in this, attracting a new generation of researchers and provoking a new look at Russia.⁴¹⁸

2. Lasting tendencies in perceptions of Russia

Russia's image has been largely formed by its history, especially by its emergence in the second half of the 19th century from a feudal into a modern society.⁴¹⁹ This means that Russia lagged behind the developed societies of the West, especially because, in the 20th century, 'great geopolitical catastrophes' stood in the way of its development – from the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 up to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Russia has no historical tradition or experience of parliamentary democracy or of a mature market economy. There has never been a civil society in Russia. Currently, it is going through difficult, sometimes dramatic circumstances marked by widespread crime; there is an ongoing synthesis of the experience of the Western and Soviet traditions, which is leading to the formation of new social stereotypes.⁴²⁰

There are cognitive dissonances between how Russia interprets itself internally and how it is perceived by the international community. The

within particular circles and personal loyalty. A. Curanović, S. Kardaś, *Rosja w WikiLeaks [Russia in WikiLeaks]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2011.

⁴¹⁵ I. Rozhkov, V. Kimereshkin, op. cit., p. 7.

⁴¹⁶ Chechen terrorism, the trials of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, political assassinations – these are the kinds of things that dominate in the information coming out of Russia.

⁴¹⁷ V. Rukavishnikov, "Russia's 'Soft Power' in the Putin Epoch", in: R.E. Kanet (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2011, p. 80.

⁴¹⁸ V. Gel'man, op. cit.

⁴¹⁹ C.H. Whittaker (ed.), *Visualizing Russia: Fedor Solvtsev and Crafting a National Past*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2010.

⁴²⁰ N.N. Petro, *Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA-London 1995.

Russian interpretations, often selective and biased,⁴²¹ do not correspond with the facts observed from abroad. For example, what the rulers in the Kremlin call “sovereign” democracy looks from the outside like a dictatorship. It is hard to speak of a new Russian identity when it involves restoration and revendication. It is based on old modes of thinking and imperial models, as is attested to by the continuation of the cult of Stalin as the architect of the triumph in the Great Patriotic War rather than of tyranny and genocide. Other historical figures have been treated to a similar popularization: the medieval prince Alexander Nevsky, who crushed a German invasion, or Pyotr Stolypin, an economic reformer at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. These are being used to symbolize the Putin regime’s determination to defend Russia against the West and its readiness to modernize the country.⁴²²

Assessments of today’s Russia have been influenced by numerous myths and stereotypes about Russia and the Russians resulting from its history. For example, there is a very widespread charge that Russian foreign policy has always been driven by a never-ending aggression and desire for expansion, and that Russia is incurably imperialistic.⁴²³ Few, however, recall that the Russians ended the Cold War more out of their own will than because of external pressure (though this certainly played a part), or that they gave up their empire voluntarily and peacefully.⁴²⁴ It is enough to compare the case of the Soviet Union with the decline of other empires, which involved various ‘dirty wars’. In fact, what the world witnessed was the phenomenal peaceful, bloodless disappearance of the largest land empire in human history. These aspects of the Russian evolution give cause for optimism, though in fact no one is in a position to predict whether or when Russia will move from an empire to a nation state, from authoritarianism to democracy, or from traditionalism to modernity.

One of the most distinguished experts on Russian political thought, Andrzej Walicki, has pointed out that, in perceptions of Russia, an enormous role is played by its purported, incomprehensible ‘uniqueness’ and

⁴²¹ R. Orttung, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

⁴²² G.P. Herd, “Russian Modernization Pathways: Foreign Policy Implications”, in: R.E. Kanet (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 59-75.

⁴²³ S. Bieleń, “Postimperializm-neoimperializm-transimperializm: próba oceny rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej” [“Postimperialism-Neoimperialism-Transimperialism: An Attempt to Evaluate Russian Foreign Policy”], in: S. Bieleń, A. Skrzypek (eds), *Rosja. Refleksje o transformacji [Russia: Reflections on the Transformation]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2010, pp. 235-265.

⁴²⁴ S. Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008.

otherness, which leads to a variety of assessments, often Russophobic, that attach a pejorative meaning to that uniqueness. This approach “pushes it into the position of a permanent enemy of the West, and thereby strengthens the forces of anti-liberal right-wing and left-wing radicalism within it”.⁴²⁵ It is also worth recalling that the Russians themselves cultivate the myth of their exceptional nature, the conviction that they have a particular historical mission resulting from the unique character of Russian civilization, which is the effect of a specific tradition, of national, ethnic, religious and cultural differences and of the country’s political institutions and geopolitical situation.⁴²⁶ This phenomenon leads, however, to various aberrations. Firstly, it gives birth to the erroneous conviction that Russia is some sort of model for other nations and states to follow, or at least be obedient to. This belief among the Russian political elites goes hand in hand with Great Rus nationalism and chauvinism, which in turn is reflected in the idea of empire.

Russia is certainly a carrier of particular cultural and civilizational values. It is the progenitor of Orthodoxy and certain imperial traditions that have determined its place in history, and its missionary and messianic ideas about itself.⁴²⁷ These are perceived as a source of expansionist and predatory intentions. Russia is treated as a challenge and a source of danger, but also as an important ally of the West in the struggle against international terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation. Due to its Eurasian character, it stands as a kind of bridge between civilizations, between the East and the West, between the worlds of Islam and Christianity.⁴²⁸

In the West, both politicians and analysts alike uncritically accept the idea that Western civilization will find solutions to virtually all of the

⁴²⁵ A. Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-century Russian Thought*, transl. H. Andrews-Rusiecka, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975; cited after the Polish edition: *W kręgu konserwatywnej utopii. Struktura i przemiany rosyjskiego słowianofilstwa*, PWN, Warszawa 2002. pp. 469-470.

⁴²⁶ J. Potulski, *Współczesne kierunki rosyjskiej myśli geopolitycznej. Między nauką, ideologicznym dyskursem a praktyką [Modern Currents in Russian Geopolitical Thought: Between Science, Ideological Discourse and Practice]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2010.

⁴²⁷ I. Massaka, *Eurazjatyzm. Z dziejów rosyjskiego misjonizmu [Eurasianism: From the History of Russian Missionism]*, Funna, Wrocław 2001.

⁴²⁸ S. Bieleń, “Tożsamość europejska Rosji – związki i różnice cywilizacyjno-kulturowe” [“Russia’s European Identity – Civilizational and Cultural Connections and Differences”, in: S. Bieleń, K. Khudolei (eds), *Stosunki Rosji z Unią Europejską. Otnosheniia Rossii s Evrosoiuzom [Russia’s Relations with the European Union]*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2009, pp. 11-35.

problems of the modern world.⁴²⁹ Americans and Western Europeans not only demonstrate the supremacy of Western political solutions and institutions; they try to impose their models on others. This is often an expression of ignorance and incompetence, and of arrogance in respect of the pluralism that exists in the world today. Tradition and identity are ideological constructs, and everyone has chosen them for themselves. Russia is one of those entities that most often comes in for criticism. Political leaders and journalists vie with each other in prescribing how to fix Russian society. It seems to them that the fact that the Western world encompasses the best governed, most democratic and most economically developed countries of the world naturally entitles it to instruct other states, including Russia, and that grafting Western models there will automatically produce the desired effects.⁴³⁰ What most disappoints outsiders is Russia's system of government. After the end of the Cold War, the West, and the United States in particular, hoped and anticipated that Russia would join the victorious bloc of democratic states and accept Western values as Japan and Germany did after World War II.⁴³¹ Yet the Russians believed otherwise, that they could join the Western system of values, but still had the right to preserve their own identity as a civilization, and as a political system. They could accept various patterns of behaviour, but on their own terms, and often by adapting them to suit themselves. The West still imagines that Russia must make a choice between two possibilities: integrating into the Western order, or rejecting it – which would mean being excluded and stigmatized. But Russia is choosing its own road – sometimes called the third way⁴³². This not only angers and irritates Western politicians, it also causes them to become confused over fundamental values such as the

⁴²⁹ The problem of the West teaching Russia has deeper psychological and cultural determinants. Because of their technological and civilizational superiority, the Western states, and especially their political elites and media, take on an offensive, arrogant tone towards Russia, and always present their arguments as an expression of universal truths and values. I. Wallerstein, *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, The New Press, New York 2006.

⁴³⁰ K. Mahbubani, "The Case Against the West: America and Europe in the Asian Century", *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 3, p. 111 et seq.

⁴³¹ For they had been the aggressor, whereas the USSR, and later Russia, felt themselves to have been victims of aggression, regardless of Stalin's approach before the outbreak of the German-Russian war (the invasion of Poland, the war with Finland).

⁴³² Russia's right to its own path of development is one of the subjects taken up by the Valdai Discussion Club, which has convened every year since 2004 and is attended by foreign researchers, journalists and politicians. The club arose at the initiative of the RIA Novosti Agency, The Russian Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, the newspaper *The Moscow Times* and the periodicals *Russia in Global Politics* and *Russia Profile*.

right of a state to determine its own political system, or sovereignty, an unquestioned domain of the state.⁴³³

Russia is still suffering from the trauma of having lost the Cold War. This is a major source of an incurable anti-Western complex.⁴³⁴ As a result, Russia cannot decide to become a full-fledged partner of either the United States or Western Europe. Its foreign policy is incoherent and full of irrational turnabouts. Russian society, though, looks on the West with sympathy, as an attractive place in which to spend time and keep money. This means that the West's image is different in the eyes of the Russian elites and those of ordinary people.

After the war in Georgia in 2008, the belief spread that Russia was engaged in a kind of *reconquista* of the spheres of influence it has lost after the Cold War. Some Russians themselves, such as Dmitri Trenin, one of the most respected experts in international affairs, consider that accusation to be a misunderstanding. Russia has its influence and interests, but at present it is not building up zones such as those that were once part of the domains of a great empire. Such opinions are based on fear, fed by historical memory – as in the case of Russia's neighbours – or are an expression of the wishful thinking of Russian politicians.⁴³⁵ Of course, Russia does not hide – as, by the way, other great powers do – that it has its spheres of influence. But this does not mean that it intends to create new geopolitical divisions. It insists only on its historically, ethnically and geographically conditioned right to worry about the stability of its neighbouring states.

Russia often creates its image to suit the expectations those to whom it is addressed. Many states, and their political elites in particular, try to answer the question of what kind of Russia they need and how it can serve their own interests. This usually involved ensuring the safe supply of energy resources, but also includes bringing Russia into arrangements that are not antagonistic and will not provoke it to play the nuclear card. In this context, however, it is worth noting the fact that, in the case of Russia, an enormous role is played by the personification of politics, that is, attributing extraordinary significance in creating political reality to the personality traits of politicians.⁴³⁶ The image of the political leader is superimposed on

⁴³³ V. Feklyunina, "Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West", *Europe-Asia Studies* 2008, No. 4, pp. 605-629.

⁴³⁴ P. Shearman, "History, Russia and the West, and Cold Wars", in: R.E. Kanet (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 11-29.

⁴³⁵ D. Trenin, *Russia, Polity*, Cambridge-Medford, MA 2019, pp. 164-176.

⁴³⁶ In Russia, an attachment to the stagnation of the *status quo* dominates, as expressed in a traditionalisation of politics that shows a clear conflict between the personified authorities and the democracy and how it is legitimised.

the image of the state. This was the case with Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and is even more apparent in the case of Vladimir Putin: the Western media have demonized his KGB past, his violations of human rights, his ways of dealing with independent journalists, and so forth, and this makes it difficult for him to maintain normal contacts with most Western politicians.

3. The discourse over Russia

International perceptions are conditioned by how a given observer views the world, and so – as the constructivists would have it – beliefs and attitudes, religious world view and ideology all have an enormous impact. In perception, ideas and how they are understood play a bigger role than objective or material conditions.⁴³⁷ A threat from a certain entity is therefore evaluated not according to its actual potential, but according to how it is perceived in terms of sources of danger or guarantees of safety. In the contemporary literature of international relations, there are many discrepancies between the facts presented and how they are interpreted.⁴³⁸

In recent decades, the idea of ‘discourse’ has gained a lot of publicity. It refers to statements operating in the public sphere that concern a specific problem or position.⁴³⁹ Discourse means agreeing on meanings in relation to a certain phenomenon, thing or idea. Russia has been the subject of such a discourse since the middle of the 1980s because of its rapid internal changes and their impact on the international order, and the tone of the discourse has been set from outside. The West appears in the role of moral arbiter, imposing not only the criteria of evaluation but also its visions of what kind of order is desired within Russia itself, and what part Russia should play at the international level.⁴⁴⁰ This often results in a confrontational approach that does not consider the point of view of the other side.⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁷ A. Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World*, Routledge, London 1996, pp. 1-8.

⁴³⁸ K. Żukrowska, M. Grącik (eds), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka [International Security: Theory and Practice]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2006, p. 18.

⁴³⁹ S. Gajda (ed.), “Dyskurs naukowy – tradycja i zmiana” [“Academic Discourse – Tradition and Change”], Uniwersytet Opolski, Opole 1999; L. Rasiński (ed.), *Język, dyskurs, społeczeństwo [Language, Discourse, Society]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2009.

⁴⁴⁰ After the end of the Cold War, the international system went through a process of deep ‘re-imagination’. J. Solana, “The Case for Europe”, *International Herald Tribune*, 28 May 2005.

⁴⁴¹ P. Tsygankov, F. Fominykh, “The Anti-Russian Discourse of the European Union”, *Russian Politics and Law* 2010, No. 6, pp. 19-34.

Voices calling for respect for a pluralism of values and models stemming from different cultures and civilizations are in the minority.⁴⁴² Overall, the West is applying a double moral standard here. It attacks Russia for a lack of democratic reforms, and at the same time tolerates authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia out of a selfish concern for its own affairs. Democratization is conceived of instrumentally, and it used to guarantee the strategic political and economic interests of the Western powers.⁴⁴³

In the international discourse, language also plays an enormous role. It is often used to manipulate and confuse the recipients of messages. Without doubt, it is through language that one constructs one's relationship to reality. Language, in effect, helps create the world. What for some is a 'violation' of sovereignty, for others means a 'liberation' from foreign dependence. 'Genocide' under some conditions becomes an innocent 'ethnic cleansing' under others. Controlling the realm of symbols, and influencing people's imaginations, desires and visions in accordance with one's own particular interests are important manifestations of power, including within the international community. "Creating an appropriate conception of reality makes it easier to impose activities and solutions in line with one's own purpose".⁴⁴⁴ In the case of Russia, how it is perceived by the West is treated as a point of reference by many smaller and weaker states that cannot themselves cope with the legacy of perceiving it as an imperial power. This applies, for example, to the Baltic states, in which settling accounts with the 'occupier' constitutes a serious problem of identification.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴² M. Marczevska-Rytko, "Pojęcia Zachodu i Wschodu we współczesnym dyskursie" ["The Concepts of West and East in Contemporary Discourse"], in: E. Kuźelewska, K. Stefanowicz (eds), *Wybrane problemy globalnej i regionalnej polityki międzynarodowej [Selected Problems of Global and Regional International Politics]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009, p. 20.

⁴⁴³ G.W. Kołodko, *Wędrujący świat [The Wandering World]*, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2008, p. 303.

⁴⁴⁴ J. Potulski, "Infosfera – 'piąty wymiar' współczesnych analiz geopolitycznych" ["The Infosphere – the Fifth Dimension of Contemporary Geopolitical Analysis"], in: P. Czachorowski, R. Ożarowski (eds), *Jednostka. Społeczeństwo. Instytucje. Wybrane problemy badawcze z zakresu nauki o polityce [The Individual, Society, Institutions: Selected Research Problems from Political Science]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2009, p. 244.

⁴⁴⁵ I. Novikova, "The Image of Russia in the 'New Abroad': The Russian-speaking Diaspora along the Baltic", in: T. Mochizuki (ed.), *Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context*, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 2008, pp. 321-351; K. Voronov, "Perceptions of Russia in the European North", *Russian Politics and Law* 2010, No. 6, pp. 35-50.

In the international discourse, the flow of information is also significant. The dominance of Western culture and the Western mass media certainly affects how the world is perceived, and thereby what decisions are taken. The weapons of ideology and propaganda are still very much in use in international relations. While the Cold War between the East and the West is over, the psychological war has not abated. Certain axes of conflict have changed, but they are still accompanied by tensions and clashes almost daily. "It would be incredibly naive to suppose that, in the global game of politics and economics, amid the endless race for the dominance of certain ideas and one's own political and economic interests, no use would be made of placing suitably constructed materials in the media. Articles, publications, radio and television programmes are put into circulation by intelligence services interested in penetrating a given region or country. This is done not only in order to manipulate public opinion, but also to put pressure on influential and governing elites. At times, very effectively..."⁴⁴⁶ Discrediting the other side is one method of exerting ideological influence. In the West, one can observe how opinion-forming media and specialized research centres take particular pains to show Russia in a way that is off-putting, so that any initiative or achievement on its part will not be acknowledged or achieve legitimacy in the international arena. Behind every Russian success there must lie criminal activities by the oligarchs or secret services. Information on Russia is often put in an unfavourable context of evaluation, and this causes similar reactions from Russia itself. Thus, an information war is being waged in which it is difficult to distinguish between truths and lies, knowledge and ignorance, good faith and ill will.

What is most dangerous is to stigmatize Russia, to deem it the source of all unhappiness in the modern world. It is repeated almost like a mantra that Russia is pursuing its political agenda by 19th-century means: militarization, spheres of influence, maintaining a balance of power in a multipolar "concert of powers". Yet it seems that this is a one-sided, simplified view, even if effective in terms of PR. For the states of the West, the policy of a balance of power and the Concert of Europe is associated with a century of peace in Europe and the growth of the imperial power of Great Britain as the arbiter and balance on the continent. For the smaller and weaker states of Central and Eastern Europe, which practically did not exist on the map at that time, the same policy is associated with injustice and the violation of the basic principles of the self-determination of nations and the sovereignty of states. In this way a kind of modernization of history is carried out: a place is sought in the old international systems (post-Congress of Vienna)

⁴⁴⁶ G. Kołodko, *Wędrujący świat...*, [*The Wandering World...*], op. cit., p. 33.

for principles established only after World War II. And at the same time, today's Russia is anachronized: any progress it makes is deemed to be the result of motives from another era and a completely different distribution of power in international relations. In this way, the achievements made during the 20th century concerning standards of international law are neglected, as are the changes that have occurred in the consciousness of societies and states, Russia included. Russia is constantly assigned a destructive role in international relations. Today's Russia and Russians do not have, and cannot have – according to their critics – any original plan for civilization or attractive ideas. Their ambitions and aspirations only lead to a weakening of the United States, the disruption of Euroatlantic cohesion and the disintegration of the European Union. According to Fareed Zakaria, the Kremlin is not interested in what it might do to relieve the tensions that exist internationally, but in how it can manage to shift the pieces around on the world chessboard.⁴⁴⁷

How different this attitude is from that of the world of politics and the media in the 1990s. Then, for some unknown reason, it was thought that Russia – and China, too, by the way – were on the road towards liberalization. “Boris Yeltsin’s Russia seemed committed to the liberal model of political economy and closer integration with the West”.⁴⁴⁸ It seemed that Russia – touched by liberal ideology as if by a magic wand – was beginning to view the world as America and the other Western powers did.

After three decades of the existence of the new Russia, it must be admitted that it has changed its image for the better. This has largely been due to a conscious use of public diplomacy, the media, and elements of soft power. Yet, although a modest niche has been preserved for civil liberties, the need for them is not at all widely felt in Russian society, where democracy has a bad name. It has ceased to be regarded as a necessary condition of prosperity. The victory of capitalism in Russia need not lead to a victory for democracy. After the experiences of the 1990s, most Russians associate democratic transformation with losing their savings while the oligarchs grow rich. In this context, Russians question the worth of Western instructions concerning the transformation of their system. The Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov believes that the Western elites – despite their rhetoric on freedom – have created a system that prevents them from fully being removed from power. Essentially, Surkov is drawing on the ‘iron law of

⁴⁴⁷ F. Zakaria, *The Post-American World*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York-London 2008.

⁴⁴⁸ R. Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2008.

oligarchy' of Robert Michels, who showed that power in a state belongs to party bosses, and the system inevitably takes on an oligarchic character. The Western elites, then, have no moral right to demand that Russia change when they themselves will not permit a genuine democratic alternative. Surkov set out the assumptions for Russian policy, assumptions that indicate certain characteristics of Russia's political culture: a tendency towards the centralization of authority, the idealization of goals in the political struggle, and the personification of political institutions. Having a charismatic president is more important than any political programme.⁴⁴⁹

Russia's international prestige and authority derives not only from its power, but also from the stability and predictability of its policy. Its use of force to carry out neo-imperial projects and impose its will on its neighbours, and its collaboration with extremist and hostile regimes around the world – these do Russia more harm than good.⁴⁵⁰ The attractiveness of Russia's image in the world derives directly from its political, democratic and liberal modernization. Being open to the world and calling an end to aggressive, xenophobic attitudes are conditions for Russia being welcomed into the group of democratic powers of the West.

Russia's image is harmed by issues related to the protection of human rights. The Chechen question brought to light the brutal truth about the crimes committed by Russian troops in the Caucasus; the spectacular murders of Anna Politkovskaya and Natalia Estemirova showed that the killings had been politically motivated; the arrest and conviction of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was connected with the will of Kremlin politicians. Russian authorities themselves point the finger at criminal, oligarchic and corporate groups and call for a strengthening of the state and its services in order to combat violations of human rights.⁴⁵¹

In international relations in the post-Cold War period, despite the many disruptions that have occurred, a difficult process of seeking compromise is under way,⁴⁵² and so a question arises as to what extent the activities of the West are capable of affecting Russia's conduct: do they favour a petrification of existing tendencies, or are they catalysts of change that will bear fruit in a lasting transformation of Russia's political and economic

⁴⁴⁹ C. Neef, "Der Traum des Zarewitsch", *Der Spiegel*, 25 February 2008.

⁴⁵⁰ J. Fiedorow, "Rosyjskie supermocarstwo: mity i rzeczywistość" ["The Russian Superpower: Myths and Reality"], in: *Imperium Putina [Putin's Empire]*, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 2007, p. 129.

⁴⁵¹ S.A. Greene, *Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin's Russia*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2014.

⁴⁵² R.E. Kanet, "From the 'New World Order' to 'Resetting Relations': Two Decades of US-Russian Relations", in: R.E. Kanet (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 204-227.

system?⁴⁵³ Do perceptions of Russia in the world derive solely from its stubborn attachment to a geopolitical way of thinking, or from its being deemed to be a difficult, unreformable opponent? It is on the answers to these questions that an objective view of Russia largely depends, a view in which Russia is neither friend nor foe, but a country that is conducting a rational policy in order to meet its needs and protect its interests.⁴⁵⁴

Some participants in the discourse about Russia believe the country is abnormal. Those who treat it as a state like any other encounter cognitive dissonance.⁴⁵⁵ Many misunderstandings arise because one's own expectations are taken for reality, and this translates into certain logical processes that lead nowhere. Thus, for example, the first two years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, which were a time of huge economic reforms (taxes, a labour code, a land code, pension system reforms, health care, education) were treated as a synonym for the entire Putin era, when as early as 2003 a regression and degradation of political and social institutions had already begun. Today, we have a false idea of Russia's condition. The world expects a real modernization from Russia that not only involves it adapting to the demands of the global market, but also to the standards of the rule of law and civil society. For external consumption, Russia accentuates achievements such as its stability and increasing prosperity: a doubling of the quality of life of Russians, a four-fold increase in the number of cars per thousand inhabitants, easier access to flats, houses and plots of land. It treats these economic and social achievements as the result of civic activity, when in fact they are large the result of revenue from the state monopoly on natural resources. Essentially, what appears to be normal from the outside is not.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵³ P.F. Robinson, "Russia's Emergence as an International Conservative Power", *Russia in Global Affairs* 2020, No. 1.

⁴⁵⁴ The Russians are entitled to take full satisfaction from the reaction of the West to their strategic aspirations. While Russia's geostrategic position is at its strongest since the demise of the USSR, even Moscow politicians admit that they didn't expect the West to fear Russia so much. This has been largely the result of Vladimir Putin's loud rhetoric and anti-Western campaign, designed mainly for external use. Western researchers confirm this view. A. Wilson, *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy and the Post-Soviet World*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2005.

⁴⁵⁵ As Bronisław Łagowski has written, "with Russia you have to live in accord, even in friendship, but you must never forget that this is a country in which for many years crackpots were in power, and it could happen again in the future. The normalcy and common sense of its current leaders are giving Russia a moment of respite between the past – and possibly the future – madness". "Zaćmienie faktów" ["An Eclipse of the Facts"], *Przegląd*, 13 June 2010.

⁴⁵⁶ In the eyes of the Kremlin political elites, Russia is a great power that has overcome internal difficulties to become one of the most important actors on the international scene

It is also paradoxical that Russia's successes in transforming its political system are often explained in terms of the reforms carried out rather than the favourable conditions on the global energy markets. It is worth noting that Russia has a much bigger chance of coping with the financial crisis than many other states have. Its opportunities arise from the size of its currency reserves.⁴⁵⁷ Moreover, in Russia – despite widespread hopes – there is little reason to expect there will be a diversification of the structure of the economy in the foreseeable future. The economy is dependent on exports of energy resources, and it seems that, paradoxically, there will be no real diversification of the economy as long the country still has oil and gas that the rest of the world needs. “Because the goal of the Kremlin is financial independence from the West, the authorities cannot allow significant investments in sectors other than oil; even when prices on the world market are low, petroleum brings in the kind of cash flows that no other sector of the economy can replace”.⁴⁵⁸

Many observers tend to perceive Russia and its foreign policy as a ‘special case’ that functions according to specific rules. The belief exists that Russian politicians behave less rationally than their counterparts abroad, being guided not by specific national interests but by their subjective, and even personal, impulses. Such a view, though not groundless, certainly exaggerates the degree to which Russia is ‘special’. By arbitrarily deciding what is ‘normal’ and ‘rational’, external observers attribute an almost mystical nature to Russia, and thereby deprive themselves of the possibility of evaluating it properly.

‘Normal’ need not mean ‘similar to the West’ or ‘based on Western norms and customs’. It need not involve accepting some kind of universal paradigm of progress in international relations. What it really means is behaviour that is in accordance with the predictable, cohesive rules of how to act in order to achieve specific goals. Even when such behaviour is not to everyone's taste, or is even recognized as harmful, this does not

at the beginning of the 21st century. At the same time, despite having an energy resources advantage, the Russian authorities have not used their petrodollars to modernise the economy, nor to ensure lasting prosperity. President Putin's popularity in Russia is based on an adroit propaganda manipulation in which he is portrayed as the one who has overcome adverse phenomena in Russia's economy and politics, in which ‘market authoritarianism’ has become a means of effective transformation constituting a model of global dimensions. M. McFaul, K. Stoner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown Holds Russia Back”, *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 1, pp. 68-84.

⁴⁵⁷ J. Białek, A. Oleksiuk, *Gospodarka i geopolityka. Dokąd zmierza świat? [The Economy and Geopolitics: Where is the World Heading?]*, Difin, Warszawa 2009, p. 77.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

mean that Russia is an irrational entity functioning beyond the limits of understanding. The fact that the decision-making process in Russian foreign policy is rational, and in accordance with the class definition provided by American authors,⁴⁵⁹ is attested to by the fact that Russia's decision-makers are undeniably high competent, have access to information, and have various types of motivation. There is nothing to prevent us from perceiving Russian foreign policy as a 'normal' sphere of the activities of a state that is going through a complex transformation. Especially since there is a strong conviction among Russia's elites that the essence of the country's new identity in international relations is to gain universal acceptance among the states of the West.⁴⁶⁰

4. How Russia is perceived in Poland

How Russia's image is formed in Poland is for the most part historically conditioned. Viewing Poland as a historical victim of Russian expansionism results in the maintenance of an emotional relationship to Russia as the perpetrator of all evil in Polish politics.⁴⁶¹ Yet many wrongs and falsehoods in the two countries' mutual perceptions result from such a biased approach to history, from its being mythologized and used as an instrument for current political purposes.⁴⁶²

To understand Russia, it is crucial to provide other nations with an idea of the historical consciousness of the Russians, and to make this a part of the whole of European cultural memory. This task is made all the more difficult by the resistance of Russia's official policy and historiography to accept co-responsibility for the misfortunes of the 20th century (the outbreak of World War II and genocide under Stalin). Obviously, every

⁴⁵⁹ R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, B. Sapin (eds), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002.

⁴⁶⁰ F. Spiltsbodel-Hansen, "Russia's Relations with the European Union: A Constructivist Cut", *International Politics* 2002, Vol. 39, p. 407.

⁴⁶¹ How Russia is portrayed involves problems of a psychological nature. If from a critical perspective, one can win over the sympathy of many audiences. If, however, an attempt is made to be objective, one can end up being called a dangerous Russian adherent, an "agent of influence".

⁴⁶² In the opinion of Bronisław Łagowski, "the case of Katyn as a 'founding myth of the Second Polish Republic' partially evolved from that atmosphere, and was partially cynically created as a 'Polish Golgotha' in order to serve as a means of applying pressure in relations with Russia". B. Łagowski, "Ekshumacje" ["Exhumations"], *Przegląd*, 19 December 2010.

nation, and every nation state, has its own view of its history, and voices of indignation from other states, especially neighbouring states, have little effect on this. Poland's relations with its neighbours are no exception. This is why it is in Poland's interest, and in the interest of Europe as a whole, to value the changes that have taken place in the former Soviet empire since the Gorbachev era, as well as the sacrifices and suffering that the nations of the USSR endured in their confrontations with fascism and under the genocidal regime of Stalin. What is important is to analyse the past not in order to antagonize states and nations, but to learn how to co-exist wisely. When Poland judges its neighbours that have a totalitarian past (Nazi or Communist) solely as historical perpetrators of evil and tragedy, then mutual understanding and real reconciliation become impossible. Even worse is to identify today's Russia with the Stalinist Soviet Union and to demand that it pay compensation for the wrongs committed at that time. One must keep in mind that "Russia also has its Katyns".⁴⁶³

There are many facts that have not penetrated to most Poles' awareness about Russia, facts about its political transformation, its achievements and successes, and the changes going on in Russian society. Instead, public opinion is fed with sensational reports about scandals, disasters, crises, and people's tragic fates. Few knew that Moscow now ranks among the most expensive world capitals, which means that some people are not only earning, but also consuming, at a high level.

In Poland, there is little knowledge about current Russian scientific research, including in the social sciences and history. The prevailing view is that the Russians have no right to their own viewpoint, their national interests are harmful and unacceptable by nature. In the media, those experts most eager to talk about Russia are those who have made up their minds in advance, and whose opinions are usually disparaging, regardless of what the specific topic is. It does not matter that their assessments and expertise have been off the mark for years – they know that, as long as there is a greater need for anti-Russian ideology than for reliable information, their careers are safe.⁴⁶⁴

Without considering the complexity of contemporary Russia, some researchers in Poland – for some unfathomable reason – believe they are infallible in their evaluations about the country. Passing sentence on who is right and who is wrong is reminiscent of the 'moral tyranny' of Roman Dmowski, exercised by the 'healthy part of the nation' over the

⁴⁶³ N. Swanidze, "Rosja też ma swoje Katynie" ["Russia also has its Katyns"], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22-23 August 2009.

⁴⁶⁴ A. de Lazari, *Polskie i rosyjskie problemy z rosyjskością [Polish and Russian Problems with Russianness]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2009.

‘non-nationally thinking’ part of society called by the contemptuous name of half-Poles. Being objective in assessing Russia does not pay off, since home-grown scholars, often harnessed to ‘patriotic politics’ or acting at the instruction of the secret services, accuse anyone who thinks differently than them of xenophilia and acting to the detriment of their own country. This approach is not conducive to high academic standards, to say the least. Russia is hard to describe, and even harder to understand, when studies serve a particular ideology and are conducted for ad hoc political ends. In Poland, being too sure of one’s own judgments and arrogant in advising the Russians are symptoms of complexes and weakness. Polish intellectuals often prove incapable of thinking independently, simply regurgitating worn-out Russophobic ideas of various provenance without giving any heed to the sorry consequences of their actions. In the long run, this leads to a kind of ‘satellite thinking’ in which Poland merely implements the ideas of others and does not give a fig for autonomous reflection. Sadly, in Poland there are practically no independent research centres, and scholars often work on behalf of government agencies.

It is widely thought that Poland possesses particular expertise concerning Russia, or more broadly, the East. In fact, Polish expertise on Eastern subjects is greatly lacking and of little use in practical politics. Interesting studies are published, but even those almost always toe the line of the political interpretation currently in vogue: we might call this very strange phenomenon a ‘harmonization’ of approaches. Such studies lack the inspirational or predictive value one ought to be able to expect. Germany, France and the Anglo-Saxon countries are much more engaged in Eastern studies, institutionally and materially. They also conduct policies that are objective and rational, without being attached to the past or needlessly emotional.

Polish media reports about Russia feature many value judgments and poor content (practically speaking, there are no journalists that specialize in a specific aspect of Russian society, e.g. its military, economic development or ethnic diversity – no one even treats the Russian cinema in a professional manner); they also tend to be superficial and seek to create ‘unhealthy sensation’. What results is a caricature of the country.

This serious distortion in how Russian reality is portrayed is certainly caused by Poland’s historical prejudices and stereotypes, but is maintained by frustration and anti-Russian phobias.⁴⁶⁵ *En masse*, Poles uncritically accept the official interpretation of history, and are hostile towards those who think

⁴⁶⁵ These are expressed in an antipathy towards Russian investment in Poland, which is rather absurd in this age of globalisation and when the state is striving to create new jobs for its citizens.

otherwise. Fear and self-dissatisfaction, and a continuing complex of inferiority and alienation in relation to the West, engender aggression towards Russia, which is treated as the root of all evil. This is why ‘conspiracy theories’ abound regarding the Smolensk air disaster, and why Poles seek to justify their own mistakes by pointing their finger at others.⁴⁶⁶ When the MAK (*Mezhgosudarstvennyi aviatsionnyi komitet*) report on the Smolensk disaster was released, many voices were raised that, to maintain its prestige, Russia will never admit to its mistakes, and will always defend its public officials, no matter what the circumstances. Yet it turns out that the organization of the flight to Smolensk was horrendous, and that there were errors and irresponsible behaviour by the crew. Tomasz Hypki, Secretary of the National Aviation Council, has stated unequivocally that “if the pilots had not insisted on landing, there would have been no catastrophe”.⁴⁶⁷

The problem in re-evaluating Polish-Russian relations boils down to the need for a culture of negotiations and dialogue. Lasting change can only come about when there are common goals, the assumption of good will on the other side, and a determination to keep talking to one another. Yet today in Poland there is no shortage of politicians – both in the opposition and in the government – who ‘position’ Russia as not only a historical, but a present-day, mortal enemy of Poland. Hence the grim warnings that one must never make a deal with Russia; the interests of the two sides are irreconcilable. The acceptance of such false policy assumptions has led to a reduction in the scope of economic cooperation between Poland and Russia. Change must be preceded not just by diplomatic spectacles and fireworks, but above all by a reliable diagnosis of errors and omissions. Looking back at Polish-Russian relations, it is evident that the period of the last few decades has been one of lost opportunities and of choices and decisions that have harmed Poland’s interests.

Poles’ political awareness about Russia continues to be formed by Mickiewicz’s poem *To Our Muscovite Friends*. We live under the superstition that, for Polish-Russian relations to improve, Russia must first become democratic, liberal and ‘civilized’. When it turns out that that superstition has no basis in reality, we feel let down and frustrated. Especially when our point of view differs from those of the Germans, French or Americans.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁶ A. Kasonta, *Ruling Elites Opted for Unconditional Cooperation with Western Countries*, April 15, 2020, <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/european-policy/professor-stanis-aw-biele-ruling-elites-opted-for-unconditional-cooperation-with-western-countries/> (21.04.2020).

⁴⁶⁷ <http://wiadmosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?wid=13144975> (17 February 2011).

⁴⁶⁸ A. Chwalba, W. Harpula, *Polska-Rosja: historia obsesji, obsesja historii [Poland-Russia: History of Obsession, Obsession with History]*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2021.

Poland is one of those countries that sees Russian weakness as a chance for peaceful existence. At the same time, many states, and great powers in particular, want Russia to regain a strong position in the world, since only such a Russia will be able to enhance stability and balance in the world. And so, the positions of the United States, France and Germany are in opposition to that of Poland. In July 2009, when Barack Obama visited Moscow, during a lecture at the Russian School of Economics he emphasized that “the United States wants a strong, peaceful and prosperous Russia. This desire is rooted in our respect for Russians and the shared history of our nations, which goes beyond rivalry”.⁴⁶⁹ One would look in vain for a similar declaration by a Polish politician in recent decades, for anything of the kind would be deemed proof of betrayal.⁴⁷⁰

Over the last dozen years or so, Russia has shown that it is determined to protect its interests, and willing to resort to ‘brute force’; it is able to alter the borders in its neighbourhood and engage in brinkmanship. There is a growing conviction in the international community that Russia should not be overestimated, but must not be underestimated. It seems that a time of *Realpolitik* is approaching, in which what counts are the factual consequences of Russia as a power, not mere suspicions about Russia’s disastrous imperialistic tendencies. Today’s Russia is forcing all the states around it, most of which it remains at odds with, to reconsider the position they take towards it. This applies as well to the Polish ruling elites who, sooner or later, will have to revise their existing approach and re-evaluate their policy towards their largest neighbour to the east.

The Russians are convinced that many states act to their detriment. This is the result of the ‘siege mentality’ that began in revolutionary Russia in the first decades of the 20th century. Today’s Russian elites and media see enemies everywhere, ready to harm the national interests of the great power. At the same time, they seek – as confirmed above all in official statements by the president – to strengthen Russia’s credibility as a solid, predictable partner in the global economy, especially in the energy sector. Vladimir Putin has succeeded in rebuilding Russia’s image as a great power.⁴⁷¹ But unlike the USSR, Russia no longer poses a serious military threat (despite its nuclear status); it is more of a geoeconomic challenge for the rest of the world. Russia treats its own backwardness as a civilization as a security

⁴⁶⁹ Excerpts from Obama’s lecture to Russian students, *Dziennik*, 8 July 2009.

⁴⁷⁰ The American president mentioned his position on Russia during a visit to Poland in May 2011. Donald Trump also confirmed this in statements he made in Warsaw in 2017.

⁴⁷¹ A. Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power”, *Post-Soviet Affairs* 2005, No. 2.

threat, which is why its modernization programme can only be implemented through close connections with the world economy, and particularly with that of the West.⁴⁷² This does not mean at all that its geoeconomic goals have replaced its traditional geopolitical goals; they simply supplement each other.⁴⁷³ When the accent is placed on geoeconomics, Russia looks pragmatic and cooperative in the eyes of the world; when geopolitical goals come to the fore, it is seen to be putting on its imperial garments.

International images of Russia are encumbered by the legacy of the Soviet Union, perceived as the greatest enemy of the West. Yet today's Russia considers itself to be a co-author of the collapse of the USSR. This is why it has officially given up on the idea of reintegrating the post-Soviet space – not to demonstrate any imperial ambitions. It does insist, though, on there being a sphere of 'privileged' interests, which inevitably evokes associations with the idea of rebuilding the empire.⁴⁷⁴ It also maintains 'positive' memories of the USSR: the role it played in defeating fascism, its place among the victims of totalitarianism, and the contribution made by Moscow in the Gorbachev era to ending the Cold War.

Russia still claims it has a universal role in the world. Its historical mission is not currently expressed in such ideological forms as a 'Third Rome', Pan-Slavism or Communism, but Russia stands in the front line in the conflict with international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other threats to the democratic (multi-polar) international order.

Russia has a plurality of images. There are large discrepancies between what Russians imagine about themselves and how they are perceived externally. In spite of all the promotional activities, marketing and lobbying, the country's image remains largely negative in the world due to the persistence of old stereotypes, the West's reluctance to accept that changes have been made, and anti-Russian propaganda. This is a source of frustration for the Moscow elites and the Russian media, and feeds anti-Western sentiment, for the Russians know very well that the problem of Russia's image in international relations is largely a function of what systems of power emerge and what Russia's place within them will be.⁴⁷⁵ Russia's place in the international hierarchy depends on how quickly it can rebuild its international identity, based on unity with the West in the axiological sphere, full participation in global processes, and cooperation with its partners in the European Union.

⁴⁷² *Rossii XXI veka: obraz zhelaemogo zavtra*, Ekon-Inform, Moscow 2010.

⁴⁷³ K. Simonov, *Énergeticheskaia sverkhderzhava*, Algoritm, Moscow 2006.

⁴⁷⁴ When the defence of such interests becomes too assertive, as in the case of the skirmish with Georgia in 2008, the aggressive, predatory elements of Russia's image prevail.

⁴⁷⁵ E. Galumov, "Imidzh Rossii v global'nom prostranstve", *Mir i politika* 2008, No. 9, p. 44.

CHAPTER IX

A return to *Realpolitik* in Russian-Western relations as a result of the conflict in Ukraine

1. The background of Russia's new confrontation with the West

There is enormous turmoil in the relations between Russia and the West. It is said that Russia is promoting a strategy of war, aggression and disinformation, as if the West, and particularly the United States, were innocent in this respect. After all, it is not Russia that is encroaching upon America's sphere of influence – the opposite is the case. The West is intervening in Russia's traditional sphere of influence in the guise of missionary and liberator. If we are consistent in opposing spheres of dependence and influence, then neither the United States nor the EU are in the right, since by pushing Russia out they seek to expand their own domain and advantages.⁴⁷⁶ If we assume that the civilizational and geopolitical allegiance of the countries located between Poland and Russia is an open question, the ongoing rivalry over gaining new influence is justified, which builds the hope that those states, and especially Ukraine, can be torn away from Russia. Yet many of the post-Soviet states and societies do not really know yet where they want to be. Few give much thought to the costs and consequences of such geopolitical 'reassignments', though in the meantime the blood of innocent people is being shed, and Ukraine is a victim of the confrontation in every respect.⁴⁷⁷ Unless the Western states take a critical look at their own activities in the region, no moralising on their part

⁴⁷⁶ What follows is a return to a 'zero-sum game' reminiscent of the Cold War rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs.

⁴⁷⁷ A. Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 2014.

will be able to conceal the fact that they are the co-authors of Ukraine's tragedy. Arming Ukraine leads directly to an escalation of the war, not to peace. It is also high time people understood that the Russians have the same right to defend their interests as any other state or nation. The West cannot build an international order based solely on its own values and its feeling of superiority over the rest of the world. In international relations, compromise requires that every participants give up its 'only reasonable' solutions based on self-adoration and having the advantage. Furthermore, Russian citizens have the right to be fearful of outside aggression.

The dramatic events in Ukraine in 2014, known as the 'revolution of dignity',⁴⁷⁸ caused a fundamental change in relations between Russia and the West. Various international groups expressed their condemnation of and indignation at Russia's violations of international law. The UN General Assembly deemed the Crimean referendum of 16 March 2014 as unlawful, while the Security Council passed a motion by the United States (with Russia voting against and China abstaining) for the preservation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. In April 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe suspended Russia's right to vote in that forum, and the G7 expelled Russia, condemning its annexation of Crimea and consenting to the imposition of coordinated sanctions. Since then, Russia has been isolated in the Euroatlantic arena, and this has hurt the Russian economy.⁴⁷⁹ It is true that Russia continues to supply EU states with natural gas (31%) and petroleum (27%), but Western investments in the country have declined dramatically, which is prompting Russia to look for partners in Asia. This is one of the reasons why China has a chance of stepping in as a strategic investor in Siberia and the Far East.⁴⁸⁰

The current confrontation between Russia and the West cannot be understood without examining the anti-Russian currents in the political thought of the United States, which seek to take advantage of Russia's weakness in order to secure the US's position as world hegemon.⁴⁸¹ Various plans for expanding US influence at Russia's expense, including the dismemberment of Russia itself (Zbigniew Brzezinski, William Kristol, Robert

⁴⁷⁸ K. Bachmann, I. Lyubashenko (eds), *The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention: Ukraine's Complex Transition*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2014.

⁴⁷⁹ P. Dobriansky, A. Olechowski, Y. Satoh, I. Yurgens, *Engaging Russia: A Return to Containment? Report to the Trilateral Commission: 65*, The Trilateral Commission, Washington, DC- Paris-Tokyo 2014, p. 62.

⁴⁸⁰ B. Lo, J.I. Bekkevold (eds), *Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2019.

⁴⁸¹ A.P. Tsygankov, *Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009.

Kagan, George Friedman) cannot be treated in Moscow as anything other than warning signals to which the Russians naturally react defensively. The consolidation of power and stability in Russia were interpreted by the US as a threat to its position. A negative narrative was created, in which there was no place for the common interests of Russia and the West.⁴⁸² In the first half of the 1990s, Russia tried to open up to the US, but found it was not being treated in a friendly manner, like an ally and partner, but as a potential enemy. It is hard to say whether the Western leaders of the time lacked imagination, or simply political will. “In exchange for consent to the dismantling of the empire and the Warsaw Pact, and to the reunification of Germany, all Gorbachev got in return were promises by President Bush (Senior) and German Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that NATO would not expand into the territory of the former Eastern bloc, and that the new Russia would receive assistance with carrying out reforms and would be recognized as a valuable partner in international cooperation”.⁴⁸³ In other words, the West responded to Gorbachev’s *Idealpolitik* and naive faith and trust with arrogance and ‘informal’ obligations it in fact treated with disregard. This claim, however, is difficult for mainstream political observers in the West to swallow, since for them, Russia and Putin must be the main perpetrators of all the world’s woes, while the West is bathed in a halo as an innocent witness, or even a victim.

2. The foundations of Russian *Realpolitik*

When speaking of Russia’s return to *Realpolitik*,⁴⁸⁴ our attention is directed towards politics as it is actually practised, with power ranking above ideal, principles or morality.⁴⁸⁵ What counts is to have a goal conceived in measurable categories, not conduct based on ideological or legal grounds. The word has a pejorative connotation, and is often used in the context of Machiavellianism (the use of ethically and morally reprehensible methods). In the German encyclopaedia *Der Grosse Brockhaus*, *Realpolitik* is the

⁴⁸² A.E. Stent, *The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford 2014.

⁴⁸³ A. Walicki, “Czy Władimir Putin może stać się ideowym przywódcą światowego konserwyzmu?” [“Can Vladimir Putin Become an Ideological Leader of World Conservatism?”], *Przegląd Polityczny* 2015, No. 130, p. 43.

⁴⁸⁴ The word was coined by Ludwig August von Rochau, a German writer and politician of the 19th century, and was propagated by Otto von Bismarck.

⁴⁸⁵ J. Bew, “The Real Origins of Realpolitik”, *The National Interest*, March-April 2014, No. 130, p. 40-52.

“politics of possibilities”, identical with neither a pure politics of interests (*Interessenpolitik*) nor an unscrupulous politics of power (*Machtpolitik*). It means adjusting political goals to actual circumstances, resigning from one’s convictions in favour of certain necessities.⁴⁸⁶ “Realistic politics” has been and is conducted by various powers. A classic example of the application of the rules of *Realpolitik* is that of England, and later Great Britain. The British often gave up on their convictions in favour of necessity, subordinating themselves to the balance of power in line with the motto of Henry VIII – *cui adhaereo, praeest* (“He whom I aid conquers”). In the eyes of the French, British politicians, guided by the wisdom that “England has neither eternal enemies nor eternal friends, only eternal interests”, earned themselves the name “perfidious Albion”. The notorious British policy of appeasement towards Hitler had a lot of *Realpolitik* in it, for Britain needed time to complete its own armament programme. Few today remember this.⁴⁸⁷

During the Cold War, the United States supported many bloody dictatorships, as long as they were not communist. This is especially so in Latin America. *Realpolitik* became associated with Henry Kissinger during the administration of Richard Nixon, who rejected doctrinal or ethic assumptions in favour of the search for a practical compromise between the superpowers (for example, by normalising relations with the People’s Republic of China regardless of opposition to communism and the doctrine of containment).⁴⁸⁸ Above all, *Realpolitik* involves a state making ideological compromises in order to effectively satisfy its interests. Today as well, the United States often supports authoritarian regimes to ensure regional security or loyalty (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan). It is indulgent towards China, counting on the strength of the Chinese economy and turning a blind eye to the nature of China’s internal regime. The US also engages in *Realpolitik* towards Russia. It is ready to support any political regime, democratic or not, as long as that regime is anti-Russian.

Realpolitik is contrary to many principles of international law, such as the right of nations to self-determination. Most national, ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities in the world cannot exercise that right out of respect

⁴⁸⁶ T. Marczak, “Wokół pojęcia racji stanu” [“Around the Concept of the *Raison d’Etat*”], *Racja Stanu. Studia i Materiały* 2007, No. 1, p. 7.

⁴⁸⁷ P.M. Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy: 1865-1980*, George Allen & Unwin, London 1981; J. Record, *Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s*, Strategic Studies Institute – U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 2005.

⁴⁸⁸ W. Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow*, The New Press, New York 1998; W. Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency*, Hill and Wang, New York 1999.

for other principles, particularly those of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, which are dictated by the interests of existing states. If a minority obtains outside support and becomes incorporated into another country through annexation or aggression, as happened in Crimea, the world cries out against such a violation of legal standards. Yet this is simply a manifestation of *Realpolitik*. In Crimea, Russia considered the specific causative factors and concluded that it was worth taking action to annex and incorporate Crimea. It had to take account of what the costs would be – psychologically, morally and materially.⁴⁸⁹

Russia has resorted to *Realpolitik* many times in its history. It did so in the 19th century, when it rebuilt its position after its defeat in the Crimean War, and again during the Bolshevik period (the treaties of Brest and Rapallo), and as the USSR under Stalin (the von Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the great conferences of World War II). During the Cold War, it was motivated by ideological principles, but in order to offset the West was ready to enter into ‘exotic alliances’ with states of the ‘Third World’ that had nothing to do with communism. After the 20th CPSU congress in 1956, the Soviet leadership decided in favour of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the West, which led to the *détente* of the 1970s.⁴⁹⁰

The new Russia was faced with the difficult task of redefining its internal and international identities. Having lost its empire and dropped a few notches in the hierarchy of powers, Russia has begun to look for a middle way between the Europeanness it has always pursued and the opportunities opening up in Asia. Russia’s continental scope determines these two poles, though today the country is more Eurasian than ever before, perhaps even more than its past rulers ever desired.⁴⁹¹

There are many pathologies in Russia that hinder the country’s modernization (electoral manipulation; control over the mass media and the activities of non-governmental organizations; the increasing role of the apparatus of violence, including the special services; increasing bureaucracy

⁴⁸⁹ Russia behaves similarly with regard to the ‘frozen conflicts’ in quasi-states in its ‘near abroad’, treating them as an instrument for putting pressure on uninvolved states. This concerns Transnistria, the Republic of Artsakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This policy of *divide et impera* is a relict of the times when Moscow had full authority over these areas. The West’s refusal to let Russia determine the fate of these lands and people led to resistance expressed in the boycotting of all initiatives that would have caused an increase in the autonomy of those geopolitical entities.

⁴⁹⁰ G. Liska, *Russia and the Road to Appeasement: Cycles of East-West Conflict in War and Peace*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore-London 1982.

⁴⁹¹ N. Popescu, *Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely*, Institut d’études de sécurité, Paris 2014.

and widespread corruption; state intervention in the economy; a lack of respect for the law; steering of the legislature and judiciary; a concentration of personalized power in the hands of the president). Yet Russia still has serious military potential, enormous human capital and highly-developed cybertechnologies that enable it to play an important role internationally. Mobilising society by means of patriotic feeling is an important factor in the legitimacy of presidential power. Unless this changes, there is no chance of there being any modification of Russia's current internal and external policy.

Because of its transcontinental nature, Russia attaches particular importance to the real balance of power in the international system, for this is what determines the form of the normative order, and how the rules of the game are interpreted, evolve and diffuse. Russia's position in this respect is the result of its experiences during the first decade after the end of the Cold War, when the West took advantage of the weakness of Yeltsinist Russia's weakness and imposed a structural and normative hegemony on the world. Russian criticism of this American unilateralism mainly concerned the lawless use of force by the United States and NATO in Iraq and Yugoslavia. As Russia's potential increased, largely due to favourable conditions on the energy resources market, it became able to take on a more decisive and assertive stance. Its promotion of a universalistic vision of the normative order, and its objective to the relativism imposed by the American hegemon, reached their peak in Vladimir Putin's address at a Munich security conference in February 2007. At that time, he opposed a concentration of authority, decision-making power and force in the hands of a single power, and promoted polycentrism and multilateralism.⁴⁹² He called for the restoration of the authority of the Security Council, whose decisions should not be circumvented or undermined by regional organizations, particularly NATO and the European Union.

Against the background of its own vision of the international order, Russia realistically evaluates its own resources and is aware of their importance in the northern hemisphere. Its geopolitical influence is based on its being the largest country in the world, its inexhaustible supplies of natural resources, its status in international institutions and its global ambitions and aspirations. The fact that its borders run through regions of strategic importance for international security make it a participant in decision-making processes concerning stability and security in Central Asia, the Near

⁴⁹² A. Zagorski, "Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy Approaches", in: E. Wilson Rowe, S. Torjesen (eds), *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London 2009, pp. 46-57.

and Middle East, the Far East and Pacific, the Arctic, and Northern and Eastern Europe. None of the currently important international security problems – Korea, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria – can be solved without Russia's position at least being taken into account. This also applies to combating international terrorism or preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These examples show what Russia's position as a great power involves. In the field of strategy, only the United States of America can equipoise Russia. With its military and energy resources, Russia can stabilize – or destabilize – international relations.⁴⁹³ By controlling transit and transport routes between Europe and Asia, it has a great effect on the international transmission of raw materials and the trade in goods.

Russia is a participant in all of the most important bodies deciding the fate of our planet, from the UN Security Council (permanent membership) to the G20, the OSCE, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Council of Europe, and is an associate of the APEC and ASEAN. Its initiatives for Eurasian integration, even if for now they have not gone beyond the conceptual stage, cannot be treated lightly, for Russia's political leaders are determined to see them through.

Russia's political decision-makers and economic circles are strongly motivated and ready to help Russia acquire as much prestige as possible in international relations. Their efforts are conditioned by ideological values, national traditions and aspirations, the personalities and ambitions of politicians, and the effectiveness of Russian diplomacy. Based on these factors, Russia counts itself among the world's most important powers, one that must be reckoned with in all important matters. It takes on particular responsibility for the Eurasian landmass, which places it in opposition to such players as the United States, the EU and China. At the same time, this position enables it to effectively play against those powers, to negate their policies, or enter into partnerships that counterbalance theirs.⁴⁹⁴

Classic realists such as Henry Kissinger, the greatest modern advocate of *Realpolitik*, believe that the only way to keep the peace is to maintain

⁴⁹³ *Realpolitik* suggests evaluating Russia not through the lens of ad hoc favourable or unfavourable conditions, but as a strategic partner in solving serious international problems, including the prices of energy resources. This matter is equally important for Russia and the United States, for it turns out that suddenly drops in the price of oil, and especially of natural gas, hit the United States just as hard as Russia, since the US has become involved in extracting non-conventional fuel deposits. Russia became a victim of the 'oil war' by chance, caught between the OPEC cartel and the United States. Predictions are now being made that the American oil crisis may force Washington to reach an understanding with Moscow to stop the price madness. This would be a clear sign of *Realpolitik*.

⁴⁹⁴ J.S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, New York 2011.

an objective balance of power, even if this means that democratic and dictatorial states must cooperate with each other.⁴⁹⁵ In this sense, they call for a peaceful arrangement with Russia, not further ‘engagement’, for example by means of a new ‘containment’. States differ from each other in how they conceive governance and justice, but this should be subordinate to what is most essential – maintain the stability of the international order. Seen in this light, Russia functions as a balance in regional power arrangements, and this in fact is conducive to the United States maintaining its position as world leader. Russia’s involvement in combating fundamentalist and terrorist movements also serves American interests, as do its taking part in world trade under WTO terms, its guaranteeing energy security through reliable energy supplies, its protection of transport routes and its influence over the arms trade. Of course, all of these can be seen in a negative light, but even then Russia’s role in America’s strategy should not be dismissed out of hand. Who knows if Russia, with its nuclear potential, is not more important for international security than China is as an economic rival?⁴⁹⁶

Criticising the United States, Russia was conducting a campaign for the creation of mechanisms by which the main global powers would lead collectively. The world perceived this as an attempt to build up a new ‘concert of powers’ reminiscent of the Vienna system of the 19th century. The difference was that Russia saw it as having room not just for the Western powers, but also for ‘emerging’ powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa. As globalization progressed – Russia said – the West was losing its monopoly on setting the rules of the game and dictating international standards of behaviour.⁴⁹⁷

In February 2014, relations between Russia and the United States worsened so drastically that, in the pre-nuclear era, the two countries would most certainly have declared war on each other. Yet the two sides, fully aware of the potential consequences of an all-out war, confined themselves to a ‘war of nerves’, that is, an escalation of tensions by means of defamation, psychological diversions, propaganda, a policy of economic sanctions, and the shredding of forums of consultation and channels of communication.⁴⁹⁸ Russia took a hard stance on Ukraine. It is betting on the Ukrainian

⁴⁹⁵ H. Kissinger, *World Order...*, op. cit., p. 371.

⁴⁹⁶ D.S. Zakheim, “Restoring American Preeminence”, *The National Interest*, March-April 2015, No. 136, pp. 29-38.

⁴⁹⁷ R. Allison, *Russia, the West...*, op. cit., pp. 170-183.

⁴⁹⁸ G. Allison, D.K. Simes, “Stumbling to War”, *The National Interest*, May-June 2015, No. 137, pp. 9-21.

authorities becoming weaker and losing their political legitimacy. While officially refusing to support the separatists and self-proclaimed republics in Eastern Ukraine, Russia is ensuring that they endure, and at the same time protecting its own interests against their taking 'independent' decisions or reckless initiatives. Russia's political leaders (the 'collective Putin') are proceeding methodically and surely, not giving way under pressure from the United States. They are aware that a decline in American hegemony will bring about aggressive responses. Three decades after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the US's greatest enemy in the form of the USSR, the Washington political elites have grown used to considering themselves the 'owner' of the world. They cannot imagine US hegemony being challenged by anyone – especially by Russia, which they had written off as being incapable of acting as 'an equal among equals' after the devastation it endured in the 1990s. The job of Russia's leadership, then, is to keep the peace, or at keep up appearances, for as long as possible.⁴⁹⁹

Realpolitik requires patience and prudence. In accordance with the maxim of the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, Russia is aware that "the greatest victory is the one that requires no battle". For this reason, it has avoided a direct invasion of Ukraine, but is influencing how the conflict progresses and making proposals for how it might be resolved. This approach is supported by that of Henry Kissinger, who argues that the process of forming and modelling societies normally spans many decades, if not centuries, and that therefore all external interventions for the purpose of accelerating political change in a given state naturally lead to a destabilization of the existing balance. After the constitutional coup in Ukraine, in March 2014 Kissinger spoke out in the *Washington Post*.⁵⁰⁰ He warned against a confrontation between the United States and Russia, which could end up as a nuclear conflict. He called for a road of neutralization for Ukraine, something like that taken by Finland during the Cold War. Though Kissinger's view has been criticised, to this day there is no real alternative to it.⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁹ *Realpolitik* suggests taking account of the power relationship in all strategies, both those based in rivalry and those based on cooperation or accommodation. The use of a unilateral advantage must always be based on a guarantee of victory, or at least of no deterioration from the starting point. Neglecting these conditions is a recipe for disaster for all sides concerned.

⁵⁰⁰ H.A. Kissinger, "To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End", *The Washington Post*, 5 March 2014.

⁵⁰¹ Ch. Lehmann, *A Response to Henry Kissinger's Advise on US-Russian Relations and the Ukraine*, <http://nbc.com/2014/03/09/response-henry-kissingers-advise-us-russian-relations-ukraine> (1.09.2014).

3. The risk of an escalation in the conflict

There is plenty of evidence that the Russian-American conflict cannot be brought to an end by a quick compromise, since that would be a negation of the hegemonic aspirations of both sides. The specific type of network or hybrid war under way will likely go on for years, provided that neither power makes a mistake that causes it to escalate.

Russia will continue to exercise its right to articulate and protect its own interests. It will defend against any active presence in the post-Soviet space, which it still regards as its sphere of 'privileged interests'. In defining its vital interests, Russia sets limits on how close Western institutions for security and integration can approach it. Though this may irritate Western politicians, they should not treat it lightly. A clash with the United States became inevitable when the Americans crossed that 'red line', and consequences of the hostile steps taken against Russia have not discouraged its leadership from conducting a decisive policy aimed at maintaining its advantage in the post-Soviet space.⁵⁰²

By annexing Crimea, Russia opposed the West and proved that once again it is up for serious challenges. Its *Realpolitik* now involves a calculated risk concerning a further escalation of the conflict. While Russia is not able to defeat the United States militarily or match it economically, it is able to stand in the way of the geopolitical aspirations of other powers. And like the US, it is aware that the use of nuclear weapons in any armed conflict between the two would be senseless. That is why both sides must look at the balance of conventional measures, and in this the ability to mobilize allies and their potential is an important factor. It has been estimated, based simply on how votes are distributed at the UN, that those states that, along with Russia, tend to oppose the United States currently control almost 60% of global GDP, and comprise 2/3 of the world's population spread out across more than 3/4 of its surface. The growth trend of those states belonging to the BRICS group may pose a threat to Western influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This should give those governing the United States and the EU food for thought.⁵⁰³

Putin's Russia rejects the idealistic vision of moving closer to the West, or rather, it has awakened from the delusions that have existed in various

⁵⁰² J.L. Black, M. Johns, A. Theriault (eds), *The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia*, Routledge, London-New York 2017.

⁵⁰³ *The Ukraine Crisis and the End of the Post-Cold War European Order: Options for NATO and the EU*. Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen 2014.

political circles since the time of ‘new thinking’ and the idea of a ‘common European home’ from the Gorbachev period.⁵⁰⁴ In subverting the universalism of Western values, Russia has decided to defend its own path of development. It objects to the use of instruments of external pressure on its political reforms, viewing these as attempts to interfere in its internal matters, and it accuses the West of treating it unequally, for example, in comparison with China, which is not subject to such criticism from the West on the issue of human rights.⁵⁰⁵

After it imposed sanctions against Russia, the Western world enjoyed watching the rouble fall, oil prices collapse, Russia’s currency reserves become depleted and its economy shrink to the size of Mexico’s. It is now fashionable to anticipate that Russia will collapse, or at least become so weak that it will no longer have a place among the great powers. Few analytical centres dealing with Russia and the post-Soviet space try to show any alternative developmental path for the East, such as an alliance between Russia and China, or the creation of an economic system based on the renminbi and the rouble, that could threaten the West. Those reckonings fail to take account of Russia’s real potential, inherent in its natural resources and increasing GDP. Nor do they consider a certain inertia or the risks entailed by a possible collapse of the Russian economy. No one knows whether the West would not then be subjected to shocks that could weaken it economically. Moreover, little attention is paid to the scale of desperation or the determination of the Russian state – and Russian society – to defend its national interests. In other words, geopolitics does not submit easily to economic calculations.⁵⁰⁶ It may turn out that, contrary to the expectations of various Western liberals, the Russian economic crisis will not lead to any change at all in Russia’s political leadership.

As part of the psychological and information war with Russia, it is trendy to insult and belittle the Russian president. It is said that Vladimir Putin is no great strategist, but only reacts to events as they happen. The annexation of Crimea was not part of any ‘great plan’. An opportunity simply arose that Russia took advantage of. Even so, there is no denying that Putin is effective. Portraying him as a devil actually resulted from the weakness of the West, which had little understanding of what was happening in Ukraine (for example, no one foresaw that Ukrainian soldiers would have zero determination to defend the occupied territory), or of

⁵⁰⁴ A. Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996.

⁵⁰⁵ This approach means that only if the West accepts Russia’s dissimilarities will it be possible to develop new formulas for the two sides to co-exist.

⁵⁰⁶ L.H. Gelb, “Détente Plus”, *The National Interest*, July-August 2015, No. 138, pp. 9-21.

today's Russians. It may be that the hatred expressed towards Putin is due to the West's powerlessness against his determination and the growing anti-Western feeling in Russia.⁵⁰⁷

Within certain Western political circles, one can currently observe people speaking out in a spirit of *Realpolitik*. Because showing cracks in the official anti-Russian front would be unthinkable, such statements are left to former high state officials or others of lower rank. For example, Gerhard Schröder (Chancellor of Germany 1998-2005) and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (President of France 1974-1981) expressed their belief that Russia has a greater right to Crimea than Ukraine does, because it was Russia, not Ukraine, that wrested Crimea from the hands of the Turks. Without a doubt, the annexation of Crimea was a violation of international law; however, it was based on evidence of the will of the people of Crimea. The annexation was carried out by a series of *faits accomplis*, which are normative in nature.⁵⁰⁸ In today's circumstances, the return of Crimea to Ukraine is improbable, and Western politicians, who did little to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, will have to deal with this.

4. Poland vs Russian *Realpolitik*

The baggage of historical experience, and above all of the expansion of the Russian state at the expense of the Polish state, preserves the image of a dangerous Russian empire in the minds of Poles, for whom it is almost axiomatic that Russia is looking to take revenge for its defeat in the Cold War and to regain its position as an imperial power – at least within the area of its former domination.⁵⁰⁹

On more than one occasion in history, Poland wasted an opportunity to build a strong position for itself in the East. One of the best-known examples of this is provided by Sigismund III Vasa. If the Polish king had

⁵⁰⁷ M.H. Van Herpen, *Putinism: The Slow Rise of a Radical Right Regime in Russia*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2013.

⁵⁰⁸ *Faits accomplis* usually result from political force. Taking over a certain territory with support from its inhabitants provides a basis for annexation or incorporation, even though international law does not recognize the legality of such actions. *Faits accomplis* may become normative in character, however, through a decision expressed in the form of a treaty *ex post*, or through silent acceptance. Either way, the change is acknowledged, as in the case of quasi-states that exist as independent entities by *consuetudo*.

⁵⁰⁹ A. Nowak, "Rosja: mocarstwo schodzące" ["Russia: a Declining Power"], in: A. Dmochowski (ed.), *Między Unią a Rosją [Between the Union and Russia]*, Wydawnictwo Słowa i Myśli, Warszawa 2013, p. 73.

accepted the coronation of Władysław IV Vasa in the Orthodox rite, then perhaps there would have existed not a Russian empire, but a Slavic empire of the Republic of Poland, Lithuania and All-Russia. Of course, this is but a speculative digression. Nevertheless, there is an unquestionable hypothesis in Polish historiography that Russia has always sought to expand its influence westward at Poland's expense. A different hypothesis is deliberately overlooked, that Polish expansion eastward was imperialistic in nature and involved the conquest of ethnically alien lands. Andrzej Drawicz, a distinguished Polish expert on Russia, enjoyed employing alternative histories. He wondered what would have happened if the Poles (Prince Józef Poniatowski) had settled into the Kremlin as victors, rather than the Russians (Grand Prince Konstantin Romanov) in the Bevedere. At a certain point the power arrangement determined that faltering Poland should yield to Russia. This was no decree of fate or divine punishment.⁵¹⁰ The fall of the Polish state brought a wave of repressions and further tragedies. As a result, two different narratives of the history of the two nations formed – one from a position of an imperial power, one from the perspective of its victim. The mental asymmetry that thus arose does not permit either side to take a critical view of the role each has played in causing the current state of relations between them.

Poland must deal with Russia as a great power, but this state of affairs meets with most resistance in Poland's governing elites, for the question arises over whether to reconcile oneself to Russia's status, or to try to undermine and change it. Because Poland has no means at all of implementing the second option, it has no choice but to accept the existing power relationship and to look for a *modus vivendi* in its relations with Russia. *Realpolitik* dictates the conditions of understandings not between those who one would want to see at the negotiating table, but between those who are actually sitting there. Poland's dream that Russia without Putin would gladly talk with the West represents nothing but a failure to understand reality.

Poland is suffering from a lack of its own geopolitical thought. It seems unable to create conceptions that would be in accordance with its national tradition and wisdom, and at the same time respond to contemporary circumstances and challenges.⁵¹¹ Seen against the confrontation between the

⁵¹⁰ S. Bieleń, "Andrzej Drawicz – rzecznik zbliżenia dwu państw i narodów" ["Andrzej Drawicz - Advocate for the Rapprochement of Two States and Peoples"], in: M. Dobroczyński (ed.), *Polacy i Rosjanie: czynniki zbliżenia [Poles and Russians: Factors of Rapprochement]*, Centrum Badań Wschodnich Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego-Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 1998, pp. 9-36.

⁵¹¹ R. Starosielec, "O upadku myśli politycznej w Polsce" ["On the Decline of Political Thought in Poland"], *Polityka Polska* 2015, No. 2, pp. 27-31.

West and Russia, Poland can only win if it takes part in trans-European and Euroatlantic cooperation along the lines of US-EU-Russia-China in the form of a *plurilogue*,⁵¹² that is, wise participation in multilateral communication. 'Jagiellonian' conceptions and visions of the Intermarium with anti-Russian overtones should yield to a pragmatic strategy of a state that earns money from transit, acting as an intermediary primarily in transport, communication and the trade in good between the East and the West. By aligning itself with America, Poland puts itself in the position of a frontier state serving the interests of the American plutocracy in a confrontation with Russia, conducting a policy directed against its two most powerful neighbours to the east and the west, and worse still, a policy that is not in line with its own national interest.

Realpolitik allows politicians to justify, by calling on vital interests, especially a mythologized 'raison d'état' or a 'state of higher necessity', actions that are morally ambiguous or even contrary to the law in force. In Poland, one of the best-known such events was the agreement to have CIA prisons on Polish soil. Apart from a few isolated voices (Józef Pinior, Adam Bodnar), there was no objection to this government policy. Centres professionally involved in protecting human rights were silent, not to mention the Churches. Does that mean that Polish society, and especially its ruling elites, unthinkingly accept the national interest as an expression of a higher necessity, and thereby accept *Realpolitik*? But in the name of what values? Is solidarity with the United States on every matter and at any price not an abuse of the trust of Polish society? Or perhaps this is not a question of *Realpolitik* at all, only evidence of Polish naïveté and the servilism of its government? Perhaps Polish society is too deeply indoctrinated and has no chance of understanding politics rationally? This phenomenon of indoctrination and anti-rationalism was highlighted in the context of the war in Ukraine.⁵¹³ How easily people let themselves be deceived by self-righteous amateurs pretending to be statesmen, who considered the fight against Russia to be the Polish state's top priority, even if it meant going against Poland's national interest.

Two dangerous myths govern Polish politics: one about 'eternal' guarantees from the West, the other about the need to engage in a policy encouraging rivalry between Germany and Russia. The lessons of history have not helped some people grasp the obvious truth that it is not wise to

⁵¹² A term used by Ursula Caser, an OSCE expert from Portugal, during a meeting of the Coordinating Project on Ukrainian issues in Odessa in December 2014. E. Minkow, "For a Plurilogue in Ukraine", *Security Community* 2014, No. 4, p. 29.

⁵¹³ S. Bieleń, "Wokół Ukrainy" ["Around Ukraine"], *Polityka Polska* 2015, No. 1, pp. 37-47.

'look for friends far away, and enemies close at hand'.⁵¹⁴ Yet disseminating the myth of Poland as an American 'wedge' driven between Russia and Germany⁵¹⁵ serves to perpetuate such myths. The United States is using Poland's difficult geopolitical situation and playing on Poland's phobias about its neighbour, since this opens the way for it to achieve its own strategic interests in this part of the world. Any ideas about Poland acting as a regional power, with Washington's help, may bring more harm than good. For such a role does not result solely from a state's aspirations and external protection, but from its actual political significance and economic capacity. Since Poland is not able on its own to affect the course of international events and processes within its immediate neighbourhood or regional groupings, it is hard to imagine on what scale it would be able to make itself be heard as a regional power. It is also worth remembering that any state's international role, if it results from outside protection, has no chance of legitimacy in the broader international community, simply because it lacks credibility.

The idea of the United States appointing Poland as a regional leader has not met with enthusiasm in Poland's vicinity.⁵¹⁶ Nor has it been acknowledged by the 'old' members of the European Union. Furthermore, consenting to take on the role of regional leader backed by America means giving up a certain amount of decision-making autonomy. There are already disturbing signs that Poland is not articulating its own interests and is uncritically accepting America's interpretation of reality, for example, on the question of the UN Security Council authorising and legitimising the use of force in international relations and ignoring international law. No answers are forthcoming on the question of where Poland's national interest coincides with that of the United States, and where the two diverge (without necessarily being contrary). A similar diagnosis can be made with respect to the EU, which does nothing to strengthen pro-EU argumentation.

One would expect the Polish political elites to show a little courage in emphasising the importance of Polish interests and in distancing themselves from conceptions that do not suit the Polish point of view on the world, even when these are put forward by Poland's closest and largest allies. Poland's friendly relations with the United States do not require

⁵¹⁴ Idem, "Poland between Germany and Russia – Determinism or Geopolitical Pluralism?" in: S. Bieleń (ed.), *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Difin, Warszawa 2010, pp. 272-291.

⁵¹⁵ G. Friedman, *The Next Decade...*, op. cit., pp. 1134-137.

⁵¹⁶ A. Antczak-Barzan, "Zmiany w środowisku bezpieczeństwa Polski w warunkach członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej" ["Changes in the Security Environment of Poland under Conditions of Membership in the European Union"], *Studia Europejskie* 2014, No. 2, pp. 9-28.

Poland to acquiesce in every move made by Washington.⁵¹⁷ It is high time for Poland to take a good look at its own inferiority complex and to accept its own greatness. The capacity to view reality critically need not mean that one fall in the eyes of others. On the contrary, it can enhance the level at which one takes part in working out rational solutions to problems. Poland should act together with other European allies of the United States, not try to push to the forefront by always trying to guess what its mentor wants. Subservience towards those who are stronger attests to weakness, not strength; to passivity and reactivity, not creativity and initiative. It is evidence of a kind of ‘auto-satellization’, even if that association brings completely other times and geopolitical directions to mind.⁵¹⁸

In Polish-Russian relations, there is a high level of mistrust that hinders contacts and the prospects for normalization. Russia’s problem is that it behaves dogmatically, whereas its partners, Poland included, are not willing to display greater empathy towards it or make the first move in helping Russia transform – not according to the Western model, but according to its own specific character and circumstances. Poland’s eastern policy lacks a grand political vision that could be used for years by successive generations of politicians. To be effective, any such vision must take account of reality. Poland has needlessly put itself on the front line between the Western democracies and the Eastern autocracies. Situated between great powers to the east and west, Poland could become a bridge between them, alleviating the new ideological division. Instead, it has chosen to take one side only, which immediately brought it into conflict with Russia. On top of this, Poland makes political use of a martyrological and heroic interpretation of history that has ended up encumbering the process of a normalization of relations with the ‘Katyn syndrome’⁵¹⁹.

Polish politicians see Poland’s active role only in terms of worsening relations with Russia. No one is suggesting positive scenarios or looking for opportunities for agreement. It is simply taken as an axiom that one cannot make a deal with Russia and that normalization is impossible.

⁵¹⁷ Zdzisław Najder wrote about this cautiously, “Błąd cielęcego proamerykanizmu” [“The Error of Foolish Pro-Americanism”], *Rzeczpospolita*, 9-11 November 2002.

⁵¹⁸ M. Stolarczyk, “Główne dylematy bezpieczeństwa zewnętrznego Polski w połowie drugiej dekady XXI wieku” [“Main Dilemmas of Poland’s External Security in the Middle of the Second Decade of the 21st Century”], in: K. Czornik, M. Lakomy (eds), *Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski...*, [Dilemmas of Polish Security Policy...], op. cit., p. 22 et seq.

⁵¹⁹ S. Bieleń, A. Skrzypek, D. Karnaukhov, O. Petrovskaia (eds), *Rossiisko-pol’skie otnosheniia v zerkale geopoliticheskikh kontseptsii*, Rossiiskii institut strategicheskikh issledovaniï, Moscow 2015, p. 266.

Poland suffers from a lack of faith in its own abilities and the conviction that there is no other way for it to behave. The events in Ukraine allowed Poland to become more active towards the east, but so far this has not brought any measurable results.

Poland features an unbelievable megalomania with regard to how it analyses Russian intentions. Any political activity by Russia towards Poland is interpreted as the result of some kind of premeditated decision, when in fact many events have nothing at all to do with a coherent, refined strategy. It is Poland that provokes Russia to have a high opinion of itself. The Poles stubbornly emphasize that the Russians impose conditions on them as the weaker side. Poland shows little initiative, but if Russia takes the lead there is an immediate accusation that the Russians are imposing conditions on the Poles.

Moral arrogance and ignoring the arguments of the other side are poor advisors. Since Putin's Russia is again becoming a dangerous state in the eyes of the West, while the West insists on extending its influence in the post-Soviet space, the only way out is to identify common interests and search for ways to bring the two sides together. If the 'parties of war' begin deciding on policy, nothing good will come of it. We must demand greater engagement from Western and Polish politicians in seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Ukraine; they must not allow the fighting to go on in its eastern territories. It is time to call the 'hawks' to order and open a diplomatic agenda in which the good faith of the two sides can achieve a compromise. Each side has to 'feel' the point of view of the other side and concede that each is at least partially in the right.⁵²⁰ The West should show greater initiative in mediating in the conflict in Ukraine, for it also faces challenges and deadly threats from fanatical Islamic terrorism. Who knows if Poland may not soon find itself forced to consolidate in a confrontation with an aggressive South and further waves of migrants. Without participation by the eastern part of the Eurasian continent, it will be difficult to effectively combat the jihadists under the banner of the Prophet.

A key condition for improving Russia's relations with the West is for each side to accept a Ukraine whose government would be friendly towards the West but not hostile towards Russia. The peoples of Ukraine must be able to decide whether their country joins the European Union or not. Such social consent is necessary in order to preserve Ukraine in its present form. Yet, for strategic security reasons, Ukraine must remain

⁵²⁰ Compromise is an expression of mutual respect in a situation of limited trust and incomplete cooperation; it is therefore a solution in which both sides win, though less than they could have won.

outside of NATO. This is a requirement of *Realpolitik*, not only with regard to Russia, but to other powers as well, such as China. The West will repeat certain ritual incantations about invalidating the annexation of Crimea, but will eventually come to accept it. After its recent experience with the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of sanctions,⁵²¹ the West is now aware of the need to maintain various contacts with Russia as part of an 'open door' policy. This offers a chance to forego confrontation in favour of a return to the kind of collaboration that is so needed throughout the northern hemisphere.

⁵²¹ P.D. Feaver, E.B. Lorber, "The Sanctions Myth", *The National Interest*, July-August 2015, No. 138, pp. 22-27.

CHAPTER X

Central European energy security in the American geopolitical game

1. Energy interdependence in the modern world

The dependence of the economies of the world's most powerful state on energy resources imported from abroad continues to be one of the most serious threats to the stability of the international system. Maintaining energy security is extremely costly. It has been calculated that, in the years 1970-2004, the United States incurred greater expenses in importing petroleum than the losses it incurred in all of its wars, starting from the American Revolution.⁵²² Today's forecasts call for many states to become increasingly dependent on energy imports, and this means an increased security risk, where security is understood as fundamental to existence. Paradoxically, this security deficit may affect developing economies most acutely, since they will be forced to finance their growing demand for energy at the expense of their own production capacity.⁵²³

Apart from the purely economic aspects of energy dependence, in recent decades the problems of the geopolitical costs associated with the formation of new centres of power and the financing of the activities of entities hostile towards the West have come to the fore. Energy will not do away with, but may modify, contemporary geopolitics,⁵²⁴ for it turns out that the oil trade with such powers as Saudi Arabia is conducive to an increase in the threat of terrorism, whereas advantageous fuel prices on the global markets help increase the power of Russia and Iran. This is frowned upon, mainly by the United States, which looks at the global power arrangement

⁵²² D. Greene, S. Ahmad, *Costs of U.S. Oil Dependence: 2005 Update*, Report to the US DOE, ORNL/TM-2005/45, US Department of Energy, Washington, DC, January 2005.

⁵²³ R. Bacon, M. Kojima, *Vulnerability to Oil Price Increases: A Decomposition Analysis of 161 Countries*, The World Bank, Washington, DC 2008.

⁵²⁴ E. Kochanek, *Geopolityka energetyczna współczesnych państw [The Energy Geopolitics of Modern States]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Minerwa, Szczecin 2016, p. 5.

from the position of hegemon and in terms of its own interests.⁵²⁵ The US perceives practically all energy-abundant regions of the world, and all the transport routes associated therewith, as vital for its security.⁵²⁶ It is making a big effort to quickly extract its own natural gas and oil (the shale revolution) to both improve its own economic situation and make the country a key gas exporter.⁵²⁷ In this way, energy resources become an important tool for influencing the economies of other states, especially those that remain dependent on supplies from Russia. This applies to those states in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, which see Russian energy domination as the source of an enormous threat. China's recent opening up to American fuels is also significant, since it may reduce Russia's bargaining power.

In the context of shrinking convention energy resources combined with increasing demand for renewable and access to atomic energy, a key issue is how to achieve a high level of energy self-sufficiency. It is estimated that only one quarter of the approximately 200 countries in the world are able to secure themselves by means of their own energy resources. The first that come to mind are Russia and Saudi Arabia, which not only function thanks to their energy supplies, but which can also manipulate prices to affect the economies of other countries. If we consider that Russia seeks to be a power that protects its interests in the post-Soviet space, and that Saudi Arabia seeks to be the leader of the entire Arab world, particularly as the 'quarterback' in the Near and Middle East, then there is no doubt that the West, and especially the United States of America, have reason to be worried. In recent decades, Australia has also emerged as an energy power, not so much because of its coal or oil resources, but because of its deposits of uranium ore (about 40% of global reserves).⁵²⁸

⁵²⁵ K. M. Campbell, J. Price, "The Global Politics of Energy: An Aspen Strategy Group Workshop", in: K. M. Campbell, J. Price (eds), *The Global Politics of Energy*, Aspen Institute, Washington, DC 2008, pp. 11-23.

⁵²⁶ G. Luft, "United States: A Shackled Superpower", in: G. Luft, A. Korin (eds), *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century*, Praeger, Denver, CO 2009, p. 66.

⁵²⁷ According to the International Energy Association (IEA), the United States is 81% self-sufficient, but this is not confirmed in various American reports. These maintain that, thanks to the shale oil revolution, the United States not only achieved energy self-sufficiency, but is also becoming an important exporter of energy resources to other states. IEA, *Energy Self-Sufficiency by World Region*, OECD, Paris 2011; B.K. Sovacool, M.A. Brown, S.V. Valentine, *Fact and Fiction in Global Energy Policy: Fifteen Contentious Questions*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2016, p. 276.

⁵²⁸ A. Forbes, "Australian Energy Security: The Benefits of Self-sufficiency", in: V. Gupta, Ch. Guan Kwa (eds), *Energy Security: Asia Pacific Perspectives*, India Manas Publications, New Delhi 2010, p. 120.

No matter how states try to achieve energy self-sufficiency, there is a growing belief among researchers and analytical centres that, in today's world, it is practically impossible to achieve energy independence, let alone maintain it. All producers and exporters are dependent on their customers/importers, which creates a complex system of interdependence from which breaking away is not only impossible, but unnecessary. For it turns out that even states that are completely self-sufficient in terms of energy are not 'energy safe' because of the existing interconnected global system. The dynamics of energy markets depend not only on energy resources as such, but also on the trade in the whole assortment of goods needed to extract, refine and transport energy. The best example of this is Russia, whose high position as an extractor and exporter to the energy markets would be impossible without the technologies it can acquire in the highly-developed states.⁵²⁹

If we look at Saudi Arabia or Australia, even though these countries are exporters of the energy resources they possess, crude oil in the first case and coal and uranium ore in the second, they still depend on supplies of liquid fuels they do not produce at home. More importantly still, no state is able to avoid the effects of various perturbations on the energy markets caused by a rise in comparative costs, the invention of new extraction and refinery technologies, or technological disasters such as nuclear power plant accidents. The energy market is dominated by transnational corporations whose capital does not belong to any one state, which makes them impervious to the fluctuations and risks on the world's capital markets. Energy interdependence is also due to a widespread network of institutional connections. Dozens of organizations exist, formalized to varying degrees, which help secure the energy needs of their member states or affiliates in various geographic areas.⁵³⁰

Experts also point to other manifestations of global energy interdependence. Striking evidence of how states depend on one another is provided by: the burning of coal, which poisons the environment through acid rain; the burning of forests for palm tree cultivation; emissions of greenhouse gases; and radioactive contamination. Even the exploitation of water resources for hydroelectric purposes means that inland waters are becoming harmful to human life in the ecosystem. The exploitation of the water of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers by Turkey, Syria and Iran

⁵²⁹ J. Perovic, R.W. Orttung, A. Wenger (eds), *Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation*, Routledge, London 2009.

⁵³⁰ "Fifty Major Global Institutions Involved in the Governance of Energy", in: B.K. Sovacool et al., op. cit., pp. 280-281.

has polluted the Shatt al-Arab river to such an extent that it is becoming of no use to Iraqi farmers.

These examples show that, in today's world, no state can rely solely on its own energy resources without considering how it affects other states, and vice versa. In other words, they point not only to objective material and spatial conditions, but also to our moral and legal responsibility for the Earth's natural resources and how we exploit them. The growing awareness of the benefits that flow when states work together for mutual energy security is causing states to create their own energy systems that are subject to autonomous control and resistant to possible attacks or interference from outside. At the same time, they are responding flexibly to external challenges related to balancing and stabilising energy systems at the global scale.⁵³¹ For every state "is always sailing in its own energy boat", but is exposed to the same upheavals and surprises from the weather as all the other boats.

2. The American energy game over Europe

It comes as no news to anyone that the United States of America treats the energy security of Europe as an element of its strategic interests. In this, the US's most important goal is to weaken the ties between Western Europe and Russia. At one time Washington really did try to protect Western Europe from 'Soviet blackmail'. In essence, however, both then and now, the real idea was to make sure Western European states remained under the political control of the United States, and to deprive Russia of revenue from fuel sales in order to restrict its imperial capability. The slogan of diversification became very popular in American strategy, and suited many of the US's Western European partners. The US created a complex 'machine of influence' in the form of Congressional committees, the US-EU Energy Board, a team of consultants and experts, all lobbying in various countries and in various international forums. As a result, EU states now go along with the American narrative, which categorically states that Europe needs "liberation from the smothering gas grip" of Russia (Amos J. Hochstein⁵³²).

⁵³¹ K. Massy, "Governance Challenges and the Role of the United States in the New Energy Landscape", in: D. Steven, E. O'Brien, B. Jones (eds), *The New Politics of Strategic Resources: Energy and Food Security Challenges in the 21st Century*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2015, pp. 318-333.

⁵³² Special representative and coordinator of international energy in the Barack Obama administration.

Ukraine is also part of the plan; through energy dependence and other measures, the West is trying to pull Ukraine towards itself, away from Russian influence.⁵³³ Interestingly, in this energy game the media keep silent about American gas prices,⁵³⁴ which result from logistical costs – mainly liquefaction. Once the political decisions to reorient sources of supply have been taken, it will be too late to grumble that the prices of gas from across the ocean are too high.

The coming decades will roll by under the sign of energy rivalry. Fuels such as natural gas, petroleum and fissile materials will be used as political tools, mainly to put pressure on countries that depend on them. They hypothesise of the dependence of states that import Russian gas is mainly political. It has long been known that the states of Western Europe bought such energy resources from the USSR when it existed, but this did not make them dependent on communist Moscow. So why should Western Europe buying Russian gas today (about 25% of gas consumed in Europe comes from Russia) be seen as an extraordinarily dangerous phenomenon?

Russia is said to be aggressive and ruthless in its energy policy, when in fact, states that establish positive relations with Moscow attain measurable benefits in the trade in energy resources and maintain friendly relations with Moscow. The example of Finland shows that good relations with its huge neighbour guarantee lower energy prices. Finland pays less than the Baltic states.⁵³⁵

The United States stepped boldly into the energy arena with a surplus of shale gas for sale to one of the world's largest energy consumers, Europe. Yet shipping fuel across the Atlantic and the need to build appropriate infrastructure considerably increase the costs of the enterprise. Today, it is known that liquefied natural gas (LNG⁵³⁶) cannot completely replace Russian gas, but can only strengthen the bargaining position of EU Member States in future price negotiations with Russia.⁵³⁷ And so Russia,

⁵³³ A. Grigas, *The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas*, Harvard University Press, London 2017, pp. 174-195.

⁵³⁴ A similar silence prevails over the United States' policy of intervening in order to manage energy cooperation between particular states.

⁵³⁵ T. Marshall, *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps that Tell You Everything You Need to Know about Global Politics*, Elliott & Thompson, London 2015, pp. 32-33.

⁵³⁶ *Liquefied natural gas* – natural gas in concentrated form, that is, at temperatures below -162°C (the boiling point of methane, the main component of LNG). During condensation, its volume is reduced 630-fold, and the 'energy density' of LNG thereby increases.

⁵³⁷ Ł. Wojcieszak, *Bezpieczeństwo naftowe Polski – problem dywersyfikacji [Poland's Petroleum Security – the Problem of Diversification]*, Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Wschodnioeuropejska, Przemyśl 2015, p. 299.

anticipating a change in the direction of supply, is concluding more and more gas supply contracts with China and other Asian customers.⁵³⁸ This means that, having more room to manoeuvre, Russia will not be doomed to incur losses or make far-reaching price concessions. This decomposition on the energy markets clearly shows how new technologies for extracting and refining raw fuels is modifying the effects of geographic barriers in international trade.

Poland is one of Russia's steady customers of gas (about 16 billion m³ per year) and petroleum (more than 25 million tonnes per year). Those needs are satisfied thanks to the 'Blue Stream' Yamal natural gas pipeline and the 'Friendship' oil pipeline, in operation for 50 years. It should be observed that, since the end of World War II, Poland has had access to unlimited sources of energy, which undoubtedly furthered its economic development. It is easy to negate the achievements of the previous political system, but no one denies that it was that system that made it possible to begin to build a capitalist economy upon a certain foundation of assets, not merely upon ruins.

Today, the essence of Poland's dispute with Russia is that Poland denies Russia's right to build Nord Stream 2, an idea that arose when it became impossible for Russia to build the Yamal 2 pipeline. Poland refused to collaborate on that investment, which forced Russia to look for other solutions. The strategy of seeking to block Nord Stream 2 has condemned Poland to isolation at a time when Western companies, including American companies, have concluded lucrative contracts with their Russian counterparts. Because of its stance, Poland has ceased to be a transit country for Russian supplies to Western Europe, and has thereby deprived itself of revenue as a middleman in gas transmissions. In the existing situation, Poland has allowed itself to be put in a position of psychological stress, where it fears supplies might be cut off or prices hiked dramatically. At the same time, it is being pushed into the arms of expensive suppliers such as the United States and Norway.⁵³⁹ Such a turn of events has geopolitical costs, as well. By diversifying its energy supplies, Poland will become increasingly dependent on Germany and the United States.⁵⁴⁰ No one can

⁵³⁸ I. Øverland, K. E. Brækhus, "Chinese Perspectives on Russian Oil and Gas", in: J. Perovic, R. W. Orttung, A. Wenger (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 201-221.

⁵³⁹ Pursuing energy policy priorities that result from American strategy means that Poland is engaging in costly undertakings determined not by their economic balance, but by a political decision.

⁵⁴⁰ In Poland, there is little information available on the errors and harmful consequences of the policy of diversification. It is worth beginning a diagnosis with the purchase of Poland's Orlen in Płock of the Lithuanian refinery in Mažeikiai, which turned out to be

say whether the Polish political elites will ever revise this disastrous policy; everything seems to indicate that, for the foreseeable future, Poland will remain more disposed towards the offensive of American companies than any other Central European country, which may not be in line with EU policy. In Brussels, there is a growing awareness that energy dependence on the United States means dependence in all other areas as well.⁵⁴¹

A particular manifestation of America's energy game is its offensive against Nord Stream 2, which the Germans defend, not wanting to become dependent on American gas. This is the only pipeline that is slipping out of American control. The United States has managed to box Russia in with many projects that involve energy resources from the post-Soviet space and at the same time block supplies of Russian gas: there are contracts with Azerbaijan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline). Under pressure from Washington, Ukraine became engaged in a gas reverse and stopped buying gas from Gazprom, while the Baltic states have begun to take in LNG. The case of Ukraine is truly phenomenal. In 2013, 100% of its gas imports came from Russia. Three years later, it bought zero gas from Gazprom. The catch is, it was buying Russian gas from Western middlemen at higher prices! This is a perfect example of how political manipulations translate into Western profits.

The Americans are ready to pressure their Central and Eastern European partners to stop cooperating with Russia on atomic energy, as well. Five EU states – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia – have a total of 18 nuclear power plants in their possession built using VVER technology.⁵⁴² These supply 52% of those countries' electricity. Additionally,

a bad, politically determined investment decision. Things were similar with Grupa Lotos' purchase of the Yme oil deposit on the North Sea. Polish public opinion has also heard little about Orlen's Canadian investments, since they resulted in serious losses. For the same reasons, the American-inspired 'shale fever', from which Orlen suffered a loss of more than 400 million zlotys on exploration activities in 2015 alone, is a closed book. PGNiG invested in gas exploration in Ukraine with the company Dewon, but that initiative also fell victim to manipulations by American capital and Ukrainian oligarchs. Finally, an attempt made to invest in the gas sector in Iran wound up as a fiasco. A. Szczęśniak, "Nieudane wyprawy po złote runo" ["Failed Quests for the Golden Fleece"], *Opcja na Prawo* 2017, Vol. 148, No. 3, p. 72-78.

⁵⁴¹ K. Pronińska, "Znaczenie czynnika surowcowo-energetycznego w interwencjach zbrojnych Zachodu po zimnej wojnie" ["The Importance of the Energy Factor in Armed Interventions by the West after the Cold War"], in: M. Madej (ed.), *Wojny Zachodu. Interwencje zbrojne państw zachodnich po zimnej wojnie* [*Wars of the West. Armed Interventions by Western States after the Cold War*], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2017, p. 326.

⁵⁴² VVER (Russian *Vodo-Vodianoj Energetičeskij Reaktor*) – water-water energy reactor; a nuclear reactor in which the moderator is ordinary (light) water at a pressure of about 15 MPa. The water simultaneously has an operational function in that it cools the reactor core.

there are four nuclear power plants in Ukraine. The United States wants to break up that collaboration, and especially for those countries to stop buying Russian nuclear fuel and to start building new nuclear facilities based on American technologies.

Every one-sided dependence on energy supplies is dangerous for a state. But changing it should be the result of cool, rational calculation, not a geopolitical game. One condition for receiving American LNG is that the relevant infrastructure must be built, which does not happen overnight. Then there is the problem of the profitability of importing American gas. Though few people are speaking about prices, there is much to indicate that customers will end up paying more than they would for Russian gas. "Russian gas, even if it were the cheapest, is politically incorrect, while expensive Qatari or American gas – that is a different story – that is 'allied, democratic' gas (!)".⁵⁴³

The European partners of Gazprom and other Russian companies maintain, in spite of American pressure, that Russia and Europe need each other. Europe has highly-processed goods to offer on the absorbent Russian market, while Russia ensures a stable supply of natural gas and crude oil to satisfy the energy needs of the Old Continent. This view is in line with the idea of co-dependence presented above, which permits a balance of the needs and benefits of the two parts of the European continent to be achieved, contrary to the wishes of American strategists.⁵⁴⁴

3. The dialectics of Russian-American interdependence

The United States' energy expansion into Central and Eastern Europe cannot be understood apart from a wider context that includes its relations with Russia and how the two countries perceive each other. Objectively, for the United States Russia is the most expansive state territorially, one that cannot be ignored in any geopolitical game. For centuries, Russia's vast spaces, countless resources and the fertile soil of the steppes have whetted the appetites of people from the outside. In the United States, which is no small state itself, voices have been raised for years about the unjust division of the planet among different nations. Americans do not conceal their pretensions to Russian resources. Politicians from various options express

⁵⁴³ A. Szczeńśniak, op. cit., p. 78.

⁵⁴⁴ P. Aalto (ed.), *The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe's Future Energy Security*, Ashgate, Hampshire, UK 2008.

them, and they are repeated in the mass media, and even by intellectuals. In their opinion, material conditions are conducive to a continual renewal of Russian imperialism, which in turn leads to natural ambitions for power.⁵⁴⁵ The thinking of American politicians is driven by fear, though they also fear striking at Russia directly because victory would be uncertain, or the scale of damage and the number of victims might outweigh the gains.

In the subjective sense, Russia is presented as an exceptionally 'refined' enemy that has penetrated all structures of the American state. The so-called Russiagate connected with the 2016 presidential election does not demonstrate interference by the Russian secret services in the election as much as it reveals a number of aberrations connected with perceptions about various participants in the election game, which the staff of the two most important presidential candidates were not able to control.⁵⁴⁶

There paradox is that, despite all its advantages, Russia is denied international significance, and its status is like that of a 'defenceless' state of the 'Third World'. Its resource-based economy and dependence on export prices of petroleum, natural gas and wood, its corruption and low work productivity, its depopulation crisis, its restricted creative freedom, the political obscurantism of its elites – all these contribute to its poor image and low position in Western rankings. At the same time, inexplicably, the West magnifies the 'Russian menace' and attributes uncanny abilities to Vladimir Putin. Suspicion, erroneous perceptions and ordinary ignorance play an enormous role in this.

When Putin pushes for regional integration on the Eurasian land mass, this is immediately seen as an attempt to rebuild the empire. It does not seem to occur to many people that the post-Soviet space is a natural area for Russia to act in, or that such behaviour is no different than that of other great powers. The difference is the agent – if it is Russia, something must be wrong! The Russians are accused of amorality in politics in the form of *Realpolitik*, as if that were not an invention of the West. The same can be said of the accusation that Russia is conducting a policy of *divide et impera* towards the European Union, undermining its unity. At the same time, it is known that the EU has no common foreign policy, which makes it very difficult to apply the same strategy in relation to all individual Member States or the union as a whole. On top of this, Russia has a centuries-long tradition of direct ties with many of the states belonging to the EU.

⁵⁴⁵ A. Orban, *Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism*, Praeger, Westport, CT 2008.

⁵⁴⁶ J.R. Biden, Jr., M. Carpenter, "How to Stand Up to the Kremlin: Defending Democracy Against Its Enemies", *Foreign Affairs* 2018, Vol. 97, No. 1, pp. 44-57.

Certainly, Moscow's policy towards its 'near abroad' is a significant factor in the creation of anti-Russian attitudes in the West; it is viewed as expansive and predatory. The annexation of Crimea, especially – regardless of the conditions under which it took place – is treated as a crime and raises fears of other such operations. It is generally accepted that Putin arbitrarily changed the ground rules of modern international relations, throwing the rest of the world into a whirl of diplomatic uncertainty⁵⁴⁷. His strategy – unpredictable according to Western politicians – has sown panic in international relations. In particular, small states near Russia such as Georgia, Estonia and even Moldavia have succumbed to phobias and obsessions that prompt them to 'take cover' under the protective umbrella of NATO and the United States. The alliance and its leader, however, are not sufficiently reliable in discharging their obligations, which leads to further fears and continues the spiral of disappointment.

Clearly, then, the problem of energy cannot be considered in isolation from the geopolitical importance of the whole Central and Eastern European region to the security of the great powers competing for influence in the area. One can even state that geopolitics goes hand in hand with strategy, and that this has ramifications in the military and political spheres, as well. The Three Seas Initiative, ostensibly an abstract entity connecting the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas, would in fact mean building a sphere of American influence in order to counterbalance Russia and Germany in this area.⁵⁴⁸ Poland is the largest country in the region geographically and demographically, but is not able alone to carve out a dominant position for itself as leader.⁵⁴⁹ Hence the concept based on the strategy of America, with whose help – as George Friedman has predicted – Poland could attain the status of a regional power.⁵⁵⁰ But it is worth bearing in mind

⁵⁴⁷ M. Kalb, *Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2015.

⁵⁴⁸ M. Sienkiewicz, "Koncepcja Trójmorza w polityce zagranicznej Polski po 2015 roku" ["The Three Seas Concept in Polish Foreign Policy after 2015"], *Dyplomacja i Bezpieczeństwo* 2016, No. 1, pp. 139-151.

⁵⁴⁹ Curiosities of Polish energy policy are the fear of Russian blackmail and an obsession that Russian investments in Poland would lead to political dependence. A different view of this issue is taken by Germany, but also by the much weaker Hungary, which cooperates on energy sector investment with Russia without worrying about losing either autonomy or profits. This example clearly shows where the sources of Polish phobias and prejudices lie.

⁵⁵⁰ During the times of the Polish People's Republic, as well, the United States treated Warsaw as an important element of the inter-bloc game, as shown by visits paid there by successive presidents, starting with Richard Nixon in 1972, though some observers consider such visits, including the most recent one by Donald Trump, as mere 'stopovers' during more important diplomatic missions.

America's instrumental approach to the concept, especially as regards the opening up of new gas and arms markets for the United States.⁵⁵¹ In this context, the old geopolitical concepts of Halford Mackinder prove useful, as does the geopolitical thought of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who treated the 'Eurasian chessboard' as the field of great power rivalry in the 21st century. With regard to these ideas, the United States does not hide that its most important goal is to overtake Russia as a gas producer and exporter. In this way, American LNG would become a tool for limiting the geopolitical influence of its rival, and also for making America's allies and partners in Europe dependent on the United States. The paradox of this strategy is that, by seeking to push Russia out of its traditional sphere of influence, it is affecting the interests of America's allies and European business concerns. It is a process that reduces the sovereignty of European states in favour of American protection.

If Western Europe, particularly Germany and France, yield to American pressure, it will be another case where the hegemonic power in the Western alliance imposes its will, dismissing the existing mechanisms of coordination and consultation. This could cause further crises in the Euroatlantic community. It requires no great insight to recognize that, if new areas of confrontation in the East arise, the international order will be exposed to further sources of tensions and misunderstandings.

The United States considers the whole Eurasian land mass – from Central and Eastern Europe to the Caucasus, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia – as within the sphere of Russian influence. Its idea is to take advantage of Russia's weakness in order to offset that influence, leading to a fundamental change such as that which is taking place in 'gas geopolitics'. Traditional suppliers of gas are losing their bargaining position, while heretofore weak importers are profiting from the possibility of diversifying their sources of supply. The United States, therefore, not intends to limit not only Russia's access to markets, but also its political influence in the post-Soviet space.⁵⁵²

In spite of this strategy, Russia remains a player to reckon with on the gas market.⁵⁵³ Its reserves are among the largest in the world, it is the world's

⁵⁵¹ P. Rutland, "US Energy Policy and the Former Soviet Union: Parallel Tracks", in: J. Perovic, R. W. Orttung, A. Wenger (eds), op. cit., pp. 181-200.

⁵⁵² J. Henderson, S. Pirani (eds), *The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change*, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford 2014.

⁵⁵³ It is estimated that, in 2017, Russia extracted record amounts of crude oil and natural gas. The increase in gas extraction was 7.9 percent in comparison with 2016, and amounted to 690.5 billion m³. Despite the largest producers agreeing to limit the supply of petroleum, Russian extractions in 2017 were the highest since the fall of the USSR. "Rosja bije rekordy w wydobyciu gazu i ropy, uruchamia naftociąg do Chin" ["Russia Breaks Oil and Gas

second-largest producer of natural gas, and a leader in global exports. Paradoxically, low oil prices do not stop Russia's offer from being attractive on European markets. The renaissance of the new Russia largely involves the search for energy resources export revenue. Russia's connection with its Western European partners, and especially Germany, France and Italy, are based on the relationship between those countries' access to energy and Russia's access to Western technologies. The brunt of the costs entailed by the new energy geopolitics is borne by those states that have changed the orientation of their foreign and defence policies: mainly the Central European and Baltic states which, having acceding to Western structures (NATO and the EU), are now paying higher prices for Russian energy resources. This is forcing them to look for alternative sources of supply. At the same time, they have fallen into the trap of a new supply monopoly, this time from the United States. This is due to gas markets becoming integrated by a single supplier, and to the construction of transmission infrastructure controlled by a single operator.

After the demise of the USSR, Russia changed its strategy towards the Eastern European region. Who knows whether the pro-Western affiliations of the Central and European states (including especially Ukraine) did not also contribute to the biggest changes in the planned transmission and transit routes for Russian energy sources to Western Europe (the northern and southern routes). In the 1990s, the conviction arose in Russia that countries that were unreliable in terms of transit security should be circumvented. From today's perspective, it is difficult to assess categorically which side is incurring more of the costs of that decomposition of transmission routes. Probably Ukraine has suffered most, and in addition has been accused by Russia of taking gas illegally. Ultimately, measures taken by the European Union blocked many Russian initiatives, but they did not stop an expansion of Russian gas exports to, for example, the Black Sea neighbourhood. Turkey, in particular, has benefited from the new arrangements.

In light of the decomposition of the post-Cold War international order, there is much to indicate that the 'triumphant unilateralism' of America is coming to an end. The blissful belief that the United States 'won the Cold War' has proved to be a harmful myth – not only for Russian-American relations, but for America itself, which thought of itself as the 'sole victor' able to dictate conditions to the vanquished. The vanquished was the USSR, but not the Russia that emerged from it. It was easy to foresee that such a policy by the US would be met with angry resistance. Once the Yeltsin

thaw passed, the time came for Putin's assertive strategy. All hopes for a Western-style democratization and modernization faded. The Kremlin again began to take the world by surprise with its decisive approach; this caused serious misunderstandings in the West. Many experts and politicians failed to appreciate the Russian heritage or properly grasp the new Russia's rationale. Only someone extremely uninformed and naive could expect Russia to agree to all the conditions being set by the West, neglecting its own identity. After all, it is simply not true that what is good for America is good for the rest of the world.

For several years now, the tensions between Russia and the West have been likened to a 'new Cold War'. While it is true that Russia is not divided from the West by such severe ideological differences as it once was, Western propaganda insists that the comparison is still an apt one. After losing the Cold War, Russia did not accept Western values, and did not give in to US dominance in the world. On the contrary, after the grim decade of the 1990s, it began to take an independent stance on many international issues, and to try to rebuild its empire. Everything brought it further away from the West, not closer to it. Even when its relations with Western Europe were giving cause for optimism, America's fears about its authority and hegemony being undermined meant that other Western states came under US pressure. Above all, the West believes it has the moral high ground, and therefore the right to judge Russia and apply various forms of pressure to it, including sanctions.

In Western Europe, in spite of certain anti-Russian sentiments, the convictions remain that the global security system cannot function without Russia being a part of it, and that Russia cannot be excluded from the trade in energy and other natural resources. While it is not stated openly, many observers admit that it is not Russia's growing power, but its weakness, that could have dramatic consequences for the international order, especially within its immediate neighbourhood.⁵⁵⁴

Currently, in the West there are two competing strategies for how to deal with Russia. No one is able to foresee the results of either of them. One of those strategies is confrontational, and involves continually punishing Russia, forcing it to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and give up its control of Crimea, as well as discrediting the current Kremlin leaders by humiliating them and eventually removing them from power.⁵⁵⁵ This

⁵⁵⁴ D. Trenin, *Should We Fear Russia?* Polity, Malden, MA 2016, p. IX.

⁵⁵⁵ Experts on Russian affairs (e.g. Richard Pipes) warn that, under current conditions, removing Putin and replacing himself with someone else would not bring about any of the changes the West would like to see. He could be replaced by someone even more radical

is a warlike strategy. The second strategy is accommodative, and more pragmatic. It does not invoke moral and legal principles, but assesses the facts – particularly the balance of power between Ukraine and Russia. On the basis of the *status quo*, that strategy posits a search for indirect solutions, some kind of *modus vivendi*; it must be acknowledged that Russia will neither give up Crimea nor give way in Ukraine. It is up to the West to come up with a way to end the small war before it escalates. Putting one's faith in a 'magic formula' attests more to the West's powerlessness than to any rational, creative diplomacy. There is a lack of ordinary good will among Western political elites, and even wider social circles that were formed during post-Cold War triumphalism under the banner of 'the end of history' and the victory of Western values around the world. This trap will be difficult to get out of, since illusions and psychological attitudes last longer than that facts that brought them to life. If, however, it comes down to a choice between a war with Russia and a compromise solution, even at Ukraine's expense, the United States and the West will choose to compromise. No one in the West wants to 'die for Kyiv'. If we but recognize that the West is not blameless, either, then a 'factual evaluation' of the current situation in Ukraine leads to only one conclusion: if Ukraine is to endure, not as a failed state but as one of those that is able to pay its bills, it must first make a deal with Russia on political and economic issues, mainly because it has no other choice. If the West and the United States decide not to cover Ukraine's debts and defend it, Ukraine will inevitably succumb to Russian pressure. At the moment, there is little evidence for believing that the West wants to take such a dangerous, costly burden onto its shoulders.⁵⁵⁶

In Poland, the catastrophic visions of Russian aggression offered up by politicians and the media not only encourage Russophobic attitudes, but also motivate the government to take steps towards mobilization, justifying the militarization of the state and an urgent search for 'hard' guarantees from Poland's allies. Fear of the existence of a common enemy is 'political food' for the Polish-American alliance.

Polish political decision-makers must consider whether, in the event of a loss of the guarantee of America being Poland's protector, the state will be able to maintain its position and defend its arguments in a relatively hostile immediate neighbourhood. Basing its security strategy and gas supply solely on American guarantees entails a considerable risk due to

and unpredictable. After all, he is currently surrounded by a handful of ultra-nationalist zealots, any one of whom could be worse than Putin from the Western perspective.

⁵⁵⁶ M. Kalb, *op. cit.*

the unpredictability of the American political administration. Experience shows that America looks out for Number One above all; it is not guided by sentiment, as Poles sometimes like to believe. Fear, therefore, has many faces, and more than one threat exists. Sometimes even a close neighbour and ally like Germany may be the cause of growing phobias and anxiety, and economic cooperation between Germany and Russia, including on energy, is treated as a real source of danger. The United States plays a big part in fostering this climate of fear; it promotes its own gas on Central European markets, and dreads any increase in German dependence on or a rapprochement with Russia. When Russian gas transmission routes bypass transit states such as Poland and Ukraine, this not only deprives them of revenue, but also marginalizes them in relation to key sources of supply.

Conclusion

In the decades since the end of World War II, two important factors have led to war no longer being the *ultima ratio* of politics. One factor is that there was a normative *debellicization*, that is, a prohibition under international law against the use or threat of force (with the exceptions set out in the Charter of the United Nations). The other was the technological revolution in the field of arms that resulted in the creation of weapons of mass destruction. Despite numerous armed conflicts of local scope that were wars (the Korean War, Indo-China War, Vietnam War, Afghan War, Israel-Arab Wars), during the Cold War there was never any point at which the superpowers took up arms directly against each other. The situation has been similar over the past three decades, since the end of the confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs. This appears to have been a special period in which the legitimacy and sense of war has been negated in the international system, though of course war has not been eliminated.⁵⁵⁷ And there is no guarantee there will be no great hegemonic war in the future, as various geopolitical visionaries like describe. But for now at least, it is peace, not war, that fills the heads of the leaders of the well-fed, self-confident West.

The Cold War era was characterized by a state of ‘armed peace’. This was a perfect reflection of the ancient Roman slogan *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (‘If you want peace, prepare for war’). The paradox of the time was that the more the two opponents prepared for war, the more unlikely war became, for nuclear weapons turned out to be ‘impotent’ in the sense of being unusable, but more effective as a deterrent than any previous weapons

⁵⁵⁷ For centuries, war was a way of some social groups enriching themselves at the expense of others. Proponents and instigators of war turned this form of politics into a lucrative endeavour. In the capitalist world, a supposedly rational philosophy was developed, that war is “the continuation of politics by other means” (Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*). Yet no war is a rational ‘continuation of politics’. It is the negation and annihilation of politics. Clausewitz’s clever phrase is an absurd abuse of reason.

in history.⁵⁵⁸ Given the impossibility of winning a total war, indirect means were resorted to, known as proxy wars. Armed conflicts were shifted to the peripheries and were waged only with conventional weapons. While the eternal motives for going to war were still in force – namely, the pursuit of wealth, the proclamation of a missionary ideology (secular or sacred) and the enhancement of prestige: “gold, God, glory” – this was the first period of such length in which the international system as a whole avoided large-scale disaster and trauma.

The current state of affairs is not completely rational. A widespread militarization of public opinion is taking place, the arms boom continues, attention is being drawn away from real problems towards creating enemies and instilling a general climate of fear. Leaders still seek to justify the use of violence against real or imaginary enemies, either to defend independence or to hang on to their current possessions (access to resources, territory, position and status in the world). They always refer to the will of the people, and invoking nationalistic sentiment has become the rule.⁵⁵⁹

The balance of fear that existed during the Cold War played an important role in keeping the peace. Yet apologists of American hegemony in the post-Cold War system of international relations see the United States as the main guarantor of the peaceful stability of that system, regardless of the various punitive expeditions and military interventions it has engaged in locally or regionally. To this we must add growing economic interdependence and progress in spreading democratic political models. Unfortunately, however, this liberal belief in ‘peace through democracy and the economy’ leads nowhere, for it turns out that the American hegemon, while proclaiming a liberal ideology, has itself been the source of many conflicts, and often engages in a policy of confrontation. The course it has taken towards Russia and China shows the true face of the interventionists across the Atlantic. Alliances between Washington and authoritarian regimes are commonplace, as indeed they were during the Cold War. *Realpolitik* prevails over the ideals of democracy and human rights; the trade war with China and political sanctions against Russia show how lofty phrases about economic interdependence quickly dissipate in the face of self-interest.

During the Cold War era, the two sides in the inter-bloc confrontation worked out certain standards which, in the area of arms control, required them to build mutual trust. Those standards comprised: unanimity on the need for treaty regulations, transparency of their nuclear and conventions

⁵⁵⁸ R. Braithwaite, *Armageddon and Paranoia: the Nuclear Confrontation*, Profile Books, London 2017.

⁵⁵⁹ H. Münkler, *Die neuen Kriege*, Rewohlt, Hamburg 2002.

arsenals, and the defensive nature of their security strategies. An awareness developed of the need for joint security, in which their greatest accomplishment was to build mutual trust. Each side communicated its peaceful intentions to the other side, and dismissed the possibility of a surprise attack.⁵⁶⁰ There is no doubt that this de-escalation of the Cold War conflict helped bring about the ‘velvet’ dismantling of the Eastern bloc, and the USSR’s successor – Russia – felt obliged to stick to the previously established rules of the game. The mistake the West made was to set new rules for itself. This contributed not only to Russia’s ‘siege mentality’, but also to its revisionist tendencies. The Russians had every right to threaten the eastward expansion of NATO as an attempt to surround and humiliate them. Especially since the West ignored Russia’s protests in that conviction that it was too weak to disrupt the pattern being laid out, that it had no choice but to go along with events. That idea, and the treatment of Russia it gave rise to, turned out to be very seriously flawed.

NATO expansion put an end to any chance of Russia becoming democratic.⁵⁶¹ It also undermined that the existing principle of unanimity between the great powers over the multilateral establishment of the rules of the game by treaty. Along with its NATO allies, the United States unilaterally changes the international order – in opposition to Russia and in spite of its protests – and excluded Russia from that system for many years. This was contrary to the traditions of how the world is to be governed that had existed since the times of the Napoleonic Wars and all through the World Wars of the 20th century. In all previous cases, defeated states – whether France or Germany – were more or less effectively brought back into the new order under conditions laid down by the victors. The Versailles Treaty imposed on Germany showed, however, how very harsh conditions of peace can give rise to resentment in the form of revisionism and revanchism. It resulted in Hitler coming to power, the proclamation of the Third Reich, and Germany embarking upon another, even bloodier and destructive war.

It has been observed that at the end of the Cold War the West treated Russia like Germany was treated at the end of World War I.⁵⁶² Rather than a unification of the European continent, a new division was made, and

⁵⁶⁰ M. Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1979.

⁵⁶¹ K.C. Langdon, V. Tismaneau, *Putin’s Totalitarian Democracy: Ideology, Myth, and Violence in the Twenty-First Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2020.

⁵⁶² M. Mandelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth*, Oxford University Press, New York 2019, p. 13.

Russia again found itself in opposition to the West.⁵⁶³ NATO's intervention against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in disregard of Russia's position, and its causing the secession of Kosovo, only deepened that division. Yet America went further in flouting the rules of the game. In 2002, George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the ABM accord (restricting anti-ballistic missiles), which for three decades the Russians had considered a guarantee of their status as a nuclear power. In Washington, Russian solidarity and support after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were not taken seriously. America's invasion of Iraq and the part it played in toppling the regime of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya – both carried out without the authorization of the UN Security Council – showed the world that the United States, along with its Western allies such as France and Britain, had taken it upon themselves to decide the fate of what sovereign states they pleased. This had to raise concerns in Russia, as well, that the United States was no longer acting in good faith and could turn its sights on Russia as well.

Russia's entanglement in Ukraine in response to the overthrow of Ukraine's legally elected president, Viktor Yanukovich, brought upon it the odium of the aggressor. The West, which was seeking to draw Kyiv towards its side, took up Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for the separatists in Donbas as a kind of *casus belli*. The Minsk Protocols of September 2014 and February 2015, agreed with the participation of four sides – Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany – did not resolve the conflict. Russia was condemned for having invaded, occupied and annexed part of another sovereign state. It was also pointed out that such events had taken place for the first time since the end of World War II. Of course, in this context no one thought about the Turkish invasion of Cyprus or Israel's annexation of eastern Jerusalem, not to mention the case of Kosovo, which constituted a hostile disintegration of Serbia. Western politicians only choose those versions of history that suit them, while obedient experts prepare appropriate interpretations, passing over uncomfortable facts in silence. Western assessments also remind Russia of its earlier armed campaign in Georgia to defend Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which indeed were torn away from Tbilisi's jurisdiction. Again, however, in the name of solidarity among governments with anti-Russian tendencies, no mention is made of the fact that Georgia disintegrated in the 1990s, and that the right of an ethnic minority to self-determination can only be exercised with support from a powerful protector (exactly as in the case of Kosovo!).

⁵⁶³ A. Walicki, *O Rosji inaczej [A Different View of Russia]*, Fundacja Oratio Recta, Warszawa 2019, p. 34, 122.

As to the war in Ukraine, most commentators have seen it as a return by Russia to imperialistic practices, and as evidence of Russia's desire to alter the geopolitical order that was established after the collapse of the USSR. Few people, apart from the Russians themselves, are able to admit that Russia acted in response to Viktor Yanukovych's return to the Eurasian Union, which caused a wave of social revolt. In light of later events, the arguments about the 'dignified' liberation of Ukrainians and their return to democracy sound naive and incredible indeed. To what degree the United States and other Western states were involved in the game remains a matter of political controversy. But there is no doubt that in Ukraine two rival geopolitical orientations clashed, and the annexation of Crimea and Donbas were obvious consequences of that. Russia's involvement proved that it considered the post-Soviet space not just as a 'sphere of its privileged interests', but above all as an area of 'vital existential interests'.⁵⁶⁴ It showed itself extremely determined to defend those interests, including through the use of force and its readiness to incur adverse consequences in its relations with the West. Russian society accepted the validity of the argument about defending vital interests, of course because of nationalistic propaganda and euphoric patriotic rapture, but also because of what it had gone through when Russia was isolated, excluded and encircled. For the Russians, it was NATO's expansion to the east that shattered the post-Cold War peace.

An analysis of Russian policy shows that, one year after the invasion of Ukraine, President Putin began a military operation in Syria that restored Russia's position as an important decision-maker in the international game. Coming to the defence of the Bashar al-Assad regime, it proved to the world that the United States alone cannot determine the fate of governments the West rejects. This has been one of the most painful lessons that the West, and the United States in particular, have had to learn.⁵⁶⁵

Many Western critics of Russia attribute the country's aggressive policy to its dictatorial system of government, kleptocracy and corruption. The faith of liberals in the 'theory of democratic peace' prevents them from seeing that the 'model' United States of America is also a source of aggressive interventions, and that democracy is only one catalyst of peace. Engaging in the arms race, assertive diplomacy and economic pressure is not the

⁵⁶⁴ For an understanding of the complexity of the conditions of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, it is worth examining earlier studies such as: A. Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 1999.

⁵⁶⁵ S. Bieleń, *Czas próby w stosunkach międzynarodowych [A Trying Time in International Relations]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2017, pp. 259-269.

best possible response today to the problems afflicting the West (terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, mass migration, climate change). And many governments realize this, and do not look upon Russia as the same kind of opponent and rival as the USSR was during the Cold War. In spite of all the criticism levelled against it, Russia is now accepted in many international bodies, and the threat of it initiating an attack is quite illusory. This has been demonstrated in various strategic analyses showing that the balance of power is not on Russia's side. Today's Russia has never articulated expansionist or aggressive intentions. On the contrary, it is working towards economic integration with the West and complying with the rules of the capitalist market. Towards Ukraine, however, it has applied a strategy of self-restraint and has refrained from engaging in an open conflict. No doubt, this was because the Kremlin overestimated what it could achieve and underestimated the risks involved, to name just the severe effects of Western sanctions. At present, the West is inclined towards a taming of the conflict and a return to normalized relations.

For the Euroatlantic alliance, a problem arose: the absence of a functional and institutional consolidation of the approaches taken by the United States, Turkey and France. NATO is now governed by two geopolitical elements – egoism and fear. The first is exercised by the alliance's strongest members, which have the ambition to lead and the elements needed for strategic independence. The second is expressed by those states taken in as 'orphans' after the demise of the Eastern bloc as part of the bandwagoning strategy. These states want to impose their own ambitions and fears on the whole West, but forget they find themselves in the coalition as 'latecomer' clients and supplicants. This naturally creates various perturbations of a psychological nature. An asymmetry of power within an alliance always gives rise to misunderstandings, and requires that the coalition's rules of solidarity be adhered to very strictly. This applies to Poland, which has been pushing NATO for a long time in the direction of military solutions, which are inevitably resisted by the largest European allies who would much prefer to resolve the conflict in Ukraine by diplomacy and who take a calmer view of the threat from the East. Moreover, in recent years Poland seems to have only been interested in the guarantees contained in Article 5, which speaks about collective defence in the case of an attack on one member of the alliance. But Warsaw pay no attention to the first articles of the NATO Treaty that discuss the need to comply with the rules of democracy and the rule of law and to resolve conflicts or disputes through diplomatic means. In the West, therefore, Poland is treated as a state that is permitting itself to depart from liberal democracy and which in its contacts with others is demanding and confrontational.

China is a growing challenge and source of danger for the stability of the international system. For it, the post-Cold War era has been one of “peace through trade and economic growth”. Its parallel interests with Russia, especially in respect of the states of Central Asia and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have resulted in a fairly stable regional division of power. On the other hand, American protection has played an important role in the peaceful development of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and more broadly, all of South and Southeast Asia. The Americans enjoy recalling their role as generous protector, but tend to forget their inglorious involvement in Asia, for example, the Vietnam War. A brutal price was paid to contain and repel communism – Chinese and Soviet – and was paid by America itself. After the end of the Cold War, the United States posed as a ‘benign hegemon’, which meant that it should be accepted as leader by all of the Asian players that wanted to flourish through increased economic interdependence, cooperation and integration. China went along with this trend, but at the same time began to show that it aspired to become a great power as a consequence of its rapid, if not to say explosive, economic growth (in 2020, China’s share in global GDP was 18,34%⁵⁶⁶). It became unyielding in defence of its own values, and this led to a disruption of the Asian order similar to that caused by Russia’s geopolitical pretensions in Europe. With its economic might and high position in international trade, China now aspires to become a military power as well, and this has brought it into conflict with its biggest rival, the United States. Such a phenomenon has been described in the literature as ‘Thucydides’ trap’, which originally referred to the inevitability of a war caused by Sparta’s fears over the growing power of Athens.⁵⁶⁷ Some observers, reminded by the current situation of the power aspirations of Germany in the last decades of the 19th century, refer to China as ‘Wilhelminian’.⁵⁶⁸ Making direct analogies from history is always a thorny business, but the warning signals coming from China are too ominous to be taken lightly.⁵⁶⁹ For now, one can only say that another theory of the West has bitten the dust. According to that theory, economic growth favours democratic tendencies, and builds democracy as a result. Yet China has no intention of changing its system based on oligarchic communism, and its foreign policy has nothing to do with liberal

⁵⁶⁶ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/270439/chinas-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/> (20.06.2021).

⁵⁶⁷ G.T. Allison, *Destined for War...*, op. cit.

⁵⁶⁸ R.N. Rosecrance, S.E. Miller (eds), *The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risks of a U.S.-China Conflict*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2015.

⁵⁶⁹ J.R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2018.

democratic standards. All that remains, then, is the hope that the Middle Kingdom, guided by its Sinocentrism, will not set out on an imperial conquest of its neighbours within the foreseeable future, but will remain focused on prosperity and building 'peace through commercialization'.

In the international relations of the late post-Cold War period, there has been a systemic polycentrization and pluralization. At present, there is no single power, as there was during the Cold War era, that is striving to change the *status quo*. There are several powers, such as Russia, China and Iran, that are trying to affect the direction the oncoming changes will take within their regions. Europe is able to stand up to the largest powers forming this polycentric international order, provided it has a maximum consolidation of power. But this would require strict integration of the states in the euro-zone, a European army, a joint arms industry, and a strategic dialogue on a partnership basis with Russia, China and the United States.

Unlike the Cold War era, no great power today is planning a universal ideological crusade or betting on being self-sufficient and cutting itself off from the rest of the world. Most important of all, none is directing its economy towards preparing for war. A pragmatic approach to pursuing one's interests, frequently based on global interdependence and cooperation, offers the hope that the risk of the outbreak of a major war is receding. No one has any clear motivation for starting a war, or any intention of doing so. The more the world is connected economically, the greater the costs of a global conflict. This does not mean, however, that rivalry or the fight for primacy that drive international politics have disappeared.

We are currently witnessing the creation of a new international balance in which monocentric rules of the game again become collective and symmetric. On this playing field of recurrent clashes and tensions, Poland must find a place for itself, which is no easy task in light of its strategy of subordination towards its American patron and protector. Since the days of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and essentially since its unhappy end in the 18th century, a large part of the Polish elite has held the belief that compromise and conciliation are less effective than an uncompromising attitude. Expressions of good will and magnanimity can be treated by either side as signs of weakness, submission or deception. Hence a growing determination to defend one's own position, even when it is unconvincing. Moreover, rather than appealing to practical goals (which is typical for the pragmatic mercantile ethos), Poles invoke pride and dignity (the 'pompous' ethos of chivalry). Compromise is seen as 'un-knightly' or 'dishonourable'. Yet even when a compromise may be deemed the result of having yielded too much, it is always better, pragmatically speaking, than a defeat, even one that is 'knightly' and 'honourable'.

What is to be done, then, to restore a culture of compromise to Poland and the Poles? It may be a manifestation of naïveté and idealistic fancy to postulate thus: particular care must be paid to education in favour of dialogue and understanding, both internally and with all external partners and neighbours. Only well-educated people who possess a thorough knowledge of the world are able not just to talk with each other, but also to understand the arguments of the other side, whether that be an ally or opponent. They need not agree, but they are able to listen. It is primarily ignorance, moral arrogance and susceptibility to manipulation and indoctrination that give rise to tensions between people and set the stage for extremist attitudes.

Poland's international strategy towards both the European Union, of which Poland is a full member, and Russia accentuates the motivating factor of rivalry, without considering what the result will be.⁵⁷⁰ The struggle itself excites Polish decision-makers, gives them a feeling of importance.⁵⁷¹ But the methods now employed will lead to disaster. Timothy Garton Ash of Oxford has given the following warning: "If we lose the spirit of cooperation and community, the deep habit that above all we talking to each other and negotiate, not fight, if we lose that which is the greatest achievement of post-war Europe, then we are headed for disaster".⁵⁷²

The example of the Ukrainian conflict shows that the slogans voiced for many years about correlating diplomatic and military activities have all but been forgotten. The idea of cooperative security, which was prominent in the 1990s and which involves cooperation among organizations and states, even those that have very different points of view, now lies in ruins. In the autumn of 2013, preventive diplomacy failed when the West decided to take advantage of the situation at that time and accelerate Ukraine's affiliation with the European Union, which led to Ukraine's 'Maidan coup'.

Poland had a good reputation during the Cold War, from the Rapacki Plan in the context of conciliatory initiatives, for 'building bridges' and cooperating across divisions. Its relations with the United States were also good enough to offer the hope that Poland's interests would be considered worthy of attention across the Atlantic. After the transformation of Poland, the country found itself in such a geopolitical situation that it could assert its pro-Western preferences without any need to escalate

⁵⁷⁰ A. Balcer et al., *Polacy wobec Unii Europejskiej: koniec konsensusu [Polish Attitudes towards the European Union: The Need for Consensus]*, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 2016.

⁵⁷¹ B. Łagowski, *Polska chora na Rosję [Poland Sick over Russia]*, Fundacja Oratio Recta, Warszawa 2016.

⁵⁷² "Bij się o Europę. Rozmowa z prof. Timothyem Gartonem Ashem" ["Fight for Europe: A Conversation with Prof. Timothy Garton Ash"], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27-28 February 2016.

its hostility towards Russia. The tragedy of Polish politics as practiced by every successive government, regardless of ideological provenance, was to reduce that room to manoeuvre down to the minimum. Holding that there was no alternative to the Euroatlantic option relieved Polish politicians and intellectuals from the task of searching for a more nuanced policy that would guarantee Poland both security and good relations in all directions, almost as if they believed regaining independence had granted the country complete freedom in forming those relations. Yet it turns out that state sovereignty is always conditioned by the real balance of power, and Poland does not come out too well in either the Atlantic or the Eastern European reckonings. Once again in its history, it is in danger of being treated instrumentally and cynically both by its protectors and its adversaries. The Polish political and intellectual elites have not learned their lesson from the nation's tragic history and unfortunate political geography. Even a biased observer should clearly realize that a middle-sized state such as Poland, situated at the crossroads of European transport routes, can benefit more from acting as an intermediary, connection, catalyst and modernizer than it can from quarrels and confrontation. A state's success is measured by its fruitful affiliations and friendly relations with other states, within which it is capable of reaching pragmatic compromises developed through the arduous toil of professional diplomats, without unnecessary demonstrations of hostility or bluster on the part of politicians.

Bibliography

- Aalto P. (ed.), *The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe's Future Energy Security*, Ashgate, Hampshire, UK 2008.
- Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J., "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", *American Economic Review* 2001, Vol. 91.
- Akihiko T., *The New Middle Ages: The World System in the 21st Century*, The International House of Japan, Tokyo 2002.
- Alcaro R. (ed.), *Re-launching the Transatlantic Security Partnership*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma 2008.
- Alexandroff A.S., Cooper A.F. (eds), *Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2010.
- Ali, S.M., *U.S.-China Relations on the "Asia-Pacific" Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008.
- Allison G., *Destined for War? Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?*, Houghton Mifflin, London 2017.
- Allison G., Simes D.K., "Stumbling to War", *The National Interest*, May-June 2015, No. 137.
- Allison R., *Russia, the West, and Military Intervention*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013.
- Ambrosio T., *Challenging America's Global Preeminence: Russia's Quest for Multipolarity*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005.
- Antczak-Barzan A., "Zmiany w środowisku bezpieczeństwa Polski w warunkach członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej" ["Changes in the Security Environment of Poland under Conditions of Membership in the European Union"], *Studia Europejskie* 2014, No. 2.
- Antonowicz L., *Rzecz o państwach i prawie międzynarodowym [On States and International Law]*, Innovatio Press, Lublin 2012.
- Armstrong D., Farrell T., Lambert H., *International Law and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007.
- Artus P., Virard M.-P., *Globalisation, le pire est à venir: inégalités croissantes, gaspillage des ressources, spéculation financière, course absurde aux profits et implosion de l'Europe*, La Découverte, Paris 2008; Polish edition: *Wielki kryzys globalizacji*, transl. L. Mazur, Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, Warszawa 2010.
- Asmus R., *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010.
- Bachmann K., Lyubashenko I. (eds), *The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention: Ukraine's Complex Transition*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2014.

- Bacon R., Kojima M., *Vulnerability to Oil Price Increases: A Decomposition Analysis of 161 Countries*, The World Bank, Washington, DC 2008.
- Balcerowicz L. (selection and introduction), *Odkrywając wolność. Przeciw zniewoleniu umysłów [Discovering Freedom: Against the Enslavement of Minds]*, Zysk i S-ka, Warszawa 2012.
- Bäcker R., *Rosyjskie myślenie polityczne za czasów prezydenta Putina [Russian Political Thought under President Putin]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007.
- Balcer A. et al., *Polacy wobec Unii Europejskiej: koniec konsensusu [Polish Attitudes towards the European Union: The Need for Consensus]*, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 2016.
- Baldersheim H., Keating M. (eds), *Small States in the Modern World: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham-Northampton 2015.
- Baumeister R.F., *Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986.
- Baylis J., Smith S. (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2001; Polish edition: *Globalizacja polityki światowej. Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych*, transl. M. Filary et al., Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2008.
- Beasley R.K., Kaarbo J., Lantis J.S., Snarr M.T. (eds), *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, 2nd ed., SAGE, Los Angeles 2013.
- Beck U., *Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2005; Polish edition: *Władza i przeciwładza w epoce globalnej. Nowa ekonomia polityki światowej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2005.
- Beck U., Grande E., *Cosmopolitan Europe*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2007.
- Bender P., *Weltmacht Amerika. Das neue Rom*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2003; Polish edition: *Ameryka: Nowy Rzym*, transl. A. Krzemińska, A. Krzemiński, Wydawnictwo Sic!, Warszawa 2004.
- Berezowski C., *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne [International Public Law]*, part I, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1966.
- Bertrand R., *Mémoires d'empire. La controverse autour du »fait colonial«*, Éditions Du Croquant, Paris 2006.
- Bew J., "The Real Origins of Realpolitik", *The National Interest*, March-April 2014, No. 130.
- Białek J., Oleksiuk A., *Gospodarka i geopolityka. Dokąd zmierza świat? [The Economy and Geopolitics. Where is the World Heading?]*, Difin, Warszawa 2009.
- Biden J.R., Jr., Carpenter M., "How to Stand Up to the Kremlin: Defending Democracy Against Its Enemies", *Foreign Affairs* 2018, Vol. 97, No. 1.
- Bieleń S., *Czas próby w stosunkach międzynarodowych [A Trying Time in International Relations]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2017.
- Bieleń S., "Deficyt realizmu w polskiej polityce zagranicznej" ["The Deficit of Realism in Polish Foreign Policy"], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 2008, No. 3-4.
- Bieleń S., "Geopolityczne uwarunkowania i implikacje polskiej niepodległości" ["The Geopolitical Conditions and Implications of Polish Independence"], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 2018, No. 1.
- Bieleń S., "Orientacje ideowo-programowe w rosyjskiej polityce zagranicznej" ["Ideological and Program Orientations in Russian Foreign Policy"], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe/International Relations* 2000, Vol. 22, No. 3-4.
- Bieleń S., *Polityka w stosunkach międzynarodowych [Policy in International Relations]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2010.

- Bieleń S., "Rosja we współczesnym świecie" ["Russia in the Modern World"], *Europejski Przegląd Prawa i Stosunków Międzynarodowych* 2009, No. 2.
- Bieleń S., *Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej [The International Identity of the Russian Federation]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2006.
- Bieleń S., "Wokół Ukrainy" ["Around Ukraine"], *Polityka Polska* 2015, No. 1.
- Bieleń S. (ed.), *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Difin, Warszawa 2010.
- Bieleń S. (ed.), *Rewolucja w myśli i praktyce politycznej [Revolution in Thought and Political Practice]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2018.
- Bieleń S. (ed.), *Rosja w procesach globalizacji [Russia in the Processes of Globalization]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2013.
- Bieleń S., Khudolei K. (eds), *Stosunki Rosji z Unią Europejską. Otnosheniia Rossii s Evrosoiuzom [Russia's Relations with the European Union]*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2009.
- Bieleń S., Skrzypek A. (eds), *Barriere modernizacji Rosji [Barriers to Russian Modernization]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2014.
- Bieleń S., Skrzypek A. (eds), *Rosja. Refleksje o transformacji [Russia: Reflections on the Transformation]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2010.
- Bieleń S., Skrzypek A., Karnaukhov D., Petrovskaia O. (eds), *Rossiisko-pol'skie otnosheniia v zerkale geopoliticheskikh kontseptsii*, Rossiiskii institut strategicheskikh issledovaniï, Moscow 2015.
- Bierzanek R., "Doświadczenie historyczne w badaniach nad stosunkami międzynarodowymi" ["Historical Experience in Research into International Relations"], *Studia Nauk Politycznych* 1980, No. 1.
- Black J.L., Johns M., Theriault A. (eds), *The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia*, Routledge, London-New York 2017.
- Blanning T.C.W., *The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802*, Arnold, London 1996.
- Bokszański Z., *Tożsamości zbiorowe [Collective Identity]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2005.
- Booth K., Wheeler N., *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2008.
- Boulding K., *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI 1956.
- Braithwaite R., *Armageddon and Paranoia: the Nuclear Confrontation*, Profile Books, London 2017; Polish edition: *Armagedon i paranoja: zimna wojna – nuklearna konfrontacja*, transl. M. Bielewicz, Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak, Kraków 2019.
- Braudel F., *Écrits sur l'histoire*, Champs-Flammarion, Paris 1984; Polish edition: *Historia i trwanie*, transl. B. Geremek, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1999.
- Bremmer I., Keat P., *The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge in an Uncertain World*, Oxford University Press, New York 2010.
- Bromke A., "Trwałe nurty w polityce polskiej" ["Lasting Currents in Polish Politics"], *Tematy* 1969, No. 31-32.
- Brooks S.G., Wohlforth W.C., "American Primacy in Perspective", *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 4.
- Brower D.R., Lazzerini E.J., *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1997.
- Brown A., *The Gorbachev Factor*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996.
- Brown S., *New Forces in World Politics*, Brookings Institute, Washington, DC 1974.
- Bryc A., Legucka A., Włodkowska-Bagan A. (eds), *Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego [The Post-Soviet Security Area]*, Difin, Warszawa 2011.

- Brzeziński Z., *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, Basic Books, New York 2012; Polish edition: *Strategiczna wizja. Ameryka a kryzys globalnej potęgi*, transl. K. Skonieczny, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2013.
- Brzeziński Z., *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York 1997; Polish edition: *Wielka szachownica. Główne cele polityki amerykańskiej*, transl. T. Wyżyński, Świat Książki, Warszawa 1998.
- Brzeziński Z., Scowcroft B., *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, Basic Books, New York 2008; Polish edition: *Ameryka i świat. Rozmowy o globalnym przebudzeniu politycznym*, transl. D. Rossowski, Wydawnictwo Aha! Świat i My, Łódź 2009.
- Buhler P., *La puissance au XXI^e siècle*, CNRS Editions, Paris 2011; Polish edition: *O potędze w XXI wieku*, transl. G. Majcher, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2014.
- Bugajski D., "Krym na zimno" ["Cold Crimea"], *Para Bellum. Niezależny Magazyn Strategiczny* 2015, No. 1.
- Bull H., *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Macmillan Press, London 1977.
- Bulmer-Thomas V., *Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 2018.
- Bundy W., *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency*, Hill and Wang, New York 1999.
- Burr W. (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow*, The New Press, New York 1998.
- Buszynski L., *Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue*, Routledge, London 2013.
- Buzan B., Little R., *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000; Polish edition: *Systemy międzynarodowe w historii świata*, transl. E. Brzozowska, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2011.
- Cameron F., *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff*, Routledge, London 2005.
- Campbell K.M., Price J. (eds), *The Global Politics of Energy*, Aspen Institute, Washington, DC 2008.
- Carrère d'Encausse H., *L'Empire d'Eurasie, une histoire de l'Empire russe de 1552 à nos jours*, Fayard, Paris 2005; Polish edition: *Eurazjatyckie imperium. Historia Imperium Rosyjskiego od 1552 do dzisiaj*, transl. K. Antkowiak, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2014.
- Cass D.Z., "Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories", *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 1992, Vol. 18.
- Cassels A., *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World*, Routledge, London 1996.
- Cassese A., *International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005.
- Chadaev A., *Putin. Ego ideologiia*, Izdatel'stvo Evropa, Moscow 2006.
- Chesterman S., Ignatieff M., Thakur R. (eds), *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo 2005.
- Chomsky N., *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*, Metropolitan Books, New York 2006.
- Chomsky N., *The New Military Humanism. Lessons from Kosovo*, Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME 1999.

- Christensen T.J., *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*, W.W. Norton, New York 2015.
- Chwalba A., Harpula W., *Polska-Rosja: historia obsesji, obsesja historii [Poland-Russia: History of Obsession, Obsession with History]*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2021.
- Chwedoruk R., *Polityka historyczna [Historical Policy]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2018.
- Cimek G., *Podstawowe problemy geopolityki i globalizacji [Basic Problems of Geopolitics and Globalization]*, Wydawnictwo Athenae Gedanenses, Gdańsk 2017.
- Clark S., Hogue S. (eds), *Debating a Post-American World: What Lies Ahead?* Routledge, Abingdon-New York 2012.
- Clegg J., *China's Global Strategy: Towards a Multipolar World*, Pluto Press, London-New York 2009.
- Clippinger J.H. III (ed.), *The Biology of Business: Decoding the Natural Laws in Enterprise*, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco 1999.
- Cohen S., "Cold War Again: Who's Responsible?", *The Nation*, 01.04.2014, <https://www.thenation.com/article/cold-war-again-whos-responsible/>
- Cohen-Tanugi L., *The Shape of the World to Come: Charting the Geopolitics of a New Century*, Columbia University Press, New York 2008.
- Colomer J.M., *Great Empires, Small Nations: The Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State*, Routledge, London 2007.
- Cooper R., *Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*, Atlantic Books, London 2003; Polish edition: *Pękanie granic. Porządek i chaos w XXI wieku*, transl. P. Kłossowicz, Media Rodzina, Poznań 2005.
- Crocker C.A., Hampson F.O., Aall P. (eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 2003.
- Curanović A., *The Religious Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London-New York 2012; Polish edition: *Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2010.
- Curanović A., "The Guardians of Traditional Values. Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Quest for Status", *Transatlantic Academy Paper Series*, February 2015, No. 1.
- Curanović A., Kardaś S., *Rosja w WikiLeaks [Russia in WikiLeaks]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2011.
- Czachorowski P., Ożarowski R. (eds), *Jednostka. Społeczeństwo. Instytucje. Wybrane problemy badawcze z zakresu nauki o polityce [The Individual, Society, Institutions: Selected Research Problems from Political Science]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2009.
- Czempiel E.O., Rosenau J.N. (eds), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s.*, Lexington Books, New York 1989.
- Czornik K., Lakomy M. (eds), *Dylematy bezpieczeństwa Polski na początku drugiej dekady XXI wieku [Security Dilemmas in Poland at the Beginning of the Second Decade of the 21st Century]*, Wydawnictwo Regionalnego Ośrodka Debaty Międzynarodowej w Katowicach, Katowice 2014.
- Daalder I.H., Lindsay J.M., *The Empty Throne: America's Abdication of Global Leadership*, Public Affairs, New York 2018.
- Dahl A.-S., Järvenpää P. (eds), *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-Unipolar World*, Routledge, London-New York 2014.
- Dam K.W., *The Rules of the Global Game: A New Look at the U.S. International Economic Policymaking*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001.

- Davidson J.W., *The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006.
- Dembinski M., Spanger H.-J., “‘Plural Peace’ – Principles of a New Russian Policy”, *PRIF Report* 2017, No. 145.
- DiCicco J.M., Levy J.S., “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1999, No. 6.
- Diec J. (ed.), *Rozpad ZSRR i jego konsekwencje dla Europy i świata. Kontekst międzynarodowy [The Collapse of the USSR and the Consequences for Europe and the World: The International Context]*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2011.
- Dmitrów E., *Obraz Rosji i Rosjan w propagandzie narodowych socjalistów 1933-1945. Stare i nowe stereotypy [The Image of Russia and Russians in the Propaganda of the National Socialists 1933-1945: Old and New Stereotypes]*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 1997.
- Dmochowski A. (ed.), *Między Unią a Rosją [Between the Union and Russia]*, Wydawnictwo Słowa i Myśli, Warszawa 2013.
- Dobriansky P., Olechowski A., Satoh Y., Yurgens I., *Engaging Russia: A Return to Containment? Report to the Trilateral Commission: 65*, The Trilateral Commission, Washington, DC- Paris-Tokyo 2014.
- Dobroczyński M. (ed.), *Polacy i Rosjanie: czynniki zbliżenia [Poles and Russians: Factors of Rapprochement]*, Centrum Badań Wschodnich Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego-Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa-Toruń 1998
- Dobrzański J., “Apel o odwilż w stosunkach USA-Rosja” [“Call for a Thaw in US-Russia Relations”], *Myśl Polska* z 27.09.-4.10.2020, No. 39-40.
- Domagała A., *Interwencjonizm humanitarny NATO [NATO’s Humanitarian Interventionism]*, EM Oficyna Wydawnicza Edward Mitek, Bydgoszcz 2014.
- Donnan H., Wilson T.M., *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State*, Routledge, London 1999; Polish edition: *Granice tożsamości, narodu, państwa*, transl. M. Głowacka-Grajper, Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków 2007.
- Donnelly J., “Rethinking Political Structures: From ‘Ordering Principles’ to ‘Vertical Differentiation’ – and Beyond”, *International Theory* 2009, No. 1.
- Doyle M.W., *Empires*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 1986.
- Doyle M., “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1983, No. 34.
- Drwęski B., *Une solidarité qui a coûté cher! Histoire populaire de Solidarnosc: Révolution dans la socialisme ou “revolution colorée” antisocialiste?* DELGA, Paris 2019; Polish edition: *Zagrabiona historia Solidarności. Został tylko mit*, transl. & comments J. Dobrzański, Fundacja Oratio Recta, Warszawa 2020.
- Dudek A., Mazur R. (eds), *Rosja między imperium a mocarstwem nowoczesnym [Russia: Between an Empire and a Modern Power]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010.
- Dunn D.H. (ed.), *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*, Macmillan, Basingstoke 1996.
- Duque M.G., “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach”, *International Studies Quarterly* 2018, Vol. 62, No. 3.
- Easterly W., *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*, Penguin Press, New York 2006.
- Eberhardt P. (ed.), *Studia nad geopolityką XX wieku [Studies on the Geopolitics of the 20th Century]*, Prace Geograficzne 2013, IGiPZ PAN, No. 242.

- Eisenstadt S.N., "Empires", in: D.L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Macmillan, New York 1968.
- Energy Self-Sufficiency by World Region*, OECD, Paris 2011.
- Engdahl F.W., *Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order*, Third Millennium Press, Boxboro, MA 2009; Polish edition: *Absolutna dominacja: totalitarna demokracja w nowym porządku świata*, transl. M. Kotowski, Wydawnictwo WEKTORY, Wrocław 2015.
- Feaver P.D., Lorber E.B., "The Sanctions Myth", *The National Interest*, July-August 2015, No. 138.
- Feklyunina V., "Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West", *Europe-Asia Studies* 2008, No. 4.
- Fenenko A., "Khuzhe, chem v kholodnuiu voïnu. Konfliktnyï potentsial rossiïsko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii", *Rossia v global'noi politike* 2016, No. 2, <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Khuzhe-chem-v-kholodnuyu-voïnu-18028>
- Ferguson N., *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, Basic Books, New York 2002; Polish edition: *Imperium. Jak Wielka Brytania zbudowała nowoczesny świat*, transl. B. Wilga, Wydawnictwo Sprawy Polityczne, Warszawa 2007.
- Ferguson N., Schularick M., *Chimerica and Global Asset Markets*, <https://www.jfki.fu-berlin.de/faculty/economics/persons/schularick/chimerica.pdf>
- Filimonov G., *Russia's Soft Power Potential*, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/number/Russians-Soft-Power-Potential-15086>
- Fisher G., *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Intercultural Press, Inc., Yarmouth, ME 1988.
- Fiszler J.M., Stępniewski T., *Polska i Ukraina w procesie transformacji, integracji i wyzwania dla bezpieczeństwa Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej [Poland and Ukraine in the Process of Transformation, Integration and Challenges to Security in Central and Eastern Europe]*, ISP PAN, Warszawa 2017.
- Flemes D. (ed.), *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*, Ashgate, Farnham-Burlington 2010.
- Foot R., MacFarlane S.N., Mastanduno M. (eds), *US Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003.
- Forsberg T., "From Ostpolitik to "Frostpolitik"? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia", *International Affairs* 2016, Vol. 92, No. 1.
- Freedman L., *Ukraine and the Art of Strategy*, Oxford University Press, New York 2019.
- Friedman G., *The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World*, Doubleday, New York 2010; Polish edition: *Następna dekada. Gdzie byliśmy i dokąd zmierzamy*, transl. M. Wyrwas-Wiśniewska, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2012.
- Fukuyama F., *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2007; Polish edition: *Ameryka na rozdrożu. Demokracja, władza i dziedzictwo neokonserwatyizmu*, transl. R. Staniecki, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, Poznań 2006.
- Fukuyama F., *America's Self Defeating Hegemony*, "Project Syndicate", Oct. 23, 2007.
- Fukuyama F., *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*, Profile Book, London 2015; Polish edition: *Ład polityczny i polityczny regres. Od rewolucji przemysłowej do globalizacji demokracji*, transl. J. Pyka, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, Poznań 2015.

- Fukuyama F., *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2004; Polish edition: *Budowanie państwa. Władza i ład międzynarodowy w XXI wieku*, transl. J. Serwański, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, Poznań 2005.
- Funabashi Y., "Keeping Up with Asia: America and the New Balance of Power", *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 5.
- Gajda S. (ed.), *Dyskurs naukowy – tradycja i zmiana [Academic Discourse – Tradition and Change]*, Uniwersytet Opolski, Opole 1999.
- Gałganek A., *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój [A History of International Relations: Uneven and Connected Development]*, Vol. 1: *Idee [Ideas]*, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa 2013.
- Gałganek A., *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój [History of International Relations: Uneven and Connected Development]*, Vol. 2: *Rzeczy i praktyki [Things and Practices]*, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa 2013.
- Galumov E., "Imidzh Rossii v global'nom prostranstve", *Mir i politika* 2008, No. 9.
- Geiss R., "Failed States – Legal Aspects and Security Implications", *German Yearbook of International Law* 2004, Vol. 47.
- Gelb L.H., "Détente Plus", *The National Interest*, July-August 2015, No. 138.
- Gel'man V., "Studying Russian Politics through Western Lenses: Changes and Challenges", *Russian Analytical Digest*, No. 94, 28 March 2011.
- Gil G., *Upadanie państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie [The Fall of States in International Relations after the Cold War]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2015.
- Gilady L., *The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2017.
- Gilarek K., *Państwo narodowe a globalizacja [Nation States and Globalization]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2003.
- Giles K., *Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 2019.
- Gill S., *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke-New York 2008.
- Gilpin R., *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981.
- Glosserman B., *Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2019.
- Gomar T., "Posledstviia raskola mezhdru Rossiei i Zapadom", *Rossia v global'noi politike* 2015, No. 3, <http://www.globalaffairs.ru>
- Goode P. (ed.), *Karl Kautsky: Selected Political Writings*, McMillan, London 1983.
- Gorlach K., Niezgodna M., Seręga Z. (eds), *Władza, naród, tożsamość [Power, Nation, Identity]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2004.
- Góralczyk B., *Wielki renesans. Chińska transformacja i jej konsekwencje [The Great Renaissance: The Chinese Transformation and Its Consequences]*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2018.
- Gray J.N., *Gray's Anatomy: Selected Writings*, Allen Lane, London 2009.
- Greene S.A., *Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin's Russia*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2014.
- Greene D., Ahmad S., *Costs of U.S. Oil Dependence: 2005 Update*, Report to the US DOE, ORNL/TM-2005/45, US Department of Energy, Washington, DC, January 2005.

- Greenspan A., *The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World*, Penguin Books, London 2008; Polish edition: *Era zawirowañ. Krok w nowy wiek*, transl. A. Krajewski et al., Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA SA, Warszawa 2008.
- Grenda B., *Środowisko bezpieczeństwa europejskiego w świetle zagrożeń militarnych ze strony Rosji [The European Security Environment in Light of Military Threats from Russia]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2019.
- Grevi G., *The Interpolar World: A New Scenario*, "Occasional Paper", European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009, No. 79.
- Grigas A. *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2016.
- Grigas A., *The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas*, Harvard University Press, London 2017.
- Grygiel J.J., Mitchell A.W., *The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2016.
- Gupta V., Guan Kwa Ch. (eds), *Energy Security: Asia Pacific Perspectives*, India Manas Publications, New Delhi 2010.
- Gyford J., *Social Democracy: Beyond Revisionism*, Fabian Society, London 1971.
- Haass R.N., "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance", *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 3.
- Haass R.N., *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War*, Council of Foreign Relations, New York 2005; Polish edition: *Rozważny szeryf. Stany Zjednoczone po zimnej wojnie*, transl. A. Niedzielski, Wydawnictwo von borowiecky, Warszawa 2004.
- Haass R.N., *World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order*, Penguin, London 2017.
- Hansen B., Heurlin B. (eds), *The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*, Macmillan, London 2000.
- Hardt M., Negri A., *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2000; Polish edition: *Imperium*, transl. S. Ślusarski, A. Kołbaniuk, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., Warszawa 2005.
- Hassner P., *La Violence et la Paix. De la bombe atomique au nettoyage ethnique*, Le Seuil, Paris 2000; Polish edition: *Koniec pewników. Eseje o wojnie, pokoju i przemocy*, transl. M. Ochab, Wydawnictwo Sic!, Warszawa 2002.
- Haugaard M., Lentner H.H. (eds), *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, Lexington Books, Lanham 2006.
- Haukkala H., Saari S. (eds), *Russia Lost or Found? Patterns and Trajectories*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki 2009.
- Henderson J., Pirani S. (eds), *The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change*, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford 2014.
- Herd G.P. (ed.), *Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century: Competing Visions of World Order*, Routledge, London 2010.
- Herpen, Van, M.H., *Putinism: The Slow Rise of a Radical Right Regime in Russia*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2013; Polish edition: *Putinizm. Powolny rozwój radykalnego reżimu prawicowego w Rosji*, transl. J. Okuniewski, Wydawnictwo Józef Częścik Grupa Wydawnicza Harmonia, Gdańsk 2013.
- Herpen, Van, M.H., *Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham MD 2014; Polish edition: *Wojny Putina. Czeczenia, Gruzja, Ukraina 2014*, transl. M. Witkowska, J. Szajkowska, Wydawnictwo Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2014.
- Hirsh M., "Bush and the World", *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 5.

- Holsti K.J., "The Necrologists of International Relations", *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1985, No. 4.
- Huntington S.P., *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, Simon & Schuster, New York 2004; Polish edition: *Kim jesteśmy? Wyzwania dla amerykańskiej tożsamości narodowej*, transl. B. Pietrzyk, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2007.
- Ikenberry G.J., "America's Imperial Ambition", *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 5.
- Ikenberry G.J., "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?", *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 1.
- Imperium Putina [Putin's Empire]*, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 2007.
- Inbar E. (ed.), *The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramifications*, Routledge, London-New York 2013.
- Indyk M.S., Lieberthal K.G., O'Hanlon M.E., *Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2013; Polish edition: *Zmieniając historię: polityka zagraniczna Baracka Obamy*, transl. J. Kędzierska, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2013.
- Isikoff M., Corn D., *Russian Roulette: The Inside Story of Putin's War on America and the Election of Donald Trump*, Twelve, New York 2018; Polish edition: *Rosyjska ruletka: jak Putin zhakował Amerykę i wygrał wybory za Donalda Trumpa*, transl. B. Gadomska, Wydawnictwo Agora, Warszawa 2018.
- Iitzkowitz Shiffrinson J.R., *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2018.
- Ivanov I., "The New Russian Identity: Innovation and Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy", *Washington Quarterly* 2001, No. 3.
- Jervis R., *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York 1989.
- Jervis R., *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1976.
- Joffe J., "The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America's Decline", *Foreign Affairs* 2009, Vol. 88, No. 5.
- Jones D.M., Smith M.L.R., "Return to Reason: Reviving Political Realism in Western Foreign Policy", *International Affairs* 2015, Vol. 91, No. 5.
- Jones S.G., *A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York-London 2018; Polish edition: *Tajna operacja: Reagan, CIA i zimnowojenny konflikt w Polsce*, tłum. J. Dzierzgowski, Wydawnictwo Sonia Draga-Post Factum, Katowice 2019.
- Jonson L., White S. (eds), *Waiting for Reform under Putin and Medvedev*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012.
- Juchnowski R., *Miejsce geopolityki w polskiej myśli politycznej XIX i XX wieku [The Place of Geopolitics in Polish Political Thought of the 19th and 20th Centuries]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2018.
- Kaczmarek M., *Russia-China Relations in the Post-Crisis International Order*, Routledge, London-New York 2015.
- Kagan R., *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2008; Polish edition: *Powrót historii i koniec marzeń*, transl. G. Sałuda, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, Poznań 2009.
- Kalb M., *Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2015; Polish edition: *Imperialna gra. Putin, Ukraina i nowa zimna wojna*, transl. S. Baranowski, Wydawnictwo Vis-à-Vis/Etiuda, Kraków 2017.

- Kanet R.E. (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2011.
- Kanet R.E., Sussex M. (eds), *Power, Politics and Confrontation in Eurasia: Foreign Policy in a Contested Region*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2015.
- Kaplan R.D., "The Post-Imperial Moment", *The National Interest* 2016, No. 143.
- Kaplan R.D., *The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in Twenty-first Century*, Random House, New York 2018.
- Karber P.A., "'Constructivism' as a Method in International Law", *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting* (American Society of International Law) 2000, No. 5-8.
- Kasonta A., *Ruling Elites Opted for Unconditional Cooperation with Western Countries*, April 15, 2020, <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/european-policy/professor-stanis-aw-biele-ruling-elites-opted-for-unconditional-cooperation-with-western-countries/>.
- Kassem M., "Staaten am Rande des Abgrunds", *Politische Studien* 2004, No. 393.
- Kazantsev A., *Bol'shaia igra" z neizvestnymi pravilami: Mirovaia politika i Tsentral'naia Aziia*, Izdatel'stvo MGIMO-Universitet, Moscow 2008.
- Kemper T.D., "How Many Emotions Are There? Wedding the Social and the Autonomic Components", *American Journal of Sociology* 1987, No. 2.
- Kennedy P.M., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, Random House, New York 1987; Polish edition: *Mocarstwa świata: narodziny, rozkwit, upadek. Przemiany gospodarcze i konflikty zbrojne w latach 1500-2000*, transl. M. Kluźniak, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1994.
- Kennedy P.M., *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy: 1865-1980*, George Allen & Unwin, London 1981.
- Kieniewicz J., *Wprowadzenie do historii cywilizacji Wschodu i Zachodu [Introduction to the History of the Civilizations of the West and the East]*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2003.
- Kissinger H.A., "To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End", *The Washington Post*, 5 March 2014.
- Kissinger H., *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, Penguin, London 2014. Polish edition: *Porządek światowy*, transl. M. Antosiewicz, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec 2016.
- Kissinger H.A., *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problem of Peace 1812-1822*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1957.
- Kivelson V.A., Suny R.G., *Russia's Empires*, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford 2017.
- Klementewicz T., *Stawka większa niż rynek. U źródeł stagnacji kapitalizmu bez granic [Stakes Higher than the Market: At the Sources of the Stagnation of Capitalism without Borders]*, Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, Warszawa 2015.
- Kłosiński K.A. (ed.), *Rosja. Ambicje i możliwości w XXI wieku [Russia: Ambitions and Opportunities in the 21st Century]*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010.
- Kłosowicz R. (ed.), *Państwa dysfunkcyjne i ich destabilizujący wpływ na stosunki międzynarodowe [Dysfunctional States and Their Destabilising Effect on International Relations]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2013.
- Knopek J., Willa R. (eds), *Polska polityka zagraniczna 1989-2014 [Polish Foreign Policy 1989-2014]*, Difin, Warszawa 2016.
- Kochanek E., *Geopolityka energetyczna współczesnych państw [The Energy Geopolitics of Modern States]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Minerwa, Szczecin 2016.

- Kocho-Williams A., *Russia's International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, London-New York 2013.
- Kołodkowski L., *Główne nurty marksizmu [Main Currents of Marxism]*, part 3: *Rozkład [Decomposition]*, Krąg, Warszawa 1989.
- Kołodko G.W., *Dokąd zmierza świat. Ekonomia polityczna przyszłości [Where the World is Heading: The Political Economy of the Future]*, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2013.
- Kołodko G.W., *Wędrujący świat [The Wandering World]*, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2008.
- Kotkin S., *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008; Polish edition: *Armagedon był o krok*, transl. M. Szubert, Świat Książki, Warszawa 2009.
- Kowalczyk M., *Łśniące miasto na wzgórzu. Ideowe podstawy amerykańskiego unilateralizmu w okresie rządów George'a Busha [A Shining City on the Hill: The Ideological Foundations of American Unilateralism under the Administrations of George Bush]*, Wydawnictwo von borowiecky, Warszawa 2008.
- Kownacki P., *Trzeci Świat a polityczny aspekt globalizacji gospodarczej [The Third World and the Political Aspect of Economic Globalization]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe ASKON, Warszawa 2006.
- Kovalik D., *The Plot to Scapegoat Russia: How the CIA and the Deep State Have Conspired to Vilify Putin*, Skyhorse, New York 2017; Polish edition: *Rosja jako kozioł ofiarny. Antyrosyjska fobia USA*, transl. J. Morka, Wydawnictwo WEKTORY, Wrocław 2018.
- Kraś I., Matsili B., Soja M. (eds), *Mechanika sceny międzynarodowej. Nowe wyzwania w nowej epoce [Mechanics of the International Scene: New Challenges in a New Era]*, Akademia im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie, Częstochowa 2013.
- Krauthammer Ch., "Realizm demokratyczny. Amerykańska polityka zagraniczna w świecie jednobiegunowym" ["Democratic Realism: American Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World"], *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny* 2004, No. 3-4.
- Krauthammer Ch., "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs* 1990/1991, No. 1.
- Kremeniuk V., "Shansy i resursy rosyjskiej derzhavnosti", *Mezhdunarodnye processy* 2012, No. 1.
- Krepinevich A.F. Jr., "Strategy in a Time of Austerity", *Foreign Affairs* 2012, No. 6.
- Kubin T., Łapaj-Kucharska J., Okraska T. (eds), *Wokół teoretycznych i praktycznych aspektów stosunków międzynarodowych [Around the Theoretical and Practical Aspects of International Relations]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2020.
- Kudors A., "Russian World" – Russia's Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy", *Russian Analytical Digest* No. 81, 16 June 2010.
- Kukułka J., *Problemy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych [Problems of the Theory of International Relations]*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1978.
- Kupchan Ch., *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, Alfred Knopf, New York 2003.
- Kupchan Ch.A., *No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*, Oxford University Press, New York 2012.
- Kuźniar R., *Porządek międzynarodowy. Perspektywa ontologiczna [The International Order: An Ontological Perspective]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2019.
- Kuźlewska E., Stefanowicz K. (eds), *Wybrane problemy globalnej i regionalnej polityki międzynarodowej [Selected Problems of Global and Regional International Politics]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009.
- Lacoste Y., *Géopolitique de Méditerranée*, Armand Colin, Paris 2006; Polish edition: *Geopolityka Śródziemnomorza*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2010.

- Lagadec E., *Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century. Europe, America and the Rise of the Rest*, Routledge, New York 2012.
- Lake D.A. "Escape from the State of Nature" Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics", *International Security* 2007, No. 1.
- Lamentowicz W., *Strategia państwa: teoria państwa aktywnego wobec sił spontanicznych [State Strategy: A Theory of the State that is Active Against Spontaneous Forces]*, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa 2015.
- Langdon K.C., Tismaneanu V., *Putin's Totalitarian Democracy: Ideology, Myth, and Violence in the Twenty-First Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2020.
- Laqueur W., *After the Fall: The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent*, Thomas Dunne Books, New York 2012.
- Laqueur W., *Russia and Its Future in the West*, St. Martin's Press, New York 2015.
- Larson D.W., Shevchenko A., *Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2019.
- Lazari, de, A., *Polskie i rosyjskie problemy z rosyjskością [Polish and Russian Problems with Russianness]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2009.
- Lehmann Ch., *A Response to Henry Kissinger's advice on US-Russian Relations and the Ukraine*, <http://nsnbc.me/2014/03/09/response-henry-kissingers-advise-us-russian-relations-ukraine>
- Legro J.W., *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-London 2005.
- Legvold R., *Return to Cold War*, Polity, Cambridge-Malden 2016.
- Leichtova M., *Misunderstanding Russia: Russian Foreign Policy and the West*, Ashgate, Farnham 2014.
- Lennon A.T.J., Kozłowski A. (eds), *Global Powers in the 21st Century. Strategies and Relations*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2008.
- Lieber R.J., *Eagle Rules: Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 2002.
- Lieber R.J., *Retreat and Its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016.
- Lieven A., *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 1999.
- Liska G., *Russia and the Road to Appeasement: Cycles of East-West Conflict in War and Peace*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore-London 1982.
- Lisowska A., Jabłoński A.W. (eds), *Wizje dobrego państwa. Idee i teorie [Visions of a Good State. Ideas and Theories]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007.
- Lo B., *Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics*, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC 2008.
- Lo B., Bekkevold J.I. (eds), *Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2019.
- Lucas E., *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York-Basingstoke 2008; Polish edition: *Nowa zimna wojna. Jak Kreml zagraża Rosji i Zachodowi*, transl. J. Stawski, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, Poznań 2008.
- Luft G., Korin A. (eds), *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century*, Praeger, Denver, CO 2009.
- Luttwak E., "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce", *The National Interest* 1990, No. 20.

- Łada A., Kaca E., Lang K.-O., Peters J., *Rosja dziś i jutro. Opinie polskich i niemieckich ekspertów [Russia Today and Tomorrow: Opinions of Polish and German Experts]*, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa 2010.
- Łagowski B., “Ekshumacje” [“Exhumations”], *Przegląd*, 19 December 2010.
- Łagowski B., *Polska chora na Rosję [Poland Sick over Russia]*, Fundacja Oratio Recta, Warszawa 2016.
- Łagowski B., “Zaćmienie faktów” [“An Eclipse of the Facts”], *Przegląd*, 13 June 2010.
- Madej M. (ed.), *Wojny Zachodu. Interwencje zbrojne państw zachodnich po zimnej wojnie [Wars of the West. Armed Interventions by Western States after the Cold War]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2017.
- Magen Z., Bagno-Moldavsky O., “The Big Game: The Great Powers in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, *Strategic Assessment* 2010, No. 4.
- Mahbubani K., “The Case Against the West: America and Europe in the Asian Century”, *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 3.
- Mahbubani K., *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*, Public Affairs Press, New York 2008.
- Maj Cz., *Socjologia stosunków międzynarodowych [Sociology of International Relations]*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2013.
- Malia M., *Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horsemen to the Lenin Mausoleum*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1999.
- Mancoff J., *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD 2009.
- Mandelbaum M., *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1979.
- Mandelbaum M., *The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth*, Oxford University Press, New York 2019.
- Marber P., “Globalization and Its Contents”, *World Policy Journal* 2004–2005, Vol. 21, No. 4.
- Marczak T., “Wokół pojęcia racji stanu” [“Around the Concept of the *Raison d’Etat*”], *Racja Stanu. Studia i Materiały* 2007, No. 1.
- Marshall T., *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps that Tell You Everything You Need to Know about Global Politics*, Elliott & Thompson, London 2015; Polish edition: *Więźniowie geografii, czyli wszystko, co chciałbyś wiedzieć o globalnej polityce*, transl. F. Filipowski, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2017.
- Mason T.D., Meernik J.D. (eds), *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, Routledge, London 2006.
- Massaka I., *Eurazjatyzm. Z dziejów rosyjskiego misjonizmu [Eurasianism: From the History of Russian Missionism]*, Funna, Wrocław 2001.
- Mastanduno M. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War”, *International Security* 1997, No. 4.
- Mathieux J., *Civilisations impériales*, Éd. du Félin, Paris 2001; Polish edition: *Wielkie cywilizacje. Rozkwit i upadek imperiów*, transl. G. Majcher, M. Żurowska, Świat Książki, Warszawa 2008.
- Mayer S. (ed.), *NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2014.
- McFaul M., *From Cold War to Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America*, Allen Lane, London 2018.

- McFaul M., Stoner-Weiss K., "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model. How Putin's Crack-down Holds Russia Back", *Foreign Affairs* 2008, No. 1.
- Mearsheimer J.J., *The Great Delusion. Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 2018.
- Mearsheimer J.J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton, New York 2001 [Polish edition: *Tragizm polityki mocarstw*, transl. P. Nowakowski, J. Sadkiewicz, UNIVERSITAS, Kraków 2019].
- Mearsheimer J.J., "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin", *Foreign Affairs* 2014, Vol. 93, No. 5.
- Menon R., *The End of Alliances*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008.
- Mercer J., *Reputation and International Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2010.
- Miller A., Lukyanov F., *Detachment Instead of Confrontation: Post-European Russia in Search of Self-Sufficiency*, http://www.kreisky-forum.org/dataall/Report_Post-EuropeanRussia.pdf
- Mills D.Q., Rosenfelde S., *The Trump Phenomenon and the Future of US Foreign Policy*, World Scientific, Singapore 2016.
- Minkow E., "For a Plurilogue in Ukraine", *Security Community* 2014, No. 4.
- Mochizuki T. (ed.), *Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context*, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 2008.
- Modelski G., "Qualifications for World Leadership", *Voice*, October 1983.
- Modzelewski W., *Polska-Rosja. Myśli o Rosji i bolszewizmie w 100-lecie niepodległości [Poland-Russia: Thoughts on Russia and Bolshevism on the Centenary of Independence]*, Vol. 5: *years 2017-2018*, Instytut Studiów Podatkowych, Warszawa 2018.
- Monaghan A., *Dealing with the Russians*, Polity, Medford, MA 2019.
- Monaghan A., "Putin's Russia: Shaping a 'Grand Strategy'?" *International Affairs* 2013, No. 5.
- Moers C. (ed.), *The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire*, Oneworld, Oxford 2006.
- Morgenthau H., K.W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, Boston 1993; Polish edition: *Polityka między narodami. Walka o potęgę i pokój*, transl. R. Włoch, Difin, Warszawa 2010.
- Motyl A.J., *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires*, Columbia University Press, New York 2001.
- Münkler H., *Die neuen Kriege*, Rewohlt, Hamburg 2002; Polish edition: *Wojny naszych czasów*, transl. K. Matuszek, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2004.
- Myrdal G., *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline*, Pantheon Books, New York 1970; Polish edition: *Przeciw nędzy w świecie: zarys światowego programu walki z nędzą*, transl. W. Adamiecki, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1975.
- Nayar B.R., *The Geopolitics of Globalization: The Consequences for Development*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008.
- Neef C., "Der Traum des Zarewitsch", *Der Spiegel*, 25 February 2008.
- Nemenskiĭ O., "Panrusizm", *Voprosy Natsionalizma* 2011, No. 3.
- Nexon D.H., Wright T., "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate", *American Political Science Review* 2007, No. 2.
- Nowacki G., *Rozpoznanie satelitarne United States i Federacji Rosyjskiej [Satellite Intelligence of the United States and the Russian Federation]*, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2002.
- Nowicka E. (ed.), *Swoi i obcy [One's Own and Strangers]*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1990.

- Nozick R., *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990; Polish edition: *Anarchia, państwo, utopia*, transl. P. Maciejko, M. Szczubiałka, Fundacja ALETHEIA, Warszawa 1999.
- Nye J.S., Jr., *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, New York 2011; Polish edition: *Przyszłość siły*, transl. B. Działoszyński, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2012.
- Nye J.S., Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York 2004; Polish edition: *Soft Power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*, transl. J. Zaborowski, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007.
- Oldberg I., "Is Russia a Status Quo Power?" *Ulpaper* (Swedish Institute of International Affairs) 2016, No. 1.
- Olechnicki K., Załęcki P., *Słownik socjologiczny [Sociological Dictionary]*, Wydawnictwo Graffiti BC, Toruń 1997.
- Olson M., *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1982.
- Oniszczyk J. (ed.), *Współczesne państwo w teorii i praktyce [Modern States in Theory and Practice]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2011.
- Opello W.C. Jr., Rosow S.J., *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder-London 2004.
- Orban A., *Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism*, Praeger, Westport, CT 2008.
- Orttung R., "Russia's Use of PR as a Foreign Policy Tool", *Russian Russian Analytical Digest*, 81, 16 June 2010.
- Osiński J., *Państwo w warunkach globalnego kryzysu ekonomicznego. Przyczynek do teorii państwa [The State under Conditions of a Global Economic Crisis. Contribution to a Theory of the State]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2017.
- Paul T.V., Larson D.W., Wohlforth W.C. (eds), *Status in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2014.
- Paul T.V., Wirtz J.J., Fortmann M. (eds), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-first Century*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA 2004.
- Penttilä R.E.J., "The G 8 As a Concert of Powers", *Adelphi Papers* 2003, No. 43.
- Perovic J., Orttung R.W., Wenger A. (eds), *Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations. Implications for Conflict and Cooperation*, Routledge, London 2009.
- Petersson M., *The US-NATO Debate: From Libya to Ukraine*, Bloomsbury Academic, New York 2015.
- N.N. Petro, *Russian Democracy. An Interpretation of Political Culture*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA-London 1995.
- Piekarski R., Graban M. (eds), *Globalizacja i my. Tożsamość lokalna wobec trendów globalnych [Globalization and Us: Local Identity and Global Trends]*, Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych UNIVERSITAS, Kraków 2003.
- Pietraś M., Hofman I., Michałowski S. (eds), *Państwo w czasach zmiany [The State in Times of Change]*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2018.
- Pietraś M., Olchowski J. (eds), *NATO w pozimnowojennym środowisku (nie)bezpieczeństwa [NATO in the post-Cold War Environment of (Non-)Security]*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2011.
- Popescu N., *Eurasian Union: the Real, the Imaginary and the Likely*, Institut d'études de sécurité, Paris 2014.
- Popescu N., Wilson A., *The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood*, The European Council on Foreign Relations, London 2009.

- Poppe A.E., *Whither to, Obama? U.S. Democracy Promotion after the Cold War*, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt am Main 2010.
- Posen B.R., *Restraint. A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2014.
- Potulski J., *Współczesne kierunki rosyjskiej myśli geopolitycznej. Między nauką, ideologicznym dyskursem a praktyką [Modern Currents in Russian Geopolitical Thought: Between Science, Ideological Discourse and Practice]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2010.
- Rachman G., *Easternization: War and Peace in the Asian Century*, Bodley Head, London 2016.
- Rasiński L. (ed.), *Język, dyskurs, społeczeństwo [Language, Discourse, Society]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2009.
- Record J., *Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s*, Strategic Studies Institute – U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 2005.
- Renshon J., *Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 2017.
- Riasanovsky N.V., Steinberg M.D., *A History of Russia*, 9th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018; Polish edition: *Historia Rosji*, transl. T. Teszner, A. Bernaczyk, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2009.
- Rich P.B. (ed.), *Crisis in the Caucasus: Russia, Georgia and the West*, Routledge, London 2010.
- Rivera, de, J.H., *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*, Merrill, Columbus, OH 1968.
- Roberts A., *Is International Law International?*, Oxford University Press, New York 2017.
- Robinson P.F., “Russia’s Emergence as an International Conservative Power”, *Russia in Global Affairs* 2020, No. 1.
- Rosecrance R.N., *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Poverty in the Coming Century*, Basic Books, New York 2000.
- Rosecrance R., Alexandroff A., Healy B., Stein A., *Power, Balance of Power, and Status in Nineteenth Century International Relations*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills-London 1974.
- Rosecrance R.N., Miller S.E. (eds), *The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risks of a U.S.-China Conflict*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2015.
- Ross R.S., “The Problem with the Pivot”, *Foreign Affairs* 2012, No. 6.
- Rossii XXI veka: obraz zhelaemogo zavtra*, Ekon-Inform, Moscow 2010.
- Rothenberg G.E., *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1978.
- Rozhkov I., Kismereshkin V., *Imidzh Rossii. Resursy, opyt, priorityty*, RIPOL’ klassik, Moscow 2008.
- Rozman G., *The Sino-Russian Challenge in the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East Versus West in the 2010s*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC 2014.
- Russell Mead W., “The American Foreign Policy Legacy”, *Foreign Affairs* 2002, No. 1.
- Sabrosky A.N., “Allies, Clients and Encumbrances”, *International Security Review* 1980, No. 2.
- Sahle E.N., *World Orders Development and Transformation*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010.
- Sakwa R., *Frontline Ukraine; Crisis in the Borderlands*, L.B. Tauris, London 2015.
- Sakwa R., *Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017.
- Sakwa R., *Russia’s Futures*, Polity, Medford, MA 2019.

- Sanger D.E., *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, Harmony Books, New York 2009.
- Schoen D., *Putin's Master Plan to Destroy Europe, Divide NATO, and Restore Russian Power and Global Influence*, Encounter Books, London 2016.
- Scholte J.A., *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005; Polish edition: *Globalizacja. Krytyczne wprowadzenie*, transl. K. Ślęczka, Oficyna Wydawnicza Humanitas, Sosnowiec 2006.
- Schwarzenberger G., *Power Politics: A Study of International Society*, Frederick A. Praeger, London–New York 1951.
- Schweller R., “Bandwagoning for Profit”, *International Security* 1994, Vol. 19, No. 1.
- Scott D., *‘The Chinese Century’?: The Challenge to Global Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008.
- Scott J., Marshall G., *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, 3rd ed. rev, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009.
- Sestanovich S., *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2014.
- Sherr J., *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion. Russia's Influence Abroad*, Chatham House, London 2013.
- Shiffrinson J.R.I., “Russia’s got a point: The U.S. broke a NATO promise”, <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shiffrinson-russia-us-nato-deal--20160530-snap-story.html>
- Sienkiewicz M., “Koncepcja Trójmorza w polityce zagranicznej Polski po 2015 roku” [“The Three Seas Concept in Polish Foreign Policy after 2015”], *Dyplomacja i Bezpieczeństwo* 2016, No. 1.
- Sikorski R., *Polska może być lepsza. Kulisy polskiej dyplomacji [Poland Can Be Better: Behind the Scenes of Polish Diplomacy]*, Znak Horyzont, Kraków 2018.
- Sills D.L. (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Macmillan, New York 1968.
- Simms B., *Europe. The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present*, Allen Lane, London 2013; Polish edition: *Taniec mocarstw. Walka o dominację w Europie od XV do XXI wieku*, transl. J. Szkudliński, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań 2015
- Simonov K., *Ėnergeticheskaia sverkhderzhava*, Algoritm, Moscow 2006.
- Struggle for Domination in Europe from the 15th to the 21st Centuries*, transl. J. Szkudliński, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań 2015.
- Skarżyński R., *Anarchia i policentryzm: Elementy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych [Anarchy and Polycentrism. Elements of the Theory of International Relations]*, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomicznej w Białymstoku, Białystok 2006.
- Skrzypek A., *Druga smuta. Zarys dziejów Rosji 1985-2004 [The Second Time of Troubles: An Outline of Russian History 1985-2004]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2004.
- Smith A.D., *State and Nation in the Third World*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1983.
- Snyder R.C., Bruck H.W., Sapin B. (eds), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002.
- Sobczyński M., *Państwa i terytoria zależne. Ujęcie geograficzno-polityczne [States and Dependent Territories: A Geographic and Political Understanding]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2006.
- Solana J., “The Case for Europe”, *International Herald Tribune* 28 May 2005.
- Solarz M.W. (ed.), *Północ wobec Południa. Południe wobec Północy [North Against South – South Against North]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2005.

- Sovacool B.K., Brown M.A., Valentine S.V., *Fact and Fiction in Global Energy Policy. Fifteen Contentious Questions*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2016.
- Sowa J., *Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesną formą [The Phantom Body of the King: Peripheral Struggles with Modern Form]*, UNIVERSITAS, Kraków 2011.
- Splidsboel-Hansen F., "Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies* 2002, No. 3.
- Spilidsbodel-Hansen F., "Russia's Relations with the European Union: A Constructivist Cut", *International Politics* 2002, Vol. 39.
- Sporek T., Pawlas I. (eds), *Atrybuty mocarstwowości Stanów Zjednoczonych [Attributes of Power of the United States]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach, Katowice 2018.
- Srogosz T., *Uti possidetis w prawie międzynarodowym publicznym [Uti Possidetis in Public International Law]*, Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2016.
- Staniszki J., *O władzy i bezsilności [On Power and Powerlessness]*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2006
- Starosielec R., "O upadku myśli politycznej w Polsce" ["On the Decline of Political Thought in Poland"], *Polityka Polska* 2015, No. 2.
- Stent A.E., *The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford 2014.
- Steven D., O'Brien E., Jones B. (eds), *The New Politics of Strategic Resources: Energy and Food Security Challenges in the 21st Century*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2015.
- Stewart J. (ed.), *Bridges Not Walls: A Book About Interpersonal Communication*, 11ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 2012; Polish edition: *Mosty zamiast murów. Podręcznik komunikacji interpersonalnej*, transl. J. Suchecki et al., Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2002.
- Stępień-Kuczyńska A., Bieleń S. (eds), *Rosja w okresie prezydentury Władimira Putina [Russia During the Presidencies of Vladimir Putin]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Łódź-Warszawa-Toruń 2008.
- Stępniewski T., "Unia Europejska, Ukraina i Rosja: kryzysy i bezpieczeństwo" ["The European Union, Ukraine and Russia: Crises and Security"], *Studia Europejskie* 2015, No. 4.
- Stolarczyk M., *Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w latach 1992-2015 [Russia in Polish Foreign Policy 1992-2015]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2016.
- Sturmer M., *Putin and the Rise of Russia*, Pegasus Books, New York 2007; Polish edition: *Putin i odrodzenie Rosji*, transl. B. Madejski, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 2008.
- Sulowski S. (ed.), *Polska-Niemcy. Nadzieja i zaufanie [Poland-Germany. Hope and Trust]*, Fundacja Politeja, Warszawa 2002.
- Sur S., *Relations internationales*, Montchrestien, Paris 1995; Polish edition: *Stosunki międzynarodowe*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2012.
- Symonides J. (ed.), *Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych. Bilans i perspektywy [The United Nations: Balance and Prospects]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2006.
- Symonides J. (ed.), *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń [A World Facing Contemporary Challenges and Threats]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2010.
- Szarota T., *Niemcy i Polacy. Wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy [Germans and Poles: Mutual Perceptions and Stereotypes]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1996.
- Szayna T.S. et al. (eds), *The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica 2001.
- Szcześniak A., "Nieudane wyprawy po złote runo" ["Failed Quest for the Golden Fleece"], *Opcja na Prawo* 2017, Vol. 148, No. 3.

- Szczudlik-Tatar J., *Negocjacje umowy o regionalnym partnerstwie gospodarczym jako kolejna próba azjatyckiej integracji [Negotiations on a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement as Another Attempt at Asian Integration]*, PISM, Warszawa 2014.
- Sztompka P., Kucia M. (eds), *Socjologia. Lektury [Sociology: Readings]*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Kraków 2006.
- Świtalski P.A., "Powracające widmo Tiamat – chaos i porządek w stosunkach międzynarodowych" ["The Returning Spectre of Tiamat – Chaos and Order in International Relations"], *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny* 2007, No. 6.
- Tarnawski M. et al., *Rola mocarstw w stosunkach międzynarodowych [The Role of Powers in International Relations]*, Texter, Warszawa 2016.
- Tishkov V.A., "History, Historians, and State Power", *Russian Politics and Law* 2010, No. 4.
- Toynbee A., *Civilization on Trial*, Oxford University Press, London 1948.
- Toynbee A., Ikeda D., *Choose Life: A Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008; Polish edition: *Wybierz życie. Dialog o ludzkiej przyszłości*, transl. A. Chmielewski, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1999.
- Trenin D., *Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC 2011.
- Trenin D., *Russia*, Polity, Cambridge-Medford, MA 2019.
- Trenin D., "Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West", *Washington Quarterly* 2007, No. 2.
- Trenin D., *Should We Fear Russia?* Polity, Malden, MA 2016.
- Trenin D.V., *True Partners: How Russia and China See Each Other*, Centre for European Reform, London 2012.
- Trzcziński K. (ed.), *Państwo w świecie współczesnym [The State in the Modern World]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2006.
- Tsygankov A.P., *Russia and America: The Asymmetric Rivalry*, Polity Press, Medford 2019.
- Tsygankov A.P., *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012.
- Tsygankov A., *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD 2010.
- Tsygankov A.P., *Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009.
- Tsygankov A., "Vladimir Putin's Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power", *Post-Soviet Affairs* 2005, No. 2.
- Tsygankov P., Fominykh F., "The Anti-Russian Discourse of the European Union", *Russian Politics and Law* 2010, No. 6.
- Tunnsjø Ø., *The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostuctural Realism*, Columbia University Press, New York 2018.
- Turner B.S., *Status*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN 1988.
- Turner J.H., *The Structure of Sociological Theory: New Edition*, Dorsey Press, Homewood, IL 1978; Polish edition: *Struktura teorii socjologicznej. Wydanie nowe*, transl. G. Woroniecka et al., Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2005.
- Tymanowski J. (ed.), *Współczesne problemy globalne a bezpieczeństwo europejskie [Modern Global Problems and European Security]*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2001.
- The Ukraine Crisis and the End of the Post-Cold War European Order: Options for NATO and the EU*. Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen 2014.

- Urban M., *The Edge: Is the Military Dominance of the West Coming to an End?* Abacus, London 2015.
- Voronov K., "Perceptions of Russia in the European North", *Russian Politics and Law* 2010, No. 6.
- Walicki A., "Czy Władimir Putin może stać się ideowym przywódcą światowego konserwatyizmu?" ["Can Vladimir Putin Become an Ideological Leader of World Conservatism?"], *Przegląd Polityczny* 2015, No. 130.
- Walicki A., *O Rosji inaczej [A Different View of Russia]*, Fundacja Oratio Recta, Warszawa 2019.
- Walicki A., *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-century Russian Thought*, transl. H. Andrews-Rusiecka, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975; Polish edition: *W kręgu konserwatywnej utopii. Struktura i przemiany rosyjskiego słowianofilstwa*, PWN, Warszawa 2002.
- Wallerstein I., *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, The New Press, New York 2006; Polish edition: *Europejski uniwersalizm. Retoryka władzy*, transl. A. Ostolski, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2007.
- Walt S.M., *Taming American Power: The Global Response to American Primacy*, W.W. Norton, New York 2005.
- Walt S.M., *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 1990.
- Waltz K.N., *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA 1979; Polish edition: *Struktura teorii stosunków międzynarodowych*, transl. R. Włoch, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2010.
- Weber M., *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*, 5th ed., Paul Siebeck, Tübingen 1972; Polish edition: *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej*, transl. D. Lachowska, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2002.
- Wegren S.K. (ed.), *Russia's Policy Challenges: Security Stability, and Development*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2003.
- Weinstein M.M. (ed.), *Globalization: What's New?* Columbia University Press, New York 2005.
- Wendt A., *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001; Polish edition: *Spoleczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*, transl. W. Derczyński, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2008.
- White S., *Understanding Russian Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011.
- Whittaker C.H. (ed.), *Visualizing Russia: Fedor Solvtsev and Crafting a National Past*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2010.
- Wierzbicki A., "Rosja dla Rosjan". *Nacjonalizm rosyjski i etnopolityka* ["Russia for the Russians". *Russian Nationalism and Ethnopolitics*], Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2018.
- Wilkinson D., "Hégemonia: Hegemony, Classical and Modern", *Journal of World-Systems Research* 2008, Vol. XIV, No. 2.
- Wilson A., *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy and the Post-Soviet World*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2005.
- Wilson A., *Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 2014.
- Wilson Rowe E., Torjesen S. (eds), *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London 2009.
- Wiśniewski J., Żodź-Kuźnia K., *Mocarstwa współczesnego świata – problem przywództwa światowego* [*Powers of the Modern World – the Problem of World Leadership*], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2008.

- Witoszek N., *Najlepszy kraj na świecie [The Best Country in the World]*, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec 2017.
- Włodkowska A., "Problemy rosyjskiej dominacji na obszarze WNP" ["The Problem of Russian Domination in the CIS Area"], *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, Year 6, Lublin 2008.
- Włodkowska-Bagan A., *Rywalizacja mocarstw na obszarze poradzieckim [Rivalry among Powers in the Post-Soviet Space]*, Difin, Warszawa 2013.
- Wojcieszak Ł., *Bezpieczeństwo naftowe Polski – problem dywersyfikacji [Poland's Petroleum Security – the Problem of Diversification]*, Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Wschodnioeuropejska, Przemysł 2015.
- Wolff A.T., "The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis", *International Affairs* 2015, Vol. 91, No. 5.
- Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area*, <http://www.uvm.edu/~fmagdo/employment%20Jan.12.11/http:::siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil:personnel:M05:m05sep05.pdf>
- Yan X., *Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford 2019.
- Youngs R. (ed.), *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2010.
- Zadorozhnyi O., *Russian Doctrine of International Law after the Annexation of Crimea*, K.I.S., Kyiv 2016.
- Zajadło J., *Dylematy humanitarnej interwencji [Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention]*, Arche, Gdańsk 2005.
- Zajadło J., "Prawo międzynarodowe wobec problemu «państwa upadłego»" ["International Law on the Problem of the 'Failed State'"], *Państwo i Prawo* 2005, No. 2.
- Zakaria F., "Can America Be Fixed?", *Foreign Affairs* 2013, No. 1.
- Zakaria F., *The Post-American World*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York-London 2008; Polish edition: *Koniec hegemonii Ameryki*, transl. S. Kroszczyński, Media Lazar, Nadir, Warszawa 2009.
- Zakheim D.S., "Restoring American Preeminence", *The National Interest*, March-April 2015, No. 136.
- Zank W. (ed.), *Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations? Overlapping Integration and Identities*, Ashgate, Burlington 2009.
- Zartman I.W. (ed.), *Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London 2009.
- Zevelev I., "Russian and American National Identity, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations", *International Politics* 2002, Vol. 39.
- Zięba R., *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century: From Cooperation to Crisis*, Springer, Cham 2018.
- Zyblikiewicz L., Czajkowski M., Bajor P. (eds), *Polityka zagraniczna Federacji Rosyjskiej. Wybrane aspekty stosunków z Polską, Ukrainą i Białorusią [Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: Selected Aspects of Relations with Poland, Ukraine and Belarus]*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2010.
- Żakiewicz Z., *Rosja, Rosja... [Russia, Russia...]*, Wydawnictwo Oskar Polnord, Gdańsk 2006.
- Żelazny W., *Etniczność. Ład – konflikt – sprawiedliwość [Ethnicity: Order – Conflict – Justice]*, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań 2004.
- Żukrowska K., Grącik M. (eds), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka [International Security: Theory and Practice]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2006.

Index

This index covers the main text and footnotes. Page numbers are listed in italics where the given individual is mentioned only in footnotes.

- Aall Pamela R. *49*
Aalto Pami *190*
Acemoglu Daron *35*
Ahmad Sanjana *183*
Aitken William Maxwell *45*
Akihiko Tanaka *23*
al-Assad Bashar Hafez *202*
Alcaro Riccardo *115*
Alexander I (Aleksandr Pavlovich Romanov) *138*
Alexander II (Aleksandr Nikolayevich Romanov) *126*
Alexandroff Alan S. *68, 100*
Ali S. Mahmud *22*
Allison Graham T. *79, 172, 204*
Allison Roy *106, 172*
Ambrosio Thomas *128*
Andrews-Rusiecka Hilda *149*
Antczak-Barzan Anna *179*
Antonowicz Lech *62, 71*
Applebaum Anne *146*
Aristotle *87*
Armstrong David *37, 84*
Artus Patrick *50, 51*
Asmus Ronald *126*
Ayooob Mohammed *49*
- Bachmann Klaus *166*
Bäcker Roman *123*
Bacon Robert *183*
- Bagno-Moldavsky Olena *133*
Bajor Piotr *129*
Balcer Adam *206*
Balcerowicz Leszek Henryk *57*
Baldersheim Harald *114*
Baumeister Roy F. *145*
Baylis John *25*
Beasley Ryan K. *132*
Beck Ulrich *36, 38, 40*
Bekkevold Jo Inge *166*
Bender Peter *93*
Berezowski Cezary *62*
Bertrand Romain *41*
Bew John *167*
Białek Jacek *158*
Biden Joe (Joseph Robinette Biden Jr.) *8, 191*
Bieleń Stanisław *24, 28, 47, 64, 68, 88, 95, 117, 120, 122, 125–127, 134, 135, 145, 148, 149, 177–180, 202*
Bierzanek Remigiusz *30*
Bismarck Otto, von (Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck-Schönhausen) *120, 167*
Black J.L. *174*
Blanning T.C.W. *76*
Block Walter *55*
Bodnar Adam *178*
Boksański Zbigniew *61*
Bonaparte Napoléon *76, 139*
Booth Ken *78*

- Boulding Kenneth E. 144
 Bourdieu Pierre 50
Brækhus Kyrre Elvenes 188
 Braithwaite Rodric 199
 Braudel Fernand 55
 Bremmer Ian 96
 Bromke Adam 114
 Brooks Stephen G. 93
 Brower Daniel R. 121
 Brown Archie 175
 Brown Marilyn A. 184
 Brown Seyom 24
 Bruck Henry W. 159
 Bryc Agnieszka 125
 Brzeziński Zbigniew 17, 91, 93, 166, 193
 Bugajski Dariusz 141, 142
 Buhler Pierre 93
 Bull Hedley 25, 94, 95
 Bulmer-Thomas Victor 98
 Bundy William P. 168
 Burr William 168
 Bush George Herbert Walker 167
 Bush George Walker 43, 106, 201
 Buszynski Leszek 67
 Buzan Barry 63

 Cameron Fraser 27
 Campbell Kurt M. 184
 Carpenter Michael 191
 Carrère d'Encausse Hélène 139
 Caser Ursula 178
 Cass Deborah Z. 45
 Cassels Alan 152
 Cassese Antonio 61
 Catherine the Great, Catherine II (Sophie of Anhalt-Zerbst) 119
 Chadaev Aleksei 135
 Chesterman Simon 49
 Chomsky Noam 38, 45
 Christensen Thomas J. 100
 Chwalba Andrzej 162
 Cimek Gracjan 96
 Clark Sean 97
 Clausewitz Carl, von 198
 Clegg Jenny 21
 Clippinger John Henry III 30
 Clunan Anne L. 63

 Cohen Stephen F. 85
 Cohen-Tanugi Laurent H.G. 20, 97
 Collins Randall 59
 Colomer Joseph M. 41
 Cooper Andrew F. 100
 Cooper Robert 34, 37, 42, 44
 Corn David 102
 Crocker Chester A. 49
 Curanović Alicja 135, 137, 147
 Czachorowski Piotr 153
 Czajkowski Marek 129
 Czempiel Ernst Otto 38
 Czornik Katarzyna 106, 180

 Daalder Ivo H. 85
 Dahl Ann-Sofie 109
 Dahl Robert 24
 Dalai Lama XIV (Lhamo Dhondup) 81
 Dam Kenneth W. 92
 Davidson Jason W. 80
 Dembinski Matthias 13, 97
 DiCicco Jonathan M. 32
 Diec Joachim 127
 Dmitrów Edmund 146
 Dmochowski Artur 176
 Dmowski Roman Stanisław 160
 Dobriansky Paula 166
 Dobroczyński Michał 177
 Domagała Arkadiusz 113
 Donnan Hastings 39
 Donnelly Jack 29, 32, 88
 Doyle Michael W. 18, 32
 Drawicz Andrzej 177
 Dudek Adriana 134
 Dunn David H. 66
 Duque Marina G. 64

 Easterly William 29
 Eberhardt Piotr 28
 Eisenstadt Shmuel N. 32
 Engdahl F. William 113
 Estemirova Natalia Khusainovna 156

 Farrell Theo 37, 84
 Feaver Peter D. 182
 Feklyunina Valentina 151
Fenenko Alexey 108

- Ferguson Niall 20, 23, 41
 Fiedorow Jurij 156
 Filimonov Georgy 138
 Filipowicz Stanisław 39
 Fisher Glen 144
 Fiszer Józef M. 73
 Fledes Daniel 100
 Fominykh Filipp 152
 Foot Rosemary 100
 Forbes Andrew 184
 Forsberg Tuomas 117
 Fortmann Michel 22
 Freedman Lawrence 77
 Friedman George 70, 83, 115, 167, 179, 192
 Fukuyama Francis 8, 35, 43, 44, 48, 85, 111
 Funabashi Yoichi 21
- Gajda Stanisław 152
 Galumov E. 164
 Gałganek Andrzej 63, 87
 Garton Ash Timothy 206
 Gaulle Charles André, de 60
 Geiss Robin 47
 Gel'man Vladimir 145, 147
 Gelb Leslie H. 175
 Genscher Hans-Dietrich 167
 Gil Grzegorz 46
 Gilady Lilach 64
 Gilarek Katarzyna 39
 Giles Keir 79
 Gill Stephen 22
 Gilpin Robert 23
 Giscard d'Estaing Valéry Marie Rene
 Georges 176
 Glosserman Brad 81
 Głąb Anna 129
Gomar Toma 140
 Goode Patrick 41
 Gorbachev Mikhail 106, 121, 152, 160, 164,
 167, 175
 Gorchakov Aleksandr Mikhaylovich 126
 Gorlach Krzysztof 38
 Góralczyk Bogdan 80
 Graban Michał 40
 Grande Edgar 38
 Gray John N. 23
 Grącik Małgorzata 152
- Greene David L. 183
 Greene Samuel A. 156
 Greenspan Alan 56
 Grenda Bogdan 84
 Grevi Giovanni 22
 Grigas Agnia 77, 187
 Grygiel Jakub J. 97
 Guan Kwa Chong 184
 Gupta Virendra 184
 Gyford John 75
- Haass Richard N. 23, 85, 90
 Hampson Fen Osler 49
 Hansen Birthe 29
 Hardt Michael 41
 Harpula Wojciech 162
 Hassner Pierre 26
 Haugaard Mark 88
 Haukkala Hiski 68
 Healy Brian 68
 Henderson James 193
 Henry VIII Tudor 168
 Herd Graeme P. 133, 148
 Herodotus 87
 Herpen Marcel H., Van 140, 176
 Herspring Dale R. 132
 Heurlin Bertel 29
 Hirsh Michael 89
 Hitler Adolf 82, 121, 139, 168, 200
 Hobbes Thomas 31, 46
 Hochstein Amos J. 186
 Hofman Iwona 72
 Hogue Sabrina 97
 Holsti Kalevi J. 36
 Huntington Samuel P. 8, 23, 110, 145
 Hussein Saddam 49
 Hypki Tomasz 162
- Ignatieff Michael 49
 Ikeda Daisaku 36
 Ikenberry G. John 20, 90
 Inbar Efraim 78
 Indyk Martin S. 29
 Isikoff Michael 102
 Isocrates 87
 Itzkowitz Shifrinson Joshua R. 204
 Ivan III (Ivan Vasilyevich Rurik) 139

- Ivan the Terrible (Ivan IV Vasilyevich) 120
 Ivanov Igor 126
- Jabłoński Andrzej W. 37
 Järvenpää Pauli 109
 Jervis Robert 66, 78, 144
 Joffe Josef 89
 Johns Michael 174
 Johnson Simon 35
 Jones Bruce D. 186
 Jones David Martin 112
 Jong-un Kim 101
 Jonson Lena 128
 Juchnowski Rafał 70
- Kaarbo Juliet 132
 Kaca Elżbieta 127
 Kaczmarek Marcin 79
 Kaczyński Jarosław Aleksander 9
 Kagan Robert 42, 155, 167
 Kalb Marvin 192, 196
 Kanet Roger E. 106, 147, 148, 151, 156
 Kaplan Robert D. 91, 98
 Karber Philip A. 61
 Kardaś Szymon 147
 Karnaukhov Dmitry 180
 Karwat Mirosław 71
 Kasonta Adriel 162
 Kassem Mahmoud 47
 Kautsky Karl 41
 Kazantsev Andrei 133
 Keat Preston 96
 Keating Michael 114
 Kemper Theodore D. 59, 60
 Kennedy Paul M. 89, 121, 168
 Khodorkovsky Mikhail Borisovich 147, 156
 Khudolei Konstantin 149
 Kieniewicz Jan 120
 Kismereshkin Vladimir G. 145, 147
 Kissinger Henry (Heinz Alfred Kissinger) 12, 15, 26, 76, 98, 168, 171, 172, 173
 Kivelson Valerie A. 84
 Kleinowski Marcin 112
 Klementewicz Tadeusz 51
 Kłosiński Kazimierz Albin 128
 Kłosowicz Robert 44
 Knopek Jacek 112
- Kochanek Ewelina 183
 Kocho-Williams Alastair 121
 Kojima Masami 183
 Kołakowski Leszek 75
 Kołodko Grzegorz W. 52, 153, 154
 Korin Anne 184
 Kotkin Stephen 148
 Kovalik Dan 101
 Kowalczyk Michał 89
 Kownacki Piotr 19
 Kozłowski Amanda 131
 Kraś Ireneusz 102
 Krauthammer Charles 27, 28, 43, 89
 Kremenuk Victor A. 130
 Krepinevich Andrew F. Jr. 94
 Kristol William 166
 Kucia Marek 59
 Kudors Andis 136
 Kukułka Józef 24
 Kupchan Charles A. 95, 129
 Kuźniar Roman 130
 Kuzelewska Elżbieta 153
- Lacoste Yves 96
 Lagadec Erwan 133
 Lake David A. 64
 Lakomy Miron 106, 180
 Lambert Hélène 37, 84
 Lamentowicz Wojciech 73
 Lang Kai-Olaf 127
 Langdon Kate C. 200
 Lantis Jeffrey S. 132
 Laqueur Walter 97, 111
 Larson Deborah Welch 63, 66
 Lazari Andrzej, de 160
 Lazzarini Edward J. 121
 Legro Jeffrey W. 26
 Legucka Agnieszka 125
 Legvold Robert 7
 Lehmann Christof 173
 Leichtova Magda 138
 Lennon Alexander T.J. 131
 Lentner Howard H. 88
 Levy Jack S. 32
 Lieber Robert J. 82, 95, 109
 Lieberthal Kenneth G. 29
 Lieven Anatol 202

- Lindsay James M. 85
Liska George 169
Lisowska Alicja 37
Little Richard 63
Lo Bobo 127, 166
Lorber Eric B. 182
Lucas Edward 115
Luft Gal 184
Lukashenko Alexander Grigoryevich 29
Lukyanov Fyodor 11
Luttwak Edward N. 97
Lyubashenko Igor 166
- Łada Agnieszka 127
Łagowski Bronisław 156, 159, 206
- MacFarlane S. Neil 100
Mackinder Halford 193
Madej Marek 189
Magen Zvi 133
Mahan Alfred Thayer 89
Mahubani Kishore 19, 150
Maj Czesław 65
Malia Martin 120
Mancoff Jeffrey 125
Mandelbaum Michael 200
Marber Peter 17
Marczak Tadeusz 168
Marczewska-Rytko Maria 153
Margenthau Hans 80
Markowski Daniel 38
Marshall Gordon 60
Marshall Tim 187
Mason T. David 48
Massaka Iwona 149
Massy Kevin 186
Mastanduno Michael 89, 100
Mathiex Jean 42
Matsili Bethuel 102
Mayer Sebastian 106
Mazur Renata 134
McFaul Michael 77, 158
Mead Walter Russell 89
Mearsheimer John J. 10, 24, 78, 81, 82, 85
Meernik James D. 48
Menon Rajan 108
Mercer Jonathan 64
- Merton Robert K. 59
Michałowski Stanisław 72
Michels Robert 156
Mickiewicz Adam 162
Mickiewicz Piotr 105
Mieszko I 51
Milanović Branco 52
Milewski Jan Jerzy 39
Miller Alexei 11
Miller Steven E. 204
Mills Daniel Quinn 101
Minkow Elisabeth 178
Mitchell A. Wess 97
Mochizuki Tetsuo 153
Modelski George 91
Modzelewski Witold 68
Monaghan Andrew 78, 125
Moors Colin 41
Morgenthau Hans J. 66, 80
Motyl Alexander J. 32
Münkler Herfried 199
Myrdal Gunnar 45
- Najder Zdzisław 180
Nayar Baldev Raj 18
Neef Christian 156
Negri Antonio 41
Nehru Jawaharlal 60
Nemenskii Oleg 139
Nevsky Alexander (Aleksandr Yaroslavich Rurik) 148
Nexon Daniel H. 32
Nietzsche Friedrich Wilhelm 36
Niezgoda Marian 38
Nixon M. Richard 12, 168, 192
Nostradamus 58
Novikova Irina 153
Nowacki Gabriel 92
Nowak Andrzej 176
Nowicka Ewa 145
Nozick Robert 39
Nye Joseph S., Jr. 27, 65, 171
- O'Brien Emily 186
O'Hanlon Michael E. 29
Obama Barack Hussein II 27, 143, 163, 186
Olchowski Jakub 105

- Oldberg Ingmar 24
 Olechnicki Krzysztof 60
 Olechowski Andrzej 166
 Oleksiuk Adam 158
 Olson Mancur 54
 Omelicheva Mariya 132
 Oniszczyk Jerzy 57
 Opello Walter C. Jr. 36
 Orban Anita 191
 Orbán Viktor Mihály 9
 Orttung Robert W. 137, 148, 185, 188, 193
 Osiński Joachim 50, 52, 53, 55, 56
 Øverland Indra 188
 Ożarowski Rafał 153
- Paul T.V. 22, 63, 66
 Pawlas Iwona 90
 Penttilä Risto E.J. 31
 Perovic Jeronim 185, 188, 193
 Peter the Great, Peter I (Pyotr Alekséyevich Romanov) 119
 Peters Jan 127
 Petersson Magnus 109
 Petro Nicolai N. 147
 Petrovskaia O.V. 180
 Phan Peter C. 142
 Piekarski Romuald 40
 Pietraś Marek 72, 105
 Piniór Józef 178
 Piotrowski M.A. 46
 Pipes Richard 195
 Pirani Simon 193
 Politkovskaya Anna (Anna Stepanovna Mazepa) 156
 Poniatowski Józef 177
 Pope Francis (Jorge Mario Bergoglio) 142
 Popescu Nicu 132, 169
 Poppe Annika E. 27
 Posen Barry R. 10
 Potulski Jakub 149, 153
 Price Jonathon 184
 Pronińska Kamila 189
 Przystek Daniel 15
 Putin Vladimir Vladimirovich 9, 14, 78, 112, 115, 116, 125, 126, 128, 133, 134, 142, 143, 148, 152, 157, 158, 163, 167, 170, 173, 175, 176, 181, 191, 192, 195, 202
- Qaddafi Muammar 201
- Rachman Gideon 79
 Rasiński Lotar 152
 Record Jeffrey 168
 Renshon Jonathan 65
 Riasanovsky Nicholas V. 120
 Rich Paul B. 126
 Rivera Joseph H., de 144
 Roberts Anthea 62
 Robinson James 35
 Robinson Paul F. 157
 Rochau Ludwig August, von 167
 Romanov Konstantin 177
 Roosevelt Theodore 89
 Rosecrance Richard N. 18, 68, 204
 Rosenau James N. 38
 Rosenfelde Steven 101
 Rosow Stephen J. 36
 Ross Robert S. 98
 Rostow Walt W. 44
 Rothenberg Gunther E. 76
 Rozhkov Igor Ya. 145, 147
 Rozman Gilbert 102
 Rukavishnikov Vladimir 147
 Rutland Peter 193
- Saari Sinikukka 68
 Sabrosky Alan Ned 114
 Sahle Eunice N. 129
 Sakwa Richard 10, 78, 85, 116
 Sanger David E. 21
 Sapin Burton 159
 Satoh Yukio 166
 Schoen Douglas E. 85
 Scholte Jan Aart 17
 Schröder Gerhard 176
 Schularick Moritz 20
 Schwarzenberger Georg 25, 26
 Schweller Randall L. 28
 Scott David 20
 Scott John 60
 Scowcroft Brent I.D. 17
 Seręga Zygmunt 38
 Sestanovich Stephen 88
 Shearman Peter 151
 Sherr James 138

- Shevchenko Alexei 66
 Shifrinson Joshua R.I. 107
 Sienkiewicz Marcin 192
 Sigismund III Vasa 176
 Sikorski Radosław 70
 Sills David L. 32
 Simes Dimitri K. 172
 Simms Brendan 69
 Simonov Konstantin 164
 Skalski Szymon 48
 Skarzyński Ryszard 64
 Skrzypek Andrzej 122, 126, 148, 180
 Smith Anthony D. 43
 Smith M.L.R. 112
 Smith Steve 25
 Snarr Michael T. 132
 Snyder Richard C. 159
 Sobczyński Marek 61
 Soja Małgorzata 102
 Solana Javier 152
 Solarz Marcin Wojciech 46
 Sommer Jerzy 37
 Sovacool Benjamin K. 184, 185
 Sowa Jan 61
 Spanger Hans-Joachim 13, 97
 Splidsboel-Hansen Flemming 126, 159
 Sporek Tadeusz 90
 Srogosz Tomasz 76
 Stachura Jadwiga 128
 Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich (Ioseb Dzhugashvili) 121, 138, 148, 150, 159, 160, 169
 Staniszkiś Jadwiga 41, 42
 Stark David 30
 Starosielec Romuald 177
 Stefanowicz Karolina 153
 Stein Arthur 68
 Steinberg Mark D 120
 Stent Angela E. 167
 Steven David 186
 Stewart John 74
 Stępień-Kuczyńska Alicja 135
 Stępniewski Tomasz 73, 109
 Stolarczyk Mieczysław 180
 Stolypin Pyotr Arkadyevich 126, 148
 Stoner-Weiss Kathryn 158
 Stuermer Michael 125
 Sulowski Stanisław 95
 Suny Ronald Grigor 84
 Surkov Vladislav Yuryevich 155, 156
 Sussex Matthew 106
 Swanidze Nikolaĵ 160
 Symonides Janusz 25, 47, 64
 Szarota Tomasz 145
 Szayna Thomas S. 65
 Szczęśniak Andrzej 189, 190
 Szczudlik-Tatar Justyna 101
 Sztompka Piotr 59
 Świeca Jerzy 102
 Świtalski Piotr A. 96
 Taleb Nassim Nicholas 96
 Tarnawski Marcin 65
 Thakur Ramesh 49
 Theriault Alanda D. 174
 Thompson Kenneth W. 66, 80
 Thucydides 83, 204
 Tishkov Valery Aleksandrovich 146
 Tismaneau Vladimir 200
 Torjesen Stina 170
 Toynbee Arnold Joseph 19, 23, 36
 Trenin Dmitri V. 79, 127, 131, 134, 151, 195, 127, 131, 134, 151, 195
 Trump Donald John 12, 101, 102, 104, 163, 192
 Trzciński Krzysztof 40, 48
 Tsygankov Andrei P. 67, 78, 128, 163, 166
 Tsygankov Pavel 152
 Tunsjø Øystein 104
 Turner Bryan S. 59
 Turner Jonathan H. 59
 Tymanowski Józef 39
 Tyutchev Fyodor 145, 146
 Tzu Sun 173
 Urban Mark 85
 Valentine Scott V. 184
 Virard Marie-Paule 50, 51
 Voronov Konstantin 153
 Walicki Andrzej 148, 149, 167, 201
 Wallerstein Immanuel 150
 Walt Stephen M. 10, 28, 114

- Waltz Kenneth N. 29, 30
Washington George 89
Weber Max 13, 46, 59
Wegren Stephen K. 132
Weinstein Michael M. 18
Wendt Alexander 145
Wenger Andreas 185, 188, 193
Wheeler Nicholas J. 78
White Stephen 128, 146
Whittaker Cynthia Hyla 147
Wierzbicki Andrzej 16, 140
Wilkin Jerzy 55
Wilkinson David 87
Willa Rafał 112
Wilson Andrew 132, 156, 165
Wilson Rowe Elana 170
Wilson Thomas M. 39
Wirtz James J. 22
Wiśniewski Janusz 65, 95
Witoszek Nina 55
Witte Sergey Yulyevich 126
Władysław IV Vasa 177
Włodkowska-Bagan Agata 122, 125, 135
Wohlforth William C. 63, 66, 93
Wojcieszak Łukasz 187
Wolff Andrew T. 112
Woodward Bob 101
Woś Rafał 51
Wright Thomas 32
Xenophon 87
Yan Xuetong 80
Yanukovych Viktor Viktorovych 201, 202
Yeltsin Boris 152, 155, 170, 194
Youngs Richard 29
Yurgens Igor 166
Zadorozhnii Oleksandr V. 10
Zagończyk Jerzy 71
Zagorski Andrei 170
Zajadło Jerzy 38, 47
Zajac Justyna 106
Zakaria Fareed Rafiq 98, 155
Zakheim Dov S. 172
Załęcki Paweł 60
Zank Wolfgang 19
Zartman I. William 26
Zedong Mao 81
Zevelev Igor 144
Zięba Ryszard 78
Zybliekiewicz Lubomir 129
Żakiewicz Zbigniew 146
Żelazny Walter 145
Żodź-Kuźnia Katarzyna 65, 95
Żukrowska Katarzyna 152

Perhaps the biggest virtue that jumps out from the pages of the book under review is the author's intellectual independence and scrupulousness, which pay heed to no fashion or environmental conformism. The social sciences today, unfortunately, are not free of these, nor of ideological and political commitments that may certainly enhance individual academic careers, but objectively harm science, whatever the political system; above all, they violate the academic imperative of impartiality in the pursuit of knowledge. In this respect, Bielen's book can serve as a model to be emulated by younger generations of researchers, whom it will encourage to take the high road of individual sovereignty, avoiding compromises with the truth that could lead them to put undue, ill-directed emphasis on their own career success and rapid advancement as measured by quantitative administrative methods.

from a publisher's review by Jarosław Dobrzański

Professor Bielen's work, in comparison with those of many other Polish authors, has the merit of approaching the subject investigated from a broad perspective that is untainted – as often happens – with polonocentrism, which is frequently combined with a very subjective view of history that limits an author's ability to refrain from overly partial analyses. The method employed in this work is helpful in making sense of the interests of particular states, and of the pleasant or unpleasant realities functioning within every state, especially powerful states – including those allied with Poland - that never put the interests of their allies ahead of their own (...).

From the perspective of foreign researchers who are rather unfamiliar with the realities of Poland, Professor Bielen's work can be helpful in understanding today's Poland as it actually functions, but is not too subjective for readers to accept the description provided of situations that often discourage many researchers from the realities of Poland. This also applies more broadly, to the educated foreign public, especially in the countries of the West and in Russia; in both cases, Poles are often suspected of being partial and of taking a subjective view of the reality around them.

from a publisher's review by Bruno Drwęski